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Preface 
 
 
 
On September 30, 1965 Indonesia stood on the brink of 
becoming an openly proclaimed communist country. The political 
atmosphere was  already  tense,  the  society  was  driven  by  a  fear 
bordering on terror, and President Sukarno was leading the world's 
fifth most populous nation toward a close working alliance with what 
was then the most radical wing of the world communist movement. 
The West, and particularly the United States, was under a  daily 
barrage of  propaganda attacks  while  the  American Embassy and 
other  non-communist  installations  were  the  subject  of  recurrent 
hostile demonstrations. Internally, Sukarno was increasingly 
identifying himself with an Indonesian Communist Party whose size 
was only exceeded by those of the Soviet Union and China and was 
demanding that the country advance to a higher "socialist" stage of 
revolution. The tension was suddenly brought to a climax during the 
night of September 30-October 1 as assassination squads attacked the 
homes of the leading generals of the Indonesian Army and seized or 
killed six out of seven, the single survivor narrowly escaping by a 
stroke of luck. A coup apparently led by an obscure officer of the 
Palace Guard was underway. It was soon supported by a number of 
communist sympathizers including the Air Force Commander and by 
the Indonesian Communist Party itself. Curiously, President Sukarno 
himself was found to be located at the headquarters of the coup 
forces and voluntarily so. The so-called coup failed as the Army 
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rallied around a then obscure general named Suharto who moved in a 
swift but measured fashion to suppress the military forces arrayed 
with Sukarno and  to  isolate  and  then  set  aside  the  nation's first 
president and "Great Leader", Sukarno. 
The importance of these events was recognized to some degree 
at the time but much still clouds the course of events at that time and 
afterwards in this vast archipelago that extends for a distance 
equivalent to that from Seattle to Bermuda. Although several times 
larger than the Indo-China countries put together, Indonesia seemed 
a side-show compared to the already heavy American involvement in 
Vietnam and the significance of the Indonesian upheaval has not 
really been understood. 
This book sets forth two basic theses that, if valid, will require a 
significant re-evaluation of the post-World War II history not only of 
Indonesia but of East Asia and beyond. The first thesis holds that 
President Sukarno was himself the driving force behind the so-called 
coup and was intent on what proved to be a poorly-executed attack 
on the moderate Army leadership because of a long-cherished aim to 
transform the country into a communist-albeit a national-oriented 
communist-state. Much of the book is devoted to the massive 
evidence for this assertion. Particular emphasis is placed on the chain 
of events from late 1964 through the first nine months of 1965 that 
led to the “coup” and to Sukarno’s clear commitment during the 
spring and summer of 1965 to forcing Indonesia into his final 
“socialist stage” of the revolution, a commitment that included his 
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reliance on the Indonesian Communist Party as the revolutionary 
 
“vanguard” and chosen instrument. 
 
A second thesis holds that the then radically-oriented Chinese 
leadership was fully aware of Indonesia's imminent entry into the 
communist camp, which it regarded as a major step on the road to a 
region-wide ascendancy of Asian communism, but that the shock of 
unexpected failure drove China into itself and thereby contributed to 
the excesses of the Cultural Revolution in a fit of rage caused by the 
failure of its great dream of a communist Asia dominated by Peking. 
Paradoxically, this evaporation of the great dream created the 
conditions for accommodation with the United States as well as a 
significant shift in the focus of the Sino-Soviet conflict. These major 
changes,  all  flowing  from  the  Indonesian  debacle,  also  had  a 
profound secondary effect on the Vietnam war and U.S. attitudes 
toward that war as well as peripheral effects on European and world 
issues.  Above  all,  a  major  result  has  been  the  conversion  of 
Southeast Asia from one of the world's most unstable regions to one 
of the world's most stable with obvious consequences for the 
economic and political impact of East Asia on the world scene that 
has come about during the past 25 years. 
In retrospect, it is clear that September 1965 was the high-water 
mark of world communism, a mark that would have been far higher 
on October 1, 1965 if the coup had succeeded.  It would be excessive 
to attribute the fall of communism in the USSR and Eastern Europe 
to the Indonesian debacle for these dramatic changes can be traced 
principally to indigenous causes and internal contradictions that were 
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apparent for many years.  Nevertheless, there is an element, even in 
the Eastern Europe debacle, of communism’s failure being ultimately 
the failure of an idea with world-wide pretensions.  Indonesia was a 
major step in destroying the myth of communist momentum, the 
image of its supposed inevitable triumph. 
These points are presented in stark form in this introduction for 
the sake of clarity. Nuances and reservations exist and are spelled out 
in the chapters that follow along with a considerable body of both 
direct and circumstantial evidence for the theses themselves. But, if 
these central theses stand up to examination, then the Indonesian 
upheaval of 1965 was truly a major international turning point as 
stated in the title of this book. 
My own qualifications and reasons for devoting such a major 
effort to an analytical book on a subject that has been covered in 
several early (and valuable) descriptive works needs to be stated. I 
was  a  Foreign  Service  Officer  in  the  Political  Section  of  the 
American Embassy in Jakarta from September, 1963 to August, 1966 
with particular responsibility for following the Indonesian 
Communist Party (PKI), other "pro-communist" organizations and 
Indonesian relations with communist countries. I came to this 
assignment from almost 10 years of work on Soviet affairs at the 
Embassy in Moscow and at the Department of State in Washington 
and was to return again to Soviet affairs after Indonesia although I 
later spent as much time in East Asian assignments as in Europe. 
Although not as fluent as some of our Indonesian specialists who had 
received extensive formal language and area training (as had I in 
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Russian and,  later,  Romanian), I  did  manage  over  time  to  learn 
Indonesian rather well and to become well versed in the history, 
culture and politics of the country. I had already come to the 
conclusion by early 1964 that the Marxist content in President 
Sukarno's speeches should be regarded more seriously than was the 
accepted wisdom, particularly given the clear trend of his policies. 
Sukarno's proclaimed intention in early 1965 to "enter the socialist 
stage" in the immediate future seemed to me a clear signal that he 
intended Indonesia to become a communist state under his leadership 
and his subsequent efforts to bully the Army leadership and other 
non-communist elements into practical measures designed to destroy 
their resistance confirmed this view. I long believed that Sukarno, 
and no one else, was responsible for launching the ill-fated "coup" 
which was intended to clear the path for this final conversion of 
Indonesia into a full-fledged communist state and my extensive 
research after retirement not only reinforced this view but produced a 
wealth of additional information that illuminates the development of 
Sukarno's ideas and his final actions. 
The  early  chapters  of  this  book  review  the  development of 
communism in Indonesia from the First World War onward and 
stress the powerful grip of Marxism on the early national movement, 
the significance of the failed communist rebellion of 1926 against the 
Dutch  and  the  influence  of  Marxism  on  the  young  Sukarno. 
Sukarno's ideology is examined, including his rather original and 
profound intellectual contributions to Asian Marxist thought, as are 
the nationalist and personal reservations that caused him to oppose 
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the 1948 communist revolt against a republic of which he was then 
only a figurehead leader. These first six chapters contain some 
original research based largely on Sukarno's little-noted speeches of 
1965 but in large part rely heavily on the well established factual 
material in the existing historical literature - but with a quite different 
analysis that  re-examines the  earlier  conclusions on  the  basis  of 
Sukarno's self-revelations of the 1965 period. 
The next six chapters examine Sukarno's drive to "enter the 
socialist stage," that is the nine months that preceded the so-called 
coup by the "September 30 Movement" on October 1, 1965. These 
chapters are the heart of the book since they are believed to establish 
on the basis of Sukarno's own speeches and actions that he intended 
to make Indonesia a communist country in 1965. They also add 
supplementary testimony on the behind-the-scenes plotting and 
planning in which Sukarno, certain left-wing generals and the PKI 
were  all  involved but  over  which  Sukarno was  the  guiding and 
driving force. The coup and its aftermath follow including a study of 
the  causes  of  Sukarno's unexpected failure including information 
conveyed to the author by knowledgeable sources at the time, 
followed by an analysis of how this "Indonesian turning-point" 
affected the Asian balance of power both directly and indirectly. 
Most of this material has either not been developed in previous 
publications or has not been adequately treated in my view. The final 
chapters deal with the international ramifications of the communist 
failure. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of the many colleagues 
from the American Embassy in Jakarta in 1965-66 who have read 
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and commented on this book or who have otherwise influenced my 
thinking.   This   book   owes   much   to   the   encouragement   of 
Ambassador Marshall Green who guided American policy through 
the difficult transition from the Sukarno to the Suharto era and who 
was later Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs during the opening to China. It also benefited from the advice 
of Deputy Chief of Mission Frank Galbraith and his successor, Jack 
Lydman, as well as Political Counselor Edward Masters. Galbraith 
and  Masters  were  later  ambassadors to  Indonesia while  Lydman 
became ambassador to Malaysia. Others who read the draft in its 
entirety and made useful contributions were Henry Heymann, Dick 
Howland, Mary Vance Trent, Hugh Tovar, Joseph Smith, Colonel 
George Benson, (all Jakarta colleagues of 1963-66), Edward 
Ingraham (then the Indonesian desk officer), Abdul Rony (Library of 
Congress), Dr. Guy Pauker (Rand Corporation), Professor Robert 
Scalapino  (University  of  California)  and  journalist  John  Hughes 
(who received the Pulitzer Prize for his Indonesian Upheaval and 
was later Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs). During the 
year before his death, I also discussed the book in three long 
telephone conversations with William Bundy, the Assistant Secretary 
for East Asian Affairs at the time of the coup.   He was strongly 
supportive and, indeed, I had sent him the manuscript after reading 
his own unpublished work on Southeast Asia during the sixties. I 
would especially acknowledge the contributions of Dick Howland 
and Henry Heymann not only for helpful commentary on the book 
but for contributing much to my knowledge of Indonesian affairs 
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over the years. I would add two points regarding these substantive 
contributions.  First,  I  am  also  indebted  to  a  number  of  other 
American colleagues from the 1963-66 years who were not available 
to review the text because of distance and other responsibilities and 
to numerous Indonesian friends. I regard a few among the latter as 
some of the best friends of my life as well as persons who provided 
special insights into the events described. Second, I should note that, 
while all offered encouragement and agreed with the basic thrust of 
my analysis, this does not imply total agreement with every point, of 
course. I  am  ultimately  solely  responsible  for  the  content  and 
presentation as well as for any failings, both major and minor.  I do 
believe they deserve consideration from all serious students of 
Indonesia and of international affairs. Finally, I wish to express 
appreciation for the original typing and other clerical support of Mrs. 
Susu Toth and for the support over many years of my wife, Pat, for 
this and all my endeavors. 
A word on names. The Indonesian orthography of 1963-66 has 
undergone certain changes in the interim and I decided to cope with 
those changes in a somewhat inconsistent way. Geographical names 
and other phrases that remain in common use are spelled in the 
modern way while words or phrases that were unique to the Sukarno 
era retain their old spellings in this text on the ground that they 
continue to be better known in that rendition, at least in English 
language works. The principal changes are "J" for the former "Dj" as 
in Jakarta, "C" for Tj" as in the towns of Ceribon and Ciamis (but I 
have kept Tjakrabirawa for the name of Sukarno's palace guard) and 
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"y" for "j" as in the sports complex of Senayan (but Harian Rakjat, 
the PKI newspaper, has been left with the spelling that existed on its 
last day). Indonesian personal names have generally retained the old 
spellings anyway so there is little problem in this area. For readers 
unacquainted with Indonesian names, some - especially those of an 
Islamic or Christian cast - consist of a given name and a family name 
in the familiar European or American pattern. However, others - and 
this applies mainly to Javanese names - have the principal name first 
followed by a second name that is not cited by itself. And some 
Indonesians like Sukarno have only one name. There has also been a 
change in the Latin rendition of Chinese characters since the period 
of this book. I have retained the old spellings here, largely to avoid a 
loss in the flavor of the era. 
A final word on the accuracy of the material presented since so 
much evidence is still withheld or is subject to distortion to protect 
individual reputations or to accomplish political purposes - including 
purposes of noble intention. I feel most comfortable with those 
chapters such as seven through nine that rely almost totally on 
speeches and comment published openly-in the Indonesian press and 
the well-publicized actions or attempted actions of Sukarno. This 
material  in  itself  constitutes  the  clearest  evidence  of  what  the 
so-called coup was all about. Other material based on trial testimony, 
behind-the-scenes allegations by Indonesian sources to the author 
and to others, and the rather sensational testimony of a Sukarno aide 
that was leaked to a Dutch writer and published in the Netherlands 
are also used in a supplementary way as they shed additional light on 
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what happened. Some of the latter was also told to me in December 
 
1965  by  a  senior  aide  to  Adam  Malik. Most  of  this  material 
obviously appeared valid to the writer or it would not otherwise have 
been used but it is possible that some of the particular anecdotal 
incidents will prove to be wrong or distorted. It is even more likely 
that an opening of the Indonesian Government's complete record of 
the interrogations would shed additional light on the full extent of 
Sukarno's involvement and on the actions and intentions of the other 
players. But any such amendments would still be minor; the main 
thrust of what happened in the months (and even years) leading up to 
the momentous events of late 1965 is clear enough while the decisive 
nature of the failure can also be adduced from a careful and 
reasonable analysis of the chain of events that followed. 
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I 
 
Marxism and Nationalism  
 
in Indonesia - The Beginning 
 
 
 
The Indonesian archipelago was visited first by Portuguese and 
then by Dutch adventurers in the 16th century. Small portions of this 
vast region had recently fallen or were falling under the influence of 
Islam. Many areas were primitive although Java had assimilated the 
culture of India over many centuries and had developed Hindu and 
Buddhist Kingdoms. Both Islam and the earlier Hindic influences 
were absorbed into the existing local cultural traditions in ways that 
made  the  Indonesian  archipelago  unique.  The  initial  European 
impact was on the smaller, so-called spice, islands of the Moluccas 
and the Lesser Sunda group but Dutch inroads into the larger islands 
and particularly into Java took place a century later. Although some 
remote areas were scarcely under complete Dutch control even at the 
end of the nineteenth Century, one may say that for all practical 
purposes the archipelago was a colony of this small European nation 
for some 350 years. The peoples of the archipelago were largely of 
Malay stock and spoke Malay or Malay-based languages but there 
were also pronounced social and cultural differences, many of which 
have lingered on and deeply influenced Indonesian political 
developments even to the present day. The majority of Javanese, that 
is the people of Central and East Java, retained their pre-Islamic and 
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pre-Dutch civilization long after the arrival of Europeans and have 
continued to be more deeply influenced by these indigenous and 
Hindic cultural traditions than by the thin overlay of nominal 
adherence to Islam. 
Actually, Javanese society has been characterized by deep 
cleavages between a minority that became strongly Islamicized (the 
so-called santri class) on the one hand and, on the other, both the 
majority of the common people and the traditional Javanese upper 
class. This traditional upper class, that had its roots in the court 
society of the old Javanese Kingdoms, is called the "priyayi" (prijaji 
in the old orthography) and is steeped in the elaborate rituals and 
cultural forms that have evolved from the ancient Hindic kingdoms. 
The tales and symbols of the Ramayana, for example, are a source of 
almost constant allusion in public life as well as forming the central 
themes of contemporary culture. The third category of Javanese 
society,  the  abangan,  consists  of  the  great  mass  of  Javanese 
peasantry, particularly in Central Java and in those areas of East Java 
not dominated by santri influence. Like the priyayi, the abangan 
masses are deeply moved by pre-Islamic cultural traditions with 
mysticism and local superstition intermixed with the more popular 
forms of Hindic tradition as in the great popularity of the wayang 
shadow plays that are based on the Ramayana. The santri class is 
particularly prevalent in the small island of Madura, just offshore 
from Surabaya on the northern coast of Java, and along the northern 
section of the East Java mainland. This geographic focus reflects the 
history  of  early  Islamic  penetration  through  Arab  traders.  Santri 
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individuals and santri-dominated villages may be formed in other 
areas, however. The religiously conservative Nahdatul Ulama (NU) 
or Moslem Scholars political party was largely based on the East 
Java santri constituency although it also sought support elsewhere. 
This brief outline of Javanese sociology is perforce a 
generalization  and  indeed  the  subject,  when  explored  at  greater 
depth, is one that is debated by both foreign scholars and Indonesians 
but these main outlines are important as they have strongly affected 
Indonesian internal politics. The rise of communism and a variety of 
eclectic   mixtures   of   nationalism   and   Marxism   in   Indonesia, 
especially in Java, in the aftermath of World War I was profoundly 
influenced by the susceptibility of the non-santri Javanese to secular 
ideologies. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), in particular, 
always had its strongest appeal in Central and East Java. West Java, 
which also had a distinct and complex language called Sundanese 
and a sense of past cultural and historical accomplishment, although 
on a lesser scale than "Java", lacked the class conflicts noted above 
and embraced Islam. The peoples of the "Outer Islands", of which 
Sumatra was by far the most populous and politically advanced, also 
adopted Islam as the primary component of their cultural identities 
except for certain pockets of Christianity such as the Karo Bataks of 
North Sumatra, the Minahasa of North Sulawesi and various groups 
in the smaller islands of East Indonesia. The Islamic peoples of West 
Sumatra and  the  Outer Islands tended to  be  anti-communist and 
suspicious  of  Javanese  dominance.  The  anti-communist Masjumi 
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Party,  as  will  be  seen,  predominated in  these  areas  until  it  was 
banned by Sukarno. 
While the divisions noted above are important to an 
understanding of Indonesian political developments, their existence 
should not be overemphasized at the expense of their opposite - a 
very  real  sense  of  common interests  and  common cause  against 
colonialism that developed into a deep-felt sense of Indonesian 
national identity. Although Sukarno split the nation on several 
occasions to advance the cause of the continuing Indonesian 
revolution that he envisaged, he also contributed mightily to the 
mystique of unity that is expressed in the national motto "In Unity, 
Diversity".  The   phenomenal   spread   of   a   national   Indonesian 
language at the expense of local languages and dialects has 
contributed to this unity as has the cumulative experience, however 
bitter at times, of more than five decades now as an independent 
nation. Resentment and a desire for independence were undoubtedly 
strong throughout the long colonial history, and particularly in Java 
and parts of Sumatra that could recall flourishing pre-Dutch empires 
such as Majapahit and Sriwijaya and which nourished a belief in 
Javanese (or Indonesian) superiority and greatness. Nevertheless, the 
conscious Indonesian nationalist movement dates mainly from the 
beginning of the Twentieth Century, first with the Budi Utomo 
movement (founded in 1908) and the Sarekat Dagang Islam (1909) 
and then with the more openly political Sarekat Islam which was 
founded in  1912. These essentially secular movements also took 
place in the company of a revitalization of Islam which flowed from 
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the reform and modernization efforts that arose in Cairo at the turn of 
the century and led to the founding in Indonesia of the 
Muhammadiyah in 1912. The Muhammadiyah particularly attracted 
those   Indonesians   who   remained   firmly   attached   to   Islamic 
principles but  who were  conscious of  modern developments and 
were affected by the stirrings of nationalism. Although a religious 
and social movement, Muhammadiyah eventually became the core of 
the Masjumi Party in the post-war period, a political party that 
opposed  the  communists, and  eventually  Sukarno,  before  it  was 
banned in 1960.(1) 
This trend was eclipsed for the time being by the spectacular 
growth of the Sarekat Islam which, despite the Islam in its title, was 
essentially a secular nationalist movement. Under the leadership of 
Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, the Sarekat Islam grew rapidly through 
the rest of the decade although it was increasingly subject to diverse 
ideological currents. Another party,  the  Nationale  Indische Partij 
(National Indonesian Party), which had a large Eurasian composition 
and advocated racial equality, social justice, and eventual 
independence,  was  banned  after  only  one  year.  This  ended,  as 
George Kahin has noted, any potential for an Indonesian-Eurasian 
combination against Dutch rule.(2) It also left the political field to 
the Sarekat Islam as the preeminent vehicle for the expression of 
Indonesian nationalism, a role similar to that of the Kuomintang in 
China under Sun Yat-sen. 
The  first  avowedly  Marxist  organization,  the  Indies  Social 
 
Democratic Association (known by its Dutch language initials as the 
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ISDV)  was  founded in  1914  by  a  recently  arrived  Dutch  social 
democrat, Henrik Sneevliet. The ISDV was initially a grouping of 
Dutch  socialists  with  a  fairly  wide  range  of  political  attitudes 
although the movement's activist core quickly moved in a radical 
direction. This trend towards radicalism was subsequently reinforced 
by the attraction of the Russian revolution to most of its membership. 
Partly through the impact of the Dutch language ISDV newspaper, 
the Free Word (Het Vrije Woord), the new Marxist party began to 
have an impact on radical nationalist Indonesians by 1916. Both 
Sneevliet and another Dutch Marxist, Adolf Baars, were strongly 
committed to influencing the native Indonesian nationalist movement 
in  a  radical  and  Marxist  direction  -  the  beginning of  the  "Bloc 
Within" strategy  that  Sneevliet  was  to  employ  with  great  initial 
success in Indonesia and later in China. After a short-lived flirtation 
with infiltration of "Insulinde", a Eurasian organization allied to the 
banned National Indies Party, the ISDV quickly succeeded in 
recruiting into its own ranks many of the more radical local leaders 
of the Sarekat Islam. This success was particularly great in the large 
Central Java city of Semarang, whose radical leadership became not 
only  the  left  wing  of  the  Sarekat  Islam  but  simultaneously  the 
nucleus of the Indonesian Communist Party. (3) This radical left 
wing of  the  Sarekat Islam became  sufficiently powerful that  the 
entire Sarekat Islam was impelled towards a more radical posture, 
both as a nationalist force striving for independence and increasingly 
as a receptacle for the fusion of Marxist and nationalist thought in a 
variety of forms. Indeed, it may be said that nowhere else in the 
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world outside of Russia did Marxism become so deeply imbedded so 
early in the consciousness of a national movement. Even 
Tjokroaminoto was to denounce "sinful capitalism" although he later 
limited that concept more specifically to foreign ownership.(4) It is 
important  to   realize   that   this  strong  Marxist  implantation  in 
Indonesia substantially preceded that in China and was in many ways 
a model for China (second only to that of the Russian Revolution 
itself), not the other way around. (5) 
In   spite   of   growing   Marxist   influence   on   the   national 
movement, the Marxist faction was unable to gain control of the 
Fourth Congress of the Sarekat Islam in 1919, causing this group to 
found the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) on May 23, 1920 in 
the Semarang office of the Sarekat Islam. The first (PKI) chairman 
was Semaun, the young leader of the Semarang branch of the Sarekat 
Islam (SI). His deputy was Darsono. Both remained members of the 
Sarekat Islam for the moment but the growing struggle between them 
and the Sarekat Islam national leadership headed by Tjokroaminoto 
and his active assistant, Hadji Agus Salim, made a rupture inevitable. 
This occurred at the Sixth Congress of the Sarekat Islam in October, 
1921  when  Salim  pushed  through  a  resolution  stating  that  no 
member of the Sarekat Islam could be a member of another political 
party. The communists present in the Congress then resigned and the 
Semarang and some other branches shortly seceded. The new PKI 
quickly established a "Red Sarekat Islam" which later became the 
"Sarekat Rakjat" (People's Association - the current spelling would 
be rakyat) and succeeded in wresting away a probable majority of the 
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Sarekat Islam branches. This new association was a PKI controlled 
mass organization designed to mobilize a wider "front" of supporters 
than the PKI proper. It was relatively successful although the PKI 
had made a mistake in allowing the conservative opposition to make 
religion versus atheism a central aspect of the debate, a mistake that 
the PKI tried to overcome by denying any opposition to religion on 
its part. The Indonesian communists have sought thereafter to 
deemphasize or even deny traditional European communism's 
hostility  toward  religion.  It  is  also  noteworthy  that  the  young 
Sukarno placed great emphasis on the need for an alliance of 
nationalism,  religion  and  communism after  his  emergence  as  an 
important political figure in 1927 and that this "Nasakom" idea was 
supported in later years by both Sukarno and the PKI as a necessity 
for the "national democratic" or pre-socialist stage of what was 
viewed as a continuing revolution. 
The progress of the PKI in Indonesia was being carried out, of 
course, against the background of Bolshevik ability to hold on to 
power in Russia, however precariously, and on the 
institutionalization of the Third International or Comintern with its 
headquarters in Moscow. The Second Congress of the Comintern 
took place in July-August, 1920 and, under the driving force of 
Lenin's leadership, decided that all communist parties should actively 
support the "revolutionary movements of liberation" in the colonial 
areas. They should also "establish temporary relations and even 
unions with the revolutionary movements in the colonies and 
backward  countries  without, however, amalgamating with  them". 
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Alliances should be forged not only with the peasantry and petty 
bourgeoisie but with bourgeois nationalists in spite of the fact that 
divergence with the latter could be expected further down the 
revolutionary road. Although the hoped for revolution in these areas 
would be national and not communist in the early stages, leadership 
should be "in the hands of the communist vanguard".(6) Lenin had 
already   made   plain   that   he   saw   great   value   in   supporting 
revolutionary nationalism in the colonial world and especially in 
Asia against Western capitalism on opportunistic grounds, whatever 
the level of revolutionary consciousness among the Asians in 
traditional Marxist terms. 
The above passages reflected the experiences of the Russian 
revolution itself, of course, and were only a minor extension of the 
alterations to traditional Marxist theory that Trotsky and Lenin had 
evolved in order to act forcefully in a Russia that was obviously 
ready for revolution in 1917 even though it was the most backward 
of the major European countries and therefore lacking the sizable 
proletariat that traditional Marxist theory regarded as the cornerstone 
of a socialist revolution. The Comintern - and Lenin in particular - 
were also greatly influenced by the apparent revolutionary advances 
in Indonesia and by the effective arguments of Sneevliet who had 
arrived from Holland after his expulsion from Indonesia in 1918 and 
was present at the Second Comintern Congress as a semi-official 
PKI representative. Not surprisingly, there were arguments at the 
Congress between those, like the Indian communist, M. N. Roy, who 
favored a more narrow approach to revolution in Asia with emphasis 
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on retention of control by the communist party and a lesser degree of 
reliance on cooperation with "bourgeois nationalist" elements on the 
one hand, and those like Lenin and Sneevliet (now already known by 
the pseudonym of Maring) who wanted to take advantage of the 
national awakenings as a  weapon against the capitalist European 
powers, whatever their ideological orientation in Marxist terms.(7) 
Sneevliet also argued, in the Indonesian case, for better 
understanding that the Sarekat Islam, despite its name, was a strong 
anti-Dutch national movement (and even "proletarian", he said on 
one occasion) and should not be regarded as a bourgeois or 
reactionary religious rival to communism that would be anathema to 
communist atheism. (8) 
The debate between those who favored party supremacy and 
doctrinal purity versus those who favored a more opportunistic and 
open approach in order to mobilize fellow travelling elements for 
short term objectives has been continuous in all communist parties 
and, indeed, within the individual minds of communist leaders who 
have shifted from one emphasis to another as the external 
environment or internal power struggles required (some of course 
had personalities inclined to be chronically more rigid or more 
flexible than others). The PKI had such a history in these early years, 
since it became increasingly elitist and skeptical of national front 
tactics in the 1923-26 period and was then reluctant to cooperate 
with the national bourgeoisie to the extent that it might have. The 
PKI did establish the Sarekat Rakjat as a broad national front but, 
according to Van der Kroef, lost interest in it until leverage was 
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applied from Moscow to be "less sectarian", the stock communist 
phrase for attacking a party or party faction deemed to be 
insufficiently willing to make tactical alliances with non-party 
elements.(9) Even Aidit, the PKI leader of the late Sukarno era, 
subsequently criticized the early PKI for having been "overly 
sectarian". (10) One could argue, however, that this criticism from 
both Aidit and Western observers is too glib; that the rupture of the 
Sarekat Islam was a necessity given an incompatibility of goals that 
could not be papered over indefinitely and that there were definite 
limits to what the PKI could do thereafter to build a strong national 
front.  Even  Sukarno,  the  great  synthesizer  and  architect  of  his 
version of unity on the basis of the Sukarnoist doctrines of Panca 
Sila (Pantja Sila) and Nasakom, ultimately failed because he could 
not proceed from a unity developed on the basis of compromise to a 
unity that was pegged to a Marxist view of the revolution that had 
limited acceptance in the broader society. In 1926 the chances for 
overthrowing Dutch power were virtually nil, whatever the tactics, 
and the primary mistake of the PKI was not its very real faults of 
"sectarianism"  but  its  launching  of  an  armed  rebellion  that  was 
bound to fail miserably. 
One must pause at this point to note the movements of the 
various early communist leaders. Sneevliet, Baars and most of the 
other early European Marxist leaders had been expelled from 
Indonesia  by  the  Dutch  authorities  around  1918-1919. Sneevliet, 
under his newly assumed name of "Maring", was then sent to China 
in 1920-21 as the Comintern's first representative there with the task 
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of promoting his patented "Bloc Within" strategy. He was present at 
the formal founding meeting of the Chinese Communist Party in the 
summer of 1921. It is worth underlining that in these early years, 
Indonesian Marxism was clearly a more successful movement than 
that in China and that the latter was significantly influenced by the 
early Indonesian model. This reliance eroded as the Chinese 
movement gained strength and the limitations of the Bloc Within 
strategy were manifested. Nevertheless, the  stature of  Indonesian 
communism probably remained greater in the eyes of the Chinese 
communists than that of smaller and more late-blooming communist 
movements elsewhere. Meanwhile, Adolf Baars and others went to 
Moscow  where  Baars  eventually  became  disillusioned.  He  left 
Russia  and  finally  returned to  Indonesia many  years  later  as  an 
opponent of communism, a road also followed by the first deputy 
PKI chairman, Darsono. The first PKI chairman, Semaun, who was 
forced out of Indonesia in 1923, remained in the Soviet Union as an 
obscure figure until December 1956, however, when he returned 
with his Russian family and eventually became a little known figure 
on Sukarno's forty-six member Supreme Advisory Council. (11) Tan 
Malaka, another early PKI leader, was ousted from Indonesia in 
1922 and later became the Comintern representative for Southeast 
Asia with headquarters in the Philippines. The Communist Party 
within Indonesia thereafter came under the sway of Musso and 
Alimin, two radical young leaders who pressed the PKI into a course 
of armed revolution in 1926 against the strong opposition of Tan 
Malaka from abroad. 
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The pathetically ill-prepared 1926-27 PKI revolt was soon 
crushed. The Dutch banned the Party, and exiled those among its 
cadres who could be found and captured to a remote prison camp in 
New  Guinea  called  Boven  Digul  (Tanah  Merah  or  Red  Earth). 
Alimin and Musso managed to flee from Singapore to the Soviet 
Union where they remained until 1948 (Musso made a secret trip to 
Indonesia in 1935 to lay out a Soviet approved program for the 
underground PKI). (12) The vacuum left by the failure and 
suppression of the 1926 PKI was soon to be filled by new nationalist 
leaders, above all by Sukarno who came to national prominence in 
1927 as leader of the new Indonesian Nationalist Party or PNI. Most 
of the traditional literature on Sukarno and Indonesian nationalism 
admits a  strong Marxist strain in Sukarno's thought but tends to 
downplay Sukarno's Marxism as exotic, romantic and subsumed into 
his nationalism.(13) I believe, however, that Sukarno was deeply 
committed to the basic principles and ideology of authoritarian 
Marxism and indeed was more linked to communism itself than this 
traditional view would hold. I further believe that Sukarno never lost 
sight of his personal commitment to an independent Indonesia that 
would eventually be "socialist" in the communist sense. Sukarno in 
fact exhibited remarkable intellectual consistency over the years in 
his basic beliefs despite a tactical need to obscure his ultimate 
program - an approach not foreign to other communist movements. 
Sukarno's fundamental commitment became ever more clear in the 
days leading to the September 30/October 1, 1965 "coup". By this 
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time, Sukarno was openly identifying himself almost totally with the 
 
PKI. 
 
Sukarno was undeniably also, and perhaps primarily, an 
Indonesian nationalist. However, this was also largely true of the 
early PKI and again, after the mid-1950s, of the later PKI. Indeed, 
Marxism and nationalism were intricately intertwined in the early 
history of the Indonesian independence movement and 
Marxism-Leninism's adoption of  anti-colonial and  anti-imperialist 
themes was the central element in attracting not only Sukarno but the 
overt members of the PKI such as Semaun, Darsono, Tan Malaka, 
Musso and, in later years, men like Aidit, Njoto and Lukman.  Other 
Indonesians had a similar commitment to independence and were 
attracted to many of the tenets of Marxism. However, they never 
became committed to an essentially Leninist vision of the Revolution 
and the society which that revolution was intended to establish. Or in 
some other cases, they began with a Marxist view as young men but 
shrugged it off later. Men like Hatta, Sjahrir and later Adam Malik 
were Marxists in their youth and retained a strong social 
consciousness later while rejecting communism. This was not true of 
Sukarno, in my view, and that case will emerge in the course of this 
book. Before continuing to-develop and refine the analysis of how 
Sukarno, the PKI and the Indonesian revolution fit together, one 
should first describe the salient points in Sukarno's early career. He 
was born in a small town in East Java on June 6, 1901 of middle 
class Indonesian parents, attended high school in the large Javanese 
seaport city of Surabaya and eventually continued his studies at the 
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Technical College in Bandung where he graduated as an engineer in 
 
1926.  He  had  already  become  acquainted  with  Marxism  as  a 
teenager, first from a relatively moderate Dutch Marxist teacher 
named Hartogh at the Surabaya Hogere Burger School and later from 
the fiery Dutch communist, Adolf Baars. Sukarno was not 
sympathetic years later, incidentally, when Baars left the Soviet 
Union, broke with communism and returned to Indonesia to warn 
against that doctrine. The young Sukarno was also absorbing the 
romance of Indonesian nationalism, the Hindu mysticism of East and 
Central Java and the politics of the national movement. To a greater 
or lesser degree, this could also be said of other budding Indonesian 
politicians whether connected with the Sarekat Islam, the new 
Communist Party or the various nationalist groupings that were to 
follow the suppression of the PKI after 1926. 
With such future communist leaders as Musso and Alimin, 
Sukarno boarded for a time in the house of the Sarekat Islam leader, 
Tjokroaminoto,  which  was  also  visited  frequently  by  Sneevliet, 
Baars and other Marxists as well as by non-Marxist nationalists. 
Sukarno's ideological development continued in the same general 
direction of blending Marxism and nationalism. Such a blending was 
not seen as  contradictory except by the anti-Marxist nationalists. 
Sukarno's views then, as in subsequent decades, were similar to those 
of the early PKI including those leaders such as Tan Malaka and 
Musso who later could be considered as threats to his leadership in 
the early post-war era. Sukarno's identification with the radical left 
wing of the Sarekat Islam was probably tempered for a time by his 
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courtship and brief marriage to Tjokroaminoto's daughter, a factor 
that probably explains his spirited defense of his father-in-law at the 
Second PKI Party Congress at Bandung in 1923. His very attendance 
at  this  PKI  congress  is  a  remarkable  indication  of  his  political 
leanings even before his break with the Sarekat Islam moderates. It 
has been known but also largely ignored by analysts of Sukarno's 
career. While Sukarno was undoubtedly close to the Sarekat Islam 
leader as a young man in his late teens and very early twenties, he 
was also writing already on nationalist themes that advocated 
elimination  of  capitalism  in  Indonesia  as  well  as  evincing  a 
beginning of his insight into the need to join the themes of socialism, 
nationalism and Islam to achieve independence. 
After  enrolling  at  the  Bandung  Technical  College,  Sukarno 
broke with Tjokroaminoto and divorced Tjokroaminoto's young 
daughter, while gradually becoming more deeply committed to the 
left wing of the nationalist movement that was dominated by the 
PKI. According to the traditional literature, he is said to have been 
under the influence of the nationalistic and radical but 
non-communist National-Indische Party of Douwes Dekker, Tjipto 
Mangunkusumo, and Suwardi Surjaningrat in this period but in 1965 
Sukarno identified himself as having been "a member" of the forces 
that led the 1926 revolt, notably the PKI and its Sarekat Rakjat 
front.(14). He was, of course, still a student at Bandung through 
much of this period and continued to be visible primarily as a leader 
of the Bandung Study Group during the period of early PKI 
ascendancy. It is interesting to note that the PKI had already been 
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forced underground by the Dutch and had reestablished its 
headquarters in Bandung on an illegal basis some months before the 
1926 revolt broke out. Although speculative, Sukarno's allusions to 
an association by himself with the 1926 PKI combined with the 
presence  of  the  national  PKI  headquarters  in  Bandung  certainly 
makes plausible a line of conjecture that Sukarno already had strong 
secret ties with the PKI. (15) Sukarno's graduation and sudden 
emergence as a national leader in 1927 coincided with the failure of 
the  1926  PKI  revolt  and  the  suppression of  the  PKI  as  a  legal 
organization. The vacuum was filled by establishment of the 
Indonesian Nationalist Party or PNI in 1927 at the initiative of the 
Bandung Study Group headed by Sukarno. On the eve of the 
September 30 affair of 1965 - the communist "coup" launched by 
Sukarno - the latter proclaimed in a little publicized speech that he 
had "always" been a  member of the 1926 PKI "generation" and 
emphasized  that  his  loyalties  had  been  to  the  PKI,  not  to  the 
Bandung Study Group. He added that the word had been passed by 
imprisoned PKI leaders to carry on the work of the revolution by 
other means. In other words, Sukarno was virtually saying in 1965 
that he had been a secret member of the PKI who had felt compelled 
to adopt the pose of a non-PKI nationalist leader in order to operate 
politically under the conditions of PKI illegality between 1927 and 
the establishment of Indonesian independence almost two decades 
later. It may be noted that other well known Indonesian political 
figures had revealed over the years that they had been secret 
communists  while  ostensibly  acting  as  leading  figures  in  other 
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organizations. These included a one-time Premier from the Socialist 
Party (PSI), Amir Sjarifuddin, and several leaders of the Netherlands 
based student organization, Perhimpunan Indonesia, such as Maruto 
Darusman, Setiadjit (later head of the Labor Party) and Abdulmadjid. 
The year 1927 also saw the first enunciation of Sukarno's 
doctrine of "Nasikom", an alliance of the forces of nationalism (nas), 
Islam(i), and communism(kom) to achieve liberation from Dutch 
imperialism.  When this doctrine re-emerged many years later under 
Sukarno's Guided Democracy, it was refined as Nasakom, with the 
middle "a" standing for agama, the Indonesian word for religion, in 
place of the "i" for Islam in the early version. The refinement did not 
signify a policy change since 
Sukarno had long advanced the tactical argument that Islam was 
not a good basis for revolution in Indonesia because Christian 
minorities  should  not  be  excluded  from  the  revolutionary ranks. 
Sukarno's linking of nationalism, religion and communism has, in 
the conventional wisdom (and especially among his Western 
apologists), been taken as evidence that his primary motivation was 
simply to balance forces in order to enhance his own position and 
maintain unity at all costs. 
This portrayal of Sukarno as a kind of non-ideological 
opportunist, reinforced by a playboy image, has been fundamentally 
incorrect in my opinion. Whether one admires the man and is 
sympathetic toward his policies and goals or not, Sukarno deserves 
respect as a serious, far-sighted thinker who was committed toward a 
particular set of values and beliefs. Sukarno's outlook was dominated 
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not only by the hatred of imperialism and colonialism that attracted 
him to Marxism in the first place but by the core ideas of the Marxist 
system of thought. These embraced, in particular, the concept of the 
historical dialectic including the inevitability of ultimate socialist 
triumph and the division of the revolution into historical "stages" 
which required different tactics and different constellations of allies 
in each. Marxism, in this connection, also provided the tactical 
doctrine of the united front or national front and the need for a 
vanguard to infiltrate and gradually take over broad based coalitions. 
In this regard, the real meaning of Nasakom was from its inception a 
national front tactic for uniting a wide grouping of forces to pursue 
the initial objectives of, first, national independence and, later, of 
completing the "national democratic stage" of the revolution, both of 
which were pre-requisites under classical communist theory (and 
certainly that of the PKI), to a later shift of objectives, that is to the 
final advance to the higher "socialist stage" of the revolution.(16) 
Understandably this was not so clear in the late 1940s and 1950s but 
Sukarno's actions as well as his rhetoric substantiate this view as he 
achieved greater and greater power and became more and more 
confident of victory in the 1960s. As this occurred, both Sukarno and 
the  PKI  shifted  from  an  emphasis  on  "unity"  to  an  ever  more 
narrowly  defined  unity  of  the  "progressive  revolutionary  forces" 
alone  -  a  formulation designed to  accommodate what  Rakosi  of 
Hungary so aptly phrased as "slicing the salami". 
In the years that followed the birth of the PNI in 1927, Sukarno 
also promoted his concept of Marhaenism which was described as 
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Marxism   adapted   to   the   conditions   of   Indonesia.   The   word 
"Marhaen" was attributed to a poor subsistence peasant whom 
Sukarno met in West Java in the early 1920s. It was designed to 
cover not only the rural poor as the basis and intended beneficiary of 
revolution but the urban proletariat and the poorer elements of the 
petty bourgeoisie as well. Much has been made of the supposed 
"vagueness" of this concept to distinguish Sukarno's thought from 
that of "true" communists but in truth these ideas became chronic to 
Asian communism since their essential content was a two-fold 
deviation from the Soviet model that the industrial proletariat was 
too  insignificant in  the  underdeveloped world to  be  the  primary 
instrument of  social  revolution and  that  the  center  of  the  world 
revolution was considered to be in Asia, not in Europe. No wonder 
that European-oriented Marxists and even Russian Marxists have 
looked askance at the purity of Sukarno's Marxism but the parallels 
between Sukarno's Marhaenism and the views of both the PKI and 
Chinese communism are clear.(17) Indeed, one may also note that 
Sukarno had developed a philosophical view of Marxism akin to the 
central idea system of Mao Tse-tung some years before Mao's ideas 
were crystallized in China. This is not to say that Sukarno was Mao's 
teacher; this trend of thought arose naturally from indigenous 
conditions in both places and was probably advanced independently 
by a good many Asian revolutionaries before it received the imprint 
of  famous names. These  points do,  however, underline both  the 
seriousness and coherence of Sukarno's Marxism and the importance 
35  
 
of   Indonesia  as   a   fertile   early  breeding  ground  for  Marxist 
intellectual development in an Asian nationalist context. 
It should also be noted that the deviation of such 
peasant-oriented concepts of Marxism from Leninism is not all that 
great. Leninism (and certainly the PKI) has always distinguished 
between the almost organic alliance between the proletariat, the 
peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie that was to be preserved into the 
higher socialist stage beyond the victory of the national and 
democratic (bourgeois) revolution on the one hand and the temporary 
alliance with the "national bourgeoisie" in the national democratic 
revolution on the other. The communists say that the proletariat is 
the head of this organic alliance with the peasantry and petty 
bourgeoisie, and they disparage the alleged slackness of the latter, 
but they have never been loath to use them as revolutionary fuel. Nor 
have the Asian communist "deviationists", including Sukarno, sought 
to elevate the peasantry above the industrial workers in their Marxist 
cosmology, they have simply placed greater weight on the need to 
broaden both membership requirements and tactics to accommodate 
the communist movement with Asian reality. Lenin himself 
recognized that revolution was to be different under the conditions of 
the colonial East although his arguments were more tactical and less 
theoretical than those of subsequent generations of Asian Marxists. 
Indeed, the Bolshevik movement itself had already significantly 
revised classical Marxism to permit more suitable and flexible tactics 
in the backward, semi-feudal environment that was Tsarist Russia. 
36 
 
 
In any event, the Dutch authorities were sufficiently concerned 
by the revolutionary threat to their rule to arrest and incarcerate 
Sukarno twice. Arrested in December 1929, Sukarno was released in 
December, 1931 after which he joined the Indonesian Party 
(Partindo), one of the successors to the disbanded PNI. Rearrested in 
August, 1933, Sukarno was exiled first to the island of Flores in the 
Lesser   Sunda  group  and   later   to   the   town  of   Bengkulu  in 
southwestern Sumatra.  Many  other  nationalist  leaders  of  varying 
ideological persuasion were exiled in this period as well including 
the other two principal figures of the successful post-war 
independence movement, Mohammed Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir. 
Sukarno remained in exile until freed by the Japanese in 1942. 
One noteworthy indication of Sukarno's continuing commitment 
to revolutionary Marxism was his relationship in Bengkulu with two 
young brothers, Asmara Hadi and A. M. Hanafi, whom Sukarno 
indoctrinated along Marxist lines. Asmara Hadi married Sukarno's 
adopted daughter (he had no children of his own at that point) and 
both  Asmara  Hadi  and  his  brother  were  widely  regarded  as 
quasi-adopted children of Sukarno as well.(18) These two men 
eventually became the leaders in the 1960s of a new Partindo Party 
that was a policy clone of the PKI as well as the chosen instrument 
for Sukarno's close personal control over the Chinese minority 
through the Marxist organization known as Baperki.(19) 
The Japanese occupation was a period of fairly widespread 
collaboration between Indonesian nationalists including Sukarno, 
Hatta and the ex-PKI national communist, Tan Malaka, with the 
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Japanese although a small pro-allied underground existed that was 
led by Sutan Sjarir and Amir Sjarifuddin. The two groups kept in 
touch with each other for a time. The web of motives among those 
who collaborated with the Japanese occupation has been extensively 
argued  but  there  is  little  doubt  that  most  of  the  Indonesians, 
including Sukarno, were trying to use what they saw as the necessary 
evil of the Japanese occupation to achieve long range national 
goals.(20) Sukarno, the most famous of the Indonesian leaders and 
the one with the greatest reputation for stirring oratory, gave lectures 
at a Japanese-organized political school. The young PKI chairman, 
D. N. Aidit, has said (in early 1965) that Sukarno was one of his first 
instructors in Marxism at this time.(21) Although the motives for 
such a statement can be assumed to have been self-serving or 
sycophantic, there is no reason to assume that Aidit was being totally 
disingenuous; such a well-publicized statement could, after all, have 
been denounced by Sukarno if regarded by the latter as totally false. 
It not only never was but Sukarno was increasingly warm in his 
praise of Aidit in the weeks and months that followed. 
Sukarno emerged as President of Indonesia in August, 1945 
with Mohammed Hatta as Vice-President. The fact that Sukarno was 
Javanese and  Hatta  Sumatran helped to  make  the  duumvirate of 
greater appeal to the Outer Islands or at least to Sumatra. The 
independence proclamation was made against the initial reluctance 
of  Sukarno  and  Hatta  after  strong  pressure  from  a  group  of 
nationalist  youth,  some  of  whom  became  famous  later.  They 
included  Wikana  of  the  PKI,  Chairul  Saleh,  Sukarni  and  Adam 
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Malik, the latter three being followers of Tan Malaka. The form of 
government that followed was parliamentary in nature with an 
appointed quasi-parliament. Sutan Sjahrir, the democratic socialist 
who had headed the anti-Japanese underground, became premier and 
the  effective  leader  of  the  early  republic.  The  socialist  party  he 
headed was infiltrated by communists, including his successor as 
Premier,  Amir  Sjarifuddin,  and  it  eventually  split;  a  probable 
majority joined the communists while Sjahrir led the rest into a new 
democratically-oriented Socialist  Party  of  Indonesia  or  PSI.  This 
work  is  not  the  place  for  a  detailed  description of  the  complex 
history of that period which included the abortive attempt of a 
national communist movement led by Tan Malaka to seize power, 
the disastrous PKI revolt in Central Java centered on the town of 
Madiun and, of course, the recurrent fighting with the Dutch who 
sought to reimpose their control. 
The PKI emerged as a legal party in 1945 under the original 
leadership of a Tan Malaka sympathizer named Muhammad Yusuf. 
Yusuf was deposed in due course by a more legitimate PKI figure 
named Sardjono, who then shared the spotlight with Alimin after the 
latter's return from China. In 1948, Musso returned from Moscow in 
the wake of the new world-wide hard-line associated with the name 
of Zhdanov. This line was a product of the emerging Cold War and 
called, in essence, for tactics of violent revolution and tight party 
control. A "front" policy was also included but on a rather narrow 
basis in which communist domination of front policy with little or no 
compromise  was  required.  In  Indonesia,  Musso's  "New  Road" 
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pointed toward armed rebellion  later  in  the  year  although actual 
fighting broke out prematurely and piecemeal on the initiative of 
local communist military units that felt threatened by Premier Hatta's 
program for improving central government control over the military 
in ways that would have reduced and dominated communist and 
other factionally-oriented units. Musso, Amir Sjarifuddin, Setiadjit 
and other, but not all, communist leaders flocked to the small city of 
Madiun,  which  had  become  the  headquarters  of  the  communist 
forces, once the fighting had begun. They were ultimately killed by 
loyalist  forces  spearheaded by  the  West  Java  Siliwangi Division 
under Colonel Nasution. Amir and Setiadjit had not been open 
communists until this point and Amir's declaration of solidarity with 
the PKI and admission that he had long been in the party came as a 
great surprise to most including Sjahrir. The communists 
subsequently claimed that "Madiun", as the revolt came to be known 
to all Indonesians, was a provocation initiated by Hatta and other 
"reactionary" elements. 
Sukarno had made a famous radio appeal at the height of the 
rebellion for the Indonesian people to choose between Musso and 
himself and it is clear he did not regard either Musso or the rebellion 
with favor. He did appeal unsuccessfully for clemency toward Amir, 
the former Premier. Sukarno also made a point thereafter of 
condemning the "PKI-Musso" as if to imply that there was another 
PKI that should be absolved. Since Alimin and some others had not 
favored the Musso policy of armed rebellion and did not take part in 
the affair, there is come justification for this view. There is also a 
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point, although not a very good one, to Aidit's claim that Madiun was 
a provocation and that the fighting had not erupted as a PKI revolt. 
This is a chicken and egg argument since Musso's line was to split 
the republic leadership and form a communist-led group of sufficient 
strength to  seize  power and then lead  the  revolution through its 
bourgeois  and  anti-imperialist  stage  with  an  ultimate  communist 
state  in  mind.  The  Hatta-led  government  (Hatta,  the  moderate 
Vice-President who was close to Sjahrir, had become Premier after 
the fall of the Amir Sjarifuddin coalition government) had 
understandably taken action to prevent a build-up of independent 
communist military strength which forced the hand of communist 
military commanders. The Hatta “provocation” then was ultimately 
an  unwillingness  to  succumb  without  resistance  to  a  communist 
power bid. 
Since  Sukarno  had  emerged  as  President  of  Indonesia  in 
August, 1945 and remained so throughout the 1948 Madiun rebellion 
and during a succession of non-communist governments over the 
next decade, one may question his commitment to an essentially 
communist viewpoint in the early years of his Presidency. It should 
be noted, however, that Sukarno had massive liabilities as well as 
assets  in  the  late  1940s.  He  had  collaborated  closely  with  the 
Japanese and both he and Indonesia generally therefore had to 
accommodate themselves to the pro-ally underground led by Sjahrir 
in order to woo those liberal, anti-colonial tendencies among the 
Western   allies,   especially   the   United   States,   that   might   be 
sympathetic to de-colonization. Secondly, while Sukarno's prestige 
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and charisma were used by the early leaders of Indonesian 
independence, he was in fact shunted to the side as the early 
Indonesian governments were dominated by moderate democratic 
socialists and Islamic modernists. Sukarno's true colors could only be 
revealed  after  the  collapse  of  constitutional  democracy  in  the 
mid-1950s. Furthermore, and most important of all, Sukarno was 
intent on retaining and strengthening his power as the pre-eminent 
leader of Indonesia, a role that would be lost if either the Moscow 
emissary, Musso, or the national communist, Tan Malaka, were to 
triumph. One may also speculate that Sukarno's Indonesia-centered 
Marxism was bound to reject a PKI led by recent returnees from 
Stalinist Russia whose desire to direct and control world communism 
was well known. While Sukarno probably also regarded Tan Malaka 
unfavorably because of his stature as a rival charismatic leader, he 
later gave prominent positions to Tan Malaka's leading followers 
such as Chairul Saleh, Sukarni and Adam Malik until they turned out 
to be insufficiently revolutionary for Sukarno's tastes in 1964-65. 
Sukarno's commitment to revolutionary Marxism had always been 
closely connected with his nationalism and his willingness to link 
himself to the PKI was accordingly contingent on the 
"Indonesianization" of that Party, a possibility that had seemed at 
least open in the early and even later 1920s before the entrenchment 
of Stalin and which again became feasible with the rise of the Aidit 
leadership in the PKI and the erosion of Soviet control over the 
world communist movement after the Twentieth Party Congress of 
the CPSU. 
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Footnotes - Chapter I 
 
 
 
1. The Masjumi Party was formed during the Japanese occupation 
and initially comprised both the Muhammadiyah and the more 
traditional Nahdatul Ulama (NU) or Moslem Scholars. The NU 
later seceded to become a major political party in its own right. 
2. George M. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia 
 
(Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press) 1952. pp 70-71. 
 
3. Semarang was already well known as the leading center of 
Javanese radicalism from the turn of the century. See Bernard 
H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara, A History of Indonesia (The Hague 
and Bandung, W. Van Hoeve, Ltd. and Chicago, Ill., 
Quadrangle Books) 1960. First published in 1943 in the 
Netherlands. pp 351-352. 
4. Vlekke, p. 355. 
 
5. The factual data on the ISDV and early PKI appears in various 
standard English language works. The most detailed and 
comprehensive work on the early PKI and its antecedents is 
Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, 
N.Y., Cornell University Press) 1965. Also Arnold C. 
Brackman, Indonesian Communism (New York and London, 
Frederick A. Praeger) 1963. pp 1-32. Also Kahin pp 64-100. 
6. Justus M. Van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 
(Vancouver, Publications Centre, University of British 
Columbia) 1965. p.5. 
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7. M. N. Roy's early fame was based, however, on his founding of 
the Mexican Communist Party, the first formal declaration of a 
communist party outside Russia, as well as on Roy's influence 
on the early leaders of the Mexican Revolution. At Lenin's 
behest, Roy, a native of British India who had reached North 
America early in World War I, was then brought to Moscow by 
Mikhail Borodin. Borodin in turn was to become a successor to 
Maring/Sneevliet as Comintern representative in China. Roy's 
autobiography of this period is fascinating but also reflects, in 
my view, a rather surprising superficiality. Roy later broke with 
Moscow and the international communist movement although 
his politics remained radical. See M. N. Roy's Memoirs 
(Bombay and New York, Allied Publishers) 1964. 
8. See McVey, pp 53-61 for a fairly detailed discussion of the 
Second Comintern Congress as it related to Indonesia. McVey 
notes that Soviet appeals to the East from 1918-20 were often 
directed to Moslem sentiment, being geared to holding on to 
Islamic portions of the Tsarist empire and currying favor with 
Moslem buffer states such as Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. The 
subject is also covered in Charles B. McLane, Soviet Strategies 
in Southeast Asia (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press) 
1966, pp 12-23. 
 
9. Van der Kroef, pp 12-15. 
 
10.  e.g. D. N. Aidit, Problems of the Indonesian Revolution 
 
(DEMOS) 1963, p. 41. 
 
11.  Brackman, p. 260. 
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12.  See McVey, pp. 290-322 and Aidit, pp 68-72. Although the 
 
1926 PKI revolt was seen as "leftist" and "adventurist", the PKI 
leaders hung the label of "Trotskyist" on Tan Malaka whose 
approach was actually more in line with Comintern strategy 
than was that of Musso. Musso and Alimin were quick to link 
themselves with a Stalin who had eliminated Trotsky and were 
thereafter under strong Soviet influence if not control. In 
Musso's case this continued through the 1948 Madiun rebellion 
of the PKI. Tan Malaka, facing the Dutch repression of the PKI 
after the 1926-27 failure, sought to present himself 
increasingly as a nationalist as well as a Marxist. In this respect, 
and for similar reasons, his political course of attempting to fuse 
Marxism and nationalism broadly resembled that of Sukarno 
although they were rivals and operating from different personal 
histories. 
13.  The traditional view of Sukarno as primarily a nationalist whose 
expressed Marxism was played down is apparent in Kahin's 
otherwise pioneering and invaluable work and it persisted in the 
work of American and Australian scholars who followed Kahin, 
as well as by journalist experts on Indonesia such as Brackman. 
These views were also accepted by almost all American 
diplomatic experts on Indonesia before 1964 and by some 
thereafter. This view is also apparent in the major biographic 
work on Sukarno by the German scholar, Dahm. See Bernard 
Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesia's Independence 
(Ithaca,  N.Y., Cornell University Press, English translation) 
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1969. Original publication in German in 1966. A more recent 
biography  of Sukarno is similar in this respect: C. L. M. 
Penders, The Life and Times of Sukarno (London, Sidgwick 
and Jackson, Ltd.)  1974. 
14.  Sukarno's speech of September 13, 1965 to the PSII (a small 
political party claiming direct descent from the Sarekat Islam) 
as reported in Embassy Jakarta Airgram A-30 of October 22, 
1965 entitled "The September 30 Affair", p. 34 (Indonesian 
Country File, National Security File, Lyndon Baines Johnson 
Library). Also Howard P. Jones, Indonesia, The Possible Dream 
(New York, Harcourt, Brace and Ivanovich, Inc.) 1971, p. 381 
for a more extensive quotation from the original Embassy report 
which is not available. 
15.  See McVey on relocation of the PKI headquarters to Bandung, 
p.327. 
16.  The term "national democratic stage" is a late refinement of the 
"bourgeois" or "capitalist" stage that precedes the "socialist" 
stage in the historical dialectic. See Aidit, op. sit. p. 58 and 148 
showing variations in terminology. Also see Robert Martens, "A 
Soviet View of the Road to Communism in the Third World", 
The National War College Forum (Washington D.C.) Fall 1969. 
pp 42-60. 
17.  A typical disparagement of Marhaenism as a serious Marxist 
concept is a passing reference in Van der Kroef, p. 51, referring 
to it as "a nativistic kind of populism". 
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18.  Hanafi's initials of A. M. stood for Anak Marhaen or "son of the 
Marhaen", a reference to his spiritual relationship to Sukarno's 
philosophy and perhaps to his filial attitude toward Sukarno 
himself. 
19.  Four of the seven top leaders of Partindo were also four of  the 
top seven leaders of Baperki according to comparisons of their 
politburo equivalents as published in the Partindo 
newspaper, Bintang Timur in 1963. All, including Hadi and 
Hanafi, were also close associates of Sukarno (others were 
Winoto Danuasmoro and S. Tahsin). Baperki was officially an 
organization for all Indonesian citizens regardless of race which 
provided the rationale for a non-Chinese leadership even 
though it was widely regarded as the organization of 
 
pro-Communist Indonesian Chinese. Hanafi fled to Moscow 
after 1965 but reportedly changed his exile to Sweden later. 
20.  A rationale for collaboration with the Japanese was also 
provided by the ancient Javanese myth that a "Ratu Adil" – a 
kind of mystic hero - would eventually free Indonesia from a 
long period of colonial servitude but only after a brief 
occupation by another race whose physical description fitted the 
Japanese. Dahm and others place considerable stress on the 
influence of the Ratu Adil myth on many Javanese leaders and 
on Sukarno in particular. I do not deny such influence or, 
indeed, the importance of Javanese mysticism and personality 
characteristics on Sukarno but I do not find this to negate his 
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attachment to Marxist thought or the decisive role of the latter 
in shaping his political commitments and actions. 
21.  Harian Rakiat March 19, 1965. The speech itself was made on 
 
February 11 - the delay of over a month is unusual. 
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II 
 
The Conceptions and Tactics  
 
of the Indonesian Revolution 
 
 
 
To understand Sukarno and the PKI and to understand what 
happened in the so-called coup by the September 30 Movement in 
1965, one must examine closely the Marxist concept of the historical 
dialectic and how it was fitted into the theory of the Indonesian 
Revolution. Indeed, Sukarno's speeches show a preoccupation with 
the historical dialectic adapted, of course, to his perceptions of the 
concrete situation in Indonesia - that even exceeded that of the PKI. 
This preoccupation became particularly striking in 1965 when 
Sukarno's speeches and actions demonstrated a desire to leave the 
"national-democratic stage"  as  soon  as  possible  in  order  to  gain 
personal credit before the bar of history for having led Indonesia into 
"socialism" in his lifetime. The classical Hegelian view of the 
dialectic is, in a nut shell, that every "thesis" gives rise to internal 
contradictions which constitute an "antithesis". Resolution of this 
inherent conflict between thesis and antithesis then creates a new 
"synthesis". This "synthesis" also becomes the "thesis" for a new 
round of thesis, antithesis and synthesis which can go on indefinitely. 
Marx applied this theory to history although elaboration of the 
historical dialectic also owes much to Marx's collaborator, Friedrich 
Engels. In essence, human history begins with a stage of "primitive" 
50 
 
 
society which is replaced by a higher "slave-holding" stage followed 
by "feudalism",  "capitalism",  "socialism" and  ultimately 
"communism". Since Marx and the Western European Marxists lived 
in capitalist societies, their attention was focused primarily on the 
transition from capitalism to socialism which was to occur because 
the  internal contradictions of  capitalism  would cause  progressive 
concentration of capital in fewer and fewer hands, the 
impoverishment of a growing proletariat, and an increasing wave of 
revolutionary consciousness on the part of the proletariat as its 
grievances and numbers multiplied. The presumption was that 
socialist revolution would occur first in advanced capitalist societies 
in Western Europe. 
Russian reality caused problems for the Bolsheviks since, as 
Lenin noted in 1914, Russia was more feudal than capitalist. (1) The 
result was a gradual shift after the Second Party Congress of the 
Russia Social Democratic Party in 1903 to concepts of a  highly 
disciplined, secret and conspiratorial party that would seize control 
of the bourgeois revolution long before the situation was ripe for a 
socialist revolution and would then lead this bourgeois revolution in 
a  way  that  would  prepare  the  ground  for  a  more  rapid  and 
uncontested entry into the socialist stage. Since the less developed 
colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America were even more removed than Russia from the advanced 
stage of capitalism which Marx had seen as the launching pad for 
socialist revolution, Marxists in the Leninist tradition have had to 
bend  Marx's  historical  dialectic  further  to  legitimize  communist 
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seizure  of  power  in  societies  even  more  backward  than  Tsarist 
Russia. This they have done with tortuous lines of reasoning 
beginning with Outer Mongolia in the 1920s and 1930s (it was said 
that small feudal societies adjoining the USSR and under its 
protection could be guided to socialism without going through 
capitalism). (2) 
After communist advances in the wake of World War II, North 
Korea and North Vietnam were regarded as "People's Democracies" 
similar to the new conquests in Eastern Europe although "People's 
Democracy" was a term that had been designed to cover a transition 
from the capitalist societies of Eastern Europe to socialism. The 
Chinese   Communists  had   already   conceived   of   a   two   stage 
revolution in which the first stage would be "national" and 
"democratic",  that  is  a   variant  of  the  pre-socialist  bourgeois 
revolution applicable to Asian conditions and accordingly a possible 
ideological justification for Communist Party rule in an 
economically backward society. This terminology and thought 
process is close to that adopted by the PKI and Sukarno in 1959 and 
it was also folded into the formal Soviet ideological framework in 
1960.(3) Sukarno's Political Manifesto of  August 17, 1959 -  the 
ideological underpinning of Sukarno's rule under Guided Democracy 
- set forth the doctrine of a two stage revolution in which the first 
stage, which was labeled "national democratic", would require the 
elimination of foreign imperialist institutions from Indonesian soil 
and the elimination of "feudalism" from the countryside. Only then 
could the "socialist stage" of the revolution be launched. 
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While this simple conceptual formulation did not specify just 
what was meant by the prospective elimination of imperialism and 
feudalism from Indonesia, it became clear that eliminating 
imperialism would require  seizure  of  foreign enterprises and  the 
removal from political power of Indonesians who dragged their feet 
against the increasingly radical policies of the 1960s. Elimination of 
feudalism came to be vaguely identified with "land reform". Actually 
Indonesia did not have an extensive classical land reform problem 
from an objective standpoint since there was no significant large 
landholding class and land holdings were generally small. 
Nevertheless, tensions over land were high because of high rural 
population  density  in  Java,  a  point  to  be  developed  later.  The 
essential meaning of the PKI doctrinal requirement that feudalism be 
eliminated in the countryside before the national democratic stage 
could be considered as completed was that the PKI would become 
politically dominant through its peasant organization affiliate, the 
Barisan Tani Indonesia (BTI) and be able to intimidate all other rural 
power centers with Sukarno's implicit backing. As will be seen, both 
these goals appeared to have been accomplished by September 1965. 
In this respect, Sukarno was ahead of the PKI, incidentally, as will be 
seen. This whole manner of thinking will seem strange to the average 
Western reader  and,  indeed, to  most non-Marxist Indonesians as 
well. But it must be emphasized that these ideas were at the very 
center of PKI philosophy and were even more at the forefront of 
Sukarno's thinking in 1965. They emerge clearly in Sukarno's 
repeated  assertions  throughout  1965  that  Indonesia  had  "almost 
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completed the  national democratic stage"  and  was  "beginning to 
enter  the  socialist  stage".  It  should  be  noted  that  entry  into  the 
socialist stage did not mean "socialism" was then achieved; what was 
meant was commencement of the building of socialism which might 
go on for a long time. Entry into "the socialist stage" was a kind of 
shorthand for beginning to "build socialism". There must have been a 
great deal of oral discussion of this idea among Sukarno's coterie as 
well since various Indonesian cabinet ministers and other political 
figures felt it necessary in 1965 to include references to these two 
stages and to an imminent transition from one stage to another. (4) 
Sukarno's view of the Indonesian Revolution also had other 
sweeping historical aspects which were related to the actual course 
of events that he had witnessed in his lifetime. He described the 
Revolution as consisting of five generations (angkatan) in a speech 
to the MPRS in May, 1963 and harked back to these five generations 
on a number of occasions thereafter, the most significant being in 
September, 1965 shortly before the so-called coup.(5) Although 
romantic and even mystical to a degree, this concept again was at the 
very basis of Sukarno's thinking and is also important to 
understanding the events of 1965. The first of Indonesia's five 
generations of revolutionaries was labeled "perincis" ("perintjis" in 
the old orthography) which means those who "specify" or "identify" 
and was applied to the early national movements starting with Budi 
Utomo in 1908 and continuing through the early Sarekat Islam of 
Tjokroaminoto. The second generation was called "pencoba" 
("pentjoba") which meant those who "try" or  "attempt" and  was 
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identified by Sukarno with the ascendancy of the early Indonesian 
Communist Party up to and through the unsuccessful PKI revolt 
against the Dutch in 1926-27. The third generation was called 
"penegas" meaning those who "affirm" and this was applied to the 
period after the suppression of the PKI and up to World War II. This 
was the period of Sukarno's own early prominence and has been seen 
as applying to the early Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) and its 
offshoots. The fourth generation was called "pendobrak", from the 
Indonesian word for "break" and was applied to the so-called 45 
Generation that had declared and then achieved national 
independence (broken away) from the Dutch. The fifth generation 
was labeled "pelaksana" for those who "carry out" and applied to the 
revolutionary stage that was then being reached in 1963-1965. 
In September 1965, Sukarno suddenly amended this ordering of 
the "generations" to call the 1926 PKI "penegas" for toughening or 
strengthening the revolutionary movement while the third, post-PKI, 
generation was now labeled "pencoba" with this word for "attempt" 
now given a disparaging connotation of unwarranted collaboration 
with the Dutch.(6) The published text of this latter speech (it only 
appeared in the PSII newspaper, Karya Bhakti) shows considerable 
identification by Sukarno with the 1926 PKI but Sukarno's actual ad 
lib remarks went even further. The Karya Bhakti text of September 
15 must have been the originally prepared written text because 
Sukarno's actual words contained an explicit assertion by Sukarno 
that he had belonged to the second ("penegas") generation (the 1926 
PKI) and a denial of his having belonged to the third generation, that 
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is the Algemene Studie Group or PNI nucleus with which Sukarno 
had always been identified. 
Sukarno's published text in September, 1965 also shows a belief 
that all the generations were revolutionary in their period (except the 
third) but that revolutionary credentials must continually be 
reaffirmed. This theme had been stated in various ways all through 
1965. Both Sukarno and his leading deputy in the government, 
Subandrio, had declared since early in the year that some former 
comrades  were  no  longer  keeping  up  with  the  march  of  the 
revolution to the left (that is to higher levels) and would have to be 
left behind.(7) Sukarno also noted on at least two occasions that the 
45 Generation (the "pendobrak" generation) had played an important 
role in its day but that its members would have to show that they 
were still revolutionary by meeting the tasks of the present 
"pelaksana" generation.(8) Only two weeks before the September 30 
Affair and shortly after his speech to the PSII on the five generations, 
Sukarno noted that the 45 Generation had been the "pendobrak" 
generation but  must  now  become  part  of  the  current  pelaksana" 
generation which would require adherence to Nasakom in practice 
and in spirit. Subandrio followed up in even sharper terms by noting 
that "some" people were saying that "revisionism" was to be found in 
the "Pendobrak" generation since it did not wish to move forward to 
continue  the  revolutionary  advance.  Subandrio  then  said  the  45 
Generation needed to subject itself to introspection and remain on 
the "rails of the revolution". These criticisms were aimed particularly 
at Chairul Saleh who was a rival of Subandrio and had clashed with 
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Aidit in late 1964 and early 1965, points to be discussed later, but the 
form of the criticism also reflected Sukarno's view of the historical 
revolutionary process in Indonesia. 
Another important aspect of Sukarno's ideology that was 
pertinent to the unfolding of the revolutionary offensive of 1965 was 
Nasakom. Although Nasakom had been a key element in Sukarno's 
thinking from the 1920s, it had slipped into the background until its 
revival during the early stages of Guided Democracy. It was then 
recognized as a somewhat more ominous formulation of national 
unity than Sukarno's more vague and less tendentious concept of 
"Panca Sila" which had been introduced on the eve of the 
independence proclamation in 1945 during a time for caution given 
the correlation of forces within the national movement as a whole 
and within a Southeast Asia conquered by the United States and the 
British Empire. However, most observers still regarded the revival of 
Nasakom as evidence of the President's desire to balance the main 
political  forces  of  the  country  in  order  to  maximize  his  own 
influence. The popular view seemed to be that, while Nasakom 
legitimized the communists and permitted rapid growth in their 
numbers and position, Sukarno was merely permitting their advance 
as a counterweight to the Army and its political allies.  However, the 
real significance of Nasakom was and had always been that of a 
tactical formula for advancing a communist cause with as wide a 
following of temporary fellow travelers as possible. In other words, 
Nasakom meant the employment of a popular front or national front 
in which the nationalist and religious elements would be used as 
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allies against immediate enemies (at various times the Dutch, the 
British, Malaysia, the United States and "imperialism" generally on 
the international side and, internally, the Hatta/Sjahrir and Masjumi 
syndromes, the right and later the center of all political parties. etc.). 
This deeper purpose was less evident but was occasionally 
manifested in the difficult conditions of the 1930s and under 
constitutional democracy during the early republic but it finally 
became extremely clear in the 1960s when the time appeared ripe to 
employ salami tactics to the fullest. Of the ten Nasakom parties, only 
the PKI was allowed to remain its unalloyed self. Of the four "Nas" 
or nationalist parties, every effort was made to neutralize strong 
leaders and then subvert them. The IP-KI party, which was originally 
intended by  its  army  sponsors to  be  an  anti-communist political 
force,  was  compelled  by  Sukarno and  Sukarno alone  to  appoint 
Aminah Hidajat, the pro-PKI wife of Lt. General Hidajat, a Sukarno 
cabinet minister, to be its General Chairman, while the moderate 
wing  was  suppressed.  Since  this  was  an  artificial  imposition  of 
pro-PKI control at the top, the IP-KI grass roots remained strongly 
anti-communist, of course, but Sukarno's intent was clear. The 
Partindo Party, run by Sukarno's two quasi-adopted sons and certain 
Palace  cronies, was,  if  anything, to  the  left  of  the  PKI  and  the 
Partindo cadres would easily and surely have been incorporated into 
an  expanded  PKI  when  it  came  time  to  have  one  party  (in  the 
socialist stage). Murba, the small national communist party, was a 
ready ally of the PKI for a time but once it became a center of 
anti-communist opposition  in  1964,  it  had  to  be  denounced  and 
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abolished. Although the PKI led the hue and cry against Murba, it 
was Sukarno himself who banned Murba and who made it clear that 
this move was not reluctant. The larger Indonesian Nationalist Party 
or PNI, the real core of the nationalist element in the Nasakom 
troika, was purged of its moderate elements by Sukarno in the 
summer   of   1965   and   turned   over   to   its   Secretary   General, 
Surachman, a known PKI infiltrator.(9) Even Ali Sastroamidjojo, the 
former prime minister who had gone along with Sukarno's every 
demand and presided over the purge of "false Marhaenists", became 
almost invisible in September as Sukarno dealt almost exclusively 
with Surachman on PNI matters during the final two or three weeks 
before the September 30 affair.(10) 
The religious or "Agama" element, the "A" of Nasakom, 
underwent similar experiences although its  experiences were less 
spectacular  or  complete.  The  real  core  of  political  Islam,  the 
Masjumi, had already been dealt with by a ban in 1960. Of the 
remaining five parties, two were Christian and three Islamic. The 
Christian parties were not very important in the first place and there 
was little effort to subvert them. Their traditional fear of political 
Islam and their need to rely on Indonesia's secular politicians made 
them susceptible to Sukarno's leadership, particularly the Protestant 
Parkindo which followed the lead of Sukarno's weak Second Deputy 
Prime Minister, Johannes Leimena. For the Catholics, a less effective 
but similar role was played by one of Sukarno's ministers, Frans 
Seda. The Catholics were less malleable and subsequently became 
one of the more forceful and effective members of the 
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anti-communist  coalition  that  developed  after  the  September  30 
affair. 
Of the three remaining Moslem parties, the small West-Java 
centered Perti party was placed under the control of a strong 
communist sympathizer, Sjarifuddin Abbas, at the direct behest of 
President Sukarno even though Sjarifuddin Abbas had no real 
following for his views among Perti cadres or the rank and file. The 
process for Perti was similar to Mrs. Hidajat's ascendancy in IP-KI. 
A small leftist minority was established and became very noisy. The 
"Great Leader" then posed as a fair-minded and judicious balancer of 
forces, and agreed to mediate the quarrel. After listening and 
appearing to ponder the issue, the President would announce the 
inevitable result - the "real" IP-KI or Perti was to be the far left 
faction. In the case of Perti, the non-communist faction continued to 
exist,  although in  total  obscurity, but  then  emerged  briefly  as  a 
supporter  of  the  anti-PKI  "Sukarnoism"  movement  in  late  1964 
before sinking from view again after Sukarno's disavowal of that 
movement: after his return from abroad. A second minor Islamic 
Party, the PSII, was the rather pathetic remnant of the old Sarekat 
Islam. Its leader, Arudji Kartawinata, who also held a position 
somewhat similar to that of speaker for the impotent and largely 
ceremonial Parliament, could be relied upon to advocate any position 
enunciated  by  Sukarno  and  the  PKI  in  as  obsequious a  way  as 
possible. Arudji's apparent revolutionary ardor was, in fact, 
opportunistic as his quick shift to denunciation of the communists 
after their fall was to show, but before that fall the PSII had become 
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a virtual mouthpiece and transition belt to a particular constituency 
for the communists. 
The non-communist party least taken over by the communists 
by September, 1965 was the large Nahdatul Ulama (NU) or Moslem 
Scholars Party. The NU had a reputation for know-nothing 
fundamentalism in the religious sphere and for crass opportunism in 
the political arena. Its leaders had often been willing to sell principle 
for representation in cabinets and other high positions. It was always 
prepared to repeat PKI themes and extol Nasakom at the Jakarta 
level while its grass roots were frequently in conflict, even violent 
conflict,  with  PKI  cadres.  NU  provincial  cadres,  particularly  its 
youth arm, Ansor, conducted the anti-communist vendetta in late 
1965  in  East  Java.  The  NU  appeared  to  be  no  real  problem  to 
Sukarno and the PKI as the revolution approached its culmination of 
leaving  the   national  democratic  stage   in   mid-1965,  however. 
Sukarno  had  exploited  the  corruption and  venality  of  its  leader, 
Idham Chalid, and fed him patronage in return for his unswerving 
adherence to the revolutionary line. Other NU national leaders 
generally remained quiet or slavishly repeated regime propaganda, 
whatever their real feelings. One of the NU deputy chairmen, 
Subchan, later emerged as a leader of the anti-communist reaction to 
the September 30 movement. 
The picture that emerges from this brief review of the political 
parties  is  clear.  Nasakom was  an  instrument for  the  progressive 
employment   of   salami   tactics   in   order   to   remake   all   the 
non-communist  parties  into  appendages  of  the  communists.  The 
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rationalization was loyalty to Bung Karno (the affectionate name for 
Sukarno, "Bung" meaning brother in a common man context) but the 
reality was their progressive emasculation. It has often been argued 
that Sukarno could not have been a communist since he allowed a 
multiplicity of parties and held no position in the PKI. Such an 
argument ignores the realities of the Indonesian political situation 
that Sukarno and the PKI were experiencing and had experienced. 
Sukarno could not identify himself openly with the PKI when that 
party was first suppressed (by the Dutch) and then (in the 1950s) was 
weak and in need of protection from above by an ostensibly impartial 
national hero. This did not mean that Sukarno was opposed in 
principle to eventual establishment of a single vanguard party, to use 
the traditional communist jargon. Indeed, Sukarno talked of a 
vanguard (pelopor) party but did so in a vague futuristic way that 
would avoid premature ill-feelings on the part of other parties. He 
spoke of "Manipol competition" between the parties, meaning that 
they should all try to outdo each other in revolutionary spirit in order 
to earn the glory of being a "vanguard". "Manipol" was an acronym 
for the "Political Manifesto", Sukarno's national day speech of 1959 
which laid out the tenets of Sukarno's "Guided Democracy". As 1965 
proceeded, however, Sukarno and his spokesmen such as Sabandrio 
became more open in applying the term "pelopor" to the PKI while 
omitting such a phrase for others. Sukarno's repeated praise of the 
PKI to PNI audiences was another way of saying that the PKI was to 
become the  vanguard while  the  PNI was  not, although this was 
expressed primarily by innuendos since the immediate job was to 
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press   for   more   "Nasakomization"  against   the   army's  obvious 
reluctance. 
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Footnotes - Chapter II 
 
 
 
1. V.I.Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination", 
Selected Works, Vol. 1, pp 633-687. 
2. Lectures I attended in Moscow in 1956-58 followed this line. 
 
Also G. Kim and A. Kaufman, "Non-capitalist Development: 
Achievements and Difficulties", Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, 
December 1967. pp 98-108 and E. Bavrin, "Mongolia's Road to 
Socialism" Pamphlet (Moscow, Novosti) 1973, p.6 and pp 
84-86. 
 
3. See Robert Martens, op sit, for a discussion of the development 
of Soviet views on the "non-capitalist path" and "national 
democracy". Prior to Sukarno's "Manipol" speech of August 17, 
1959, the PKI spoke of both a people's democracy stage and a 
revolutionary stage that would be "national and democratic". 
See D.N. Aidit, Problems of the Indonesian Revolution, p. 58. 
4. See Warta Bhakti, March 25, 1965 (Partindo leader Asmara 
Hadi), April 6 (Cabinet Minister Ruslan Abdulgani), April 8 
(Air Force Commander Omar Dani), April 13 (PNI leader Ali 
Sastroamidjojo), April 17 (MPRS ratification), May 4 (Navy 
Commander Martadinata), May 7 (Central Java military 
commander General Surjosumpeno, the man who later 
organized the defeat of the September 30 Movement in his 
region), May 17 (Police Minister Sutjipto Danoekoesumo), May 
 
21 (Armed Forces Minister General Nasution), May 27 (Foreign 
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Minister Subandrio), and August 26 (Indonesian Chinese leader 
 
Oei Tjoe Tat). 
 
5. The 1963 speech to the MPRS is summarized in Harian Rakjat 
of May 21, 1963 and also appears in the Indonesian press 
service "Warta Bhakti" of that date. 
6. Karya Bhakti September 15, 1965. 
 
7. Harian Rakiat Jan 4, March 25, April 7, 1965. 
 
8. Warta Bhakti April 16, 1965 
 
9. Surachman had spent his early political life in the Communist 
youth arm, the Pemuda Rakjat, rather than the PNI affiliate. His 
PKI identification was widely known. 
10.  Ali Sastroamidjojo was visibly embarrassed by the "false 
Marhaenist" campaign, of which he was a leading spokesman 
during a conversation with the author in July, 1965. When asked 
about the false Marhaenists mentioned in Sukarno's speeches, 
Ali corrected me by saying "so-called false Marhaenists" and 
made an expression of disgust. Although Ali remained a 
Sukarno sycophant to the end and had done terrible damage to 
the cause of a democratic society during his career, I could not 
help but feel sorry for him during the Bandung conference of 
the PNI in the early Suharto era when he and the Surachman 
clique were expelled for collaboration with the PKI. I passed 
him and his broken down car on the way back to Jakarta but he 
politely refused my offer of help. His whole appearance was 
that of a forlorn and broken figure, confused by all that had 
befallen him. 
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III 
 
The Road to Guided Democracy  
 
and the Rise of the PKI 
 
 
 
For the purpose of this work, it is unnecessary to trace in great 
detail the process that led to the gradual collapse of the moderate and 
democratically oriented governments of the republic's early years 
and finally of the institutions of constitutional democracy 
themselves. While some of the democratic leaders might have done 
things differently, their task had always been enormous, once 
independence had been won given the fact that Indonesia was a 
far-flung underdeveloped archipelago with a great variety of cultural, 
political  and  religious  differences  and  was  beset  by  complex 
problems of social cohesion, overpopulation and poverty. There were 
long-standing rivalries between Java and Sumatra, the two principal 
islands that had led the revolution against the Dutch, between those 
two islands and the forces - mainly in the eastern islands - that had 
wished to maintain some kind of interdependent relationship with the 
Netherlands and between the strong Islamic segments and the 
essentially anti-Islamic currents that not only appeared in some 
modernist circles but rose particularly from the pre-Islamic and 
Hindic cultural milieu of Central and East Java. The strong Moslem 
currents were divided themselves between an essentially modernist 
segment that crystallized in the Masjumi Party and was centered 
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mostly in Sundanese West Java and Sumatra on the one hand and a 
more rigid and traditional Islam that was represented in the Islamic 
Scholars Party (Nahdhatul Ulama or NU) which was especially 
prominent in East Java, particularly in Madura and along the 
northeastern coast of Java itself. (1) 
As noted in Chapter I the Javanese, that is the population of 
East and Central Java, were divided among the priyayi, abangan and 
santri classes of which the last was strongly Moslem and the core of 
the NU while the priyayi and abangan were philosophically and 
politically  opposed  to  the  Islam  of  the  santri  class  despite  a 
superficial Islamic overlay of their pre-Islamic cultural values.(2) 
These typically Javanese elements were greatly attracted toward 
secular nationalism and Marxism and toward the PKI and PNI. All 
the political parties had branches and supporters throughout the 
archipelago but the PKI and PNI were especially strong in East and 
Central Java, the NU in East Java, and the Masjumi (banned in 1960) 
in West Java and Sumatra. Some of the smaller parties tended to 
have geographic affinities as well. Perti, a small Moslem party, had a 
West Java orientation; Parkindo - the Protestant Christian party - was 
strong in North Sulawesi (the Celebes), a largely Christian region; 
the Catholic Party was rooted among the sizable Catholic element 
among the  Chinese and  among the  indigenous population in  the 
Lesser Sunda islands where early Portuguese missionary work had 
left its imprint. Partindo and Murba were small Marxist parties with 
constituencies similar  to  the  PKI  and  PNI. The  two  other  small 
parties, IP-KI and the PSII were essentially fossilized remnants of 
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still-born or spent political tendencies. IP-KI was intended to be a 
political vehicle for the Army and especially for Nasution but it had 
been largely neutralized by Sukarno in the early 1960s. The PSII was 
a somewhat pathetic remnant of the old Sarekat Islam under the 
guidance of a servile Sukarno lackey, Arudji Kartawinata. There had 
earlier been a number of other small parties, incidentally, but their 
number had been reduced by executive fiat in the late 1950s. 
After  the  failure  of  the  1948  Madiun  uprising,  the  PKI 
leadership and many of its cadres had been largely destroyed or 
dispersed.  Since  the  Republican  government  was  lenient  toward 
those not directly involved (unlike 1965), a  few leaders such as 
Alimin and Tan Ling Djie, were able to reconstitute a legal PKI but 
they understandably decided to keep a low profile for the Party and 
look toward a long slow rebuilding process that would emphasize 
elitism and infiltration of other parties and front groups. This was 
undoubtedly due not only to the chastening experience that Musso's 
aggressive tactics had produced in 1948 but also to a certain sense of 
vindication on the part of Alimin and Tan Ling Djie that their advice 
had been swept aside by the enthusiasm for Musso's "New Road". 
The PKI might have remained in the doldrums indefinitely but for 
the return to Indonesia of Aidit and Lukman, two very young second 
level party leaders under Musso.(3) These two had fled abroad, the 
bulk of their exile being spent in China and North Vietnam, and had 
slipped back into Indonesia in 1950. Joining with another young man 
in their age group, Njoto, and supported by others such as Sudisman 
and Sakirman from a self-styled "Leninist wing" of the Party, they 
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were able to isolate Alimin and Tan Ling Djie and to take control of 
the Party by January, 1951. Alimin remained in the new Politburo 
along with Aidit, Lukman, Njoto and Sudisman while Tan Ling Djie 
remained a Central Committee member only. The two older leaders 
were to be dropped by stages from the leadership entirely prior to the 
Fifth Party Congress in March, 1954. Another older generation rival, 
Wikana, the communist youth leader who had played such a 
prominent role in 1945, remained on the Central Committee until the 
collapse of the PKI in 1965 but he was never again a significant 
figure. 
There were tactical differences between the new and older 
leadership over national front strategy, the Aidit group initially being 
doubtful about the efficacy of parliamentary maneuver and opposed 
to the idea of working through other parties. They also supported 
somewhat more aggressive tactics in mass organizations, giving 
particular support to the communist controlled labor front, SOBSI, 
which was led by Njono, another younger generation member of the 
Aidit clique who had frequently been at odds with Alimin over the 
latter's impatience with Njono's boldness on the strike front. Above 
all, Aidit was intent on development of the party and its cadres. He 
also reaffirmed the Musso "New Road" strategy, probably sincerely 
at the beginning, but early recognition of new opportunities caused 
the PKI to embark on a strategy of ingratiation and cooperation with 
the President and other left wing nationalist groups such as the PNI, 
coupled with vigorous growth of Party and front group 
membership.(4) 
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The principal reason for this initial shift toward cooperation 
with Sukarno, the PNI and Murba-oriented "national communists" 
was the increasing evidence of polarization between the large 
Masjumi Party and the PSI on the one hand and the PNI and other 
ultra-nationalist groups on the other. This split was accompanied by 
an  obvious  deterioration  of  relations  between  two  supposedly 
supra-party symbols of Indonesian independence, Sukarno and Hatta, 
the first sympathetic to the leftist parties and to a radical stance in 
foreign policy and the second favoring the Masjumi and PSI while 
more cautious and pragmatic on foreign policy issues. Sukarno was 
already pressing for Dutch cession of western New Guinea or West 
Irian  and  inveighing  against  imperialism.  The  PKI,  which  had 
labeled  Indonesia  a  semi-colonial  country  because  of  the  rather 
minor  restrictions  on  its  freedom  of  action  emanating  from  the 
Round Table agreements, was eager to lend its own shrill voice to all 
such issues, of course. Although the top Army leadership was 
generally anti-communist and, in the case of some of its top officers, 
even sympathetic to the PSI or the Masjumi, there were a variety of 
cliques. Some of these cliques were opposed to the Army leadership 
because they were leftovers from the factional irregular forces of the 
late 1940s, some resented efforts to professionalize the military and 
some were loyal followers of Sukarno and his policies. These 
conditions formed the background to one of the major slow motion, 
shadow-play political struggles of the early 1950s - the confrontation 
of the Army leadership with Sukarno on October 17, 1952 and a split 
in the Army between a pro-October 17 group and an anti-October 17 
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group supported by Sukarno, the PNI, and the rest of the nationalist 
left.(5) Nasution, one of the leaders of the October 17 group, had 
apparently been  encouraged initially by  Sukarno on  the  basis of 
Nasution's anti-parliament sentiments and his support for a strong 
unfettered presidency but Sukarno's interest shifted to opposition as 
it became clear that the Nasution group's plans would amount to too 
powerful a restraint on the President's freedom of action. 
This chain of events reinforced the PKI leadership's increasing 
commitment to a strategy of identification with Sukarno. This partly 
developed  from  a  realization  of  the  Party's  weakness  after  the 
Madiun failure coupled with a similar understanding of Sukarno's 
enormous personal popularity. However, it  was also undoubtedly 
reinforced by Aidit's understanding of the strength of Sukarno's 
ideological commitment to Marxism and a socialist perspective for 
the Indonesian revolution, however much he was also an Indonesian 
nationalist. Although an apparently monolithic Moscow-centered 
world communism to which Aidit was still loyal stood in the way of 
complete identity of views, the road was paved for increasing 
cooperation. Furthermore, Aidit himself had come to communism as 
a  nationalist  and  his  close  relationship  to  Sukarno  as  a  young 
member of Sukarno's entourage in the later war period probably 
generated mutual trust in the similarity of their underlying beliefs 
and long-term objectives.(6) Ultimately, Aidit and Sukarno moved 
on the same path because they instinctively favored a coupling of 
Marxist ideology and a Marxist philosophy of revolution with an 
Indonesia-first priority that precluded subservience to an allegedly 
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infallible and domineering communist big brother in Europe, the 
Soviet Union. This, after all, was not much different than the earlier 
willingness of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin to adjust Western European 
Marxism to the national demands of the Russian revolution. Despite 
their different perspectives on the imminence of revolution outside 
Russia, this was as true of Trotsky as it was of Lenin, for it was 
Trotsky who made the earlier adjustment toward advocating a 
communist-led revolution in an essentially feudal country, Tsarist 
Russia, when that was contrary to previous orthodox thinking.(7) 
The PNI, meanwhile, was profiting from the tacit support of the 
PKI while apparently having to give up little in return since the 
balance of forces in the country coupled with the continuing stigma 
of Madiun in the background, meant that only the PNI would obtain 
the rewards of cabinet positions and even most of the spoils of office 
in the provinces. PKI skill in mobilizing worker and peasant 
demonstrations contributed to the fall of the Wilopo cabinet in June, 
1953. Although Wilopo was from the PNI, this Government was 
strongly influenced by the Masjumi and PSI and Wilopo himself 
represented  a  moderate  wing  of  the  party  that  was  thoroughly 
disliked by Sukarno and the PNI militant left (many of whom would 
later be purged as too moderate). 
The Ali Sastroamidjojo government, which followed Wilopo, 
and  lasted  from  July,  1953  to  July,  1955,  was  the  first  to  be 
supported by the PKI even though the latter was given no seat in the 
cabinet. The Ali cabinet excluded the Masjumi and PSI but included 
the opportunistic NU which had split off from the Masjumi.(8) A 
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mixture of moderates and hyper-nationalists, the Ali cabinet brought 
in for the first time since the days of Amir Sjarifuddin several radical 
nationalist   Marxists   including   Sadjarwo   of   the   Barisan   Tani 
Indonesia (the PKI-dominated peasant front) as Minister of 
Agriculture and two Tan Malaka disciples in key ministries - Iwa 
Kusumasumantri in Defence and Muhammad Yamin in Justice. The 
Ali period was one of rapid growth for the PKI, a  sloganeering 
approach  to  foreign  policy,  and  a  much  increased  stature  for 
Sukarno. It was also a period of eclipse for the moderate political 
parties, the fading of Hatta as a virtual co-equal of Sukarno, and the 
progressive decline of sentiment for constitutional democracy on a 
Western model. The Indonesian initiative for an Afro-Asian summit 
at Bandung in 1955 became one of the major world events of the 
1950s and provided Sukarno with a platform to project himself on 
the world stage. It also set Indonesia on a path of radical leadership 
in the Third World and common cause with Communist China. PKI 
growth under these conditions of PNI alliance and Sukarno's 
patronage was rapid. The priority commitment of the PKI leadership 
to development of a mass party was the key factor, of course, and 
Aidit understood that the long association of the earlier PKI with 
nationalist sentiment provided a fertile field for recruitment. Party 
membership had been less than 10,000 and party organization 
confined to Java in 1951 but the Party increased to over 100,000 in 
1952  while  the  organization was  extended  to  Madura,  Sulawesi, 
Kalimantan, the Lesser Sunda Islands and the Moluccas.(9) 
Membership was said to be 165,206 at the time of the Fifth Party 
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Congress in 1954, one million in 1956, two million in 1962, three 
million by the PKI anniversary in May, 1965 and 3.5 million in 
August 1965. Growth of PKI affiliated organizations such as SOBSI 
(trade unions), the BTI (the peasant front), Pemuda Rakjat (the youth 
front) and Gerwani (the communist women's organization) was also 
rapid. As noted elsewhere, these figures - especially in the final 
period - are subject to some skepticism since their announcement had 
a tactical objective of reinforcing a bandwagon image. The earlier 
figures  are  probably  more  certain  but,  in  any  case,  there  is  no 
question that growth was spectacular. This was demonstrated in the 
1955 parliamentary election where the PKI received more than six 
million votes or some 16.4 percent of the total and emerged as one of 
the top four political parties (the PNI had 22.3 percent, Masjumi 
20.9% and the NU 18.4%).(10) 
 
Meanwhile, the Ali government had fallen in July, 1955 on 
issues  connected  with  leadership  of  the  Army.  Ali's  Defense 
Minister, Iwa Kusumasumantri had named a rather junior colonel 
with a reputation for pliability, Bambang Utojo, to be Chief of Staff 
but this caused a great uproar by Army professionals led by the fiery 
deputy (and acting) Chief of Staff, Zulkifli Lubis. The Army 
coalesced on this issue including both supporters and opponents of 
the Nasution modernizing group of the October 17, 1952 affair. Iwa 
was forced to resign and then joined Sukarno on a convenient 
pilgrimage to Mecca as the Ali government collapsed in the face of 
Army intransigence. The Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet that followed 
in August, 1955 and which hung on after the September elections 
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was a kind of last hurrah for the moderate forces. It was formed with 
the support of Vice-President Hatta and the Army leadership but 
quarrels over patronage made it more ineffectual than was hoped. 
Burhanuddin was from the Masjumi and the cabinet was a mixture of 
Masjumi,  other  Islamic  parties  including  the  NU,  the  PSI,  and 
like-minded forces. The PNI was excluded as, of course, was the 
PKI. The life of the Burhanuddin cabinet was determined by the 
need to form a new cabinet on the basis of the newly-elected 
parliament. 
Sukarno had been elated by the election results and particularly 
by the poor showing of the PSI, the democratic socialist party headed 
by his long-time rival, Sutan Sjahrir, which had captured a mere 2% 
of the vote. Sukarno now became much more active, introducing for 
the first time a program for "planned" democracy in place of liberal 
western institutions and launching a series of charges about illegal 
Western plots to undermine the internal order through corruption and 
sabotage and compelling the republic to "sign foreign treaties whose 
disadvantages would not be known until later".(11) Then, in 
November,   1955,   Sukarno   began   to   attack   Western   liberal 
democracy as an institution and to propose a "planned democracy" 
which was later to become a program of "guided democracy". The 
Burhanuddin Harahap government responded by opening 
negotiations with the Dutch in December to try to recover West Irian 
and thereby preempt the left but this effort failed because of Dutch 
failure to perceive the importance of shoring up what was to be the 
last hope of supporting a moderate pro-Western government. 
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President Sukarno now named Ali Sastroamidjojo as formateur 
of a new government based on the elections. He pressed initially for 
a "four-legged" cabinet that would include the PKI but that objective 
proved unobtainable. While this was partly because of the opposition 
of key Army officers and the traditional opposition of the Masjumi 
and PSI, it also reflected concern on the part of the PNI over the 
rapid gains of the communists in the elections and a much increased 
awareness that these two parties were competing for influence in the 
same constituency, the traditional anti-Moslem classes of Javanese 
society. 
Although  Ali  was  a  longtime  supporter  and  colleague  of 
Sukarno and was to follow the President's direction in carrying out a 
pro-communist purge of the PNI in 1965, Ali was also a PNI 
organization loyalist who never had any great sympathy for the PKI. 
In 1956, the PNI was fearful of communist gains at its expense, 
especially in its central Java stronghold, and desired a coalition that 
would provide some reconciliation with the Masjumi. Although 
members of the anti-PNI Burhanuddin cabinet were excluded, the 
new government eventually formed by Ali included both Masjumi 
and NU ministers as well as those of the PNI. The communists 
originally sought to be included in the cabinet, but seeing that this 
was not possible, pressed for inclusion of some PKI sympathizers. 
Sukarno himself pressed strongly for this latter alternative, the names 
being offered including the two brothers, A. M. Hanafi and Asmara 
Hadi, the BTI (leftist peasant) leader, Sadjarwo, and a Professor 
Purbodiningrat who had been prominent in communist peace front 
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activities. The new coalition partners and Ali himself refused to go 
along, however, and Sukarno settled for a non-communist technician 
whom  he  trusted,  Djuanda.(12)  Tension  mounted  in  1956  on  a 
number of fronts. The Army had lost its unity again following the 
return of General Nasution to the Chief of Staff position in October, 
1955. Although anti-communist, Nasution was a strong proponent of 
highly centralized government, was critical of the political parties 
and was opposed to the independent "war-lord" tendencies of some 
of the regional commanders who were sympathetic to the Masjumi 
or PSI and had long tenure in their billets. He was also at odds with 
his deputy, the same Colonel Zulkifli Lubis who was among his 
opponents in the October, 1952 affair. The new intra-Army struggle 
did not always follow the previous line-up as Nasution was intent on 
transferring not only Lubis but a number of commanders who had 
supported him in 1952 such as Colonel Simbolon in North Sumatra. 
He also appears to have made his peace with Sukarno as well as Ali, 
and not for the last time. 
Another factor was Sukarno's assumption of  an  increasingly 
independent role separate or "above" that of the Ali Government. 
This was reflected in his criticisms of liberal democracy and in his 
somewhat highhanded conduct of personal diplomacy abroad, most 
notably his pressing Foreign Minister Ruslan Abdulgani to sign a 
controversial Joint Statement with the Soviet Union during the 
President's visit to Moscow in September 1956, a trip which also 
netted a Soviet economic assistance package of 100 million dollars. 
Sukarno now began to gather around him a group of relatively young 
77  
 
leftists from the so-called '45 Generation including Chairul Saleh and 
the former "Student Army" leader from the revolutionary struggle 
period, Achmadi. Most of these new young leaders were Marxists as 
well as radical nationalists whether they were connected with the 
PKI, Murba or Partindo. On returning from the Soviet Union and 
China in October, Sukarno had high praise for communist systems, 
particularly that in China, and began to press much more openly and 
strongly for a system of "guided democracy" to replace the "liberal 
democracy  of  Western  Europe".  This  guided  "democracy"  was 
linked frequently with Sukarno's favorable impressions of China and 
was also called a "national democracy", a term that was to fit in with 
developing communist concepts of a national democratic stage as a 
tactical waypoint on the road to establishing a communist regime. As 
Arnold Brackman has noted, there was a certain "poignant tragedy" 
in this sequence of events since Sukarno's push for a  system of 
guided democracy based in part on his tour of the communist world 
took place in the year of Khrushchev's exposure of Stalin's crimes 
and at the very time that Poland and Hungary were shaken with 
popular uprisings and a less known peasant rebellion was quelled in 
North Vietnam. (13) 
Sukarno's drive for guided democracy and his open favoritism 
for  the  communist  countries  drew  sharp  criticism  from  Vice 
President Hatta who announced his intention to resign. This he did 
on November 30, 1956. Withdrawal by Hatta was widely interpreted 
in Sumatra as raising the threat of increased Javanese domination 
over the Outer Islands as the Sukarno-Hatta duumvirate had always 
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stood for some kind of geographic as well as ideological balance. 
The combination of Sukarno's play for greater power and his more 
open leftist stance, Hatta's withdrawal, and Nasution's efforts to 
remove territorial commanders including Simbolon led to a series of 
revolts throughout Sumatra in December. The Masjumi party left the 
government coalition in January, 1957. An effort was then made by 
Sukarno to form a new government based on the PNI, NU and PKI 
but this failed because of NU opposition.(12) Sukarno then engaged 
in a bizarre but effective maneuver to make himself "formateur" and 
appoint a government of "experts" headed by Djuanda Kartawidjaja, 
a nonparty independent, as premier. Djuanda subsequently became 
"First Minister" under Sukarno as Prime Minister and retained that 
position until his death in late 1963 but he was totally overshadowed 
by Sukarno. 
The new cabinet contained no open PKI members but a process 
was begun of installing a certain number of Marxist-oriented extreme 
leftists in cabinet positions. These included both people who were 
close  to  the  PKI  and  others  who  were  more  attuned  to  the  old 
national communist coterie of Tan Malaka under the banner of the 
Generation of '45 headed by Chairul Saleh. The PKI occasionally 
showed its displeasure with inclusion of these figures but its 
leadership almost certainly understood Sukarno's need to mobilize a 
fairly  broad-based leftist  and  nationalist  front  against  the  "right" 
which was defined as including not only genuine reactionary and 
feudal elements but all the confused and disorganized forces of 
constitutional  democracy  that  opposed  Sukarno's  drive  toward  a 
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totalitarian order. The pattern of the further Indonesian revolution 
was  set.  Sukarno  and  the  PKI,  working  hand  in  glove,  were 
embarked on a strategy whereby the PKI kept up the pressure "from 
below" while Sukarno, as President, Great Leader of the Revolution, 
Father  of  Marhaenism  and  Supreme  Commander  of  the  Armed 
Forces (to use some of the principal titles he accumulated over the 
next few years), played the role of ostensible moderate and judge 
who would placate all forces when necessary and then move to the 
left as fast as the traffic would bear. These tactics are analyzed in 
greater detail elsewhere. 
In 1957 as in later years, a radical posture toward foreign 
enemies was employed not only to achieve specific foreign policy 
objectives but, much more, to further the internal revolutionary 
process. A campaign to force Dutch cession of West New Guinea or 
West Irian was launched that built up steam throughout the year with 
the PKI highly visible as the most vociferous and most 
organizationally skilled  component of  the  national front. Foreign 
communist support for the Indonesian claim was also on display, 
particularly during the triumphal visit of the Soviet chief of state, 
Marshal Voroshilov. The PKI profited in regional elections held at 
this time, largely at the expense of the PNI, and to a considerable 
extent   because   of   Sukarno's   warm   attitude   toward   it.   The 
communists came in first in Central Java, were second to the NU in 
East Java by only a small margin and second to the Masjumi in West 
Java and Jakarta. In the face of rising concern by moderate elements, 
especially outside of Java, both Sukarno and the PKI increased the 
80 
 
 
level of demagoguery over the West Irian issue and, following an 
unsuccessful attempt on Sukarno's life, seizure of Dutch properties 
by the Communist trade union federation, SOBSI, began. The 
simmering revolt in the Outer Islands erupted more fully in early 
1958 as a number of prominent disillusioned moderates headed by a 
Masjumi member and former President of the Central Bank, 
Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, proclaimed a rival government with its 
capital at the mountain resort of Bukittinggi in West Sumatra. Hatta 
and Sjahrir, although appalled by Sukarno's dictatorial practices and 
leftward   drift,   nevertheless   opposed   the   PRRI,   as   the   rival 
government was known. (13) 
A key factor in the political equation was the attitude of the 
Indonesian Army or TNI (for Tentara Nasional Indonesia). Born in 
the revolution against the Dutch from a mixture of Japanese-trained 
officers, units of various political coloration that had been spawned 
by the independence struggle and finally by a growing coterie of 
professionally minded soldiers, the TNI officer corps had come to 
regard itself as a national institution with a political as well as a 
military role. This role was not seen in the 1950s as requiring the 
establishment of military rule but as a kind of silent partnership with 
the civilian leadership in which the Army would participate in the 
political life of the country to some degree, would act as a guarantor 
of  national  unity,  and  might  intervene  for  limited  objectives  on 
special occasions. The Army leadership around General Nasution 
were all firm proponents of national unity and the territorial integrity 
of the Indonesian archipelago although these values co-existed with a 
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strong  hostility  toward  the  PKI  which  was  based  not  only  on 
ideology but on their view of that Party as a would-be saboteur of the 
Revolution in 1948. Nasution, in particular, held this view because of 
his role and that of his Siliwangi division in suppressing the Madiun 
revolt.  His  role  in  1957-58  in  moving  decisively  against  the 
Sumatran and Sulawesi rebellions was also undoubtedly the natural 
consequence of his conflict with the territorial commanders in pure 
internal army terms, that is his desire to put his personal stamp on the 
Army and to insist on his authority to effect transfers. 
The Army leadership, particularly Nasution, was also critical of 
the Western parliamentary system and favored replacement of 
political parties with a system of "functional groups" of which the 
armed forces would be one.(14) This latter idea seemed, at least 
superficially, to  coincide  with  some  aspects  of  Sukarno's guided 
democracy, particularly the idea of abolishing parties and 
establishing a  national  front  based  on  functional groups such  as 
labor, peasants, youth, the armed forces, etc. Such a National Front 
was established formally by Sukarno although political parties 
remained and most of the functional group membership consisted of 
political party affiliates. The National Front, in fact, came to be 
dominated by the extreme left and was a vehicle for ensuring that 
PKI and Sukarnoist agitprop activities were projected as national 
efforts.  The  writer  believes  that  Sukarno  was  clever  enough  to 
project his "national front" ideas in forms that appeared to coincide 
with Army thinking in order to make the Army a fellow traveler for 
his immediate purposes but with no intention of abolishing all the 
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political parties at this stage. There was a "consolidation" of parties 
that eliminated some small splinter organizations, however, and 
Sukarno's Masjumi and PSI enemies were soon to be banned, of 
course. 
The Army, Sukarno and the PKI were agreed at this point on the 
need to move swiftly and effectively against the Outer Island 
rebellions and this they did. During a few short months in the spring 
of 1958, the Indonesian army under the field command of General 
Yani took major towns in Sumatra including the PRRI capital at 
Bukittinggi, employing fairly sophisticated airborne assault tactics; 
and in June took the Sulawesi capital of Menado following an 
amphibious landing. Scattered insurgency continued in rural areas 
and neither the civilian nor military leaders of the rebellion were to 
surrender   until   1961.   Nevertheless   the   ease   with   which   the 
Indonesian  Army  had  defeated  the  PRRI  and  Permesta  forces 
ensured their ultimate failure while providing Sukarno and the PKI 
with a symbol for attacking the internal opposition at home and the 
West, particularly the US, abroad. The downing of a rebel B-26 
flown by an American pilot, Allan Pope, became a particular cause 
celebre that was exploited fully by the PKI. These events had created 
a new constellation of forces which the political shorthand of the day 
reduced to a triangle of the Army and PKI being balanced by the 
President. There was some truth in this summary as the sputtering 
Outer  Island  rebellions  had  not  only  placed  its  open  supporters 
outside the pale but had discredited the Masjumi and Socialist (PSI) 
parties as well as Hatta and many non-Javanese Army officers. The 
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chief beneficiaries were clearly Sukarno, the central Army leadership 
and  the  PKI  but  the  political  equation  was  in  fact  much  more 
complex  due  to  the  continued participation in  political  life  of  a 
variety of other elements and the susceptibility of the Armed Forces 
to manipulation because of internal rivalries, nationalist appeals on 
particular issues and Sukarno's personal authority and control of the 
initiative. 
Nevertheless,   the   Army   was   initially   able   to   act   rather 
decisively on its own behalf and against the communists when it 
chose to do so. A number of its officers entered the cabinet and a 
variety of other important civilian positions. It openly harassed the 
PKI in 1959 and again in 1960, forcing a Party Congress to be 
postponed in the first case and closing the party newspaper 
temporarily and interrogating leading Party officials on the second 
occasion. The Army also supported an anti-Chinese campaign in 
1960 that forced the Chinese out of rural trade where they had had a 
virtual  monopoly  position  and  established  much  more  restrictive 
rules on Indonesian citizenship. The Army's political position was 
gradually eroded, however, since it had proclaimed its loyalty to a 
president with enormous personal prestige and an inner commitment 
to drive the Indonesian Revolution step by step to the left in 
accordance with a radical Marxist conception. Nasution's own 
position as head of the Army was also undermined by the fact that he 
was a Sumatran in an Army that had become more Java-centric after 
the  PRRI/Permesta defections and  Sukarno was  also  able  to  use 
patronage and the glow of his personal attention to erode much of the 
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Army loyalty from Nasution to himself. This was a gradual process 
that  had  become  much  more  effective  by  1963-65  but  it  was 
important from the beginning. Nasution's own personal 
indecisiveness in a crunch was also a major factor although this too 
was not as clear in the late 1950s as it was to become in 1965-1966. 
Meanwhile, Sukarno retained the initiative and the ability to 
take advantage of internal and external events to further an 
atmosphere of inevitable revolutionary change. His August 17, 1959 
Independence  Day  speech,  reportedly  drafted  in  part  by  Aidit, 
became a blueprint for a revolutionary offensive. Called the Political 
Manifesto (Manipol), it contained a set of five vague but lofty 
principles (USDEK) that  became  a  touchstone for  loyalty to  the 
Revolution and could be used to condemn almost any form of 
opposition. The very vagueness of these principles (the 1945 
constitution, socialism, guided democracy, guided economy, and 
Indonesian Identity) was conducive to a process of constant 
reinterpretation of the standards of loyalty while the mesmerizing use 
of slogans and acronyms served to extinguish critical thought and 
create an atmosphere of hypnotic obedience. The 1959 speech also 
mentioned the two stages of the revolution concept without 
elaboration.  Indeed,  one  of  Sukarno's  brilliant  tactics  was  to 
introduce Marxist ideas in formulations that were initially vague and 
unorthodox in their jargon but fit loosely into traditional Indonesian 
cultural values and symbolism. Once the jargon had been accepted 
by the elites, who had little understanding of what they were 
accepting, definitions began to be expanded and interwoven with 
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new slogans so that a whole society was being herded toward 
revolutionary goals that were held in common by Sukarno and the 
PKI.  For  example,  Sukarno  tried  to  make  the  pro-communist 
doctrine of "Nasakom" more palatable by linking it to the traditional 
Indonesian concept of "gotong-royong" (cooperation and mutual self 
help, especially at the village level) and "panca sila", the five vague 
principles he had proclaimed in 1945 which were accepted as 
traditional aims of the independence struggle. It is also worth noting 
that Sukarno's ideas of a national democratic stage to be followed by 
a socialist stage were enunciated in Manipol more than a year before 
this terminology began to emerge in world-wide communist doctrine 
at  the  Moscow  Conference  of  Communist  Parties  in  November, 
1961. 
 
In this period Indonesia began to step up its demands for the 
Netherlands to cede West Irian to Indonesia and responded to Dutch 
recalcitrance by beginning a process of gradual seizure of Dutch 
properties. The PKI and the ardent left-wing nationalists were in the 
forefront of this campaign while the Army and moderate elements 
were  caught  in  the  difficult  position  of  favoring  the  national 
objectives at issue (and after securing for themselves practical 
advantages in additional management positions) but they were also 
concerned by the political advantages accruing to the PKI as well as 
the decline in national economic capacity inherent in such actions. 
Communist bloc support, both verbal and material, was also being 
increased, particularly after Khrushchev's visit in early 1960. The 
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Soviet leader not only endorsed Indonesia's claim to West Irian but 
offered a 250 million dollar line of credit at low interest. (15) 
Sukarno now began to move more emphatically to install the 
institutions of Guided Democracy. He dismissed the elected 
parliament   on   March   5,   1960   and   established   an   appointed 
"Gotong-Royong" parliament twenty days later (the Gotong-Royong 
phraseology implied that cooperation, not party competition, would 
be   demanded   and   that   cooperation  with   the   communists,  in 
particular, would be expected). Sukarno was given power to ban 
political parties if he saw fit. He established a "National Front" with 
a   strong   leftist   orientation   that   came   increasingly   under   the 
leadership and domination of the communists. He appointed a 
People's Congress, the MPRS, which consisted of the 283 members 
of Parliament, 232 representatives of functional groups (youth, labor, 
peasants, military, cultural, etc.) and 94 regional representatives. On 
August 17, 1960, Sukarno dissolved the Masjumi and PSI parties and 
many of their leaders were imprisoned a year or two later including 
Sutan Sjahrir (leader of the war-time resistance and twice premier), 
Mohamad Rum (signatory of the agreement that ended Dutch rule 
and secured Indonesia's independence), and Mohamad Natsir (leader 
of the Masjumi and a former premier). Moderate forces fought back 
by establishing a "Democratic League" while Sukarno was abroad 
but  it  was  eventually  disbanded  by  Sukarno  in  much  the  same 
manner that the Body to Promote Sukarnoism (BPS) led a short 
exhilarating existence until banned by Sukarno in 1964. The 
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Army also launched another short-lived anti Communist 
campaign in the summer of 1960, first on a national scale and then 
instituting a regional ban of the Party in South Kalimantan, South 
Sulawesi and South Sumatra (sometimes called the Three Souths 
Affair), all of which evoked denunciations of "communist phobia" 
from the President. All of these efforts were but a minor and 
weakening counter effort against the predominant thrust of the 
country toward a tightening dictatorship of an ever more powerful 
Sukarno and continued momentum for the fast growing PKI. 
Sukarno's prestige and position were increasing, above all 
because of his ability to turn the country toward external 
confrontations, the immediate target being an accelerated political 
offensive to gain West Irian. It was unfortunate that the Dutch had 
not included this territory in  its  transfer of  sovereignty over the 
Dutch East Indies earlier although there was also a case that the 
peoples of this territory were not Indonesian and might not wish to 
be  part  of  Indonesia.  A  transfer  of  this  large,  underdeveloped 
territory to Indonesia a decade earlier would have strengthened the 
prestige of moderate, democratic government; its transfer to Sukarno 
would demonstrate that an extremist approach paid off. On the other 
hand, it was also clear that Sukarno would use the issue, as long as 
West Irian remained Dutch, to arouse the revolutionary tempo 
internally and damage the already cowed democratic forces. The 
policy of confrontation, not surprisingly, had the support of both the 
PKI and the Nasution-led Army. As the propaganda campaign 
proceeded, Nasution travelled to Moscow where substantial military 
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assistance was provided. By 1961, advanced Soviet aircraft including 
TU-16s, MIG-19s and MIG-21s were arriving as well as a variety of 
warships. A concerned United States was fearful of Indonesia falling 
under Soviet and Chinese influence that might be prevented, it was 
hoped, if a peaceful transfer of West Irian could be accomplished 
with US help. A US offer to mediate was advanced in early 
December, 1961, a move undoubtedly welcomed by Sukarno as a 
sign of weakness. The President ordered "total mobilization" as part 
of a military effort to take the territory but this was largely a 
blustering propaganda show. Although the  PKI  was  offering the 
bodies of its membership and of its front organizations as volunteers, 
such military action as took place was by the professional military 
under the  field command of  General Suharto and even this was 
largely limited to hit and run raids by small elite units beginning with 
a parachute drop in January, 1962. Under the auspices of the US 
mediator, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, agreement for a peaceful 
transfer was signed at the UN on August 15, 1962 with the actual 
transfer to take place by May, 1963. 
The Irian settlement was accompanied by a revival of hopes that 
Indonesia would now pursue a path of peaceful economic 
development. Substantial US economic assistance was offered as 
part of a program of economic stabilization to be conducted by First 
Minister Djuanda. This dream was not to last long, however, as 
Sukarno had other ideas. His own economic program was stated to 
the  MPRS  in  May  under  a  new  slogan,  DEKON,  the  main 
anti-capitalist and anti Western elements of which were preached by 
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the PKI with great fervor. Sukarno's main trump, however, continued 
to be his ability to stir up foreign crises. The opportunity to do just 
that was presented by the British decision to combine an already 
independent Malaya with several colonies along Indonesia's northern 
periphery into  a  single  entity  that  would be  given  independence 
under the name of Malaysia. 
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Footnotes - Chapter III 
 
 
 
1. Although the Masjumi leadership and cadres were 
overwhelmingly modernist, that party also embraced some of 
the more fanatical fundamentalist groups, particularly in West 
Java and certain strongly Moslem areas of the Outer Islands 
such as South Sulawesi and Aceh. This presumably reflected the 
identification of most non-Javanese with the Masjumi rather 
than the Java-centered Nahdatul Ulama. Islamic fanaticism was 
expressed most vividly in the Darul Islam rebellions in West 
Java and South Sulawesi. The first had been largely suppressed 
in the late 1950s, the latter only in 1964. It must also be 
emphasized that the Nahdatul Ulama Party of the later Suharto 
era and post Suharto period, while a descendent of the party of 
the Sukarno era, is not the same. Since the Masjumi was never 
resurrected, the modern Nahdatul Ulama embraces a wide 
spectrum of Islamic adherents. 
2. The classic study on this subject is Clifford Geertz, The  
Religion of Java (Glencoe, Ill) 1960. Most Indonesians and 
Western scholars agree with the importance of these 
sociological groupings although not always with Geertz's 
detailed analysis. Van der Kroef, while not denying their 
significance, held that they have been somewhat 
over-emphasized and felt that loyalty to modern institutions 
such as political parties should be accorded greater significance 
in analyzing political conduct. His point is well taken although 
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the significance of these competing (or sometimes reinforcing) 
loyalties has varied in different circumstances. The 
interweaving of various ethnic, cultural, institutional and 
personal factors was and remains especially complex in 
Indonesia. 
3. Aidit was born on July 30, 1923; Lukman in 1920; Njoto in 
 
1925 and Sudisman in 1920. They accordingly ranged in age 
from 25 to 30 when they took over the Party in 1951. 
4. Actually, all significant PKI figures continued to give lip 
service to Musso's "New Road" in general terms although 
Alimin and Tan Ling Djie had shown much more caution than 
Musso in practice. The Aidit PKI obviously deviated greatly 
from the 1948 stance toward Sukarno and in the manner of 
applying united front tactics but it continued to claim a direct 
lineal descent from Musso and his New Road. There were 
considerable areas of similarity, of course, particularly in 
respect to Party discipline and organization. Van der Kroef, p. 
45, discusses the Alimin posture. 
 
5. See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in 
 
Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press) 1962, pp. 
 
246-273. 
 
6. As noted elsewhere, Aidit attended lectures by Sukarno and 
other Indonesian nationalist figures during the Japanese 
occupation and subsequently claimed to have been attracted to 
Marxism by Sukarno's teachings. Both he and Lukman 
belonged to a small Japanese-trained para-military force that 
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acted as a bodyguard for Sukarno in the latter stages of the 
 
Japanese occupation. The latter point is noted by Mortimer, p. 
 
36. 
 
7. Discussed at length in Bertram Wolfe, Three Who Made a  
Revolution (New York) 1984. 
8. The first Ali cabinet included representatives of several small 
nationalist parties as well. 
9. See Aidit, Problems of the Indonesian Revolution p. 263. 
 
10.  The growth of the PKI under Aidit's leadership is accorded 
detailed treatment in Brackman, Van der Kroef and Donald 
Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963 
(Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press) 
1964. The latter contains much useful detail but suffers, in my 
view, from an analytical defect in its summation. Hindley 
lays out a whole series of hypothetical options as to how the 
PKI might achieve power along with the liabilities of each. 
Since Hindley had a traditional view of PKI separateness from 
Sukarno, none of his options covered the real dynamics of the 
unfolding revolutionary situation - an advance toward 
communism by Sukarno himself. On the other hand, 
Hindley, in my judgment, has a more valid view of essential 
PKI leadership harmony than some writers and is properly 
skeptical of popular rumors about significant leadership splits. 
11.  Brackman, p. 221. 
 
12.  In an autobiography written shortly before his death, Ali 
 
Sastroamidjojo said that Sukarno was very angry with him for 
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not including the PKI in his second cabinet. (p.324). He also 
said the only reason why Sukarno's "policy of Nasakom was 
espoused by the political parties was expediency, because the 
authority and power of Sukarno was so great that to oppose his 
policies was to commit political suicide". Ali Sastroamidjojo, 
Milestones on My Journey (St. Lucia, Queensland, Australia) 
1979. p 357. 
 
13.  Brackman, p. 228. 
 
14.  The PKI continued until the very end to refer to 
Sukarno's"conception" of February 21, 1957 as its basis for 
advocating a Nasakom cabinet. See, for example, the Harian 
Rakjat edition of February 22, 1964. On February 23, 1964, 
Harian Rakjat cited current statements by Murba, IP-KI, 
Partindo, Perti and the PNI in support of a Nasakom cabinet. It 
is noteworthy that the NU (as well as the Catholic and 
Protestant "Parkindo" parties were not cited by the PKI 
newspaper, apparently an indication that the NU had still not 
backed off from its opposition of seven years earlier in spite of 
the national leadership's willingness to echo Nasakom slogans 
more generally. 
15.  The initials PRRI derive from the Indonesian words for 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia. It 
called itself the Government of the Federated Republic of 
Indonesia after 1959 but is still generally known as the PRRI. 
The rebellion in Sulawesi took the initials PERMESTA, an 
acronym for the "Universal Charter for Struggle". Subsequent 
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denunciations by the PKI and Sukarno of their enemies 
commonly combined the two acronyms into a common 
"PRRI/PERMESTA". 
16.  The leading American academic authority on the Indonesian 
Army has been Guy Pauker of the RAND Corporation. For 
example, see his "The Role of the Military in Indonesia" in J. J. 
Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped  
Countries (Princeton, N.J.) 1962. 
17.  Brackman, p. 273. 
95  
 
IV 
 
The Indonesian Communist Party 
 
 
 
A considerable Western literature now exists on the Indonesian 
Communist Party including books by Arnold Brackman, Ruth 
McVey, Donald Hindley, Rex Mortimer, Justus Van der Kroef, and 
Antonie Dake. The points of view among these authors range from 
strongly anti-communist to sympathy or regret for the PKI's fall but 
all make useful contributions and are serious scholarly works. Much 
of the basic data on the PKI and its history is now firmly established 
although some areas of controversy remain. While I do not propose 
to reconstruct this vast history, I would like to review some essential 
points about the PKI as an institution and note some areas where I 
believe at least some of the existing literature has gone astray. Since 
the   early   attraction   of   communism  in   Indonesia   was   to   its 
anti-imperialist and anti-colonial features, the PKI has always been 
prone toward distinctly national Indonesian variations. Its invention 
of the "bloc within" strategy and that strategy's initial early success 
also made the PKI inordinately inclined toward national front tactics 
and toward making rather far reaching ideological and tactical 
compromises to advance its cause. Sukarno's own blurred record of 
combining Marxism and nationalism also served as a beacon for the 
young leaders and cadres of the PKI organization, especially since it 
became clear in the 1950s that the PKI would go nowhere except 
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under the protective umbrella of the Great Leader of the Revolution. 
There were, as in all human affairs, countervailing tendencies at 
times, of course. Dutch efforts to suppress the PKI in the 1920s, both 
before and after the unsuccessful 1926 revolt, caused the exile of 
many leading communists to Moscow where they came under great 
pressure to conform to whatever international line was being pursued 
by the Soviet Union at the moment. PKI resistance to these 
blandishments is ably recorded by Ruth McVey in her history of the 
early  movement  and  by  Arnold  Brackman  and  others  for  later 
periods. This Soviet influence waxed most strongly in the 1930s and 
1940s when the Party was weak and then in the early post-war period 
when the  hard  "Zhdanov line" of  encouraging armed action and 
de-emphasizing accommodation with potential allies was imposed. 
The 1948 Madiun fiasco was the result, a premature and abortive 
second PKI revolt that remained an albatross around the Party's neck 
in later years no matter how hard the PKI and Sukarno himself tried 
to rid the party of the charge of treason against the young Republic 
that was fighting for its life against the Dutch. Without the blemish 
of Madiun and the enmity for the PKI which it established in the 
minds of much of the Army, there is little doubt that Indonesia would 
have followed Sukarno into a communist-dominated Indonesia in 
1965. Much has been written about the fabulous rebirth and rapid 
growth of the Communist Party during the 1950s under the 
imaginative leadership of D. N. Aidit, Lukman and Njoto. Their 
policy of patient construction of a mass party, development of a 
plethora of strong front groups such as the Pemuda Rakjat (youth), 
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Gerwani (women), SOBSI (labor unions), the BTI (peasant front), 
CGMI (university students), HSI (scholars and intellectuals), and 
LEKRA (culture), participation in elections, friendly relations with 
certain partners and groups while ostracizing others, and patriotism, 
all proved essential. Above all, these young men understood the need 
to work with Sukarno and to build respectability by identifying 
themselves  and  their  party  with  the   symbols  and  causes  of 
Indonesian nationalism. This course allowed for criticism as well as 
support of the government and some of this criticism was seen as 
directed at times toward President Sukarno. 
To the extent that analysts of Indonesia have seen Sukarno as a 
neutral balancer of forces and as the all-powerful leader of the 
government, the tendency has been to hold that PKI criticism of the 
government was anti-Sukarno. Since no relationship, even among 
close associates, is devoid of friction, it would be foolhardy to deny 
that some real criticism of Sukarno was occasionally intended. 
However,  much  of  the  abstract  criticism  of  the  government  in 
general or of the government "leadership" was intended to strengthen 
Sukarno's hand against the Army and other moderate or right wing 
forces that retained a powerful veto, particularly in the early years of 
guided democracy. Some authors, for example, have seen PKI 
criticism of Sukarno for his failure to establish a Nasakom cabinet 
when, in fact, it was Sukarno who tried to bring the PKI into the 
cabinet as early as the late 1950s and who worked consistently 
thereafter toward reducing "communist phobia" and enhancing the 
Party's acceptability among the powerful entrenched interests of the 
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country including those who controlled the instruments of physical 
power. Another example is Rex Mortimer's description of Sukarno in 
the so-called Three Souths Affair of July 8, 1960 (crackdowns on the 
PKI by local military commanders in South Sumatra, South 
Kalimantan and South Sulawesi) as having "moderated the collision 
between the two parties (the Army and the PKI), demonstrated his 
authority over both, and left the power balance relatively 
undisturbed".(l) The implication of a Sukarno who was motivated 
solely by his personal power needs and was ideologically equidistant 
between the two contenders is one interpretation but one may also 
view his role as consonant with PKI needs as well as his own. After 
all, the Army was powerful and visibly intent on restricting the PKI 
in that period, was feeling its oats as a result of its victories against 
the Outer Islands rebellions, and was especially strong throughout 
the Outer Islands where the PKI and even Sukarno were weak. Some 
accommodation had to be made, particularly in view of the 
commitment of both Sukarno and the PKI to achievement of their 
internal goals in the context of a united Indonesia. Given Sukarno's 
clear ideological kinship to the PKI, as demonstrated in his conduct 
as well as his rhetoric in the years that followed, the alternative 
model of Sukarno and the PKI working in close collusion even in 
1960 seems preferable. There was a differentiation between the two 
but it was primarily a tactical one; the Great Leader who was in 
reality  committed  to  one  side  could  not  afford  to  appear  so 
committed prematurely but had to seem above it all, to be judicious 
and "balanced" - while endeavoring to shift that political balance 
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gradually in the direction he wished to go. To do otherwise would 
have meant the undermining of his own authority and also the 
destruction very quickly in 1960 of the PKI itself. 
Much has been made of alleged differences among the PKI 
leaders - too much, in fact. Arnold Brackman speaks a bit too 
emphatically of differences between a pro-Soviet and a pro-Chinese 
faction, for example, but Dake goes particularly far in elaborating an 
almost independently powerful pro-Chinese "Njoto faction" that 
strains the credulity of one who followed the PKI at close hand in its 
closing years.(2) As a Soviet specialist for some years before going 
to Indonesia, I was predisposed by background and training to look 
for factional splits but I found them less evident in Indonesia than in 
any other communist party I encountered either before or after 
Indonesia (even the apparently monolithic Romanian party under 
Ceausescu showed more fissures under careful Kremlinological 
analysis, in my view). The very young triumvirate of Aidit, Lukman 
and Njoto that took over the PKI in 1951-52 appeared extremely 
close and united on the basic party strategy for achieving power. 
After the expulsion of their predecessors (Alimin and Tan Ling Djie) 
and isolation of other senior Party leaders such as Wikana, the PKI 
showed remarkable continuity in its senior cadre structure.(3) Year 
after year, the same Politburo, the same Central Committee and the 
same Central Verification Committee members remained. Promotion 
was a problem, particularly given the young age of the top leaders, 
and could only be effected artificially by expanding the size of the 
Party's higher deliberative bodies. The promotion of a Njono (SOBSI 
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chief and later head of the Jakarta city committee) or a Rewang 
(Central Java leader) to the Politburo in 1964, for example, offered 
recognition but did not mean that they had moved from sixth to fifth 
or from eight to seventh (or whatever) in the hierarchy. Their relative 
positions remained unaffected or virtually unaffected. This could be 
said equally of somewhat less senior Party officials in the 45th or 
51st positions in the Party as the size of the Central Committee was 
progressively expanded. In other words, the Party showed none of 
the direct signs of excessive infighting and splits that characterized 
many  other  Communist parties.  This  basic  unity  is  important to 
understand since there was evidence of disagreement in 1965 over 
PKI policy toward Sukarno's decision to "enter the socialist stage" 
that year; however the disagreement was overcome without a serious 
fight and without a purge. 
Although other Politburo members such as Sudisman (head of 
the Secretariat) and Sakirman (economic specialist) had a certain 
prestige and secondary prominence, the PKI was dominated by the 
Chairman and two Deputy Chairmen as a triumvirate.(4) While Aidit 
had overall authority, guidance over the organization appeared to be 
divided three ways with Aidit in charge of party organization and 
general command and membership functions, with Lukman in charge 
of the various front groups and with Njoto dealing with agitprop and 
ideology (he was editor of Harian Rakyat, the Party daily, for 
example). Lines of demarcation were undoubtedly blurred on 
occasion and there also appeared to be conflicts of interest 
("contradictions") among these different functions from time to time. 
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Signs of such conflicts in the published party material were usually 
extremely obscure although Aidit did acknowledge at the Party 
Conference in July 1964 that contradictions existed within the PKI. 
Although minor compared to those with the Party's enemies, they 
needed to be resolved by discussion, he said.(5) One could easily 
read a lot or very little into the apparent differences of emphasis that 
undoubtedly existed,  as  they  exist  in  all  organizations. My  own 
belief is that some Western observers have read too much into these 
obscure passages and, in retrospect, I believe I sometimes did the 
same despite an early conviction that this was a more unified Party 
than most. 
This tendency to overemphasize factionalism was abetted by the 
prevalence in Jakarta of alleged PKI tipsters willing to peddle 
supposedly inside information for a price, whether monetary or 
securing recognition and inflated importance for themselves. One 
could be offered detailed accounts of just who was supposed to be 
"pro-Soviet"  or   "pro-Chinese"  by   informants  who   could   not, 
however, even identify the heads of Central Committee sections (we 
knew some from exhaustive study of the PKI press and Party 
publications purchased openly and regularly at the three main Party 
bookstores in Jakarta and at similar small stores in major provincial 
towns). 
This is not to say that there was monolithic unity of views at all 
times. The Party shifted its posture toward the international 
communist movement and the issues between the leading foreign 
parties through the early 1960s as the Sino-Soviet conflict deepened 
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and as PKI interests required. There were undoubtedly differences of 
nuance, and differentiated Party roles were even required of some 
leaders to say more than others or to pitch their remarks in the 
context of different ultimate audiences. Insofar as Njoto appeared 
more "pro-Chinese", for example, this may have reflected his role as 
senior ideologue and propagandist who had a certain responsibility to 
project a given line toward other parties. Lukman, on the other hand, 
had responsibilities for coordinating disparate affiliates and fronts 
that may have required a different emphasis while Aidit had to be 
especially conscious of the need to keep the PKI position close to 
that of Sukarno and to take account of national policy considerations. 
Soviet support was still to be solicited on many issues as late as 
1964, for example, even though the PKI (and Sukarno) were 
increasingly dissatisfied with the Soviet emphasis on peaceful 
coexistence when both China and Indonesia believed that Asia was 
ripe  for  revolution  and  demanded  confrontational  policies.  Deep 
down Sukarno himself was among the most radical, as 1964-65 later 
demonstrated, and it is true that Njoto became both more prominent 
and especially close to the President in this period. However, that can 
be attributed to his expertise as a speech writer and propagandist and 
as a Javanese with a personality pleasing to Sukarno.(6) There is no 
evidence that Aidit was displeased by this additional PKI tie to the 
President, particularly since his own influence on and compatibility 
with Sukarno remained high. 
The important fact in the 1962-65 period was that Indonesian 
 
Marxists (and this includes Sukarno as well as the PKI) had assessed 
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the revolutionary prospects within the country and throughout 
Southeast Asia favorably and that this view coincided with the 
assessment of the Chinese and most other East Asian communist 
parties while progressively differing from that of a more cautious 
and realistic Soviet Union. While China's excessive revolutionary 
optimism and lack of realism were partly a reflection of its isolation, 
that of Indonesia was to some considerable degree a function of 
Sukarno's apparent success in the face of opponents at home and 
abroad who appeared to be vacillating, weak and sycophantic toward 
his  person.(7) To  Sukarno, this  even  seemed  true  of  the  United 
States, whose efforts to show understanding and good will were 
often misconstrued, particularly since they could be set alongside 
actions  that  were  seen  as  gross  intervention  either  in  Indonesia 
(low-level support of Outer Island insurrections) or in other parts of 
the region (Vietnam and Korea). 
It is small wonder then that the Soviets were almost as isolated 
and out of touch by early 1965 as the Americans while Indonesia, 
North Korea, China, and North Vietnam were linked together in a 
love feast that came to be known as the 
Pyongyang-Peking-Hanoi-Phnom  Penh-Jakarta  axis.(8)  Sihanouk, 
and to a large extent Pakistan, were regarded as affiliates - the latter, 
in particular, after clashes with India developed into full scale war in 
August,  1965.  Another  aspect  of  PKI  behavior  that  deserves 
emphasis  is  its  stress  on  a  mass  party  and  collaboration  with 
Sukarno. Although both Peking and Moscow also courted Sukarno 
and encouraged PKI policy in their different ways at the time, it 
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became fashionable after the failure of the September 30 movement 
and the destruction of the PKI for both communist superpowers to 
criticize the PKI for alleged strategic errors. The PKI was said by the 
Chinese to be too inclined toward collaboration with the national 
bourgeoisie (defined after the fact as including the now discredited 
and defeated Sukarno) and thus insufficiently committed to armed 
rebellion from below while the Soviets also pointed to overreliance 
on collaboration with Sukarno and alleged a half-cocked 
adventurism that could be described as ultra-left and unduly 
influenced by China. When all the jargon is stripped away, the 
criticism of both ring hollow; each has wished to rewrite history to 
justify its  position toward each other and toward the rest of the 
movement after it was clear that Indonesian communism had failed 
and had to be written off. (9) 
In the real world of the Indonesia in which the PKI operated, 
there was little choice. The strategy of revolution from above and 
below had to rely mainly on revolution from above and this meant 
both identification with Sukarno and,   above all,   Sukarno's 
identification with the PKI view of the Indonesian revolution. Given 
Sukarno's history and romantic view of himself and Marxism, this 
latter point was not very difficult. Revolution from below - that is 
organization of a massive Party and front group structure as well as 
organization of demonstrations and intimidation at the grass roots 
level - was distinctly supplemental. It was never designed to be 
revolutionary in the physical, guerrilla warfare style that occurred in 
China and  Vietnam. This  mass  effort  from below was  aimed  at 
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demonstrating "inevitability", that the march of the revolution was 
proceeding step by step in accordance with Sukarno's rhetoric and 
Sukarno's  progressive emasculation  of  all  non-communist forces. 
The announced increases of PKI and front group membership figures 
seemed to be accelerating as the apex of the revolution approached, 
reaching 3.5 million for the Party by September, 1965, eight million 
for the peasant front, three million for the Pemuda Rakjat and so on 
(Sukarno's speech to the PKI forty-fifth anniversary celebration in 
May, 1965 cited  three million party members and 20 million in 
affiliated organizations). These figures were never real, either in my 
view at the time or in my view now; they were simply convenient 
numbers designed to  awe  the  opposition and  to  demonstrate the 
revolutionary trend. They were also reasonable or believable because 
of the size of PKI electoral results in mid 1955 and especially 1957 
as well as the "feel" of the political situation at any given time based 
on Party visibility. But these large numbers did not mean hard-core 
cadres or even a disciplined rank and file that could be used in a 
quasi-military role. Crowds of demonstrators could be recruited, and 
by no one more efficiently than the PKI, but even the one or two 
hundred thousand Party and front group cadres were geared 
overwhelmingly to  a  wajang  (shadow  play)  revolution  in  which 
theatricality and posturing were supposed to do the trick as long as 
the  "dalang"  or  puppet  master  -  Sukarno  -  knew  the  plot  and 
skillfully led all the puppets through their allotted roles. 
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Footnotes - Chapter IV 
 
 
 
1. Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno (Ithaca 
and London, Cornell University Press) 1974, p.107. 
2. Dake. See pp. 286-287 in particular although the theme is 
recurrent throughout most of his book. 
3. Alimin launched a strong criticism against the Aidit leadership 
in 1956 but failed. The Aidit leadership thereafter was 
sufficiently entrenched to make use of Alimin and Wikana as 
respected elder statesmen. Both Aidit and Sukarno praised 
Alimin as a national hero on his death in 1965. 
4. Being head of the secretariat became a route to great power in 
most communist countries, Stalin's triumph being the classic 
example. Sudisman's position in the PKI appeared to be more 
technical and no real power base for a challenge to the top three 
leaders. He was slightly older than Aidit and Njoto and, though 
respected and consulted, was not a full member of the three-man 
inner circle. The fact that he survived the early post September 
30 affair massacre for a while, and perforce became head of the 
underground party until captured and publicly tried, has given 
him more visibility than he otherwise would have had. His 
criticisms of PKI strategy and tactics at his trial had to  have 
been greatly influenced by his predicament and that of the 
Party; his earlier public pronouncements when the PKI was in 
its  heyday echoed the Party line but were among the most 
sterile and pro forma of any PKI officials. 
107  
 
5. Harian Rakjat. July 5, 1964. 
 
6. As noted by Dake, Njoto was a major drafter (along with Oei 
 
Tjoe Tat) of Sukarno's ominous "Tavip" speech of August 17, 
 
1964 ("the Year of Living Dangerously") and of Sukarno's 
speech to non-aligned leaders in Jakarta some ten months later. 
This was widely known in Jakarta at the time. See Dake, p 287. 
7. This criticism has been leveled in particular at Ambassador 
Jones for his desire to appear more Indonesian than the 
Indonesians. I vividly recall acting as Russian language 
interpreter for Jones during the Mikoyan visit in 1964 when 
Jones gratuitously told the Chief of the Political Administration 
of the Soviet Armed Forces, General Yepishev, that anyone 
could look at the map and see that North Kalimantan (i.e. 
Sarawak and North Borneo or Sabah) rightfully belonged to 
Indonesia - a claim that even the Indonesians did not make 
overtly and one which Yepishev, incidentally, did not accept. 
8. I attended several Sukarno speeches in mid-1965 at which I was 
the only foreign diplomat present other than the Chinese, North 
Vietnamese and North Koreans (other US embassy officers had 
similar experiences when they attended). The Soviets were 
simply no longer visible. In 1963, incidentally, the US Embassy 
received an invitation to "all diplomatic missions" (it should 
have been to all friendly diplomatic missions) to attend a 
Pemuda Rakjat rally. Another American officer (Henry 
Heymann) and I went and were seated immediately behind the 
PKI Politburo on the assumption that we were Soviet. No other 
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foreigners came. We had a nice friendly conversation with a 
Central Committee member until he asked where we were from 
and received a truthful reply (we had been careful to do nothing 
to give a false response to any queries although we had guessed, 
of course, that this invitation had arrived as the result of a 
clerical error). When Aidit and Lukman, who were seated in the 
chairs immediately in front of us, were informed of our identity, 
they seemed stricken with indecision but eventually moved to 
another part of the room. We were treated, however, with 
extreme courtesy in spite of the vitriolic anti-American speech 
by Pemuda Rakjat Deputy Chairman Anwar Nasution and we 
then left quietly after the speech. 
9. There may be more validity to Soviet criticism that the Party 
should not have continued to claim that the September 30 
affair was simply an internal Army matter that did not involve 
the PKI when that was clearly not sustainable. Aleksey Yuryev 
makes this point in his book Indonesiya Posle Sobytiye 1965  
goda (Moscow, "Nauka") 1973, p.215. According to Yuryev, 
this stance caused confusion and immobilization in the party 
ranks. Aidit, he says, had lapsed into an "inertia of legalism" 
when he should have been mobilizing the Party to defend itself. 
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V 
 
The Anti - Malaysia Campaign 
 
 
 
Sukarno had used the West New Guinea issue (known to the 
Indonesians as West Irian) as a tool to mobilize revolutionary 
sentiment internally as well as for the more direct purpose of gaining 
additional territory. Once recovered as a result of the Ellsworth 
Bunker mediation effort in 1962, Irian could no longer be used as a 
rallying point and a touchstone for demonstrating revolutionary 
loyalty. It was accordingly hoped by the West and by moderates 
within the country that Indonesia would now turn to economic 
development and resolution of a multitude of problems faced by such 
a poor and underdeveloped country. The United States, in particular, 
hoped for recognition of its role in the Irian settlement and eagerly 
offered additional economic assistance. A preliminary credit of $17 
million  was  extended  in   February.(l)  First  Minister  Djuanda, 
regarded as a sensible pragmatist, became the focal point within the 
Indonesian Government for a new network of cooperation with eager 
and idealistic American developers. Ambassador Howard P. Jones, a 
man whose life had become dedicated to Indonesia and to the 
proposition that Sukarno would be America's friend if only he could 
be understood and weaned away from evil influences, was among 
those most encouraged.(2) On one front, Sukarno did indeed cater to 
these  hopes  as  internal  political  needs  required  some  apparent 
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concessions to those who favored development; But not for long. 
With the PKI critical of economic reforms pushed through the MPRS 
in this period, Sukarno made a rousing speech to the MPRS on 
March 28, 1963 blaming economic ills on foreigners and the rich and 
advocating policies to improve the lot of the poor.(3) The "economic 
declaration", or DEKON as it came to be known in the popular 
newspeak, was trumpeted by the PKI over the next two years as a 
kind  of  mesmerizing  slogan  in  support  of  PKI  policy  and  as  a 
weapon against its enemies. A series of austerity regulations passed 
by parliament in May, 1963 was eventually rescinded in 1965 and 
hailed as a victory by the communists. 
The principal vehicle for a new revolutionary thrust, however, 
was  to  be  the  British  and  Malayan  scheme  to  establish  a  new 
political entity of Malaysia out of the former and existing British 
colonies to the north of Indonesia. This new state would incorporate 
Malaya, which had achieved independence in 1957 after a long 
struggle against a communist insurgency, the largely Chinese city 
state of Singapore, which faced an internal communist threat and 
severe economic problems caused by its isolation from its former 
hinterland, and the three British colonies along the north coast of 
Kalimantan or Borneo, that is Sarawak, Brunei and British North 
Borneo. Some two thirds of the island of Borneo was Indonesian, 
having been  part  of  the  old  Dutch  East  Indies. When originally 
proposed in May, 1961, the Malaysian concept attracted no visible 
opposition from the Indonesian Government although it was soon 
condemned by the  PKI as  a  neo-colonial scheme of  the  British. 
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Philippine opposition appeared in due course because of an ancient 
claim of the Sultans of Sulu to Sabah or North Borneo (the 
northeastern tip of the island), a claim that was pressed in large part 
because Philippine President Macapagal had studied these claims as 
a young man and was emotionally involved with the idea. 
In  December,  1962,  a  revolt  erupted  in  the  small,  oil-rich 
enclave of Brunei where opposition to Malaysia was strong because 
of the rich little territory's interest in avoiding any requirement to 
share its wealth with a larger entity. The populations of the much 
larger Sarawak and British North Borneo were strongly favorable to 
incorporation in Malaysia as the most viable route to independence 
in  a  secure  setting.  Both  feared  eventual  incorporation  into  a 
Sukarno-dominated Indonesia otherwise. The Brunei revolt was led 
by a Brunei politician named Azahari who was also an adherent of 
the Partindo Party in Indonesia - a party usually regarded as a front 
for the PKI because of the identity of their policies but which was 
actually led by some of Sukarno's closest personal disciples and 
entourage  members.(4)  Azahari  proclaimed  his  movement  to  be 
more than just a Brunei revolt; he announced the existence of a 
Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara (North Kalimantan) of which he 
was to be Prime Minister. This North Kalimantan Government was, 
in  fact,  a  creature of  Jakarta  even  to  the  point of  reflecting the 
political spectrum in Indonesia. Although the North Kalimantan front 
was dominated by the far left, the Defense Minister was an NU 
member who also had the backing of Nasution. Born in Sarawak, this 
colorful fellow, Abang Kifli, had once served in the Philippine Army 
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during the Korean War and maintained clandestine connections with 
the Philippines. As Indonesia moved increasingly to the left in late 
1963, Kifli was purged and became fearful for his life despite some 
degree of weak protection from Nasution. He was arrested, escaped 
and eventually fled to the Philippine embassy until the events of late 
1965 permitted him to emerge. The Azahari movement by this time 
had become a Sukarno-Subandrio-PKI operation, reflecting the 
direction in which Indonesia itself was moving.(5) 
Sukarno  had  already  signaled  a  probable  cool  Indonesian 
attitude toward Malaysia in September, 1962 in a  statement that 
Indonesia could not remain indifferent to developments there. After 
the Azahari revolt in Brunei in December, Subandrio asserted in 
January, 1963 that Indonesia would pursue a policy of confrontation 
against the new state and this was confirmed by Sukarno on February 
13. Invective against Malaysia and the British mounted progressively 
as the September 16 date for official establishment of the new state 
approached.  Anti-Indonesian  demonstrations took  place  in  Kuala 
Lumpur and anti-Malaysian and anti-British demonstrations occurred 
in Jakarta on September 16 and 17 followed by the sacking and 
burning of the British Embassy and the ransacking of most British 
homes  on  September  18  and  the  seizure  of  British  business 
enterprises soon thereafter.(6) Relations between Indonesia and 
Malaya were broken, Indonesia placed a ban on travel to and from 
Malaysia  that  even  included  impediments  to  transit  stops,  and 
military activity by Indonesian-supported guerrilla groups increased 
along Indonesia's border with Sarawak and Sabah, the former British 
113  
 
protectorates that were now part of Malaysia. Confrontation was on 
with a vengeance, Sukarno and his claques shouted hysterically that 
Malaysia would be "crushed", and large billboards lined principal 
streets showing heroic Indonesian workers smashing puny figures 
labeled Malaysia and imperialism. "Imperialism" often looked 
suspiciously like a figure of Uncle Sam, and sometimes like 
Ambassador Jones. 
The PKI Chairman, D. N. Aidit, returned from a trip to the 
USSR and China shortly thereafter and issued a long statement that 
attracted attention primarily for its almost complete identification 
with Chinese positions in the mushrooming Sino-Soviet ideological 
conflict (the PKI had originally been rather even handed but had 
already moved much closer to China during the previous year; this 
speech substantially completed the process).(7) The speech was also 
interesting because of veiled but clear language on how Indonesian 
political forces viewed the confrontation with Malaysia. Aidit's 
analysis was perceptive as he favored a policy of primarily political 
confrontation but warned against those who wanted more extreme 
measures in order to justify imposition of martial law in the Outer 
Islands, particularly the regions closest to Malaysia such as 
Kalimantan and Sumatra. This warning was clearly intended to apply 
to the Army and it was indeed true that speeches by Nasution and 
other army figures were of an especially saber rattling nature at this 
time. Both Sukarno and the PKI on the one side and the Army on the 
other tried to shape the confrontation issue in ways that would be 
advantageous to them in the subtle internal struggle but Sukarno, as 
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President, Great Leader of the Revolution and Supreme Commander 
of the Armed Forces, retained the initiative and continued to be 
much more imaginative than the Army in his tactics. The climate of 
nationalist hysteria was such that the Army and moderates not only 
had to appear as anti-Malaysia as the extreme left but felt themselves 
compelled to use Sukarno's ideological concepts and jargon, all of 
which severely curtailed their tactical options. 
As time went on, Sukarno kept the rhetorical level high on 
confrontation but made sure that military action was restricted to 
pin-pricks with psychological, not military, goals in mind. Sukarno 
had already largely isolated the weak and vacillating Nasution by 
kicking him upstairs to be Minister of Defense while turning over 
actual command of the Army in 1962 to General Yani, a man he 
hoped to control because of Yani's love of the good life and apparent 
susceptibility to the glitter and prestige of Sukarno's palace 
atmosphere. Yani had also been made Chief of Staff of KOTI, the 
operations command that paralleled and in some ways superseded 
the traditional chain of command. In early 1965 the President also 
created another anti-Malaysia command (Mandala) headed by Air 
Force Commander Omar Dani, a pro-communist loyalist. Much of 
the  limited  military  action  that  actually  took  place  fitted  this 
approach - infiltration of small subversion teams and small scale 
para-drops. For all the loud talk, significant combat operations which 
would have required Army infantry attacks, did not take place. Nor 
were they intended to although the existence of what was largely a 
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phony war provided an excuse to tip the balance of forces on Java. 
This, however, is a story for later. 
The internal utility of confrontation does not mean that Sukarno 
did not have designs on Malaysia or that an aggressive foreign policy 
was purely a servant of the inexorable march toward completion of 
the Indonesian Revolution through advance into a "socialist stage" 
and an open communist regime. It does mean that the two objectives 
were viewed as mutually reinforcing and that real priority was 
accorded to the internal purpose in spite of every effort to project the 
contrary appearance of a Malaysia obsession with foreign enemies. It 
is revealing in this respect to observe how the campaign of 
propaganda, intimidation and, ultimately, terror progressed. In late 
1963 and early 1964, the targets (and this meant an overwhelming 
cacophony of slogans and speeches on this subject) were Malaysia 
and Britain. (The former number one enemy, the Dutch, had been 
polished off and had receded into the background). Gradually the 
propaganda barrage shifted toward "imperialism" generally with 
Britain  as  an  example,  but  one  mentioned  less  often.  After  the 
famous "Tavip" (Tahun Vivere Pericoloso - Year of Living 
Dangerously) speech by Sukarno on August 17, 1964, the target 
began to shift again toward the United States as the main bulwark of 
imperialism.(8) By 1965, Britain and Malaysia had been reduced to 
minor themes while the United States and "imperialism", now 
virtually synonymous, were in the forefront of the hate campaign. 
Growing  US   involvement  in   Vietnam  gave   credence   to   this 
campaign but every American policy and weakness was pounced 
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upon in a range and form of attack that was virtually 
indistinguishable from similar campaigns emanating from Moscow 
and Peking. While the US target never disappeared (nor did those of 
Malaysia and Britain), the focus continued to shift as 1965 proceeded 
toward  the  supposed  "subversives"  and  "lackeys"  of  the  United 
States and imperialism within Indonesia. The climate of terror was 
by now enormous since internal opposition, however mild, had 
become equivalent to treason. The intention was to intimidate the 
weak   into   ready   compliance   (and   even   statements   of   eager 
agreement) with the leftist offensive and its slogans like "Nasakom", 
Marxism, completion of the national-democratic stage, and purges of 
false Marhaenists, false Nasakomists, false Manipolists, etc.. Those 
who did not comply and they were becoming precious few, would be 
isolated and removed from any kind of significant position. 
There were, of course, various well-meaning efforts to negotiate 
some kind of settlement and the United States Government was a 
leader in these efforts. Initially, the Maphilindo concept of Philippine 
President Macapagal held some attraction, since it conceived of a 
close community of consultation among the three Malay countries of 
Indonesia,  Malaysia  and  the  Philippines.  This  idea  had  some 
attraction to  the  Indonesians since there was a  definite strain of 
"Greater Indonesia" thinking in Sukarno's makeup and that of other 
Indonesian nationalists. This was reflected in Sukarno's penchant for 
calling the Indian Ocean the Indonesian Ocean, for example, and by 
occasional Sukarno assertions that the Indonesian people extended 
from Madagascar to Easter Island.(9) This ultimate nationalist dream 
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was borne in on me on one occasion by a large embroidered wall 
hanging map in Merdeka Palace in which the existing Indonesia was 
shown in solid yellow while solid yellow borders highlighted areas 
regarded as once ruled by pre-Dutch Indonesian empires. Other areas 
were bordered less ostentatiously. The visual impact was striking, at 
least to this observer. Whatever the extent of ultimate nationalist 
pretensions or the degree of their intensity, there is no question that a 
greater Indo-Malay vision had its attractions provided, of course, that 
it would be dominated by Jakarta. There were also the tactical 
considerations of encouraging an anti-Malaysia ally in Macapagal 
and making the Sukarno leadership appear more righteous internally. 
These considerations, along with a certain residual wariness toward 
US and other Western powers in the region, caused Sukarno, in my 
view, to go along with intermittent negotiations in Tokyo and 
Bangkok and to receive and toy with such American emissaries as 
Robert Kennedy in early 1964. While the American Ambassador 
remained optimistic, at least to all appearances, most of his political 
officers never had the slightest doubt about Sukarno's ultimate 
intransigence, whatever their differing views on his underlying 
motives and ideological consistency. The view of some writers such 
as Antonie Dake, that the PKI was angry with Sukarno for being 
prone to compromise at certain times in 1963-1964 appears totally 
mistaken to me.(10) Occasional PKI warnings against possible 
Indonesian   Government   softness   were   designed   to   maximize 
pressure in support of Sukarno's own intentions and to provide some 
hints of differentiation that afforded tactical advantages for what was 
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really their joint approach to their opponents abroad and at home. 
Any other interpretation is not consistent with the overall posture of 
the Indonesian Government and Sukarno throughout this period. 
To return to the central point of this chapter, defeat of Malaysia 
remained a stated Indonesian goal until the Sukarno era began to 
crumble in October, 1965 but it had gradually lost its singular 
importance as the central issue and had become incorporated in the 
broader thrust toward completion of the internal revolution within 
Indonesia. Expulsion of the imperialists from the area, or at least 
from Indonesia, was one of two pre-conditions for entering the 
socialist stage and anti-Malaysian rhetoric was part of this but only 
one of declining importance. 
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Footnotes - Chapter V 
 
 
 
1. Antonie C. A. Dake, In the Spirit of the Red Banteng (The 
 
Hague Mouton and Co.) 1973, p. 175. 
 
2. This was a rather common view of Ambassador Jones' attitude 
both within the Embassy and without. Jones was a 
hard-working, well-intentioned and dedicated envoy, however, 
and a man for whom I, for one, had much respect as a human 
being. He was right in his basic commitment to stay in the game 
and to try to work with the forces that were there. Some 
Americans would like to have seen the United States withdraw 
its presence from Indonesia entirely out of pique with Sukarno's 
behavior toward us. As it turned out, it was a good thing for US 
capacity to understand and influence the course of events and to 
build a new relationship after 1966 that we were still there on 
October l, 1965 although it is also true that the size of the 
mission, particularly its aid components, might have been 
reduced quietly and gradually so as to make the US presence 
less of a visible target. While Jones' policy of hanging on was 
useful, there is little doubt, however, that he was romantically 
naive about Sukarno and excessively protective of a government 
that was demonstrably hostile. He was also excessively wedded 
to the efficacy of personal diplomacy (the basis for his own 
claim to continuation in his Ambassadorial job was the myth of 
his personal clout with Sukarno) and he argued even into 1965 
that a Johnson-Sukarno summit was needed. US failure to 
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arrange such a meeting was held by Jones to be a significant 
reason for Sukarno's anti-US posture. Jones told President 
Johnson on December 18, 1963 that he should meet soon with 
Sukarno, arguing that US influence would depend on the 
personal rapport between the US President and Sukarno. A 
Jones telegram in January, 1965 argued that Sukarno's main 
vice was his vanity. According to Jones, Sukarno had wanted to 
work with the United States and had demonstrated this in his 
acquiescence to Djuanda's stabilization program in early 1963 
but had unfortunately been diverted by the Malaysian question. 
Because of US support for Malaysia, Sukarno did not know 
where he stood with President Johnson. Accordingly, a meeting 
was needed to clear up this essentially personal 
misunderstanding. See Embtel 1358 (Jakarta) Jones to Rusk, 
January 14, l965, Indonesia Country File, National Security 
File, LBJ Library. 
 
3. Warta Bhakti and Harian Rakiat, March 29, 1963. 
 
4. I made a study of the leadership bodies of Partindo and Baperki 
in 1963 (the racial integration society popularly regarded as the 
"Chinese" organization close to the PKI) and found an 
extraordinary overlap. Of the seven top leaders of each, that is 
their governing boards or politburos, four overlapped on both 
boards. Even more illuminating was the fact that they included 
Sukarno's two adopted sons, Asmara Hadi and A. M. Hanafi, S. 
Tahsin, the chief editor of the Partindo newspaper Binting  
Timur (regarded incorrectly by Dake and others as a PKI organ 
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more radical than Harian Rakjat but actually the organ of 
Partindo), and Winoto Danuasmoro, who for many years was 
the chief of Sukarno's household staff. The top Partindo leader 
was Asmara Hadi and A. M. Hanafi was one of the deputies. 
5. I met Kifli in late 1963 when he suddenly appeared out of the 
bushes at the home of an embassy officer friend with whom I 
was having dinner and whom Kifli had known for five or six 
years. Although we tried to keep Kifli at arms length given the 
possibility for any such contact to be misconstrued, Kifli made 
it a habit of dropping in on me occasionally although he was in 
a state of growing terror because of alleged threats to his life 
from the PKI and/or the Indonesian intelligence organization, 
the BPI. 
6. I arrived in Indonesia with my family that very day. It was my 
wife's introduction to life abroad in the Foreign Service. 
7. The text appeared in Harian Rakjat on October 4-5, 1963. 
 
8. The slogan "Vivere Pericoloso" was derived from a poem by 
d'Annunzio that later entered the rhetoric of Benito Mussolini; 
its use by Sukarno was as a colleague put it, a reflection of the 
Indonesian leader's "rag-bag mind". A more positive way of 
expressing this quite accurate observation would be its 
reflection on the eclectic nature of Sukarno's mind. While 
devoted to his ideological Weltanschauung of general goals and 
principles; he was not limited to dogmatic forms of expression 
or limited sources of ideas. The straight-jacket of Marxist 
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dogma was one side of Sukarno's mental structure but he also 
remained a colorful and wide-ranging individualist. 
9. Harian Rakjat, August 6, 1964. 
 
10.  Dake, see entire discussion of Malaysia beginning on p.173. 
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VI 
Acceleration of The Internal Struggle 
in 1964 
 
 
 
The final two years of Sukarno dominance, that is the period 
coinciding with confrontation against Malaysia and leading up to the 
September 30 affair or attempted communist coup as it has been 
inadequately labeled, were marked by an accelerating drive by 
Sukarno and the PKI to advance the revolution internally toward a 
socialist state. While most of this effort was being made through 
intimidation and development of a spirit of ultra-nationalism from 
the top, Government sanctioned PKI intimidation from below was 
also practiced. This effort proceeded along a number of fronts. A 
major contribution in this respect was the PKI unilateral action (aksi 
sepihak) campaign in rural areas of Java that became prominent 
around May and June of 1964. Inauguration of the rural campaign 
was presaged by the Central Committee plenum in December which 
called for a revolutionary offensive along a broad front.(l) Unilateral 
action by the PKI peasant affiliate, the BTI, was an essentially new 
program  and  it  was  slow  getting  off  the  ground.  A  massive 
"research" program headed by Aidit himself was launched in April 
and involved Party cadres laying the organizational groundwork at 
the   village   level.   The   campaign   involved   mass   actions   by 
PKI-organized peasants to demand compliance with the existing land 
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reform and crop sharing laws, actions to go beyond those laws to 
secure a greater return for sharecroppers than the laws required, and 
support for seizure of state forests, estates and properties belonging 
to politically vulnerable landholders; including those identified with 
"imperialism". While there were undoubtedly hundreds of incidents 
over  the  next  year,  only  a  few  produced  sufficient  violence  to 
become well known at the national level. The most famous were 
those at Klaten and Boyolali in Central Java in the late spring and 
early summer of 1964 and at Indramayu in West Java some months 
later. 
The   PKI   "actions"   were   pegged   to   demands   for   better 
compliance with the crop-sharing and land reform laws that had been 
enacted in 1959 and 1960, partly as the result of PKI pressure at that 
time. Some background points should be noted. First, the shortage of 
land and the social pain of inequitable distribution were acute in Java 
with  its  extremely  high  rural  population  density  and  a  rapidly 
growing young population. Second, most of Java (and particularly 
certain areas such as the north central coast and a chronically 
impoverished area southeast of Yogyakarta - previously Jogjakarta) 
had suffered widespread starvation due to drought and crop failures 
in late 1963 and early 1964.(2) Finally, although inequities did exist, 
Indonesia did not have numerous large estates and classical absentee 
landholder conditions on the massive scale that could produce 
spectacular results from land reform. Put another way, however one 
evaluated the need for reform, there was simply not enough land to 
go around to alleviate the underlying socio-economic problems in 
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more  than  a  marginal  way.  The  very  fact  that  the  underlying 
problems were so intractable made for tremendous tensions in the 
countryside and for a high political charge to be placed on any effort 
to arouse class conflict to a greater pitch. Although it is getting ahead 
of the story, it would appear in retrospect that the PKI campaign of 
rural violence was a major strategic error as it not only galvanized 
rural support and revolutionary sentiment for the PKI but frightened 
the latter's rural opponents into violent counteraction, the full fury of 
which was only realized after the Party's unexpected defeat at the 
national level. 
The land reform law restricted the size of land holdings and 
required excess land to be made available for distribution. Special 
issues turned on absentee landlords, foreign holdings and the efforts 
of landholders to retain excess land through allocation to relatives. 
The crop sharing law was probably more important. A landholder 
(and this included the probable great majority of what would be 
regarded in the West as very small holders - that is modestly well off 
peasants by local standards but people who were far poorer than the 
Jakarta leaders of the agitation or than Western observers) would 
receive a fixed amount of the harvest while the sharecroppers would 
get the rest. The percentages varied according to local tradition but 
were often 50-50 although they could be 60-40 in favor of the 
sharecropper or even higher. The PKI had originally pressed for a 
60-40 national minimum back in 1959 but had settled for 50-50 
although with provisions for ensuring the rights of the sharecroppers 
to a higher percentage where such a favorable ratio had already been 
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secured by local effort and for obtaining official support for their 
rights through better enforcement of existing legislation.(3) 
The PKI campaign in 1964 not only urged more forceful 
demands by local peasant organizations for implementation of 
existing rights under the law but urged local demands for the 60-40 
split favored by the PKI. It would be difficult to go into the merits of 
these demands which in any case are beyond the scope of this work. 
In many cases, however, a small landholder who found it profitable 
at a given division of the crop to leave the work to others while he 
pursued  a  small  trade  in  a  town  would  find  it  uneconomical to 
continue that course at a more unfavorable ratio. Some of the more 
violent clashes in Central Java occurred when peasant landholders 
returned to farm their land themselves and to expel their 
sharecroppers. The PKI would organize the landless sharecroppers to 
counter-action while the landholders were undoubtedly also being 
supported by rival organizations. In some cases this was the NU or 
the underground Masjumi but in Central Java it was usually the PNI. 
Furthermore, Central Java was an area of great strength and party 
militancy for both the PKI and the PNI. The latter was headed by a 
leadership  more  conservative  (and  pro-Western)  than  the  PNI 
national leadership and one that was acutely aware of its competition 
with the PKI at the grass roots level. Its leader, Hadisubeno 
Sosrowerdojo, was to be purged at Sukarno's insistence a few months 
before the September 30, 1965 coup as a "false Marhaenist" but he 
regained his position after the defeat of communism a year later. 
127  
 
A similar but initially less publicized conflict was taking place 
in East Java where the main rival of the PKI was the Moslem NU 
party. Here the land reform conflict was exacerbated by the 
underlying enmity between the strongly religious Santri class, which 
tended to be more well to do, and the culturally pre-Islamic abangan 
population. The local NU cadres, and particularly its youth front, 
Ansor, were much more combative and took an active part in 
organizing opposition to PKI pressures and demonstrations. This led 
to  violent  clashes  in  1965  between  Moslem  youth  groups  (both 
Ansor of the NU and the Masjumi oriented HMI) on the one hand 
and communists on the other. Sukarno eventually had to intervene by 
admonishing all sides to avoid playing into the hands of the 
imperialists through fighting among themselves. Even so, his 
favoritism toward the PKI side of the conflict was evident since the 
PKI claimed to be the aggrieved party in the more publicized cases. 
Indeed, the PKI had generally been put on the defensive at the grass 
roots level in East Java by 1965.(4) 
While East and Central Java were the main arenas of grass roots 
struggle, similar politicized strife was taking place elsewhere without 
much fanfare. The resulting polarization and development of an 
atmosphere of terror throughout 1964-65 set the stage for the 
widespread killing that occurred at the end of 1965, as will be seen. 
Some examples of these conflicts in other regions were the tensions 
between  large  numbers  of  Javanese  immigrants  in  the  western 
portion of Bali and the native Balinese, tensions between Javanese 
migrants, particularly rubber estate workers, and native Sumatrans in 
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North Sumatra, and traditional conflicts between the Christianized 
Karo and Toba Bataks and the Moslem Mendailing Bataks of North 
Sumatra. This latter conflict was politicized by the tendency of Karo 
Batak leaders to identify with Sukarno, the PNI and even the PKI as 
a   protective   measure   against   their   Masjumi-oriented   Moslem 
enemies. 
The Indramayu (a small town near Cirebon) affair in West Java 
in late 1964 illustrated a different aspect of PKI direct action on 
behalf of landless peasants for in this case the opposition was the 
government  bureaucracy  which  sought  to  evict  squatters  from 
state-owned forest lands that were regarded by officials as essential 
to the government program for water and soil management. The PKI 
supported the squatters in a well-publicized campaign.(5) Similar, 
less publicized incidents occurred in some other areas, notably in 
East Java. The issue was bound up with efforts at the technical level 
of government to prevent encroachment of squatters on state lands, 
particularly forested areas that were supposed to help deter the 
extensive erosion that was a serious long-term threat to the 
agricultural viability of the island. At a very basic level, the conflict 
was again one of overpopulation which drove a needy surplus 
population to desperate action whatever the macro-economic and 
ecological  long-term  arguments,  while  government  counteraction 
also had a solid basis from the standpoint of the general welfare. 
These sociological features of the conflict were largely obscured, 
however, by the politicization of the issues for the sake of 
revolutionary  political  goals  as  every  effort  was  made  by  the 
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aggressive revolutionary forces to intensify the problem rather than 
to  resolve  it.  A  somewhat  similar  case  occurred  in  Sumatra  in 
mid-1965 and resulted in the killing of a government official by 
aroused squatters. The PKI sided with the squatters, of course, in this 
so-called Bandar Betsy affair. 
Sukarno's implicit support for the PKI on these issues, a support 
that became quite clear in his August 17, 1964 Tavip speech and 
even more during the course of 1965, provided a message to the 
working level  authorities that  they  were  expected to  support the 
demands of the PKI-organized peasant groups. This became 
especially prominent after Sukarno announced in March, 1965 that 
Indonesia had almost completed the national democratic stage, since 
one of the two frequently reiterated conditions for that historic step 
was to be the elimination of "feudalism" which was defined almost 
entirely in land reform terms (the entire landlord class is held to be 
feudal in communist doctrine although this would not include PKI 
sympathizers in practice). The nation's judges were also lectured 
repeatedly in 1964-65 by the pro-communist Minister of Justice, 
Astrawinata, by Sukarno, Aidit, the labor Minister, and others on the 
need for judges to decide cases on the basis of the needs of the 
revolution in general and of the "peasants" against the "landlords", in 
particular.(6) The interpretation of this latter formulation totally 
followed the PKI definition of peasants, based on the Party's political 
requirements. Those who sought different interpretations, such as the 
moderate PNI leaders, were soon condemned as "false Marhaenists", 
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that is people untrue to Sukarno's conception of the Marhaen as the 
poorest peasants and the revolutionary class to be idealized. 
Another area of radical pressure was the constant campaign to 
intimidate the country's non-Marxist intelligentsia, to expunge liberal 
Western thought, and to require acceptance of Marxist textbooks. 
Like the PKI's direct action campaign in agriculture, terror tactics 
against the intellectuals took many forms. In the field of education, 
the  pro-communist Coordinating Minister  for  Education, Prijono, 
had pressed for the replacement of Western textbooks with ones 
from communist countries or ones that reflected Marxist doctrine. 
Progress  was  checked  somewhat  by  a  non-Marxist  Minister  of 
Higher   Education,   Tojib,   and   by   various   university   officials 
including the rector of the University of Indonesia, an Army doctor, 
Colonel (later Major General) Sjarif Thajeb, who had developed a 
good personal relationship with Sukarno.(7) Tojib was replaced by 
the more malleable Thajeb during a 1964 cabinet reshuffle. While no 
tower of strength, Thajeb tried to steer as balanced a course as was 
possible and eventually emerged as an accepted member of Suharto's 
circle  after  the  failure of  the  September 30 affair. Whatever the 
delays, there is no question that the curriculum in Indonesian 
universities  was  being  forced  into  a  progressively  Marxist  and 
anti-Western  direction  by  late  1963.  This  was  also  a  period  of 
PKI-organized book burnings in which gangs of "progressive youth", 
often led by the radical PNI head of the Youth Front, Zaini Mansjur 
(Mansjur was a communist infiltrator of the PNI who had originally 
been a member of the PKI university student group, the CGMI, 
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rather than its PNI counterpart), carried out well-publicized 
demonstrations during which massive piles of Western books were 
destroyed. The ability of the demonstrators to discriminate was often 
faulty, incidentally, as there was an impression that anything in a 
Western European language must perforce be imperialist, causing 
some very pro-communist books in English to disappear with the 
rest. 
 
While the non-communists were reluctant to fight back directly 
given the prevailing atmosphere of revolutionary zeal, increased fear 
was also accompanied by increased desperation which resulted in 
short-lived bursts of "counter-revolutionary" activity. One such burst 
occurred  in  early  March  of  1964  with  the  organization  of  an 
Islamic-oriented writers' conference which had the behind-the-scenes 
backing of General Nasution. A large majority of the almost 600 
participants signed a "Cultural Manifesto" written by H. B. Jassin, 
one of Indonesia's most gifted writers and a lecturer at the University 
of Indonesia, and by Wiratmo Soekito, an official of Radio Republic 
Indonesia (RRI) as  well  as  a  columnist for  an  Army subsidized 
newspaper, Semesta. This document favored some degree of cultural 
independence from the state and, while paying obeisance to Sukarno, 
chose to emphasize "Panca Sila", the Sukarno-invented slogan 
preferred by the moderates, while ignoring Nasakom. The 
communists had promptly condemned the conference and the 
Manifesto, attaching the acronym of "Manikebu" to the latter in a 
fashion that made it synonymous with treason. Sukarno refused an 
invitation to speak or even to send a message to the conference while 
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the leftist Education Minister, Prijono, sent a message that in essence 
questioned  the  loyalty  of  the  participants.  Nasution  and  another 
senior cabinet minister, Ruslan Abdulgani, who had also given initial 
encouragement to the organizers, could not back away entirely. On 
seeing Sukarno's negative attitude, however, they soon tried to 
distance themselves from the conference. Ruslan failed to appear in 
person but sent a written message while Nasution, who did appear, 
gave little encouragement and asked the audience not to quarrel with 
other groups. Both Nasution and Ruslan commented that the Cultural 
Manifesto was not in conflict with the revolution but suggested that 
some words might be changed. Sukarno fed the flames of communist 
agitation in a speech on August 14 by praising students who 
demanded the expulsion of professors who were not revolutionary. 
Left out on a limb, the Manifesto's authors, Jassin and Soekito, were 
hounded  from  their  jobs  and  the  Cultural  Manifesto  itself  was 
banned on May 8 by the President.(8) 
The atmosphere of intimidation against non-communist 
intellectuals increased steadily over the next few months, much of it 
out  of  public  view.  I  recall  an  Indonesian  professor  of  Chinese 
descent whom I knew as a sensible, apolitical scholar. He was a man 
who had shown great courage up to this point in standing up to 
communist intimidation. The atmosphere in Jakarta was already such 
that, at my own initiative, I never parked my car in front of his house 
during my occasional calls at his home. In July or August of 1964, 
this professor was publicly attacked by a British communist woman 
on Subandrio's staff who was also a deputy chairman of the PKI 
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scholars front, the HSI. The professor was so strongly intimidated by 
this  verbal  assault,  which  obviously had  been  sanctioned by  the 
regime that he stopped his resistance.(9) The professor broke off all 
contact with me and laid low. When I saw him by coincidence at the 
house of a third party shortly before the September 30 affair, he 
literally broke into tears over the course of events and the growing 
threat to his family and himself. To paraphrase his remarks, the gist 
of which I remember clearly, "If the country becomes communist, 
which  seems  likely,  I  will  undoubtedly become  a  victim  as  my 
efforts to accommodate to them almost certainly came too late but, if 
by some miracle, they fail, I will also be vulnerable because any 
swing  the  other  way  would  have  to  be  based  on  a  wave  of 
anti-Chinese right wing hysteria". Although the second alternative 
occurred to a degree, it was more discriminating than the professor 
believed and he, like most other non-communist Chinese, emerged 
unscathed although not without some trepidation. While the above 
account is anecdotal, it reflects the climate of fear that was growing 
by leaps and bounds in Indonesia at this time (10) 
Another sign of the growing isolation of the non-communists 
and a corresponding enhancement in the power of Sukarno and the 
pro-communist elements that he favored was a restructuring of the 
state "retooling" apparatus in a way that appeared to carry awesome 
implications for the future. The word "retooling", incidentally, was a 
popular Sukarnoesque phrase for purging a person from whatever 
position he held. A retooling organization had already been in 
existence since 1959 called the Committee for Retooling the State 
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Apparatus (or "PARAN" from the initials of this title in Indonesian). 
Its chairman and vice-chairman in this period were General Nasution 
and Ruslan Abdulgani, both regarded as anti-communist, however 
ineffectually so. Nasution was strongly and consistently 
anti-communist at least whatever his compromises, while Ruslan, a 
long-time Sukarno confidant and spokesman, was stirred by certain 
immediate personal considerations as well as by his ties to the Army 
and his awareness of the growing resistance to the PKI by his 
Nationalist Party's organization in Central Java. (In addition to his 
probable resentment over his replacement by Subandrio as Foreign 
Minister some years earlier, the personal considerations related to the 
arrest and torture of his brother-in-law on the basis of trumped up 
charges by the PKI that the brother-in-law had organized a "Gerakan 
Anti-Sukarno"  or  Anti-Sukarno  Movement.)(11)  A  Presidential 
decree of May 3, 1964 abolished PARAN and established a new 
body called the Supreme Operations Command for Retooling the 
Apparatus of the Revolution or KOTRAR for short. KOTRAR was 
to be chaired by President Sukarno personally with Subandrio as 
Deputy  Supreme  Commander  and  General  Yani  as  Chief  of 
Staff.(12) The latter, although regarded by Sukarno and the PKI as 
an improvement over Nasution, was actually a second choice. The 
original idea, advanced by Subandrio, had been to appoint a Colonel 
Bambang Supeno, a bitter enemy of Nasution, to the top operational 
leadership  position  in  the  new  organization  but  this  had  been 
opposed by Yani as unacceptable to the Army. Subandrio then 
proposed himself as Deputy Commander and Yani as Chief of Staff, 
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the latter being regarded as far less political than Nasution, subject to 
flattery and the good life, and accordingly manageable. Subandrio's 
position was regarded as carrying considerable potential power since 
"retooling" also fitted in with his position as head of the principal 
Indonesian intelligence organization, the BPI (Badan Pusat 
Intelligensi). Of equal concern was the apparent intention to convert 
the old innocuous PARAN into a purge organization with real teeth 
and to apply it not just to government offices but to all aspects of 
society, an intention even implicit in the new title since Retooling the 
Apparatus of the Revolution could cover almost anything. 
There were, however, cautious efforts to divert or slow down 
the revolutionary trend of events. Although weak and inadequate in 
appearance since they were advanced in a package of glorification of 
Sukarno and tortuous reasoning, these efforts also reflected 
considerable courage on the part of their promoters given the reign of 
terror  and  idolization  of  Sukarno  that  dominated  the  Indonesian 
scene at that time. The principal figures behind this modest 
counteroffensive were an unlikely lot. One was Ruslan Abdulgani, a 
senior "coordinating minister" for public relations in the cabinet and 
prominent in the upper reaches of the PNI leadership. Although a 
Sukarno sycophant, he had better relations with the Army than other 
senior Sukarno cronies. Another was Chairul Saleh, one of three 
deputy  prime  ministers,  head  of  an  organization  called  the  "45 
Generation", made up of generally leftist veterans of the 
revolutionary period and a one time follower of national communist 
Tan Malaka. They tried to keep their roles obscure and they soon 
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retreated after Sukarno made his disapproval known. The more 
forceful leadership belonged to two former Tan Malaka followers of 
the national communist Murba party, Sukarni and Adam Malik, who 
had returned from ambassadorial assignments in Peking and Moscow 
respectively in early 1964. Both were apparently highly disillusioned 
with the communism they had seen practiced in China and the USSR 
and,  as  the  two  most  prestigious members of  Murba, they  soon 
turned that party from its previous sycophantic echoing of the PKI 
into a nucleus of moderate opposition. The principal platform for the 
views  of  this  new  opposition  were  three  newspapers  closely 
connected with Murba - Berita Indonesia, Warta Berita and Merdeka, 
the last owned by Indonesia's ambassador to Bangkok, B. M. Diah, a 
man whose political life had been associated with the PNI but who 
had also had associations with Murba in the past. From their recent 
years abroad (and Diah was still in Thailand most of the time), it 
would appear that all three were less mesmerized by the peculiar 
atmosphere of the Sukarno court than the other courtiers (and this 
included such top  military figures as  General Yani and  Admiral 
Martadinata in my view). 
In the initial stages, several vague speeches and articles were 
advanced by Ruslan Abdulgani on "Sukarnoism" which appeared to 
define Sukarno's thinking in a nationalist but non-communist 
direction. Simultaneously, Berita Indonesia and Merdeka began in 
June to advocate the replacement of the ten legal political parties by 
a broad single party while hinting their opposition to the theory of a 
two stage revolution. They implied at one point that the PKI was 
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aiming at elimination of all parties except itself, their own apparent 
intention being to merge the PKI into a broader "vanguard" party 
which the communists would not control. Aidit promptly rejected the 
claim that the PKI sought to be the sole vanguard party but reserved 
most of his ammunition for attacking proposals to eliminate existing 
political parties, holding that this was not appropriate for the current 
revolutionary stage. A debate then followed between Harian Rakjat 
on the one hand and Merdeka on the other with Berita Indonesia and 
Warta Berita, the two Murba-oriented papers, in occasional support 
of Merdeka. Merdeka had become particularly aggressive because 
Diah had returned on a long trip from Bangkok and decided that 
something had to be done to slow the PKI. His paper had been 
following a pro-PKI line because of his absence and the effective 
management of editorial policy by a pro-communist editor. The new 
Merdeka line was thus established by Diah personally and was made 
easier by Sukarno's absence from the country coupled with the fact 
that Chairul Saleh had been left in charge along with the politically 
weak Leimena. Saleh, as a former Tan Malaka follower who was 
close to Malik and Sukarni, had long favored replacement of political 
parties by a single "national front". 
The debate began in earnest with a Merdeka editorial on June 15 
which charged that the "Harian Rakjat group" misused the ideas of 
Sukarno to try to still all voices but their own and broadened its 
attack in the days that followed to cast doubt on the PKI's ultimate 
intentions, even alluding to the 1948 Madiun revolt. It roundly 
condemned the PKI for provoking rural violence which it likened to 
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Madiun. Some rather forced courtesy remained as the two papers 
agreed to print each other's editorials alongside their own and both 
relied heavily on quotations from Sukarno's writings of the 1920s 
and 1930s but the openness of the polemic was unusual by prevailing 
standards. Not surprisingly, the PKI was soon able to muster 
statements from other parties, particularly the PNI, Partindo, the NU 
and Perti, in opposition to abolition of the parties while claiming that 
Sukarno himself was  not  against  their  continued existence. Sitor 
Sitomorang, a well known leftist writer close to the PKI, labeled 
Berita Indonesia as "anti-revolutionary" for its position on the parties 
and the two stage revolution.(13) These two points were linked since 
the PKI held that multiple parties were necessary to the national 
democratic stage of the revolution and that much had to be done in 
the way of revolutionary action before the socialist stage could be 
reached. It continuously charged that its opponents were opposed to 
the two stage theory of the revolution because, if the revolution was 
already completed, it would not be necessary to take further steps to 
the left nor would it be necessary to replace office holders with more 
revolutionary people. Needless to say, the moderates did not openly 
condemn the two-stage theory, since it was enshrined in Sukarno's 
Political Manifesto of 1959 and by the MPRS as state doctrine, but 
the  communists  were  right  about  the  drift  of  their  opponents' 
thinking. 
Sukarno returned to Jakarta on June 21 but did nothing directly 
to stop the debate which continued for some weeks. However, his 
sympathy for the PKI viewpoint should have been clear from the 
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nature of his speech on the occasion of Soviet Politburo member 
Mikoyan's visit two days after the President's return. Sukarno 
emphasized that the Indonesian Revolution would be successful only 
if it were carried out by the "people" and went on to say that those 
who thought it could be done by "the generals" and "leaders" were 
wrong.(14) A few days later, Subandrio stated in Bandung that 
Sukarno valued the political parties, which he regarded as necessary 
to carry out the revolution, a further indication of his support for the 
PKI side of the debate.(15) 
Sukarno's attitude  became still  more clear  in  his August 17 
"Year of Living Dangerously" speech which should have left little 
doubt that he was siding with the PKI and warning such people as 
Nasution, Chairul Saleh and Ruslan Abdulgani to back off. Any 
doubts about his attitude would ultimately be dispelled by his actions 
later in the year to repudiate the efforts of Malik and others to pursue 
a non-communist "Sukarnoism" platform in a more vigorous and 
organized way. Aidit himself was confident. He reassured the Party 
in a speech at the Aliarcham Academy, a school for PKI cadres, that 
Sukarno "is loyal in making Marxism the property of the Indonesian 
nation" and that the President, in contrast to former Vice President 
Hatta, regarded Marxism as the only theory competent for resolving 
the problems of history, politics and the society.(16) Indeed, Sukarno 
was not hiding his views all through this period. He told a congress 
of secondary school students at this time that Western media efforts 
to portray him as a fascist were ridiculous since he was a member of 
the "red front" of the workers, of socialism and communism, against 
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capitalism.(17)  Sukarno's  annual  Independence  Day  speech  on 
August 17 clarified his pro-PKI posture for all to see. It not only 
raised the temperature of his anti-Western foreign policy but clearly 
threatened  non-communist Indonesian  political  figures  who  were 
trying to oppose communist objectives. The speech was titled "Year 
of Living Dangerously" (Tahun Vivere Pericoloso or "Tavip" for 
short).   Its   intended   effect   of   frightening   the   moderates   into 
submission was to be effective as far as inspiring fear was concerned 
but the temporary subsiding of the non-communists was soon to be 
replaced by another and stronger effort to stem the communist tide. 
That too was a product of the growing fears about Sukarno's course 
even though every effort was made to lay the blame on his leftist 
advisors and the PKI. 
As noted earlier, the Tavip speech was drafted in large part by 
PKI deputy chairman Njoto and the crypto-communist minister, Oei 
Tjoe Tat, and it espoused views that were in line with those of the 
PKI in all respects.(18) It also further exposed Sukarno's views in 
areas where there might be doubt as in his attitude toward land 
reform issues where he expressed a revolutionary and demagogic 
approval of PKI positions, including support for unilateral seizure of 
land by landless peasants. Although  Sukarno's language was veiled, 
it  was  also  clear  that  he  was  condemning  Nasution,  Ruslan 
Abdulgani and Chairul Saleh, among others, for opposing the 
communists.(19) A reference in this context to the slogan of "let 
many flowers bloom" seemed to imply that Sukarno had delayed 
committing himself on some of the sensitive issues (presumably land 
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reform and probably the Merdeka - Harian Rakjat debates on 
ideology) in order to trap the moderates who persisted in putting 
their neck in the noose by basing their non-communist positions on 
their interpretation of the teachings of Bung Karno himself. Much of 
this  was  wishful  thinking  but  understandable  since  much  of 
Sukarno's earlier public pronouncements had perforce been vague 
and subject to varying interpretations because that was required by 
the tactical needs flowing from Marxist weakness in terms of actual 
power. Needless to  say,  Tavip also  showed unremitting hostility 
toward the West, particularly the United States, that went far beyond 
the specific issue of Malaysia which had been the original platform 
for launching the revolutionary offensive. Even the title, "the year of 
living  dangerously",  implied  that  Sukarno  was  prepared  to  take 
major risks to push the "revolution rapidly forward" even though that 
would sorely strain the national consensus that was his for the asking 
if he would only pursue a moderate "balanced" policy. It is also 
noteworthy that the title of the speech and its theme of risk echoed 
Aidit's  major  speech  in  February,  1963,  "Dare,  Dare  and  Dare 
Again" (Berani, Berani, Sekali Lagi Berani) as well as the theme of 
the PKI December, 1963 plenum which called for a "revolutionary 
offensive" in all fields. This latter theme continued to be advanced 
by the PKI right up to the eve of the September 30 affair in 1965. 
Although little noted at the time, Sukarno made a point of endorsing 
again the theory of a two stage revolution and the need to move 
forward toward the ultimate socialist stage. 
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Although American Ambassador Howard Jones continued to 
plead for greater US sympathy and understanding toward Sukarno, 
the rest of the Embassy felt that Sukarno's course was implacably set 
against both the West and regional non-communist countries in 
foreign   policy   and   toward   a   full-fledged   communist   society 
internally. As Jones was on consultation in Washington, it fell to 
Charge d'Affaires Francis Galbraith to warn that the Tavip speech 
"could not be shrugged off". Galbraith noted that Sukarno had been 
continuously misjudged by many Americans who had developed an 
image of him as "less serious, more frivolous and less potent than he 
really  is".  Sukarno  was  the  architect  of  Indonesian  policy,  he 
declared, and "whether from his training and habit pattern as a 
revolutionary or from a blueprint prepared long ago, Sukarno's plans 
have unfolded with remarkable consistency". Furthermore, "he has 
never really concealed that he stands for Marxism against liberal 
democracy" and "he has made it clear that his aim is to establish 
socialism in Indonesia on a communist model and to place Indonesia 
on the side of the communist camp".(20) A later cable by Galbraith 
noted  the  obstacles,  including  the  non-communist  nature  of  the 
Army, and Sukarno's age and health and followed with what proved 
to be a very perceptive observation that "The drive by Sukarno to 
take Indonesia into the Socialist camp is therefore a race by him with 
Father Time in which the odds are against Sukarno".(21) 
Sukarno had indicated in his Tavip speech that major high level 
changes were in the offing but the actual cabinet reshuffle that was 
announced  on  August  24  was  not  nearly  as  sweeping  as  most 
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observers had expected. Nasution, Chairul Saleh and Ruslan 
Abdulgani, believed to be the principal domestic targets of Tavip, 
were all retained and Adam Malik became Minister of Trade. No 
overt PKI leaders were made ministers in charge of government 
ministries but Njoto and Oei Tjoe Tat became Ministers attached to 
the cabinet Presidium, although with no specific management 
responsibilities. They and another new Minister attached to the 
Presidium, a senior police officer who was probably close to the 
intelligence chief (and Foreign Minister) Subandrio, all played more 
significant roles than most regular ministers in the months that 
followed. They were clearly in Sukarno's inner circle as were Aidit 
and Subandrio. It was obvious that the changes were not all that the 
PKI or Sukarno had wanted and both hastened to point out that this 
was neither a Nasakom nor a Tavip cabinet but a "Dwikora" cabinet 
(that is the same old thing, a cabinet based on a consensus supporting 
the twin "Dwikora" goals of "crushing Malaysia" and strengthening 
Indonesia internally). (22) Actually, during the week after August 
17, Sukarno had tried to make extensive cabinet changes, the main 
feature of which was to be the dismissal of Nasution. While little is 
known in detail, it was clear that the Army had refused to accept 
Nasution's  dismissal.  Although  Nasution  no  longer  had  great 
influence over the Army as a whole and was not well regarded by 
Yani and a number of other senior Army officers (this probably 
reflected anti-Sumatra and anti-Siliwangi division feelings among 
some senior Javanese officers among other things), the proposed 
move apparently seemed too direct an assault on the Army's position. 
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The attitude was "we'll support Nasution one more time but not 
much longer". 
Sukarno was soon to go abroad on an extensive trip from 
September 17 to November 5 and this provided the harassed 
moderates with another opportunity to counterattack which was 
somewhat  similar  to  the  Merdeka/Berita  Indonesia/Warta  Berita 
effort of June-July but much more organized and consistent. The 
moderates were to project the same fundamental weaknesses, 
however, and to do so in an even more pronounced form, through 
basing their whole strategy on the vain hope that Sukarno's real 
intentions and goals were similar to theirs. They called their 
movement "Sukarnoism" and established a "Body for the Promotion 
of Sukarnoism" or "BPS" as it universally came to be known from 
the initials of its Indonesian words "Badan Pendukung 
Sukarnoisme". Their main hope was to play to Sukarno's ego and to 
present  themselves  as  loyal  followers  of  the  Great  Leader.  The 
origins of the BPS and even the identity of all its backers are obscure 
in detail but the key figure was Trade Minister Adam Malik. It may 
be assumed that Chairul Saleh favored the effort but he never came 
out openly and, after the fall of the BPS, was to proclaim loudly that 
all efforts to connect him with the movement were false. Ruslan 
Abdulgani, whose mild articles on Sukarnoism some months earlier 
may be considered a germ of the movement, was now conspicuous 
by his absence.(23) To jump ahead, he seemed a faithful follower of 
Sukarno again in 1965 and managed to escape the purge of "false 
Marhaenists" but he was also able to avoid the counter-purge of the 
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Ali-Surachman clique when Suharto gained power. Nasution's hand 
was not visible and he does not appear to have played any significant 
role in regard to the BPS even though he came from the same Batak 
group as Malik (some said they were cousins but they were certainly 
not close in any case from all I was later to understand from some of 
their close associates). The BPS did have the behind-the-scenes 
support of B.M. Diah, the Indonesian Ambassador to Bangkok and 
owner of the newspaper Merdeka. 
The principal overt figure in the BPS was Sajuti Melik, a PNI 
intellectual who began writing a series of articles under the pen name 
of "Juti" in the unofficial Murba paper, Berita Indonesia, as early as 
July. His articles on "Sukarnoism" were not opposed to Marxism or 
overtly anti-PKI but stressed the religious aspects of the Sukarnoist 
state philosophy and argued that Indonesian socialism was already 
established. The articles were often obscure and tortuous in their 
reasoning as well as obsequious toward the Great Leader but that did 
not matter since everyone understood that they constituted at least a 
glimmer of opposition to the PKI and a plea for Sukarno to be the 
Sukarno the non-communist nationalists wanted him to be - that is 
the Sukarno of Panca Sila and Indonesian nationalism, not the 
Sukarno of Nasakom and ever more revolutionary Marxism. The 
Sajuti   Melik   articles   were   reprinted   in   a   number   of   other 
non-communist newspapers such as Merdeka and Warta Berita and 
their various provincial counterparts and their fame increased as they 
came  under  PKI  attack.  The  apparent  success  of  the  BPS  also 
inspired non-communist trade unions and student groups to organize 
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under its banner at the grass roots level. The Army, including both 
Nasution and Yani, were sympathetic although they were unwilling 
to take a public stand. Subandrio, who was in charge of the 
government during the President's absence, avoided condemning the 
movement publicly although he did call in Murba and NU leaders to 
request  a  cessation  of  controversy  in  the  interest  of  national 
unity.(24) 
Sukarno meanwhile had  been in  Vienna for medical 
consultation concerning his defective kidneys before going on to 
Moscow, Pyongyang and Tokyo. He was apparently advised to have 
a large stone removed from his one remaining kidney and was 
probably advised that his life expectancy was short, especially if the 
stone were not removed soon.(25) It is known, in any case that his 
Viennese doctors did not expect him to live more than one or two 
years.(26) Presumably Subandrio had just been apprised of the bleak 
Viennese assessment of Sukarno's health when he made a speech on 
October 25 wherein he asked how the revolution would be continued 
after Sukarno was no longer there to lead it. Subandrio's answer was 
that the entire people must become progressive and revolutionary to 
avoid the country being torn apart by coups and conflicts since the 
Indonesian revolution had been defined by Sukarno as leftist and 
national-democratic with  a socialist perspective.(27) The 
non-communist elements were grasping for other straws to discredit 
the PKI by trying to show that its  ultimate objectives were still 
classically communist, however much the Party might try to identify 
itself with the Sukarnoist state philosophy. On October 19 Aidit 
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made a speech to a group of "revolutionary cadres" in which he 
criticized the efforts of "some people" to emphasize Panca Sila as if 
it   were   the   only   philosophical   statement   of   the   Indonesian 
Revolution  while  ignoring  Nasakom  and  Manipol.(28)  He  also 
sought to undercut the advocates of a single national party by 
differentiating between the national democratic stage when several 
parties  were  desirable  and  a  second,  socialist,  stage  when  there 
would be but one. In the course of these remarks (the exact words are 
not available), he said something to the effect that Panca Sila was a 
doctrine of unity for the first stage and then either said or implied 
that Panca Sila would have served its purpose and no longer would 
be needed once the socialist stage were reached. An obscure 
newspaper, Revolusioner, leaped on this statement to claim that Aidit 
had let the cat out of the bag by indicating that Panca Sila and 
religion would be abandoned in the second stage if the PKI had its 
way. Aidit responded on October 23 that Revolusioner had distorted 
his remarks and was subversive and counter-revolutionary. 
Revolusioner  followed  with  even  stronger  statements  and  was 
banned by the Attorney General on October 31 for its headline of a 
few days earlier that "Confrontation toward the PKI is the same as 
confrontation   toward   Malaysia".(29)   It   also   appears   that   in 
December Chairul Saleh tried to raise questions about a document 
that alleged a PKI plan to seize power by 1970. Aidit promptly 
labeled the document as false and Sukarno again sided with Aidit 
who was probably able to make a convincing case to what would 
have been a sympathetic audience, the President.(30) 
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The   communists   had   not   been   simply   reacting   to   the 
anti-communist counter-offensive in late 1964, however, but 
continued to be on the attack and have most of the initiative. The 
United States was a principal scapegoat and regular attacks took 
place against American film imports (which were publicly defended 
by Malik at one point) while demonstrations against the American 
Embassy, AID, USIA and American policy were regular 
occurrences. The USIS library and the headquarters of the American 
film distributors were destroyed by mobs on December 4.(31) The 
communists continued to press for land reform and attacked Trade 
Minister Malik for the rapid price inflation as well as Minister of 
Basic Industries Chairul Saleh and unnamed "capitalist bureaucrats". 
This phrase was understood to include the large number of Army 
officers  in  civilian  positions  relating  to  the  economy.  Whatever 
hopes the non-communists had, and those hopes were meager in 
spite of some brave talk to foreigners, they were soon dashed by 
Sukarno. The President assembled party and government leaders at 
Bogor on December 12 and imposed a truce which required 
consultation on the basis of Nasakom and strict adherence to the 
policies of the Great Leader of the Revolution. (32) Not surprisingly, 
the Sukarno solution was remarkably close to the four point "code of 
Nasakom ethics" professed by Aidit in September. (33) The 
signatories for the parties included Sukarni of Murba who was soon 
to be arrested and Hardi of the PNI who was to be purged nine 
months later. 
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The  Bogor  Declaration  was  promptly  followed  by  decisive 
 
Sukarno suppression of the BPS. He banned that body on December 
 
17 and simultaneously gave KOTRAR, the purge agency, 
responsibility for dissemination of Sukarno's teachings as well as 
forbidding interpretations of those teachings by others. (34) Murba 
was suspended on January 6, 1965 and dissolved completely the 
following September a few days before the September 30 movement 
"coup". Sukarno acted with equal force on the foreign policy scene 
by pulling Indonesia out of the UN on New Year's eve on the pretext 
that  Malaysia  had  been  elected  to  the  Security  Council.  Many 
Western observers have evaluated this move as an irrational, 
emotional act. In my view, it was a coolly calculated move that 
merely took advantage of the pretext. Indonesia had been demanding 
for  some  time  that  the  UN  be  "retooled"  or  reorganized  at  the 
expense of "Nekolim", that is the "neo-colonialists and imperialists”. 
More important, Sukarno had cast Indonesia's lot solidly with the 
Peoples Republic of China which was excluded from the UN and he 
believed that his new project of a Conference of New Emerging 
Forces (CONEFO) would become a rival rallying point for an 
international Nasakom consisting of the communist countries and 
Third World radical nationalism (religion was no longer much 
mentioned and had always been merely a sop to local sensibilities). 
Sukarno's commitment to the CONEFO idea was demonstrated by a 
major construction effort to build a complex that would not only 
serve as a site for the conference but would become the permanent 
headquarters  for  a  new  revolutionary  alternative  to  the  United 
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Nations. The latter, it was hoped, would be left to "Nekolim" and 
their  "lackeys".  1964  thus  ended  on  a  note  of  foreboding  for 
non-communist Indonesians and a rallying call for radicalism. The 
auguries for 1965 were momentous and accurate indicators of what 
was yet to come. 
151  
 
Footnotes - Chapter VI 
 
 
 
1. Harian Rakjat, December 26, 1963 reports on Aidit's speech to 
the plenum. The theme was recurrent. 
2. I took an extensive trip through Java with Embassy Political 
Counsellor Floyd Whittington at this time and personally 
witnessed scenes of malnutrition and even acute starvation, 
emaciated human beings and even efforts by people at one 
location to eat non-edible fibers. 
3. Much of this can be gleaned from the Indonesian press of this 
period. The subject is covered thoroughly and well, although 
largely from the PKI vantagepoint, in Rex Mortimer, Indonesian 
Communism under Sukarno pp. 276-328. 
4. Jacob Walkin, "The Moslem-Communist Confrontation in East 
 
Java", Orbis XIII, No. 3 (Fall 1969) p 829. 
 
5. Indonesian press throughout October, 1964. Harian Rakjat's 
views were expressed strongly on October 8 and October 28. 
6. Special land reform courts were established in 1964. 
 
Astrawinata lectured a group of prosecutors and judges on May 
 
27, 1964, for example, that "a decision may be responsible in a 
juridical technical way, but don't forget that a case has other 
aspects. This is often forgotten by judges and prosecutors whose 
way of thinking is stagnant and not progressive and 
revolutionary". As he told the same group, Astrawinata also 
favored close consultation between judge and prosecutor 
throughout the trial, a consultation from which the defendant's 
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attorney was excluded. See Warta Berita, May 28, 1964. 
Astrawinata was not formally a member of any political party 
but he had long been associated with the pro-PKI wing of 
Murba and with the PKI itself, having been elected on the PKI 
slate in West Java to the Constituent Assembly and as Chairman 
of the People's Congress for West Java from 1953 until the 
Congress was dissolved in 1960. He had also been the PKI 
nominee for the post of Deputy Governor of West Java. 
7. Sjarif Thajeb was one of four brothers from Aceh, a province on 
the northern tip of Sumatra, three of whom (including himself) 
were non-communist. A fourth brother was a member of the 
Central Verification Committee of the PKI. The other two 
brothers were long-time ambassadors, although one returned to 
become a minister during the last year or so of the Sukarno era. 
Sjarif Thajeb, an Army doctor with specialist training as a 
pediatrician, reportedly became close to Sukarno on the basis of 
his medical services to the Sukarno family. He was always 
friendly and warm toward Americans in the most difficult of 
times and was regarded as solidly in the Army camp after the 
September 30 affair. I believe he was an advocate of protecting 
Sukarno's reputation, however, based on a long conversation I 
had with him around May or June of 1966. 
8. This paragraph is based in large part on the notes and 
recollections of another American embassy officer who covered 
the conference and its aftermath and reflects conversations with 
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a number of Indonesian sources as well, of course, as the press 
accounts. 
9. The British lady in question, Carmel Budiardjo, had gone to 
Eastern Europe in the late 1940's, married an Indonesian 
communist and settled with him in Indonesia. Arrested along 
with her husband after the Communist failure in 1965, she was 
subsequently released and founded a "human rights" 
organization in London, which vociferously denounced the 
Suharto Government's treatment of communist prisoners while 
remaining silent on the Sukarno Government's suppression of its 
and the PKI's opponents. 
10.  Another personal anecdote from this period may show that an 
even greater level of terror existed at the grass roots level: A 
young Indonesian who had dropped his university studies 
because of poverty gave Indonesian lessons to some of us 
foreigners. After almost a year of weekend lessons at my home, 
I decided to finance his return to the university since the 
rampant inflation and devaluations had made such a course 
easily affordable to me and I had come to regard the young man 
as a worthy friend. After telling him this one afternoon, he left 
by the front gate of my house but soon came running back since 
several men had been laying in wait to kill him, he said. He was 
obviously in great fear but wanted to return to his kampong 
(section of lower class housing consisting of shacks without 
streets or modern facilities) out of concern for his mother and 
younger brother. I walked him through the rear gate to a bus 
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stop on a main street several blocks away and expected to see 
him the following week. He never reappeared, however, even 
after the communist failure, despite my offer to help him get 
through school. I believe he was almost certainly killed by the 
communist cadres whom he had said were strong in his 
kampong and disapproved of his affinity for liberal democracy. 
11.  Based on conversations with Indonesian sources in 1964. 
 
12.  Harian Rakjat May 14, 1964. 
 
13.  Harian Rakjat June 10, 1964. 
 
14.  Harian Rakjat June 24, 1964. 
 
15.  Harian Rakjat July 5, 1964 
 
16.  Harian Rakiat July 20, 1964 
 
17.  Harian Rakjat July 27 and August 7, 1964. 
 
18.  Njoto's role has correctly been noted by Dake (the Embassy had 
reports to this effect too), but he overstates Njoto's role in this 
and other places. See Dake, p. 287. Oei Tjoe Tat's major role in 
drafting the speech was reported by the Embassy on August 20. 
See Embtel 331, (Jakarta) Galbraith to Rusk, August 20, 1964, 
Indonesia Country File, National Security File, L.B.J. Library 
19.  Ibid. 
 
20.  Embtel 312 (Jakarta) Galbraith to Rusk, August 18, 1964, 
Indonesia Country File, National Security File, LBJ Library. 21. 
Embtel 359 (Jakarta) Galbraith to Rusk, August 24, 1964, 
Indonesia Country File, National Security File, LBJ Library. 22. 
Harian Rakjat, September 4, 1964. "Dwikora" was another 
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Sukarnoist slogan that emanated from an anti-Malaysia speech 
of the Bung in May, 1964. 
21.  Jones, p.327. 
 
22.  Jones, p.351. 
 
23.  Jones, p.354. 
 
24.  Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates 
Special Memo No. 4-65 of January 26, 1965, Indonesia Country 
File, National Security File, LBJ Library. 
25.  Jones, p.354, Antara, October 26, 1964. 
 
26.  Harian Rakjat Oct. 22, 1964. 
 
27.  Harian Rakjat Nov. 1, 1964. 
 
28.  An alleged PKI document purporting to establish 1970 as the 
year for the Party to seize power was circulating during early 
1964 on a fairly wide basis in Jakarta. The document appeared 
to be a forgery and to reflect an extremely superficial 
understanding of the PKI at that. It was believed to come from a 
civilian group close to the Army but it did not attract much 
attention at the time because of its rather silly and transparent 
falseness. This may have been the document resurrected by 
Chairul Saleh some six months later. It was publicly denounced 
by Aidit at the Gerwani meeting in January as noted in Harian  
Rakjat on January 22, 1965. 
29.  Reported gleefully by Harian Rakjat on December 5. 
 
30.  Harian Rakiat December 14, 1964. 
 
31.  Harian Rakjat September 28, 1964. 
 
32.  Jones, p.356. 
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VII 
 
Early 1965: Sukarno Decides to 
 
"Enter the Socialist State" Soon 
 
 
 
The openness of Sukarno's favoritism toward the PKI had 
become  ever  more  evident  in  1964,  particularly  with  his  Tavip 
speech and his banning of the moderate "BPS" or "Sukarnoism 
movement" in December. This latter measure had been followed by a 
suspension of  the  Murba  Party, the  closure  of  several  important 
Murba-oriented newspapers and a great deal of pressure on anyone 
remotely connected with the BPS. The Army had extended some 
support to the vanquished moderates, notably by establishing two 
new newspapers, Angkatan Bersendjata and Berita Yudha, on the 
premises of the banned Merdeka and Berita Indonesia, and had even 
retained many of the personnel of the banned papers. The new 
newspapers  were  still  dependent  on  the  communist-dominated 
Antara news agency for most of their material, however, and they 
both adopted a generally cautious line in view of Sukarno's obvious 
willingness to act decisively against anything and anyone that could 
be  regarded  as  counter-revolutionary.  Except  for  the  army,  the 
non-communist forces were in terrible disarray. Not only had the real 
"right"  long  been  forced  from  political  life  but  most  of  the 
democratic center. Paradoxically, the main line of civilian resistance 
against a communist takeover had come down in late 1964 to the 
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onetime "national communists" and radical nationalists of the Murba 
Party and their sympathizers. Many of these newly designated 
"moderates" were people whose assumption of leadership positions 
in the early stages of Guided Democracy had been greeted with 
considerable trepidation by the shattered democratic forces that had 
always looked to Hatta, Sjahrir and Natsir. Their entry into 
government had also been viewed at the time by most foreign 
diplomatic, academic, and journalistic observers as a major step by 
Sukarno to the left. What was once radical was now regarded by 
Sukarno as counter-revolutionary and by opponents as the last line of 
resistance. 
The Army leadership was sufficiently frightened that General 
Yani assembled a small "Brain Trust" of generals whose political 
views he trusted. He did not include his principal deputy, General 
Mursjid, or several others that would have been logical from their 
positions in the Army hierarchy because he obviously mistrusted 
them as overly close to Sukarno and/or the PKI. This "Brain Trust" 
met informally and consisted of Yani, Suprapto, Harjono, Parman 
and Sukendro. All but Sukendro were members of Yani's senior staff 
and all were strongly anti-communist. Except for Sukendro, all were 
to die on the morning of October 1. This group was undoubtedly 
what the communists would later refer to as the "Generals Council", 
although there is no evidence that they did more than discuss 
defensive measures to protect the Army from political attack as well 
as internal personnel questions including those of reliability, 
assignments and promotions at senior levels. There is no indication 
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that they thought in terms of deposing Sukarno or that they even 
engaged in planning practical measures of any kind. 
Meanwhile, Sukarno and the PKI were obviously intent on 
driving the revolutionary offensive, as they called it, to a higher and 
higher pitch. The task did not seem that difficult as far as the overt 
political arena was concerned because the media were proclaiming in 
concert the same strident revolutionary message and the political 
statements of all elements of the elite (other than those in prison or 
under house arrest) reflected the jargon and revolutionary temper of 
the period - whatever some of them may have felt privately. This 
included the Army leaders too. Both Sukarno and the PKI were 
aware - although not sufficiently as it turned out - that there was 
another potential arena, obscured by this curtain of  uniform and 
seemingly mindless jargon, namely the physical balance of forces in 
the country. Army leaders spoke the required nonsense (as they often 
viewed it) but the traditional enmity of many Army leaders toward 
the  communists  was  well  known.  There  was  also  the  standing 
problem of latent anti-communist sentiment in the Outer Islands. 
Sukarno's   Tavip   theme   of   "living   dangerously"   and   Aidit's 
reinforcing refrain of "dare, dare, and dare again" showed a 
consciousness  that  there  was  risk  -  that  the  communist  base  of 
support was thin and that a potential backlash was there under the 
surface. The leadership of any potential opposition was regarded, 
however,  as  confused,  cowardly  and  not  very  bright  politically. 
There was considerable reason for such a view. Sukarno opened the 
new year with a series of actions and revolutionary rhetoric that 
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continued the momentum of late 1964. He pulled Indonesia out of 
the UN on New Year's eve and issued a decree a few days later 
suspending  the  Murba  Party.  Murba  members  were  promptly 
expelled from the National Front on January 8 and from other 
organizations thereafter. Subandrio, in a speech to the staff of the NU 
newspaper Duta Masjarakat on January 4, proclaimed 1965 a "year 
of crystallization" in which the revolution would march inexorably 
forward and former comrades would be "discarded" because they "no 
longer   follow   the   path   of   the   revolution   and   have   become 
counter-revolutionary".(l) Subandrio did not specify who was to be 
left  behind  but  he  surely  had  in  mind  his  arch-rival  for  the 
succession, Chairul Saleh, among others, and this was borne out by 
the strong and persistent press attacks on Saleh and Malik that 
followed. Malik, as noted earlier, was an overt Murba leader while 
Saleh was linked to Murba by his Tan Malaka past and his known 
sympathies and informal connections, if not more. PKI unions 
demonstrated at the offices of Saleh and Malik on January 6 and on a 
number of occasions thereafter. Saleh pleaded on January 12 that 
efforts (by the US press he said) to link him to Murba were not true 
but he was not believed or allowed to get off the hook.(2) Aidit 
attacked him personally a week later in a public speech for backing 
distribution of a document falsely ascribed to the PKI while the 
drumfire of criticism against "capitalist bureaucrats" or "Kabirs", to 
use the PKI-coined acronym, mounted.(3) This latter term applied 
particularly to Saleh as the coordinating cabinet minister in charge of 
the industrial sector of the economy and to the numerous Army 
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officers who ran government enterprises and many of the economic 
ministries. 
There was no question, incidentally, that Saleh and many others 
were reaping enormous personal benefits from their official positions 
despite their revolutionary Marxist rhetoric. Saleh reportedly had a 
massive wardrobe containing literally dozens of suits, for example, 
and often sported large diamond rings. He was widely believed to 
have become one of Indonesia's richest men. It was also widely 
believed that only the PKI was immune from the temptations of 
corruption and  personal enrichment although the  truth was  more 
mixed.  The   economic  and   political   systems  did   not   provide 
legitimate methods for financing political organizations which were 
more personalized, complex and multi-organizational than the formal 
political party structure would imply. The result was that political 
leaders  felt  compelled  to  tap  the  corruption  spigots  in  order  to 
finance what could be rationalized as higher causes that deserved 
their support. And once this step was taken, it was not too difficult to 
rationalize the further use of corrupt funds for personal use as well. 
This problem of systemic corruption remained a continuing problem 
for Indonesia all through the Suharto period and was a major factor 
in its collapse in the late 1990s. The same point applied to the PKI, 
incidentally, although not so visibly. The Chinese business 
community was systematically tied into the far left Baperki 
organization not only for political purposes but to provide a channel 
of funds to both the PKI and the Palace. Chinese businessmen 
cooperated   because   they   also   received   benefits   in   terms   of 
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government business, allocation of domestic raw materials and the 
right to import needed machinery and raw materials from abroad as a 
quid  pro  quo.  The  Baperki/Partindo  channel  divided  the  take 
between the beneficiaries (long suspected, this mechanism could be 
confirmed from documents seized  by the  anti-communist student 
movement in 1966).(4) While PKI leaders did not live ostentatiously, 
Lukman's house, which I passed regularly enroute to work, was an 
upper middle class home similar to those of many non-communist 
cabinet ministers, generals and other members of the elite.(5) Aidit's 
home was smaller and less favorably located. The private lives of 
PKI leaders were cloaked in secrecy, however, much in the manner 
that prevailed in Eastern Europe. 
The PKI and Subandrio were not alone in keeping up the 
revolutionary pressure. Surachman, the crypto-communist Secretary 
General   of   the   PNI,   was   demanding   a   ban   of   the   small 
non-communist trade  union,  SOKSI,  and  of  the  Moslem  student 
organization, the HMI.(6) Subandrio, incidentally, was attempting at 
this time to become the patron of the HMI and other Moslem 
organizations, although under the obvious conditions that they show 
loyalty to him and be prepared to cooperate with the PKI and 
Sukarno's revolution. These efforts were not very successful, 
particularly at the grass roots level. Radical revolutionary themes 
were being expressed in speeches by Hardi and Isnaeni, two PNI 
leaders  who  were  later  to  be  purged  as  "false  Marhaenists".(7) 
Sukarno himself had continued :o crow over his departure from the 
United  Nations and had begun to advance the justification that 
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Indonesia would now stand proudly on its own feet.(8) This latter 
expression was to become the title theme of Sukarno's two most 
trumpeted speeches of the year, his "Berdikari" address to the MPRS 
in April and his national day speech on August 17. If 1964 had been 
labeled "the year of living dangerously", l965 was to be proclaimed 
as the year of "standing on one's own feet". Sukarno also ordered 
Indonesia out of UNICEF, UNESCO, the FAO and later the ILO. 
New demonstrations were launched against the US embassy on 
January 20 and February 12 and a USIS building in Jakarta was 
sacked on February 15. The USIS building in Medan was seized on 
February 21. Sukarno praised the demonstrators on February 25 and 
Subandrio followed the next day with a statement in Medan that the 
government would take steps against US installations. On February 
23, Sukarno likened the "CIA appendage" BPS to Kartosuwirjo (a 
Darul Islam rebel leader), Kahar Muzakkar (another Darul Islam 
rebel recently killed in Sulawesi) and the Masjumi (the large banned 
political party which had headed several governments in the 1950s). 
These unsupported and demagogic linkages were intended to imply, 
or indeed to state explicitly, that all who failed to go along with the 
drive toward a communist Indonesia would be regarded as traitors. 
A campaign also began to unfold against a most unlikely scape- 
goat, the local head of the American Motion Picture Association, Bill 
Palmer, who was declared by the PKI to be an agent of US 
intelligence on the basis of an article in the Indian paper, 
Mainstream.(9) This allegation was attributed to Subandrio and it is 
clear that the whole scenario was manufactured by Subandrio's BPI 
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or Central Intelligence organization. Palmer was a pudgy, middle 
aged man who had lived for years in Indonesia and was totally 
enamored with Indonesian culture. He considered himself a personal 
friend of Sukarno and had arranged Sukarno's 1961 visit to 
Hollywood where the President and his party were lavishly 
entertained. I did not know him well but he was a fixture on the local 
cocktail circuit where he came across as one of the more apolitical 
and naive people I have known. Palmer not only sold films to 
Indonesia but showed them to private audiences of Indonesians at his 
retreat in the mountainous "Puncak" (Puntjak) area near Bogor. A 
few months later, Palmer was to become the goat for a Subandrio 
intelligence operation to plant a purported British embassy message 
in his mountain retreat. In this document, British Ambassador 
Gilchrist supposedly alluded to "our" people in the Indonesian 
military and spoke of a plot to kill Sukarno, Subandrio and General 
Yani.  This  document  was  not  only  a  forgery  but  as  crude  and 
simple-minded a forgery as one could imagine. Poor Bill Palmer 
never knew what hit him. After being attacked repeatedly in the 
press, he would sadly mumble his appreciation for the Panca Sila and 
President Sukarno to anyone who came along. He seemed like a 
broken hearted rejected lover and eventually went to Thailand where 
he  died  some  years  later.  American  intelligence  officers  were 
assigned to Indonesia, of course, but CIA officials, including the 
Chief   of   Station,   categorically   denied   that   Palmer   had   any 
connection with intelligence in Indonesia.  The possibility of such a 
connection was regarded, indeed, with considerable humor. 
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American films were one of the PKI's most frequently mentioned 
propaganda  targets,  however,  and  Bill  Palmer  was  a  convenient 
scapegoat, not least because he was so gullible and psychologically 
defenseless. The Gilchrist document was also said on occasion to 
have come from the seizure of the British Embassy almost two years 
earlier.  This  would  have  been  a  more  logical  place  to  find  a 
purportedly secret British diplomatic document of great sensitivity 
but that version had the disadvantage of being more dated. Sukarno's 
military aide, Bambang Widjanarko, expressed this second version 
as the one he was aware of during his interrogation by the Army.(10) 
On international women's day, Sukarno railed that Indonesia did 
not fear US support for Malaysia and would never compromise with 
imperialism because Indonesia was not alone, having the support of 
North Vietnam, China and all of the "New Emerging Forces".(11) 
Aidit, meanwhile, was speaking almost daily on the theme of 
Sukarno's belief  in  Marxism. Sukarno's teachings concerned "the 
problems of socialism and Indonesian socialism", he said, and those 
teachings "condemn reformism, opportunism and the like". Sukarno 
had been correct in adapting Marxism to Indonesian conditions 
according to Aidit, because Marxism was not supposed to be dogma 
but a program for action.(12) This latter theme had also been stated 
by Aidit in a speech to the Department of Transmigration (an agency 
to  spur  resettlement of  people  from overpopulated Java  to  other 
islands) on February 11 that was only reported by Harian Rakjat on 
March 13. "Sukarno was my first teacher of Marxism" when he was 
giving lectures at the Japanese sponsored institute at Menteng 31, 
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said Aidit, who added that there were two kinds of Marxism, 
dogmatic and creative, and that Sukarno had properly been a 
"creative"  Marxist  appropriately adapting  Marxism  to  Indonesian 
conditions.(13) 
The drift was clear toward placing increasing emphasis on the 
Marxist component as the central element of Sukarno's thought. 
Sukarno himself led this trend. He gave two speeches to a gathering 
of PNI cadres in late March in which he stressed that Marhaenism 
was Marxism adapted to Indonesian conditions and that he expected 
the PNI to become more genuinely Marhaenist and Marxist. He also 
introduced a new ideological theme that Indonesia was now in the 
national democratic stage of a two stage revolution but that it was 
now time to complete that stage by "expunging to the roots" 
imperialism and feudalism. True Marhaenism, said Sukarno, was a 
theory of struggle and those who did not believe in such a struggle 
were not true Marhaenists. Marhaenism was not a simple theory of 
unity  but  a  theory  of  "national  progressive  revolutionary unity". 
Anyone who opposed the policy of Nasakom under the guise of unity 
would be expelled from the movement, he said, adding "I do not 
want to become the property of the false Marhaenists". Making it 
clear  that  Marhaenism  and  Marxism  were  to  be  equated  more 
directly and openly, Sukarno then began talking of Marxism in the 
same manner, asserting that Marxism was "a theory of struggle, a 
guiding theory for conducting struggle" and labeling Marx himself as 
"the great teacher of Marhaenism". Several major PNI speakers such 
as  Surachman,  Ali  Sastroamidjojo  and  Ruslan  Abdulgani  then 
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followed with  demands to  "crush" the  BPS  and  form a  genuine 
revolutionary unity on the basis of Nasakom. They also echoed the 
emphasis on Marhaenism as Marxism adapted to Indonesian 
conditions. All three also extolled the Marxist principles of historical 
materialism (the dialectic view of inevitable victory for socialism) - 
perhaps with foreknowledge of Sukarno's coming campaign to "enter 
the  socialist  stage".(14)  These  themes  were  observed  by  the 
Nasakom elite elsewhere as Partindo Chairman Asmara Hadi stated 
in  Medan  that  "Nasakom  unity  is  necessary  to  complete  the 
national-democratic stage of the revolution now in order to finally 
advance to a socialist society of Indonesia". The responsibility of 
revolutionaries, according to Asmara Hadi, was to study Marxism 
and to work with "Kom", that is the PKI.(15) Even Idham Chalid of 
the NU was emphasizing that Nasakom was the basis of Sukarno's 
teachings   and   had   been   ever   since   the   appearance   of   his 
"Nationalism, Islam and Marxism" in 1926 which was later refined 
by his "Sumpuh Pemuda" article of October 28, 1928.(16)  Sukarno 
told a veterans group two days later that the "Indonesian revolution 
is not completed" but that they must struggle to complete it soon. 
Sukarno's  new  obsession  with  entering  the  socialist  stage 
became still more evident in a speech to a New Emerging Forces 
indoctrination group in early April. After describing the differences 
between the first and second stages of the revolution and declaring 
that the main tasks of the national-democratic stage were to clear 
away  obstacles  to  entering  the  socialist  period,  he  said,  "The 
national-democratic period is already almost completed and we are 
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already beginning to enter the period of building socialism". This 
socialism would be a modern socialism, not the socialism of a 
Mahatma Gandhi.(17) That is, Sukarno's intent was to achieve a 
"scientific socialism" in the Leninist sense, not a "utopian" version 
that digressed from the communist model. A chastened Ruslan 
Abdulgani was to say openly some weeks later that the socialism that 
was the revolution's goal was "scientific socialism"(18) The next day 
Sukarno told a congress of judges to understand and work for the 
revolution in one speech and in another speech that same day on the 
rather pedestrian subject of urban cleanliness, he cited Lenin as the 
authority for his admonitions. 
The foreign policy aspects of this revolutionary surge toward 
communism were not being neglected either. One aspect was 
Sukarno's effort to turn the posture of the armed forces toward 
alliance with China, North Vietnam and North Korea and against the 
West, a course that was made evident from early April. This trend 
will be examined in another chapter. Both Sukarno and Subandrio 
were hailing Indonesia as being at the very center of the progressive 
effort to destroy imperialism. "Nekolim (the acronym for 
"neo-colonialism and imperialism", meaning the US and the West) is 
more afraid of Indonesia than the communist countries", he said, 
"because Indonesia is working to unify all the progressive 
revolutionary forces of the whole world".(l9) This was Nasakom to 
be applied on a world scale through such mechanisms as the 
"Conference of New Emerging Forces" or CONEFO idea which was 
soon to be unveiled. Meanwhile Kim Il-Sung of North Korea arrived 
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on April 9 for a prolonged and greatly publicized state visit that was 
to take in Sukarno's major address to the MPRS (the rubber-stamp 
legislature in effect) and the spectacular celebration in Jakarta of the 
tenth anniversary of the original Bandung Conference. Indonesia and 
North Korea would "struggle together to establish a new world", said 
the Bung. Kim's prominence was no accident as he had long made it 
his and North Korea's trade mark to extol the principle of "standing 
on  one's  own  feet",  the  new  Sukarno  theme.  Mystic  affinities 
between Indonesia and North Korea were later to be affirmed by rites 
between the Indonesian Parliament chairman, Arudji Kartawinata, 
and a North Korean parliamentary delegation in which the "sacred" 
soils of the two countries were mixed in a quasi-religious ceremony. 
Sukarno's speech to the MPRS at Bandung in April was notable 
for several features. He declared a "Banting Stir", which was defined 
as a sharp turn of the wheel of Indonesian policy toward the left. 
This would involve an almost total severance of connections with the 
West  under  the  "standing on  one's  own  feet"  theme  which  now 
acquired the acronym of "Berdikari". The 'life line of imperialism" in 
the Pacific was about to be cut and would become the "death line of 
imperialism". Sukarno's intent to organize a CONEFO conference in 
Jakarta of new emerging forces was also stated and the theme of 
entering the socialist stage was now put forward in a much more 
official setting. "According to the clear situation", Sukarno said, "the 
national-democratic stage is already almost complete. We already 
have defeated imperialism and are now entering the stage of 
Indonesian  socialism".  This  second  stage  of  building  socialism 
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would be a stage of development and hard work but it would be 
conducted  on  the  basis  of  guidance  from  the  top  since  "liberal 
policies are finished". This would require greater discipline and close 
control of the economy. Sycophantic repetition of these themes 
promptly followed not  only  from the  PKI  but  from virtually all 
political organizations. 
Sukarno's emphasis on entering the socialist stage and leaving 
the national democratic stage in the near future can only be 
understood as an intention to place Indonesia on an open communist 
footing - to proclaim himself the leader of a communist Indonesia in 
which the PKI would be the vanguard party leading the state while 
all other elements would be shoved into the background. The 
Indonesian case, though unique in detail, was to be similar to that of 
Cuba under Castro. Incidentally, Indonesia and Cuba were the first 
two countries that the new Soviet theory of "national democracy" 
had  placed  in  that  special  category  of  being  embarked  on  a 
non-capitalist path leading to communism following the emergence 
of that theory in 1960, although a few other countries were to be 
added soon thereafter such as Nkrumah's Ghana and Sekou Toure's 
Guinea. This new Soviet theory was an evaluation of trends that 
Moscow wished to encourage but which were largely beyond its 
control. Sukarno's - and Aidit's - views were based on their own 
concept of the Indonesian revolution, however, and it was Sukarno 
himself who was the propelling force because he wanted to enter the 
socialist stage in his lifetime. He wanted, in essence, to go down in 
history as more than an Indonesian "bourgeois" leader, he wanted to 
171  
 
be the Lenin or the Mao of Indonesian history. No other analysis 
serves to explain why he should commit himself to "leaving the 
national democratic stage" so precipitously, to force to the wall an 
otherwise obedient Indonesian Army that was prepared to 
acknowledge his leadership, indeed his virtual divinity, and to 
undertake all the other radical and dangerous policies that he now 
wished to impose on the country. 
The rhetoric about entering the socialist stage is intelligible only 
if  it  is  viewed  in  conjunction  with  the  practical  measures  that 
Sukarno then launched. For the Great Leader immediately embarked 
on a series of measures designed to force the pace of the revolution. 
The easily defined targets were (a) a complete political reorientation 
of the armed forces leadership including imposition of a commissar 
system, (b) a purge of all "false Marhaenists" from the PNI which 
meant complete domination by its extreme left wing under the 
guidance of its pro-communist Secretary General, Surachman, and 
(c) a purge of Chairul Saleh's base in the "45 Generation" 
organization. The second and third of the above goals were largely 
achieved prior to the attempted purge of the Army leadership on the 
night of September 30/October 1. 
In regard to the last of these goals, Sukarno announced a new 
leadership of the 45 Generation on April 12. Saleh was retained but 
leadership was no longer vested in him alone but in a five man 
council  that  consisted  of  Saleh,  A.M.  Hanafi,  Wikana,  Sidik 
Kertapati and Astrawinata. Wikana and Sidik Kertapati were PKI 
Central Committee members while  Hanafi and  Astrawinata were 
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Partindo leaders whose views were indistinguishable from those of 
the PKI. The 27 members of the larger leadership body were also 
heavily PKI and Partindo oriented. They included Aidit and several 
PKI Central Committee members. Adam Malik, one of the principal 
figures in  the  1945 events  from which  the  organization took  its 
name, was not mentioned. Several military men were included but 
most were well known leftists like Air Marshal Suryadarma and 
Djamin Gintings although Yani was included, presumably because of 
a residual hope that Yani could be handled with the application of 
sufficient soft soap, to which he was believed to be susceptible. If 
there was any balancing element to the right of the PKI in formal 
political party terms, it was limited to the inclusion of Surachman of 
the PNI and Arudji Kartawinata of the PSII, neither of whom could 
really be distinguished from the PKI line by the slightest deviation 
on any subject.(20) 
A second line of attack was on the middle (Hardi and Isnaeni) 
and right wing (Hadisubeno) factions of  the  PNI, who were the 
targets of Sukarno's blasts at "false Marhaenists" within the PNI. 
Hadisubeno Sosrowerdojo, who lived on the same high ridge 
overlooking the Central Java port and capital of Semarang from 
which Joseph Conrad was reputedly inspired to write some of his 
tales of the Indies, was a somewhat traditional political boss who led 
the Central Java branch of the PNI. This branch was the traditional 
core of PNI strength in the country as a whole and it was also the 
main impediment to the PKI in Central Java where it had led the 
opposition to the unilateral land seizures by PKI-organized peasant 
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groups. Hadisubeno was initially the main target but was apparently 
defended by Hardi, Isnaeni and others in the central PNI leadership 
against  the  pressure for  expulsion from  Sukarno and  Surachman 
while Ali Sastroamidjojo went along with Sukarno's wishes despite 
personal misgivings as noted elsewhere. Despite his firm opposition 
to the PKI, Hadisubeno looked upon himself as a loyal follower of 
Bung Karno and could not believe that he was the target of the false 
Marhaenist campaign. Even after his ouster, Hadisubeno maintained 
to friends that Sukarno must really have meant the communists in his 
attacks  on  "false  Marhaenists" and  that  the  Great  Leader  would 
surely require a purge of communist infiltrators from the PNI in the 
near future. This grasping at straws was characteristic in this period 
of  many  non-communist  Indonesians  who  had  committed  their 
loyalty to Sukarno; it was the same psychology that had underlain 
the "Sukarnoism" movement of the BPS and the results were to 
follow the same disastrous course. 
The third line of Sukarno's attack was to straighten out the 
Indonesian military but this was a more delicate and difficult task. 
As it turned out, all other lines of attack succeeded but this one 
ultimately failed. However, that was by no means a foregone 
conclusion and it was only through extraordinary good fortune and 
communist overconfidence that the action launched on September 
30-October 1 failed. The Indonesian armed forces consisted of four 
armed  services:  the  Army,  the  Navy  (with  a   Marine  Corps 
component known by its initials as the KKO), the Air Force, and the 
Police. The Army was overwhelmingly the most powerful of the 
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services and it had a rather good record of successful though limited 
military action. It had fought the Dutch to a standstill in the late 
1940s;  it  had  crushed  the  PKI  Madiun  revolt  in  1948;  it  had 
contained and eventually put down Darul Islam rebellions in West 
Java and South Sulawesi, although not without difficulty, and it had 
been effective against the PRRI and Permesta rebellions at the onset 
of Guided Democracy. It had not done very much in the campaigns 
for West Irian and against Malaysia but those campaigns had really 
been ones of bluff and political maneuver, in which military force 
was not fully employed. Those who have been critical of the 
Indonesian  Army's  effectiveness  against  prolonged  insurgencies 
might well compare its record against the record of 
counter-insurgency efforts elsewhere. The TNI is one of the few 
armies since World War II to have managed to subdue insurgencies, 
however long it took, and it did so in spite of the fact that the causes 
of those insurgencies - both from the left and the right - were 
attractive to significant segments of the armed forces themselves at 
all levels. 
Although the Army had historically been beset by internal 
rivalries and factions, it had also developed a certain unifying 
mystique born out of the common experiences of its heroic period in 
the revolutionary campaigns of the 1945-49 independence struggle. 
There was a considerable tension between these centrifugal and 
centripetal forces and it  would have been difficult to  say  which 
would win out in a crisis. That would depend greatly on the structure 
of any crisis and on the emotional appeal that such a crisis would 
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pose toward different facets of the Army's collective mind as well as 
toward the minds of its individual members. This was to be a key 
factor in October, 1965 and an instinctive awareness of the delicate 
balance between these emotions helps to explain both the caution 
and the firmness with which General Suharto was to move in that 
later period. It should also be noted that there was a certain tradition 
in the Army officer class of regarding the Army as more than a 
military institution. In one sense, the Army knew its place and had 
not attempted to seize power for itself from the constitutional 
governments or from Sukarno but, as earlier pages will make clear, it 
had frequently tried to exert a powerful influence and to be a kind of 
backroom partner to governments whose ultimate authority it 
acknowledged. Indeed, Army power to influence government had 
reached  its  height  under  early  Guided  Democracy  although  its 
decline thereafter had been due to the Army leadership's inability or 
unwillingness to make a crass grab for direct power. The residue of 
that period was manifested, however, in the continued presence of 
senior Army officers in a multitude of civilian positions, particularly 
those related to the economy, in its presence as a "functional group" 
in the parliament, National Front, and in other national bodies, and in 
its de facto ability to veto the Nasakom cabinet desired by Sukarno 
and the  PKI. It  supported a  program of  "civic action" including 
contributions of manpower and equipment to infrastructure projects 
and its local commanders were often the dominant partners in an 
institutionalized program of cooperation with the civil authorities at 
the regional and local levels. 
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The Army was generally anti-communist and consisted to a 
great degree of less than fervent Sukarnoists but there was also a 
significant minority of pro-Sukarno officers and a lesser number of 
convinced leftists who might be favorable to the PKI or at least to 
some vision of a "national Marxism" irrespective of Sukarno. The 
military commander in Bali and the lesser Sunda Islands, a Sukarno 
friend, General Sjafiuddin, was of the latter type as were, of course, 
people like General Supardjo and Colonel Latief of the September 30 
movement. There were also devoted Sukarno followers like General 
Adjie, the commander in 1965 of the key Siliwangi Division of West 
Java that surrounded  Jakarta. Adjie  claimed to be very 
anti-communist but also fanatically pro-Sukarno. Was the first 
position related to a  requirement for leadership  of   the 
anti-communist Siliwangi or was there a real, if confused, clash of 
contending loyalties? There were also people like General Pranoto, 
General Mursjid and General Djamin Gintings of the Army General 
staff  who  were  certainly  loyal  Sukarnoists  and  who  were  also 
believed to be sympathetic to the PKI and to far left causes although 
it  was  possible, even  likely,  that  the  second  aspect  was  heavily 
influenced by the first. Finally, there were numerous senior officers 
whose views were not clear. Everyone by this time was talking the 
jargon  of  Nasakom,  Manipol-Usdek,  Berdikari,  crush  Malaysia, 
crush the Kabirs, hidup (long-live) Bung Karno, etc. all of which 
made them appear to be indistinguishable from the communists in 
their public rhetoric. Some of this posture was undoubtedly reflected 
in private conversation too since most men must rationalize their 
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compromises for the sake of political need and personal 
advancement into a  self-lie  in  which they  feel  compelled to  tell 
themselves that positions they take for reasons of opportunism are 
what they really believe. 
Aspects of this phenomenon, to be discussed later, were another 
important explanation of the slowness and apparent confusion with 
which the Army's reaction to the September 30 movement unfolded - 
especially in relation to Sukarno. The tendency of Army Generals to 
talk like communists was reinforced when they left the drafting of 
their  speeches  to  staff  members  who  were  communists,  either 
because the generals were too lazy or too inarticulate to do or to 
monitor the job themselves or because they were too disgusted with 
the  jargon.  I  had  begun  to  wonder  in  the  summer of  1965,  for 
example,   whether   the   Jakarta   garrison   commander   (Brigadier 
General  Umar  Wiranadikusumah) was  not  a  communist,  despite 
contrary assurances from our military experts, because of the content 
of some of Umar's speeches (I have not been able to locate the 
particular examples two decades later despite a rather methodical 
review of the Indonesian language Antara) but it turned out that 
Umar was very much on the side of Suharto during and after the 
September 30/October 1 "coup" and became one of Suharto's more 
trusted lieutenants and ultimately Vice-President of the Republic. I 
subsequently asked a knowledgeable Indonesian Army friend about 
this and was told that Umar left all his speeches to a certain colonel 
on his staff (not Latief) who was a convinced communist and was 
subsequently arrested. Suharto obviously knew Umar well enough to 
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trust him (particularly since Umar was the first general officer to act 
against the coup group, even before Suharto) but there must have 
been a lot of cases where loyalties were unclear. 
None of the other services could be considered homogeneous 
political entities but all of the others were regarded by Sukarno as 
manageable.   The   Air   Force   was   led   by   a   communist   or 
crypto-communist, Omar Dani, who had succeeded a man of similar 
leanings, and many senior Air Force officers were in the Omar Dani 
political camp. There were notable exceptions, however, and it may 
be remembered that it was an Air Force pilot, Lt. Daniel Maukar, 
who  had  tried  to  assassinate  Sukarno  several  years  earlier  in  a 
strafing run on the Palace.(21) The Omar Dani pro-communist clique 
in the Air Force was known, incidentally, as the "California group" 
because most had received training in the United States. Our training 
programs have been acclaimed as contributing to a Western 
orientation of the Indonesian military and civilian elites. That was a 
generally valid assessment but individual results were by no means 
as assured as some Americans seemed to think. I know of some cases 
where originally well disposed students turned against the United 
States, precisely because of their experiences in the United States. 
This was not always because of any bad treatment; one of the most 
striking cases I remember was due to the particular individual being 
intellectually incompetent to complete his program and being unable 
to accept that unwelcome truth. This phenomenon of disaffection 
toward the country of one's studies was much more true of Third 
World students in the Soviet Union, incidentally, where I would 
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estimate that the great majority were turned off by their experience. 
Of course, many, whether they were disillusioned or not, felt 
compelled to identify with the Soviet Union to protect their 
educational investment, particularly in countries where a Soviet 
education was considered suspect compared to a Western education. 
The Navy, although led by an appealing Western-oriented 
lightweight, Admiral Martadinata, was regarded as manageable by 
the Sukarno and PKI forces and the Navy was not very important 
anyway, especially as a potential element in a coup situation. Some 
of the Navy's key figures below Martadinata were strongly 
Sukarnoist, while its lower ranks had been beset by an 
anti-Martadinata mutiny of obscure cause in the first half of 1965 
(More than 100 officers were removed including a son of Deputy 
Prime Minister Leimena). The Marine Corps or KKO was a more 
serious factor in military terms and it tended to be arrayed against the 
Army, largely because of inter-service rivalry. Indeed, inter-service 
jealousy of the Army was probably the most significant factor for 
regarding all of the other services as potentially loyal to Sukarno in 
any show down. Furthermore, the KKO commandant, General 
Hartono,  was  a  brother-in-law of  Subandrio  and  firmly  loyal  to 
Sukarno. Oddly enough, Hartono had attended a course at Fort 
Benning and was unusually warm toward American military 
colleagues. I recall a US Marine Corps military advisor in our 
Embassy who had been in the same course at Fort Benning and who 
was a strong advocate of military assistance to the KKO in spite of 
its probable alignment on the wrong side from the US point of view. 
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Whether the American Marine officer was influenced by the fact that 
both  he  and  the  Indonesian had  felt  a  common "outsider" unity 
during the US Army course or whether all Marines were regarded as 
"good", or whether it was simply a matter of personal friendship and 
lack of political sophistication, was unclear. 
The Police was another service that had a high proportion of 
pro-Sukarno senior officers and it was a frequent target for appeals 
from Sukarno, Subandrio, the PKI and leftist cabinet ministers. Our 
AID Public Safety advisors had found most of the Indonesian police 
officers  personally  attractive  and  friendly  but  there  was  little 
question that the institution was regarded as personally loyal to 
Sukarno and another counter-weight to the Army. I knew one 
Indonesian police colonel rather well in 1964. He was American 
educated, opposed to the political trend toward communism, and 
became scared to death of too much association with Americans like 
myself as relations began to deteriorate more severely (our personal 
relationship was suspended but was later renewed in early 1966). 
This officer had been frank to admit that the overwhelming majority 
of the police appeared to be going along with Sukarno's pro-PKI and 
anti-Western postures (they are not the same but both lines were 
being accepted). In addition to the regular police, there was a police 
"Mobile  Brigade",  a  highly  modernized  para-military  force  that 
traced its proud history back to Sutan Sjahrir's organization of it. 
Sjahrir and Hatta had regarded the Mobile Brigade and the Army's 
Siliwangi division as the modernized professional core of what was 
to be an apolitical national military establishment to overcome the 
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collection of half-trained, frequently-ideological, factional armies of 
the independence era. The Mobile Brigade had, for various reasons, 
been the darling of the American Ambassador and the AID program 
and was largely equipped by the United States. One hope seemed to 
be that the Mobile Brigade could be counted on to protect the 
embassies and other foreigners and to be well disposed toward the 
United States (many of its officers, even those ardently pro-Sukarno, 
were in fact personally friendly toward the United States when and to 
the extent that that was possible). In fact, the Mobile Brigade was 
one of the more reliable Sukarnoist forces, cooperating closely with 
demonstrating communist mobs, and was also a potential opponent 
of the Army. Like the KKO and Air Force, it did not openly come 
into  play  against  the  Suharto-led  army  in  late  1965/early  1966 
because the balance of forces appeared to preclude an effective 
military effort against Suharto. Furthermore, the "coup" and its 
aftermath unfolded in bizarre and unforeseen ways, and no command 
to act was ever delivered by the Great Leader of the Revolution and 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. 
The  police  were  brought  further  under  Sukarno's  control  in 
May, 1965 when Police General Sutjipto Danukusumo (nicknamed 
"Little Tjipto") was replaced by Police General Sutjipto Judodihardjo 
("Big Tjipto") as Minister of Police. The latter was a professional 
police officer who probably had few strong ideological beliefs of his 
own but who was an unswerving Sukarno loyalist. The former had 
been accused behind the scenes of being a Murba supporter. His 
ouster was reportedly engineered by Subandrio who exercised a great 
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deal of control over the police (Little Tjipto was given a consolation 
prize as "Coordinator" for West Irian affairs). Subandrio's influence 
over the police was based in part on his position as head of the BPI 
(Badan Pusat Intelligensi or Central Intelligence Agency) which had 
a number of Police generals such as the BPI deputy director, General 
Sutarto, and in part because two Police generals were cabinet 
ministers attached to the Cabinet Presidium who reported directly to 
Subandrio. The precise roles of these two police generals, Mudjoko 
and  Bugi  Supeno,  were  unclear  but  their  appointments reflected 
greater regime reliance on the intelligence arm. It is noteworthy that 
Oei Tjoe Tat, the pro-communist Baperki minister attached to the 
cabinet presidium, was also given responsibilities about this time of 
working with the BPI and with Bureau VIII (the "Biro Chusus" or 
Special Bureau) of the Secretariat of State. The new Police Minister, 
Sutjipto Judodihardjo, wasted no time in making overtures to the 
PKI, incidentally, telling it that the "PKI and police are comrades in 
arms".(22) 
The first step in the intended neutralization of the Army was a 
conference on revolutionary war doctrine held in Bandung in early 
April, that is prior to Sukarno's "Berdikari" speech to the MPRS. The 
themes of this conference were the reorientation of the Army to 
participate  in  the  concentration  of  all  progressive  revolutionary 
forces based on Nasakom internally and in its  integration on an 
international level with the New Emerging Forces. Nasution declared 
that ABRI (the Armed Forces) must become "cadres of Pantja Sila 
and  Manipol"  and  "must  be  loyal  to  the  Great  Leader  of  the 
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Revolution".(23) Yani  said  ABRI and  especially  the  Army must 
reevaluate  and  reorient  itself  since  it  was  an  "instrument of  the 
revolution". Revolutionary war doctrine must be connected, Yani 
said, with the general political doctrines of the government and the 
revolution since the armed forces were part of the progressive 
revolutionary forces.(24) Yani was essentially repeating a similar 
statement by Subandrio to the conference earlier that day. The new 
doctrine for the TNI or Army that emerged was called "Tri Ubaya 
Sakti" (also spelled Cakti and Cekti - this is a Sanskrit phrase and 
transliteration from Sanskrit script was not always consistent) and 
held that the putative enemy could no longer be considered to be the 
communist countries but, on the contrary, must be regarded as 
Western  imperialism  (Nekolim)  headed  by  the  United  States.  It 
should be noted, however, that the long text (it  appeared in the 
Indonesian language Antara piecemeal over several days in May), 
while verbose and filled with a great deal of the earlier jargon of 
Guided Democracy such as Panca Sila and Manipol-Usdek, only 
devoted relatively few words to Nasakom. However, Tri Ubaya Sakti 
did refer specifically to the two stages of the revolution which was 
now becoming necessary to include in all major pronouncements. 
Of related interest on the doctrinal side, Sukarno established a 
new National Defense Institute on May 10 and declared that national 
defense must be political as well as military and based on the 
geopolitical needs of the state. He stressed that the curriculum of the 
Institute must include the teaching of Marxism, that "Nasakom 
phobia" must be eliminated from the armed forces, and that the 
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"people" must be brought into the system of defense organization, 
the efficacy of which had been demonstrated by the experience of the 
People's Republic of China and North Vietnam.(25) The senior 
Armed  Forces  representative  in  the  leadership  of  the  MPRS,  a 
pro-communist political general loyal to Sukarno named Wilujo 
Puspojudo, was named as the Institute's director, supported by one 
deputy from each of the four armed services. Sukarno apparently 
hoped to make the Institute a major instrument for reorienting the 
thinking of the Armed Forces as he took the time during a very 
active period for him to make several appearances there in May. At 
the end of the month, Sukarno used this forum to press for the fifth 
armed force scheme, citing the advice of Chou En-lai (see below). 
Nasution   was   present.(26)   Marxist   indoctrination   was   being 
advanced at the Institute by other leading figures as well, ranging 
from those who had most to gain, such as Aidit, to those who were 
trying to prove their loyalty to Sukarno. Ruslan Abdulgani made it a 
point to emphasize to the Institute that the curriculum should be 
based on the study of Marx, Lenin and the Communist 
Manifesto.(27) Aidit soon appeared in his role as Coordinating 
Minister and Deputy Chairman of the MPRS to repeat the need for 
study of Marxist fundamentals, citing Sukarno's edict to that effect. 
Repeating an old PKI message, he said that Marxism was essential to 
the comprehension of Sukarno's teachings and that contemporary 
Marxist experience  could  be  learned  from  the  experience  of  the 
existing socialist states (the PRC, USSR, etc.).(28) 
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The attack on the Armed Forces had two more practical features 
that were to give the Army leadership real trouble. Most of the Army 
leadership was somewhat inured to (and benumbed by) 
indoctrination and prepared to go along with Sukarno's political line 
but tampering with the Army as  an institution or threatening its 
power base was another matter. These two pro-communist measures 
were the establishment of a fifth armed force (also called the arming 
of the workers and peasants) and the establishment of a system of 
"Nasakom advisory councils" which was correctly seen as the 
imposition of a commissar system.(29) The fifth armed force concept 
was in one sense an idea that had long been brewing. In essence, this 
was a proposal for the military training and arming of a civilian 
militia on a massive scale, the assumption being that such a militia 
would be dominated by the communists. The Confrontation with 
Malaysia had been accompanied by much rhetoric from Sukarno, 
Subandrio and other high regime figures, as well as by the PKI 
leaders, about millions of "volunteers". Since announcements of the 
readiness of thousands or millions of volunteers by various left wing 
organizations (Sukatno of  the  Pemuda Rakjat  gave  a  supposedly 
precise figure on one occasion of 1,280,730) was accompanied by 
much talk of rifles, "gun in hand", etc., the implication was that 
masses of armed volunteers were being offered for military 
purposes.(30) This was widely regarded as mere posturing toward 
Malaysia and indeed that was true as far as the international aspects 
were concerned but it was also a preparation of the psychological 
climate  for a more serious proposal to create a  leftist controlled 
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military force. In mid-January, Aidit said he had made a proposal to 
Sukarno in a palace meeting for the government to arm the workers 
and peasants against Malaysia and this theme began to accumulate 
momentum through repetition. As Mortimer notes, Aidit "would 
hardly have revealed the content of palace discussions on such a 
delicate matter without Sukarno's approval". The idea was 
subsequently made to  sound a  bit  less  overtly communist, when 
Sukarno called for the establishment of a fifth armed force at the 
National Defense Institute on May 31 although he hardly bothered to 
disguise its purpose very much since he attributed the idea to Chou 
En-lai.(31) As Mortimer again correctly notes, the  President had 
given the PKI "the task of mobilizing public support", had then 
"contented himself at first with guarded pronouncements.... that 'the 
workers and peasants will be armed if necessary'" and then waited 
for a snowball effect after an initial PKI campaign had flowered into 
an apparently broader based groundswell of support drummed up by 
the National Front, the communist dominated journalist association 
and other mass organizations.(32) 
The  second  major  practical  move  by  Sukarno  and  the  PKI 
against the Army was the proposal for establishing "Nasakom 
advisory councils".(33) Advanced at about the same time as the fifth 
armed force scheme, it is clear that the original idea was to attach 
civilian commissars at various levels of the armed forces although 
public   statements   remained   vague-presumably  because   of   the 
delicacy  of  discussions with  the  armed  forces  leadership  on  the 
subject. Since "Nasakom" was gradually being swallowed by "Kom" 
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through the infiltration tactics discussed in an earlier chapter, 
Nasakom  advisory  councils  really  had  to  mean  communist  or 
quasi-communist indoctrination and political control, as the Army 
well understood. In my view, the Nasakom advisory council proposal 
was even more of a threat to the integrity of the army than the fifth 
armed force concept and was regarded as such by key Army leaders 
including Yani.  Yani  had  always been  willing  to  go  along  with 
Sukarno's  ideological  pronouncements and  confrontational  tactics 
against  non-communist  external  enemies,  while  remaining  aloof 
from the revolutionary drive against civilian moderates, but these last 
two moves meant more than ideology; they spelled interference with 
the army leadership's perquisites, self-respect and authority over its 
own organization. Yani resolved to oppose these plans in practice 
although he continued to give lip service to the current jargon about 
Nasakom as will be seen in the next chapter. While the Sukarno 
offensive was mostly one of intimidation, some effort was also made 
to sway the Army toward Sukarno's point of view through a show of 
interest in military activities and particular units as well-as an effort 
to  convince  military  leaders  that  "Nekolim"  was  really  up  to 
nefarious ends. The Siliwangi division was visited by Subandrio on 
its  anniversary  celebration  in  early  May  and  Sukarno  sent  it  a 
message that was read by Chairul Saleh. Nasution was dispatched on 
a trip to Moscow with a personal message from Sukarno to Kosygin. 
A new "Mandala Siaga" command for infiltration of Malaysia was 
established in early 1965 under the command of the pro-communist 
Air Force commander, Omar Dani, but reporting to General Yani as 
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Chief of Staff of KOTI. Regional Mandala commands were also 
established but were placed under the two senior Army generals in 
Sumatra  and  Kalimantan,  both  of  whom  were  anti-communist 
officers loyal to Yani (Major General Mokoginta in Sumatra and 
Major General Panggabean in Kalimantan). General Suharto as the 
KOSTRAD  (army  strategic  reserve)  commander  became  Omar 
Dani's deputy for the overall Mandala Command at this time. 
Although a  compromise, this  move  was  designed  to  elevate  the 
importance of Omar Dani and provide him with the authority to 
handle  high  level  operational  matters  in  key  areas  at  Sukarno's 
behest. In late May, Sukarno chose a conference of regional military 
commanders as the scene for revealing the alleged imperialist plot, 
mentioned earlier, to kill him, Subandrio and Yani during the 
forthcoming Afro-Asian Conference. This plot was supposedly 
revealed by reports of British Ambassador Gilchrist found in the 
mountain cabin of Bill Palmer. Proof of the hostile intentions of 
"Nekolim" would hopefully convince the army that the danger was 
real and therefore that Sukarno's demands for alliance with China, 
creation of a fifth armed force, and acceptance of Nasakom political 
advisors were justified. 
The revolutionary offensive of this period had other aspects. In 
his May Day speech, Sukarno had quoted Lenin on the twisting path 
of  revolution ("revolution is  not  a  straight  line  like  the  Nevsky 
Prospect")  and  that  the  workers  must  "seize  political  power" 
(rebutkan Kekuasaan politik).(34) Judges were being called to task to 
shape their decisions to coincide with the needs of the workers and 
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peasants and with the demands of the Revolution.(35) Marxist 
indoctrination of civilian officials was proceeding on an extensive 
scale and the models of East Asian communism were being projected 
forcefully through the high visibility of visiting delegations, 
particularly as a feature of the "Dasawarsa" celebration in April to 
commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Bandung conference. In 
addition to Kim Il-Sung, other prominent participants were Chou 
En-lai, Pham Van Dong and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The "Dasawarsa" 
celebration was hardly finished when a massive build-up was 
launched for the forty-fifth anniversary of the PKI. Congratulations 
to the Communist Party poured in from most cabinet ministers and 
from virtually all the other political parties, much of it fawning on 
what was clearly now the number one political party and the chosen 
instrument of the Great Leader of the Revolution. Chairul Saleh, the 
victim of persistent attacks from Aidit and the PKI press early in the 
year, now obsequiously praised the Party and even called the PKI the 
"vanguard party".(36) The idea of the PKI as the "vanguard" was 
gaining acceptance. Information Minister Achmadi also told the 
Pemuda Rakjat to be the "vanguard of the youth" at this time.(37) 
After days of preparation, a massive rally was held in the large 
stadium of the Soviet-built Senayan sports complex with an 
attendance of more than 100,000. Likenesses of Marx, Engels, Lenin 
and Stalin flanked portraits of Sukarno and Aidit. Sukarno spoke at 
length, hailing  the  Party  as  a  "mighty factor"  in  completing the 
Revolution and noting that the PKI was "consistently progressive 
and revolutionary", an encomium in contrast to his talks to the PNI, 
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which had supposedly been "his" party. He had spoken to the PNI 
not of revolutionary "consistency" but rather of the prevalence of 
"false Marhaenists" that had to be uprooted. Sukarno noted that the 
PKI   had   grown   to   three   million   members   and   20   million 
sympathizers (these figures were to be raised again a few months 
later) and said that the large number of sympathizers were the result 
of its consistently progressive revolutionary record. He stressed too 
that he had deliberately selected the title of Nasakom and not 
Nasamarx or Nasasos because only the communists were genuine 
Marxists whereas others, like the old PSI of Sjahrir, claimed to be 
Marxists but were merely revisionists. Building towards a climax, 
Sukarno  said  he  had  meant  "Kom,  Kom  and  again  Kom  -  PKI 
onward, never retreat". Embracing Aidit, Sukarno called him the 
"fortress of Indonesia", a play on Aidit's two given names, Dipa 
Nusantara (Nusantara means archipelago, "Dipa" was the same as 
"Banteng", the word for fortress, according to the President).(38) 
Speeches were also given by such foreign luminaries as Le Duc Tho 
of North Vietnam and Peng Chen of China (the Soviets sent a rather 
obscure figure). 
On the very next day, Sukarno spoke to the National Front, 
telling it and its component parties and functional groups that they 
must get down to the kampong level (the working class barrios) in 
order to create a stronger organization and to lead the people. The 
people do not act spontaneously, Sukarno said, but must be led "as 
was fully recognized by Lenin". He had just praised the PKI at its 
anniversary, Sukarno continued, and his warm feelings for the PKI 
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reflected the fact that it alone was getting down to the people. He 
then followed with a vague threat to move against those members of 
the National Front that did not follow the PKI in this regard.(39) 
Sukarno also received the PKI's guests from Cuba, the USSR, 
Romania, Japan, Albania, North Korea and North Vietnam a day or 
two after his participation in the PKI anniversary.(40) Provincial PKI 
anniversary  celebrations,  usually  with  the  participation  of  PKI 
leaders such as Lukman, were also taking place around the country. 
They were accompanied by felicitations and praise from governors 
and   regional   military   commanders.   The   steam   roller   of   the 
Revolution seemed to be moving inexorably ahead. Perhaps this is 
why PKI Deputy Chairman Njoto was ready to declare three weeks 
later  that  Indonesia had now become the  14th country in  which 
Marxism had been adopted as the doctrine of the entire country, the 
only one, Njoto observed, outside the formal socialist bloc.(41) 
Confused and politically emasculated, the Army had to attempt 
a response. The next chapter discusses that response and Sukarno's 
decision to deal with its foot-dragging by opting for a violent entry 
into the socialist stage, the goal he was bent on achieving as the 
capstone of his life's work. 
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Footnotes - Chapter VII 
 
 
 
1. Suluh Indonesia, Harian Rakjat, Antara (Warta Bhakti) Jan 5, 
 
1965. 
 
2. Suluh Indonesia Jan 13, 1965. 
 
3. Harian Rakjat January 22, 1965. 
 
4. I was introduced to a KAMI committee in early 1966 that had 
just examined such documents in one industry. 
5. Brackman, p.62, describes how Lukman procured this house 
through a corrupt arrangement engineered by a PKI official in a 
position to apply pressure on the previous owner. John Hughes, 
Indonesian Upheaval (New York, David McKay & Co.) 1967 
describes the ostentatious living and private enrichment of the 
PKI leader in Bali, Gde Puger. p.178. 
6. Suluh Indonesia January 27, 1965. 
 
7. Suluh Indonesia January 6 and 12, 1965. 
 
8. Harian Rakjat February 5, 1965, Suluh Indonesia February 6, 
 
1965. 
 
9. Harian Rakjat February 14, 1964. 
 
10.  Bambang Setyono Widjanarko, The Devious Dalang (The 
 
Hague). 
 
11.  Harian Rakjat March 9, 1965. 
 
12.  Harian Rakjat March 12, 1965. 
 
13.  Harian Rakjat March 13, 1965. 
 
14.  Warta Bhakti March 25 and March 26, 1965, Suluh Indonesia 
and Harian Rakjat same dates 
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15.  Warta Bhakti March 25, 1965 
 
16.  Warta Bhakti March 26, 1965. 
 
17.  Warta Bhakti April 5, 1965. 
 
18.  Warta Bhakti June 1, 1965. 
 
19.  Warta Bhakti April 8, 1965. 
 
20.  Warta Bhakti April 13, 1965. 
 
21.  Brackman p. 273. 
 
22.  Harian Rakjat May 21, 1965. 
 
23.  Warta Bhakti April 8, 1965. 
 
24.  Warta Bhakti April 5, 1965. 
 
25.  Warta Bhakti May 10, May 20, 1965. 
 
26.  Warta Bhakti June 1, 1965. 
 
27.  Warta Bhakti June 8, 1965. 
 
28.  Warta Bhakti June 16, 1965. 
 
29.  Some people distinguished between the fifth armed force 
concept and "arming the workers and peasants". K. Werdojo, a 
member of the top leadership of the far left Partindo Party said 
in his role as a member of the Security/Defense Commission of 
the MPRS that the workers and peasants must be armed and the 
fifth armed force established. He added that arming the workers 
and peasants had first priority and the fifth armed force second 
priority. See Warta Bhakti, June 24, 1965. 
30.  Warta Bhakti June 1, 1965. 
 
31.  Mortimer, ibid (pp. 381-382). 
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32.  Sukarno said he agreed with Aidit's proposals for 
Nasakomization of the armed forces on May 17, for example, 
according to Warta Bhakti of May 18, 1965. 
33.  As recalled from the notes of an Embassy officer who was 
present (not the author). Also see Warta Bhakti, May 2, 1965. 
34.  See Warta Bhakti April 6, 1965 for a Sukarno speech on this 
subject. 
35.  Warta Bhakti May 20, 1965. 
 
36.  Warta Bhakti May 26, 1965. The vanguard party concept was 
connected with entry into the socialist stage. PKI theory called 
for a number of parties in the national democratic stage as a 
corollary of its united front tactics (or Nasakom) while only one 
"vanguard" party would exist in the final socialist stage. There 
might be other parties then too (as in Poland) but they would not 
be of a vanguard nature. 
37.  Harian Rakjat and Warta Bhakti May 24, 1964. 
 
38.  Warta Bhakti May 25, 1965. 
 
39.  Warta Bhakti May 26, 1965. 
 
40.  Warta Bhakti June 24, 1965. Njoto did not identify the thirteen 
but that number would include Cuba which had been, with 
Indonesia, one of the first two "national democracies" but 
had been elevated to the "socialist stage" following Castro's 
declaration that he and the Cuban revolution were really 
Communist. 
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VIII 
 
PKI and Army Responses  
 
to Sukarno's Drive to Enter  
 
the Socialist Stage 
 
 
 
The Sukarno proclamation of intent to leave the national 
democratic stage and enter the socialist stage was probably 
understood only by the PKI and by those few who had a strong 
appreciation of Marxist terminology. The PKI might have been 
expected to have been elated at this development but this was not 
clearly the case. The declaration had probably not come as any great 
surprise to Aidit and Njoto, who were both very close to Sukarno, 
but  others  in  the  Party  appeared  to  raise  questions.  Aidit  had 
probably anticipated a move in this direction after the Tavip speech 
of the previous August 17 national day since he had begun to weave 
talk of leaving the national democratic stage into his speeches shortly 
thereafter. In a speech on August 28, 1964 to a conference on the 
arts, for example, Aidit had spoken of the need to complete the 
national democratic stage and advance to the socialist stage.(l) 
However, he had also warned against those who claimed that the 
socialist stage had already arrived, a theme that was to become the 
most powerful element of PKI discourse after Sukarno's MPRS 
speech. Aidit had said on October 5 or 6, for example, that "To say 
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we are now already building socialism is demagoguery, subjective 
and reactionary. The present stage must be to complete the national 
democratic revolution".(2) The targets of this attack were not 
identified but were easily identifiable as the non-communists 
generally and the ideologues of the banned BPS in particular (even if 
these elements were saying little in view of their recent disastrous 
defeat at the hands of Sukarno). 
The PKI initially said little after Sukarno's proclamation that the 
national democratic stage was "almost finished" and Indonesia was 
"beginning to enter" the socialist stage. While other leftist elements 
began to repeat Sukarno's theme, Harian Rakjat soon began to carry 
statements about the transition from one stage to another in a highly 
theoretical way as if nothing had been said on the subject by the 
Great Leader of the Revolution. Lukman, in particular, seemed to be 
cautioning that one must be very careful about a premature transition 
to the socialist stage since failure could set back the revolution for a 
long time to come. (3) All of the PKI comment that followed 
emphasized that Indonesia was still in the national democratic stage 
and that major tasks still had to be accomplished before the country 
could go on to the higher socialist stage.(4) The PKI was pleased, of 
course, with Sukarno's commitment to move the revolution forward. 
It applauded the "Banting Stir", that is the sharp turning of the wheel 
of policy to the left that was announced in the same MPRS speech 
that spoke of leaving the national democratic stage. The PKI was 
elated over the campaign to purge the PNI of false Marhaenists and 
to whip the Army, its principal potential enemy, into line. Entering 
197  
 
the socialist stage would be fine too, the PKI soon implied, if the 
ground were prepared first. Aidit and others pointed out that the 
tasks of the national democratic stage were to expel all elements of 
imperialism and neo-imperialism and to rid the country of feudalism, 
meaning above all the completion of land reform. The PKI also 
added another requirement - realization at long last of a Nasakom 
cabinet.  Given  the  virtual  take-over  or  neutralization  of  other 
political   parties,   a   Nasakom   cabinet   would   be   the   practical 
equivalent of a communist dominated cabinet, the Asian equivalent 
of the Petru Groza cabinet in Romania during the latter's short 
"People's Democracy" phase when a tame figurehead 
non-communist was deemed expedient as a transition measure. 
Sukarno himself was not opposed to meeting these conditions. 
The whole thrust of "Berdikari" or standing on one's own feet, after 
all, was to sever all economic ties with imperialism and to align 
oneself with Communist China, North Vietnam and North Korea. 
There was certainly no conflict on that  score. Nor was Sukarno 
against  more  rapid  implementation of  the  land  reform  and  crop 
sharing   laws   along   lines   favored   by   the   PKI.   He   and   his 
pro-communist Minister of Justice, Astrawinata, had established land 
reform courts and  were  haranguing the  judges to  side  with "the 
people" (the PKI) on disputed issues, setting aside "traditional" law 
where necessary in favor of the "laws of the revolution", meaning the 
most radical demands of those forces, notably the PKI, that claimed 
to lead the revolution. Sukarno was also unquestionably in favor of a 
Nasakom cabinet but this would require doing something about the 
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army's political veto. After his initial burst of speeches saying that 
Indonesia had "almost" completed the national democratic stage and 
was "beginning to enter" the socialist stage, Sukarno began to back 
off a bit in his rhetoric and this was almost certainly because of the 
PKI reservations and misgivings.(5) No one else had negative 
comments - either because they failed to comprehend the point, were 
surfeited with ideological jargon, or because they wanted to twist 
Sukarno's language to imply that the revolution could stop with the 
achievement of a proclaimed socialism that would not alter the real 
status  quo.  The  PKI  led  the  charge  against  this  latter  heresy 
(although few were advocating such a course publicly any longer 
given the degree of fear) and Sukarno soon joined in to emphasize 
that the goals of the national democratic stage indeed had to be 
completed first. But that, he said in effect, is just what he was up to. 
I believe that the PKI leaders (and Lukman and Sudisman 
seemed  the  more  cautious  if  one  can  trust  one's  sense  of  the 
Aesopian language that appeared in Harian Rakiat) were ambivalent 
- they were both skeptical and pleased at the same time by Sukarno's 
stated intentions. The PKI leaders were all much younger than the 
President, so in one sense they could afford to wait another ten or 
twenty years to achieve victory. On the other hand, they had to 
understand that  the  revolutionary advances being achieved under 
Sukarno could not be sustained if he should pass from the scene 
before a Marxist system was institutionalized (the socialist stage). 
Lukman might grumble, as he did in a speech to women cadres in 
April that organization and discipline were needed, "not 
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individualism and egoism"(6) but only Sukarno could ensure a 
successful entry into the socialist stage while Sukarno's death before 
institutionalization of a communist power structure would probably 
soon bring an Army-led counter-revolution. 
The PKI final position was perhaps most clearly stated by an 
obscure PKI Central Committee and Secretariat member, M. Zaelani, 
whose article commenting on Sukarno's Berdikari speech appeared 
in Harian Rakjat on April 29. In order to complete the tasks of the 
national democratic stage "which is a condition for entering the 
socialist stage", said Zaelani, "we must liquidate the economic 
positions of the imperialists and the remnants of economic 
feudalism....” He added "Statements which say that the national 
democratic stage is almost completed and that we already will begin 
to enter the socialist stage cannot be regarded other than as 'sweet 
meat' for us to move quickly and consistently to liquidate those 
strategic obstacles....to liquidate consistently foreign assets that limit 
our economic freedom and to strengthen further the state sector of 
the economy." The peasants must also first be "liberated" from 
feudalism. Entry into socialism would require not only economic 
steps but "political steps". Noting that the "working class is not now 
in the government", Zaelani said that a Nasakom cabinet must be 
formed "as desired by Bung Karno."(7) A few days later Aidit said 
that the Indonesian revolution was "already national democratic with 
a perspective of socialism" but that some were trying to say that the 
national democratic stage was already completed when Sukarno had 
merely said it was almost completed.(8) A speech by Rewang, the 
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Central Java PKI leader and a Politburo candidate member, also 
sought to  refute  the  idea  that  the  national democratic stage  was 
completed.(9) Texts of the PKI Central Committee plenum 
proceedings that had been held two weeks earlier appeared on this 
day. Strangely, little was said about such a momentous coming event 
as entering the socialist stage. Instead there was a curious effort to 
recite the accomplishments achieved under Sukarno including his 
ban of the BPS, the ouster of the Peace Corps, the withdrawal under 
pressure of USIS, the exit from the UN and considerable 
Nasakomization. The plenum resolution then emphasized the 
importance  of  democratic  centralism  and  Party  discipline  and 
rejected the criticism by some, "even in the Party Committee", that 
the revolution was not being led by the Party. Given the apparent 
turmoil and second thoughts in the Party over Sukarno's proclaimed 
intention to enter the socialist stage, it would appear that this rare 
acknowledgement of  differences,  even  at  the  Central  Committee 
level, was focused on this issue.(10) Sukarno himself quit referring 
to the two stages for some time but did not change his mind. This 
became apparent in late July and August as will be seen. Whatever 
its initial hesitation over the wisdom of such an adventurous course, 
the PKI leadership (and most obviously Aidit and Njoto) was soon 
committed to hurry with Sukarno toward the socialist stage. The PKI 
had little choice for it had long proclaimed its belief in a 
"revolutionary offensive" and was imbued with the spirit of "dare, 
dare and dare again" or "vivere pericoloso". It was also able to see 
the increasingly favorable effects of Sukarno's aggressiveness - the 
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isolation  and  expulsion of  all  PNI  leaders  unwilling  to  embrace 
communism, the Army's acceptance of "Tri Ubaya Sakti" and an 
apparent general buckling to the atmosphere of terror and 
intimidation. Sukarno's precarious health also meant that the 
revolution must reach a point of no return within a year or two. 
The Army, as noted earlier, had gone along with Tri Ubaya 
Sakti,   the   new   Army   doctrine   for   cooperation   with   Asian 
communism against the West, and conformity with Sukarno's view 
of the revolution internally. This was mostly lip service although it 
was a lip service that tended to stress earlier Sukarno slogans such as 
Panca Sila and Manipol in preference to Nasakom. When Nasakom 
had to be mentioned, it was often qualified with some expression 
such as "Nasakom in the spirit of Panca Sila" to imply at least some 
mental reservations.(11) References were also made to "God" or 
"faith in God" in conjunction with the required obeisance to the 
slogans of the Revolution, particularly in the statements of army 
commanders   in   Sumatra   and   Kalimantan   such   as   Generals 
Mokoginta, Darjatmo and Panggabean.(12) An image of 
revolutionary ardor or at least of patriotism was nurtured by threats 
of drastic action against the imperialists from both Yani and 
Nasution.(13) Sukarno's proposals for a fifth armed force and for 
Nasakom  advisory  councils  in  the  armed  forces  created  a  more 
severe problem but essentially the same tactics were employed by 
Army leaders of not contradicting the President directly but of 
attempting to give lip service to these ideas while subtly redefining 
them into more innocuous forms. 
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The tactics for dealing with Nasakom advisory councils seem to 
have come from General Yani or at least were enunciated almost 
entirely by him. They were probably worked out with his small inner 
circle or "brain trust" that had been formed in January, most of 
whom  were  to  be  killed  along  with  Yani  on  October  1.  Yani's 
position was first stated in early May and repeated with more clarity 
thereafter along the lines of Nasakom being in reality a matter of 
"spirit" and not a scheme for compartmentalization of the Armed 
Forces. It would be impractical to have commissars from each of the 
three  Nasakom  components,  he  argued.(14)  Later  Yani  said  he 
agreed with the Banting Stir and Berdikari and promised that the 
Army would seek "self-sufficiency" in accord with the latter. It was 
already operating on a basis of Panca Sila. As for Nasakomization of 
the Army, the TNI already had Nasakom spirit in accordance with 
the spirit of Panca Sila.(15) In a speech to the regional military 
command in North Sulawesi (Kodam XIII) at about the same time, 
Yani said that regarding proposals that "representatives of political 
parties enter as political commissars within the organization of the 
Army, I consider it is not necessary".(16) As Defense Minister with 
responsibility for all four of the armed services, General Nasution 
seemed content to let Yani take the lead although he did express 
basic  agreement  with  Yani  during  a  press  interview.  On  that 
occasion, Nasution said he could not answer a question about 
Nasakom councils since it was up to President Sukarno to decide. He 
added that he agreed with the comments of General Yani, however, 
that it would be impractical to have a commander from the PNI, for 
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example, and deputy commanders from the religious and communist 
elements of Nasakom.(17) Yani's representation to the President that 
Nasakom was really "spirit", not compartmentalization seemed well 
taken, according to Nasution. 
The disingenuous but effective Army response, which was in 
essence that Nasakom advisory councils were unnecessary since 
Army officers were filled  to  the  brim with Nasakom spirit, was 
projected in a great many ways at this time. One of the favorite little 
chants sung by claques (usually organized by the National Front with 
a strong PKI role) at the frequent political rallies featuring the 
President was "Nasakom Bersatu" which meant "Nasakom unites". 
The chant too is instructive. It said: 
Nasakom bersatu Nasakom unites us 
Singkirkan Kepala batu Set aside the stubborn ones 
Nasakom satu kita Nasakom unites us all 
Sosialisme pasti menang! Socialism will certainly triumph! 
 
A new version now came to the fore called "Nasakom Berjiwa" 
or "Nasakom inspires" (Jiwa means spirit). Of course, no one 
including  Sukarno  could  very  well  reject  the  idea  of  people, 
including the Army, having Nasakom spirit. This, after all, is what he 
and the PKI had been preaching. Sukarno himself and his cronies 
began using the phrase and demanding that this Nasakom spirit be 
genuine and proven in actions.(18) This was particularly the case in 
the final month or two leading up to the September 30 "coup". 
Army reaction to the fifth armed force concept was initially to 
try to ignore it and then to define it as an extension of the existing 
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Army reservist program called Hansip. Major General Sokowati, a 
senior member of the Army general staff, discussed the new army 
doctrine, Tri Ubaya Sakti, before a Hansip conference in mid-May, 
noting that "Nekolim" was now identified as the enemy and that all 
Indonesians must be ready to repel that enemy.(19) Given the 
audience, the obvious impression was that the existing Army Hansip 
structure was to be strengthened. This was prior to Sukarno's speech 
to the National Defense Institute of late May in which the President 
pressed publicly for a fifth armed force and cited Chou En-lai as 
inspiration.(20)   Although   Admiral   Martadinata   had   expressed 
himself in favor a day or two earlier and the Air Force and Police 
could be assumed to be in favor, the Army said nothing publicly until 
Defense  Minister Nasution said  in  an  aside  during an  otherwise 
bellicose anti-Western speech on June 17 that the fifth armed force 
concept  "would  be  discussed".(21) Although  at  least  five  public 
statements by General Yani were reported by Antara over the next 
month including those  previously cited  in  reference  to  Nasakom 
advisory  councils,  Yani  was  silent  on  the  fifth  armed  force. 
However, Antara reported on June 30 that the top Army commander 
in Sumatra had issued instructions to all military commands in his 
jurisdiction to form armed companies of workers and peasants within 
the Hansip framework. One company was to be formed in each 
military sub-district (KODIM). This was precious little given the 
supposed reservoir of "millions" of would-be workers and peasant 
volunteers, of course. Furthermore, Mokoginta's order affirmed that 
there  would  be  a  thorough  screening  process  to  ensure  that  the 
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worker and peasant volunteers were loyal to the Government and to 
the Army. They would be organized on a military basis, be subject to 
military discipline and their arms and ammunition would be carefully 
controlled.(22) 
This program was in fact carried out in Sumatra over the next 
few  months in  a  manner  that  gave  precedence  to  acceptance  of 
anti-communist volunteers (although not so flagrantly as to undercut 
an argument that compliance with Sukarno's wishes was intended. 
The controls over arms were reportedly extremely tight with a 
complete check-in and inventory at the end of each day's training). It 
is not clear from the public record that any steps were taken outside 
Sumatra although it is likely that Sukarno pressed for 
implementation of his ideas on his terms during a meeting with the 
military   leaders   concerning   defense   organization   outside   the 
Mandala  commands  (meaning  Java  primarily)  during  the  second 
week of July.(23) 
There is little doubt that the Army leadership was rejecting both 
Nasakom  advisory  councils  and  the  fifth  armed  force,  however, 
while  trying  to  do  so  as  much  as  possible  by  indirection  and 
distortion of Sukarno's orders. In a sense, this was a repetition of the 
tactics employed by anti-communist elements during the earlier 
Sukarnoism or BPS campaign but with much more control over the 
results. The other three armed services were all responding much 
more favorably to Sukarno's demands, as would be expected. Omar 
Dani of the Air Force did not need to say much since it was clear that 
he  was  fully  aligned  with  Sukarno  and  the  PKI  already.  His 
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comments were accordingly limited to general assertions of the need 
for the Armed Forces and Nasakom to work together.(24) He did 
order that Marxism would be the basis of instruction at the Air Force 
academy.(25) Dani also not only accepted the fifth armed force idea 
in principle but began a program of training communist youth at the 
Halim air base near Jakarta. These units were to be armed secretly 
through shipments from China brought into Indonesia secretly on 
Indonesian Air Force planes under the guise of CONEFO 
contributions. The units were employed in auxiliary roles on October 
1 as part of the Untung/Supardjo operation to liquidate the senior 
leadership of the Indonesian army. Whatever his real feelings, 
Admiral Martadinata declared the Navy to be fully in support of both 
Nasakomization and the fifth armed force concept on June 16. 
Touching all bases, he said the Navy was completely in accord with 
the geopolitical teachings of Bung Karno and recognized the need to 
complete the "stages of the revolution". The Navy was already 
beginning to act on Sukarno's proposals for Nasakom advisory 
councils and a fifth armed force and was making "Nasakom spirit" 
an integral part of its indoctrination courses. Volunteer camps were 
being established to implement the fifth armed force concept and the 
volunteers  would  be  used  in  confrontation against  Malaysia.(26) 
Martadinata repeated his support for the fifth armed force a few days 
later.(27) He then called at PKI headquarters to thank Aidit for his 
political help to the Navy and particularly for his addresses to armed 
forces training courses. He told Aidit that he regarded the fifth armed 
force as a positive contribution to the Indonesian revolution.(28) It 
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has  been  suggested  that  Martadinata  had  given  his  support  to 
Sukarno on these issues because of his weakness as a result of the 
mutiny of junior officers at the Navy's principal base in Surabaya a 
few months earlier. The mutineers had been critical of Martadinata's 
leadership so it is possible that the likeable little admiral purchased 
Sukarno's endorsement of his continuation in office by an agreement 
to support Nasakomization and the fifth armed force. While this 
interpretation is possible, it is not necessary to an explanation of 
Martadinata's conduct, even while acknowledging that he was not in 
sympathy with the communists and rather weakly sided with Suharto 
when the chips were down on October 1. Martadinata was a typical 
product of the Sukarno era, an intellectual light-weight who doted on 
the glitter and fun-loving atmosphere of the Sukarno court in all its 
superficial manifestations. He loved diplomatic parties, participated 
as an enthusiastic drummer (he was an expert performer) and was 
frequently the last to leave. His heart was with the West because of 
his life-style but I doubt any profound commitment to any particular 
set of political ideals or beliefs. His awareness of Sukarno's wishes 
would have been supplemented, moreover, by a realization that the 
Navy and, particularly the Marine Corps, were jealous of the Army 
and loyal to the Supreme Commander, Bung Karno. Martadinata was 
a man inclined toward following the line of least resistance and that 
led to acceptance of Sukarno's wishes. It is true that he too might 
drag his feet in practice on implementation of measures that any 
military man would consider obnoxious but only if the pressure from 
his leader was not great. Resistance to any such pressure would be 
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minimal in contrast to that of the Army; however subservient the 
Army leaders were to sound in their public statements their will to 
resist was strong. 
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Footnotes - Chapter VIII 
 
 
 
1. Harian Rakjat September 9, 1964. 
 
2. Harian Rakjat October 6, 1964. 
 
3. Harian Rakjat Various dates. 
 
4. Harian Rakjat's first report on Sukarno's Berdikari speech on 
April 13 praised his sharp turn to the left (the Banting Stir) but 
failed to mention his remarks on leaving the national democratic 
stage. Also see Aidit's comments on Berdikari in Harian Rakjat 
of April 30 (a two week delay). A set of formal "theses" issued 
by the PKI on May 6, shortly before the Central Committee 
plenum and the party's birthday celebration has remarkably little 
- and even that is theoretical and formal - on the stages of the 
revolution. The theses emphasize the need to complete the 
national democratic stage before going on to the socialist 
stage. The same approach appears in Aidit's report to the 
plenum (Harian Rakjat May 12). 
5. Sukarno repeated his remarks about beginning to enter the 
socialist stage several times in April and May but then said little 
or nothing on this issue from early June until his national day 
speech on August 17 (Takari). In Takari, Sukarno said 
Indonesia was still in the national democratic stage and that "it is 
said that we will duly enter the socialist stage of the Revolution, 
that is that the imperialist model is finished and the land held by 
the landlords is returned to the peasants". The same strange 
phraseology of "it is said that" was used by Sukarno in a 
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speech on education and character building in mid-September; 
"It is said that our revolution is already entering the stage of 
building socialism". Warta Bhakti September 13, 1965. 
6. Harian Rakjat April 30, 1965. 
 
7. Harian Rakjat April 29, 1965. 
 
8. Harian Rakjat June 9, 1965. 
 
9. Harian Rakjat June 21, 1965. 
 
10.  Harian Rakjat June 21, 1965. Note the six week delay in 
printing the plenum resolutions. 
11.  Warta Bhakti June 18, 1965. 
 
12.  Warta Bhakti April 27, June 2, June 19, 1965. 
 
13.  Warta Bhakti May 27 and June 18, 1965. 
 
14.  Warta Bhakti May 24, 1965. 
 
15.  Warta Bhakti June 18, 1965. 
 
16.  Warta Bhakti June 18, 1965. 
 
17.  Warta Bhakti June 24, 1965. 
 
18.  According to Suluh Indonesia of July 21, 1965, Sukarno 
ultimately ordered that the slogan Nasakom Bersatu be amended 
to "Nasakom Djiwaktu" which may imply "Nasakom – it’s 
about time" since "waktu" means time. "Djiwaktu" is unclear 
and a colleague believes that Sukarno's actual words were 
"Nasakom djiwaku" or "Nasakom is my spirit". See Suluh 
Indonesia July 21, 1965. 
19.  Warta Bhakti  May 15, 1965. 
 
20.  Warta Bhakti  May 31, 1965. 
 
21.  Warta Bhakti  June 18, 1965. 
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22.  Warta Bhakti  June 30, 1965. 
 
23.  Warta Bhakti  July 12, 1965. 
 
24.  Warta Bhakti  April 29, 1965 
 
25.  Warta Bhakti  June 5, 1965. 
 
26.  Warta Bhakti  June 17, 1965. 
 
27.  Warta Bhakti  June 19, 1965. 
 
28.  Warta Bhakti June 25, 1965. 
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IX 
 
Sukarno Decides for a  
Violent Transition to the 
"Socialist Stage" 
 
 
 
In retrospect, and taking account of information that has only 
become available in recent years, it appears that Sukarno became at 
least tentatively committed to a violent rather than a peaceful entry 
into the socialist stage as early as May 1965. While the details were 
not yet worked out, the basic decision for eliminating the Army 
leadership was probably made as soon as Sukarno became convinced 
that Yani was only giving lip service to Sukarno's revolutionary 
goals and that the Army would not give in on any measures that 
would alter the physical balance of power against it. However, this 
was not entirely clear from the overt record of Sukarno's speeches 
and actions until later. Indeed, the initial impression was that, after 
the storm and fury of April and May, a period of relative quiet had 
set in on the internal front in June. This was partly because Sukarno 
was preoccupied with his attendance at  the Second Non-Aligned 
Conference in Algiers where he hoped to emerge as the leader - or at 
least the policy innovator - of a broad anti-Western coalition based 
on the principles of a global Nasakom. The relative calm probably 
also reflected a desire to test whether the Army could be induced to 
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succumb peacefully to his pressures for its Nasakomization - a kind 
of "one last chance" approach before turning to violence. There may 
also  have  been  a  felt  need  to  prepare  the  psychological ground 
further, including the creation of the right climate for securing the 
fullest  commitment  of  those  who  would  have  to  execute  the 
para-military operation required. 
The political situation could not have been more favorable from 
all appearances. The media and all segments of the elite had been 
induced to spew forth unending hysterical revolutionary verbiage 
and no one was immune from the psychological duress and terror 
that gripped Indonesia in this period. At the center, all civilian 
institutions had been taken over, were neutralized, or were about to 
be, although some stirrings of resistance continued at the grass roots 
level. These would later turn out to be significant but they were 
undoubtedly underestimated at the time. Even the Army had been 
intimidated enough to accept the doctrinal upheaval of Tri Ubaya 
Sakti and to avoid an open confrontation with the Great Leader of 
the Revolution at all costs. The military balance was another story, 
however. The PKI had no real military capacity nor could it have 
had. Those who criticize this lack of military capacity from hindsight 
fail to understand that even a limited effort to move in that direction 
earlier would have been incompatible with the Sukarno/PKI program 
of building a revolutionary situation politically through national front 
tactics. The PKI could never have developed; it would have been 
sharply opposed if a case could have been made earlier that it was 
not a loyal part of the national consensus. The Army remained by far 
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the largest and most effective military force even though the Navy 
(meaning mostly the Marines), the Air Force and the Police were a 
partial offset. If Jakarta had been in Central Java, the situation would 
have appeared more favorable to the communists but the capital was 
surrounded  by  the  relatively  more  Moslem  and  anti-communist 
region of West Java and by the crack Siliwangi division. 
A direct assault on the Army was out of the question; the only 
way to  overcome its  latent  power was to  neutralize some of  its 
stronger forces, channel the action into a scenario where there would 
be a local balance of forces against it and surgically alter its 
leadership. The old leadership would then have to be shown up as a 
counter-revolutionary, unpatriotic group. The Gilchrist documents 
were created for that purpose as early as May, 1965. The Siliwangi 
division had already been weakened by transfer of many of its 
infantry battalions to counter-insurgency operations in such places as 
Sulawesi   where   it   was   mopping  up   the   remnants  of   Kahar 
Muzakkar's Darul Islam movement there and to the standing watch 
against Malaysia. In July, Sukarno was to move to neutralize the 
division further through manipulation of its commander, Major 
General Ibrahim Adjie. If the Siliwangi could be kept out of action, a 
surgical strike against the recalcitrant group of Army leaders would 
depend on forces within the capital. The Army component of this 
local balance consisted of several elements. The most obvious was 
the  Jakarta  garrison (KODAM V)  under the  command of  Major 
General Umar Wirahadikusumah. Its principal troop strength was its 
First Brigade under the command of Colonel Latief, an officer who 
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was secretly under the control of the PKI. A second element was a 
detachment of two battalions of the elite paracommando force known 
as the RPKAD that had been established a decade earlier at the 
initiative of Vice President Hatta. It was part of the Army's strategic 
reserve (KOSTRAD) under the command of Major General Suharto 
and it was stationed at Cijantung (Tjidjantung) on the southeastern 
outskirts of the city just off the road that leads to Bogor. 
Finally, although it was not strictly Army, mention must be 
made of the multi-service Tjakrabirawa (this would be Cakrabirawa 
in current spelling) regiment of Presidential Guards which was now 
being called a brigade because of recent increments to its strength. 
The Tjakrabirawa was an impressive appearing force because of its 
priority position in obtaining sophisticated modern equipment and its 
ability to obtain elite personnel from the services. The new 
commander of its First Battalion, Lt. Col. Untung, was a top hero of 
the  West  Irian  campaign,  for  example.  Like  Latief,  he  was 
responsive to the PKI and he was fanatically devoted to Sukarno who 
had personally awarded him his medal for the West Irian operation 
several years earlier. The Tjakrabirawa's movements escorting 
Sukarno were something to behold (and I beheld a number of them); 
masses of armored vehicles with impressive discipline and precision 
clearing the path for the Great Leader as he left a speech at Senayan 
Stadium and ringing his presence whenever he required official 
movement. Also on hand in Jakarta was part of the Police Mobile 
Brigade, some KKO (Marine) units  and  some Air  Force ground 
troops to protect the Halim air base. Of all these troops, the two 
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battalions of RPKAD were considered the most effective and were to 
become the decisive element on October l through a series of 
unforeseen circumstances. But it is too early to get into that, the 
point of this review having been to help the reader keep in mind the 
ever-present background of available military force which Sukarno 
as well as others had to think about as they planned their moves. 
Before bringing in and evaluating the behind-the-scenes moves 
that have come to light from the post-coup testimony of participants, 
it  is well to look at  the overt record of Sukarno's speeches and 
actions, as well as those of others, from June through the end of 
September. This overt record alone clearly demonstrates, in my 
opinion, Sukarno's intention to take violent action against the Army 
in order to clear the way for entry into the socialist stage in the near 
future. This  is  not  merely a  matter  of  hindsight, I  might add.  I 
believed strongly in the significance of Sukarno's talk about entering 
the socialist stage from his first statements on the subject. I later 
argued Sukarno's responsibility for the September 30 affair to 
Indonesian friends long before they were prepared to believe it and I 
thought that Sukarno's July 25 speech to the PNI was a signal that he 
had  shifted  from  a  course  of  peaceful  to  violent  entry  into  the 
socialist stage long before the evidence from interrogated 
participants came to light. My point in saying this is not to show my 
clairvoyance; it is to indicate that a strong case can be made for 
demonstrating Sukarno as the initiator of the September 30 affair on 
the basis of the overt historical record alone even if one were to 
discount all trial and other testimonial evidence as the work of Army 
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manipulation and duress. This "clairvoyance" was not really very 
difficult, in any case; it only required a willingness to take Sukarno 
seriously as  a  man  committed to  a  communist Indonesia and  to 
analyze his increasingly open and clear rhetoric in that light. 
Unfortunately, all those experts who had become wedded to a view 
of Sukarno as a "bourgeois nationalist" and a playboy whose reliance 
on the PKI was simply a mistaken concern with "balancing forces" 
were, and often still are, unwilling to examine this record without 
blinders. 
Sukarno's speech of July 25 to the PNI was ostensibly on the 
scale of his May speech to the PKI. Like the latter, it was held in the 
large sports stadium at Senayan, not the small basketball facility 
where he gave most of his speeches. The large stadium reportedly 
had a capacity of 100,000 compared to about 10,000 for the small 
location. The stadium was full of PNI cadres for the occasion and 
one may assume that most of the PNI leaders, except for such 
communist  infiltrators  as  its  Secretary  General,  hoped  that  their 
leader and the founder of their party in 1927 would at least show 
even-handedness.(l) They were aware, of course, of his demands that 
the PNI purge its false Marhaenists and they were in the process of 
compliance. What happened instead was that Sukarno increased the 
pressure to  expel  the  false  Marhaenists "now", not  later,  and  to 
conclude with a peroration that focused praise not on the PNI but on 
the PKI as the shining example for the Indonesian revolution. 
The nature of Sukarno's peroration is an essential element in 
understanding what happened in Indonesia in 1965 - it ranks with 
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Sukarno's earlier decision to enter the socialist stage in the near 
future and his specific actions to purge the PNI and politicize the 
Army as key steps toward launching the September 30 movement. 
Sukarno began by praising the 1926 PKI revolt. He described briefly 
how the 1926 revolt broke out in West Java and later in Sumatra. 
One of the PKI leaders arrested by the Dutch was held in jail at the 
town of Ciamis (Tjiamis), said Sukarno, and this man smuggled a 
letter  to  the  then  young Sukarno to  carry  on  the  struggle. This, 
Sukarno implied, is what he had done ever since (the story of a 
message from the Ciamis jail was repeated in Sukarno's remarks at 
the PSII anniversary in mid-September with even more emphasis and 
a vague version is also to be found in Sukarno's "autobiography" by 
Cindy Adams).(2A) Some people thought that the 1926 PKI revolt 
was a  mistake, he continued; they wanted to cooperate with the 
Dutch and gain independence gradually. However, freedom could 
not be achieved by simply asking for it, freedom must be seized. 
Sukarno asked scornfully whether the means for seizing power was 
water. No, he responded, power had to be achieved with arms - "with 
the rifle, with artillery, ships, arms and bombs". Only power and 
physical force could defeat the class enemy. The above summary is 
based on the account of the speech in the PNI newspaper, Suluh 
Indonesia, of July 26 and it reflects that paper's version of the speech 
except for the "class enemy" at the end.(?) I attended this speech and 
sat a few feet in front of Sukarno and his large and conspicuous 
uniformed bodyguard, a man who stood just below Sukarno with 
folded  arms  and  gazed  with  flitting  eyes  to  and  fro  among  the 
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audience.  This  Tjakrabirawa  guard  officer  was  none  other  than 
 
Colonel Untung, the subsequent nominal leader of the September 30 
 
Movement. While I cannot be certain of the exact words almost two 
decades later, my impression was strong that Sukarno either said or 
implied more than a need to defeat the Dutch by force of arms, and 
was referring to the present internal or class enemy. Sukarno noted 
rather ominously that Indonesia had managed to avoid class warfare 
during its continuing revolution thus far but added that class warfare 
was becoming an increasing possibility due to the recalcitrance of 
conservative elements.(3) 
There  is  no  reason  to  believe,  in  any  case,  that  Sukarno's 
purpose was limited to imparting a history lesson to his nationalist 
PNI audience about the PKI, particularly when this audience could 
reasonably expect to hear something about its own glorious history - 
that is the history of the nationalist movement after the PNI came on 
the scene in 1927 following the failure of the 1926 PKI revolt. It 
seems clear that Sukarno had in mind the parallels he saw between 
1926 and 1965. He was saying in effect that the 1926 revolt was 
correct, despite its failure, because a successful revolutionary step 
could only be taken by violent action. By whom? By the same PKI 
was the obvious message. I believe that the July 25 speech 
demonstrated that a decisive judgment had been made by Sukarno - a 
judgment that a peaceful transition to the socialist stage was not 
possible given the degree of high level Army opposition, however 
much lip service the Army leaders were paying to Sukarno's rhetoric. 
Sukarno  may  still  not  have  decided  on  a  detailed  scenario  for 
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effecting his violent entry into the socialist stage - the seizure or 
liquidation of anyone standing in the way of a communist Indonesia - 
but he had made the decision in principle. Given his lack of attention 
to the details of implementation that had always characterized his 
style  of  leadership, it  is  unlikely that  he  directly  supervised the 
planning that would be required to execute his decision such as the 
details of how Yani, Nasution and the other Army leaders were to be 
removed; that was a matter for subordinates, not for the Great Leader 
of the Revolution. But his green light was necessary. This was not a 
green light being forced on him by an  aggressive PKI, by such 
Machiavellian subordinates as Subandrio, or by restive elements in 
the Army; it was Sukarno's initiative just as Sukarno had pressed 
almost single-handedly from March onward for an early entry into 
the socialist stage, for purging the "false Marhaenists" and so on. The 
July 25 speech showed clearly, in my view, that Sukarno was not 
only totally committed to the PKI and communism but that he was 
intent on effecting final revolutionary change leading to an open 
communist state through violent means.(4) This theme of 
identification with the PKI was to be repeated in even clearer form in 
mid-September in his little publicized speech to a small Moslem 
party, the PSII. 
The next steps in the drama, as far as the PNI was concerned, 
unfolded rapidly. The removal of PNI Deputy Chairman Hardi, 
Deputy Secretary General Isnaeni, former Central Java leader 
Hadisubeno and several other top PNI leaders (Osa Maliki, Karim 
Mohammed Durjet, Sabilal Rasjad, and Mohammad Achmad) was 
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announced on August 6.(5) Sukarno then underwent an apparent 
medical setback of some sort in early August which stopped his 
speech making for about one week. This alleged medical setback has 
been greatly overplayed and, in my view, misunderstood but it will 
be  examined  shortly.  While  rumors  of  Sukarno's  illness  swept 
Jakarta, Aidit returned hurriedly from a visit to China with several 
Chinese doctors in tow. Njoto had already been summoned by 
Sukarno from travels abroad to work on the forthcoming August 17 
national day speech. Sukarno did begin making public appearances 
again in the week before his major August 17 speech and that speech 
itself was equivalent to the previous year's TAVIP speech in length 
and was delivered with all the usual Sukarno fire. The acronym of 
Takari (year of standing on one's own feet) was based on his April 
speech to the MPRS (Berdikari) concerning a sharp turn to the left 
and it strongly reiterated the themes of that speech.(6) Sukarno again 
declared his intention to enter the socialist stage but emphasized the 
need for a proper understanding of the two stages along lines being 
promoted by the PKI. He also distinguished between the need to be 
"creative, supple, flexible and clever" in tactics to complete the 
revolution while remaining absolutely firm on the strategy of the 
revolution which must remain principled. The internal situation was 
declared to be good for the revolution. Any forces that were no 
longer revolutionary would no  longer live  in  Indonesia, he  said. 
Making clear whom he had in mind, Sukarno turned to the armed 
forces and said that they, in particular, must be revolutionary armed 
forces. He referred to "Peta generals" (Yani was the most famous 
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Peta general - that is an officer of the military group formed in the 
Japanese occupation) that were of use in the 1945 period "but if they 
now  oppose  national  revolutionary unity,  if  they  now  break  the 
Nasakom front, if they are now enemies of the volunteers of the 
revolution, then they have become reactionary forces and would be 
left behind".(7) Referring to the Fifth Armed Force idea, Sukarno 
said  he  would  study  it  further  and  come  to  a  decision.  The 
implication was clear, however, that it was only a matter of time and 
of deciding how it would be effected. Takari was, of course, hailed 
by all the claque and the press. 
Aidit promptly demanded wide distribution of the Takari speech 
and declared that "Indonesia is still in the national democratic stage" 
but  "has  already  achieved  important  successes  in  this  stage. 
Indonesia will build socialism, that is the imperialist model is already 
finished and the property of the land is already given to the 
people".(8) Asmara Hadi of the Partindo Party was even more 
enthusiastic, declaring that the "whole world would be socialist by 
the   year   2000".(8)  Such  a   cowed  non-communist  as   Ruslan 
Abdulgani was hailing Takari as "rational and scientific".(9) 
In a speech on August 25, Minister Oei Tjoe Tat noted that 
Indonesia was still "only in a stage of completing the national 
democratic revolution" but since the transition was near, the speech 
concentrated  on  the  tasks  of  "building  socialism"  in  the  new 
stage.(10) Sukarno continued speaking regularly, mostly to PKI front 
groups. He talked to the PKI scholars affiliate, the HSI, at the end of 
August about the importance of Marxism-Leninism as a guide to 
224 
 
 
action but praised Mao's leadership of the Chinese Revolution in 
particular because of its adaptation to Asian conditions.(11) On 
September 1, Sukarno spoke to a Police Conference with the heads 
of  the  four  armed  forces  present.  With  Yani's  tactic  of  citing 
Nasakom "spirit" to evade Nasakom advisory councils clearly in 
mind, Sukarno conceded that the idea of Nasakom unity was a matter 
for the political parties and did not apply directly to the armed forces 
since members of the armed forces were not able to enter political 
parties. However, they could have genuine Nasakom spirit, he said, 
and genuine Nasakom spirit did not mean an intent to eliminate the 
Nasakom parties. Sukarno then addressed the four service 
commanders one at a time. Speaking to Omar Dani, Sukarno said 
that the Air Force was a good revolutionary organization because it 
was studying Marxism-Leninism. The Navy, he told Admiral 
Martadinata, was now a revolutionary force as well, in spite of its 
problems earlier  that  year  (the  mutiny). He  told  Police  Minister 
Sutjipto that the police were also becoming a good revolutionary 
force. But then Sukarno turned to Yani and said "But the Army is not 
a  revolutionary  force.  It  is  still  blocking  me.  I  will  use  my 
charismatic power and turn the people against you. The people will 
crush you". Yani was reported to have laughed (although this may 
have been more of a nervous giggle given the atmosphere at the 
time).(12)  Only  one  day  later,  Subandrio  told  an  audience  in 
Northern Sulawesi that the people had the right to take power from 
the corrupt capitalist bureaucrats and "it is you who will determine 
the  destruction  of  the  corruptors".  A  week  later  Subandrio  told 
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another audience to "smash the exploiters and capitalist bureaucrats, 
annihilate  the  pilferers  of  the  state's  wealth".  On  September  21 
Subandrio said that some of the heroes of earlier days had become 
traitors and on September 25, he said that an operation was imminent 
to eliminate the capitalist bureaucrats. 
Sukarno himself followed up his pointed attack on General Yani 
and the Army with a little publicized speech to the PSII (the small 
political party that claimed descent from the old Sarekat Islam), a 
speech that has  been alluded to  in  an  earlier  chapter. It  will be 
recalled that Sukarno had spoken in the past of five generations of 
Indonesian revolutionaries: (l) the Sarekat Islam, (2) the 1926 PKI, 
(3)  the  post-PKI  generation  that  consisted  of  the  PNI  and  its 
offshoots, (4) the '45 Generation of the immediate post-war 
independence struggle and (5) the present generation. Sukarno now 
condemned the third generation as collaborators with the Dutch and 
claimed that he had always been a member of the second generation 
which he had just identified as the 1926 PKI. He had, he said, been 
passed the word by an imprisoned PKI leader in Ciamis to carry on 
the struggle by other means. This speech was, in a sense, merely an 
extension of his peroration to the PNI anniversary celebration in 
July, but he was even more explicit in identifying himself with the 
early PKI and in implying that he had been an underground 
communist during all the intervening years. As noted in an earlier 
chapter, this speech was carried only in the small circulation PSII 
newspaper, Karya  Bhakti, and  then  only  in  watered down form, 
presumably because the message was considered indiscreet. It was 
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heard by much of  the  cabinet, however, as  well  as  by the  PSII 
audience and it undoubtedly contributed to the sense of impending 
crisis that gripped Indonesia in September, 1965. 
The PKI leaders were also making vague allusions to some kind 
of impending action using the metaphor of a mid-wife waiting with 
her instruments to deliver a baby. On September 15, Aidit told the 
Communist labor organization, SOBSI, that "if we wish our 
Revolution to develop healthily, we must eliminate the economic 
dynasty, bureaucratism, and city devils from the whole political 
economic state machinery". With a clear reference to an impending 
entry into the socialist stage in mind, the Jakarta city PKI leader and 
Politburo candidate member, Anwar Sanusi, told an audience on the 
afternoon before the September 30 movement struck that "we are 
now  in  a  situation where  our  country  is  expecting  a  child.  The 
midwife is ready with all  her instruments necessary for the safe 
delivery of the child, which was long expected. There is a handful of 
devils who threaten the safety of the country and the child to be born. 
The midwife, therefore, first should drive these devils away".(13) At 
least in retrospect, the allusion to impending violence aimed at a 
change in the fundamental nature of the system is clear. This was the 
last PKI public statement before Untung struck that very night. But 
that blow was not exclusively a blow of the PKI anymore than it was 
exclusively a blow by dissident officers; it was a blow by Sukarno 
and his entire revolutionary front. 
It may be useful to examine some of the other public statements 
and actions in September for the insight they give concerning the 
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drift of events and some degree of apparent foreknowledge by a wide 
circle   of   Sukarnoists.   Labor   Minister   Sutowo   told   a   judges 
conference on September 6 that there was now a need for a single 
"vanguard party". He noted that the CPSU played this role in the 
Soviet Union as did the CCP in China.(14) Chairul Saleh told the 
same judges that they must be "subjective" on the side of the 
Revolution. The pro-communist chairman of the Journalist 
Association was haranguing for a further purge of Radio 
Indonesia.(15) Sukarno's senior active wife, Hartini, who was widely 
regarded as sympathetic to the PKI, told an audience in Sumatra that 
Nasakom had been the basis of "our life" since 1926, implying that it 
was a necessary tactic resulting from the failure of the 1926 PKI 
revolt. In mid-September, Sukarno gave Aidit and MPRS Deputy 
Chairman Wilujo Puspojudo one of Indonesia's highest medals in a 
ceremony before the entire cabinet. It was clear that Aidit was the 
main recipient and was being further legitimized by the President 
with the entire cabinet compelled to participate.(16) 
Chairul Saleh gave a press conference in Makassar about this 
time that showed awareness of "coup" possibilities. Responding to a 
question, Saleh spoke of a coup d'etat "against" (that is to pre-empt) 
a coup d'etat managed by the imperialists. The Antara report is not 
very clear but Saleh said something to the effect that a coup against a 
coup is always found in a state that is being led by imperialists and 
was for the benefit of imperialists. Presumably, he was turning aside 
a question that fit the Indonesian situation perfectly by relating it to a 
theoretical situation in another kind of country. The important point 
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is that all three - Saleh, the questioner, and Antara - were speaking of 
a "coup against a coup", which was to be the supposed rationale for 
the September 30 movement and that they were doing so two weeks 
before the event.(17) The next day, Saleh had to listen to Sukarno 
and Subandrio lectures to the 45 Generation on how the "pendobrok" 
generation (the fourth of Sukarno's "five generations" and the one in 
which  Saleh  was  prominent)  must  not  become  "revisionist"  but 
should take up the tasks of the revolutionary present. Saleh was not 
the only one to mention coup possibilities publicly. The Journalist 
Association chairman, Karim D.P., warned on September 27 that any 
attempt to launch a coup would fail. He was not speaking of PKI 
intentions, of course, he was alluding to a possible Army coup.(18) 
Asmara Hadi of Partindo had meanwhile invented a slogan of 
"Marxism-Sukarnoism" to describe the application of Marxism to 
Indonesian conditions. He also described the PKI, not his own party, 
as the "best" (terbaik) party in Indonesia.(19) Sukarno told the 
students at Bogor Agricultural Institute on September 27 that 
Indonesia was not only completing the national democratic stage but 
that the students would be "good cadres for building socialism" as 
soon as they finished their studies.(20) In other words, Indonesia 
would have already progressed beyond the national democratic stage. 
Ruslan Abdulgani was on a tour of Central Java, meanwhile, for the 
purpose of explaining the great PNI purge to that party's faithful. He 
told a crowd of "300,000 Marhaen" (an example of the gross 
exaggeration of numbers in Indonesia) that "contradictions among 
the revolutionary forces" must be worked out peacefully in the spirit 
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of Nasakom. In other words, the PKI line must be accepted. As for 
"contradictions between the Marhaen people and ABRI" (the Armed 
Forces),  Ruslan  said  that  "all  enemies  of  the  revolution  can  be 
crushed and annihilated".(21) This does not mean that Ruslan was a 
party to the September 30 Movement nor is one sure of exactly what 
he said from the Antara coverage. The point is that impending 
violence was in the air and was considered a revolutionary "good". 
The Great Leader of the Revolution had set the tone, after all, and the 
Great Leader was to be followed and obeyed unquestioningly for the 
sake of "the Revolution". Yani's last speech before his murder, given 
on the same date, spoke of the need for vigilance by all the Armed 
Forces, but especially by the Army, although this was cast in the 
language of vigilance against the external "imperialists". 
As the "coup" date neared, Sukarno gave more speeches right 
up to the end. The very last of these was significant because Sukarno 
left the platform for what some in attendance thought was another 
illness but which later evidence has shown was a respite to receive a 
report  from  Untung  as  a  tactical  head  of  the  September  30 
Movement. When he returned, Sukarno told a story from the 
Ramayana that can be interpreted as a reference to the violence about 
to be launched. Another speech delivered a bit earlier to the 
communist university students, the CGMI, should be addressed, 
particularly because some writers have taken it as a warning to the 
PKI. This interpretation is clearly incorrect, in my view, and would 
require  an  extremely  strained  interpretation given  the  context  of 
Sukarno's posture both before and after the "coup". The remarks 
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related to a Moslem university student organization, the HMI, which 
had been allowed to continue although it had once been associated 
with the banned Masjumi party. The HMI and the NU youth group, 
Ansor, had both been involved in physical clashes with PKI youth, 
especially in East Java. The HMI was vulnerable because of the 
ex-Masjumi  connection  while  Ansor  was  not,  so  the  PKI  had 
whipped up a strong campaign in the press to ban the HMI. The 
CGMI had been in the forefront of the PKI effort. Toward the end of 
his speech, Sukarno praised the CGMI and noted that it contained 
non-communists (although progressive ones) as well as communists. 
His  point  was  the  need  to  have  a  united  front  of  all  Nasakom 
elements who were genuinely favorable to the revolution. Sukarno 
then  said  that  there  were  also  some  students  who  were  not 
progressive revolutionary and they must be banned. He was clearly 
referring to the HMI, in my opinion, although he did not come out 
and ban that organization on the spot (why stir up trouble the day 
before the assault on the army leadership?). Sukarno next made some 
rhetorical comments that he would ban any group that was not 
progressive revolutionary even if it should turn out to be the CGMI. 
Some  non-communist Indonesians  who  were  always  grasping  at 
straws to absolve the President and show that "at last" he had seen 
the light and discovered how he was being manipulated by those 
nasty communists (and the Machiavellian Subandrio), claimed that 
he was warning the PKI. However, Sukarno had often made similar 
comments in the past that were designed to show his fairness to all 
groups and this was nothing more. The whole thrust of this speech 
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earlier had been on the importance of understanding Marxism. The 
Communist Manifesto, he said, had been addressed to the proletariat 
of all countries and was the property of the world. The 1926 PKI 
revolt had been launched on the principle of Nasakom (presumably 
because the PKI had tried, rather narrowly and unsuccessfully, to 
mobilize a wider front through the Sarekat Rakjat). Nasakom was a 
"theory of struggle of Marxism, combining all revolutionary forces". 
Nasakom was now accepted by 95% of the Indonesian people. "To 
be a communist is not an easy thing", Sukarno said, "To be a 
communist one must produce and think".(22) His later comments, 
then, were made in the general context of that theme and were in no 
way extraordinary; indeed the whole thrust of the speech showed 
again Sukarno's persistent association of himself with the pre-1926 
PKI and his apparent belief that he, more than anyone then living, 
wore  its  mantle.  Some  may  not  want  to  believe  the  underlying 
validity of Sukarno's identification with the pre-1926 PKI but 
everything the man was saying pointed in the direction of his own 
belief in that fact, or myth, however one may wish to regard it. As 
for myself, I must admit that I prefer to believe Sukarno on the 
nature of Sukarno rather than those Western academicians and 
Indonesians  who  insist  that  Sukarno  is  what  they  say  he  was, 
however difficult it might seem to continue the effort to reconcile 
that image with the reality of 1965. 
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Footnotes - Chapter IX 
 
 
 
1. Ali Sastromidojojo's speech, which followed Sukarno's, 
acknowledged the role of the ISDV and the early PKI in the 
history of Indonesia's struggle but it did not refer to the 1926 
PKI revolt. Unlike Sukarno, Ali dwelled at length on the rise of 
the PNI in 1927 and thereafter. Suluh Indonesia July 27, 1965 
and August 3-4, 1965. 
2. Suluh Indonesia, July 26, 1965, and August 2, 1965, Warta 
 
Bhakti July 26, 1965. 
 
3. See, for example, Sukarno's national day speeches in 1964 and 
 
1965. (Tavip and Takari). Sukarno's drift toward violence was 
manifested in other ways. The Army captured Kahar 
Muzakkar's successor as head of the South Sulawesi Darul 
Islam guerrilla movement about this time, an ex-army officer 
named Gerungan and a man personally known to General Yani 
and other senior officers from an earlier time. A trial was set 
but, according to a number of Indonesian sources of the 
Embassy in that period, Sukarno demanded that Gerungan be 
shot without any trial. This was done - and there were rumors 
that Yani visited the man on the night before his summary 
execution. 
4. Suluh Indonesia August 6, 1965. 
 
5. Warta Bhakti, August 18, 1965. 
 
6. The press accounts of the speech used the term "Djenderal 
 
Petak" which means bald-headed generals. Dick Howland, the 
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Embassy officer who recorded the speech, says Sukarno clearly 
used the word "Peta", not "Petak". This makes sense as none of 
the generals were bald and the reference to Peta Generals would 
have been a clearly direct warning to Yani to get in line or else. 
7. Warta Bhakti, August 22, 1965. 
 
8. Warta Bhakti, August l9, 1965. 
 
9. Warta Bhakti, August 23, 1965. 
 
10.  Warta Bhakti, August 26,1965 
 
11.  Warta Bhakti, August 31, 1965. 
 
12.   Warta Bhakti, September 1 and 2, 1965. Also see Indonesia -  
 
1965, The Coup That Backfired, p.240. This is a massive CIA 
Intelligence report completed in 1968 that was originally 
classified but was later declassified in the 1970s. This report 
was based on all available sources including regular Embassy 
political reporting, intelligence sources, Indonesian Army 
interrogation reports available at the time, and the standard open 
sources of the press and radio. 
13.  The Coup That Backfired pp. 240-243. 
 
14.  Warta Bhakti, September 7, 1965. 
 
15.  Warta Bhakti, September 9, 1965. 
 
16.  Warta Bhakti, September 13, 1965. 
 
17.  Warta Bhakti, September 15, 1965. 
 
18.  Warta Bhakti, September 27, 1965. 
 
19.  Warta Bhakti, September 17, 1965. 
 
20.  Warta Bhakti, September 27, 196~. 
 
21.  Warta Bhakti, September 29, 1965. 
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22.  Warta Bhakti, September 30, 1965, Harian Rakjat October l, 
 
1965. 
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X 
 
The Pyongyang - Peking - Jakarta  
Axis and Dreams of a  
World Nasakom  
 
 
 
Before examining the specific planning and preparation of the 
September 30 Movement and Sukarno's role in it on the basis of 
what is now known about the behind-the-scenes developments, one 
other aspect of the public record of the time should be addressed, 
particularly  since  the  almost  euphoric view  then  being  taken  by 
Asian communism of its prospects contributed to the enormity of the 
sense of failure that promptly followed the destruction of Indonesian 
communism. The cataclysm visited upon an Indonesian communism 
about to achieve total victory in the world's fifth largest country was 
felt not only by the stunned Indonesian communists themselves, but 
by the Chinese who were equally anticipating a victory that would 
outflank the Western position in the Far East and spread (they hoped) 
through the rest of Southeast Asia. As noted in an earlier chapter, 
Sukarno's anti-Malaysia campaign had gradually developed during 
the course of 1964 into a broader campaign against "imperialism" in 
general and then into a campaign focused particularly on the United 
States as the principal bastion of world imperialism. Growing US 
involvement in Vietnam during the course of 1964 and 1965 made 
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such a shift more reasonable and there was undoubtedly great 
emotional resentment of the US role in addition to the calculated 
advantages for the stirring of revolutionary ardor. It will be recalled, 
however, that substantially increased US involvement in Vietnam 
was inspired or developed because of the movement of North 
Vietnamese forces into South Vietnam, changing the war in South 
Vietnam from a Vietcong insurgency into a larger-scale war. This 
major change of commitment reflected the general revolutionary 
offensive throughout East Asia. My purpose here is not to argue the 
rights and wrongs of US intervention in Vietnam, however, but to 
relate that intervention to Indonesian revolutionary developments, 
the Indonesian alliance with China, and the common Asian 
communist sense of impending victory for the communist cause. I 
personally believe that these communist expectations of their 
inexorable march toward victory in Southeast Asia to have been 
highly unrealistic from the beginning, but there is no question in my 
mind that Sukarno, the Indonesian communists, the Chinese, and 
other Asian communists did have a strong belief in the inevitability 
of their triumph and in the impending retreat of the West from East 
Asia under the blows of the aroused revolutionary masses. 
This is not to assert that there was to be a physical Chinese 
invasion or other Chinese takeover of Southeast Asia. It is rather that 
indigenous communist or quasi-communist movements were 
expected to be victorious in the not too distant future since the Asian 
communists were convinced that they had momentum on their side. 
The revolutionary momentum of the Vietnamese communists was an 
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important reason for these high expectations but it was, in my view, 
of   secondary   importance   to   the   belief   in   an   overwhelming 
communist triumph in Indonesia - a country that might be backward 
in Western eyes but which had a population, an area and natural 
resources roughly comparable to all of Indo-China, Thailand, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Burma combined. Indonesia's 
geographic  position  astride  the  trade  routes  between  the  Indian 
Ocean (or as Sukarno called it, the Indonesian Ocean) and the Pacific 
Ocean  and  sitting  on  the  southern  flank  of  all  the  small  and 
seemingly weak non-communist states of Southeast Asia, was also 
significant. The US, preoccupied with Vietnam because of its 
agonizing direct involvement, never really focused on Indonesia as a 
potential communist country. True, it was disturbed by Sukarno's 
trouble-making but this tended to be regarded as the annoying but 
not really serious antics of a not very serious man. Sukarno's jargon 
was considered pretentious and silly as was his talk of creating a vast 
bloc of "new emerging forces" against the "old established forces". 
The Chinese and other Asian communists may have had their 
reservations about some of Sukarno's personal failings too but they 
took him much more seriously and, above all, they recognized 
Indonesia's importance as a significant potential communist state and 
major ally. 
Relations with China developed on two complementary levels 
as in most things Indonesian - at the level of the PKI and at the level 
of government. By late 1963, the PKI had become closely identified 
with the Chinese and was increasingly critical of the Soviet Union 
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although its internal approach to power was regarded as 
quasi-parliamentary and non-confrontational with the government - a 
line generally associated more with Soviet worldwide tactics than 
with those of the Chinese. The essential themes of disagreement with 
the Soviets were over the Asian communist view that the 
revolutionary situation was highly favorable in the former colonial 
world and in Southeast Asia in particular, that the leadership of the 
world revolutionary movement was passing from Russian to Asian 
hands, that the peasantry should be given relatively more weight 
compared to the industrial proletariat under Asian conditions, and 
that  greater  militancy  was  needed  vis-a-vis  the  Western  powers. 
More esoteric analyses of the Sino-Soviet conflict exist and they 
have their value but the underlying causes of conflict lay in this 
inter-related basket of issues, I believe, not in the ideological 
Talmudism (to use an old Soviet epithet) that served as the formal 
structure of debate. 
These differences with the Soviets and identification with the 
Chinese   also   characterized   the   attitudes   of   Sukarno  and   the 
Indonesian government. The views of the Indonesian Government 
under Sukarno and those of the PKI were, in fact, virtually identical 
although there were rare occasions when a somewhat differentiated 
product was offered to public view. The Chinese, incidentally, were 
not really critical of PKI "peaceful" tactics vis a vis the Indonesian 
Government despite their general theoretical stance in favor of armed 
struggle. There was no reason to be since a leader committed to a 
communist  future  for  Indonesia  headed  its  government  and  was 
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gradually  expanding  his  power  to  shape  the  course  of  events. 
Sukarno was also prepared - at least rhetorically to be as militant 
against the "imperialists" and their Asian "lackeys" as anyone and 
Sukarno ultimately proved to be even more militant internally than 
the PKI bureaucracy as a whole (although perhaps not more than 
Aidit and Njoto who were personally close to their Great Leader) in 
pressing for an early entry into the socialist stage. 
By 1963 Sukarno had already come up with his theory of the 
"new emerging forces" or the "NEFOS" against the "old established 
forces" or "OLDEFOS". The latter were identical with "NEKOLIM" 
or  neo-colonialism/imperialism  and  their  leader  was  the  United 
States. The jargon, like Nasakom, seemed peculiar to intellectual 
purists but it was similar to the communist world view that there are 
only two competing camps in the world; the Western and neutralist 
view of a "third world" between the West and the communist East 
was not a Soviet or Chinese view nor was it the view of Sukarno. 
This is not to say that Sukarno (or the Chinese) viewed the structure 
of the progressive camp in the same manner as the Soviets; he did 
not. But the general complexion of the two opposing camps was the 
same. Sukarno saw the NEFOs as consisting of all the communist 
countries, the former colonial and neo-colonial countries and 
"progressive" forces in the West including the United States. While 
this latter group was never specifically defined, it would consist of 
communist parties in the West, fellow travellers and all groups or 
individuals who opposed US support for the opponents of communist 
expansion.  It  also  included  forces  that  appeared  disruptive  of 
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Western society. Like Nasakom, the doctrine was flexible since the 
goal was to unite as wide a coalition against the United States and 
countries friendly to it as possible including groupings that would 
eventually be discarded into the OLDEFO category as the world 
revolution  progressed.  The  concept  was  essentially  that  of  a 
world-wide Nasakom although it was not called that until 1965. 
Although relations had been generally friendly earlier because 
of  parallel  militancy  against  the  West,  the  real  blooming  of 
Sino-Indonesian relations into a virtual partnership dates from the 
latter part of 1964. One reason for a certain distance earlier was that 
foreign policy parallelism was largely offset by chronic Indonesian 
mistreatment of its large indigenous Chinese population of several 
millions and the capacity of conservative elements in the Army or 
the  Islamic-oriented  segments  of  the  elite   to  mobilize  latent 
anti-Chinese feeling among the population as a brake on Sukarno's 
policies of alliance with Maoism. This had still worked during early 
Guided Democracy (and was to be a factor again after the failure of 
the September 30 movement) but the revolutionary momentum had 
become so strong and the non-communists so intimidated by 1964 
that it could now be ignored. Malaysia and US involvement in 
Vietnam had also permitted a shift in identification of scapegoats on 
a massive scale. PKI-led demonstrations and book-burnings against 
US   installations   coupled   with   continuous   hounding   of   any 
intellectual ties to the West by the BPI intelligence network were 
increasing in intensity and in their effect.(l) Following the Tavip 
speech  of  August  17,  1964,  pressures  on  the  US  had  mounted 
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steadily. The Peace Corps was already on the way out and the 
Jefferson Library in Yogyakarta had already been smashed three 
days before that speech on August 14. The Surabaya Consulate 
General had been attacked on September 9 and remained a steady 
focus of demonstrations thereafter (as did the Embassy in Jakarta and 
the Consulate in Medan). The USIS Cultural Center in Jakarta was 
seriously damaged on December 4 and the Surabaya cultural center 
was closed on December 7. The Indonesian-American Association, 
long beleaguered, closed in April, 1965. The Ford Foundation was 
forced out about the same time. The Embassy's utilities and mail 
service were periodically shut off from early 1965 on, ostensibly by 
PKI controlled unions but with the open support of the government. 
USIS was closed on March 5 and AID departed shortly thereafter 
except for a small residual staff required by statute to monitor 
utilization  of  AID  funds. American businesses were  being  taken 
over, limited only by the difficulty of finding sufficiently qualified 
Indonesian specialists to handle the more technical aspects of often 
complex technologies. The  new  American Ambassador, Marshall 
Green, was insulted by Sukarno on his presentation of credentials in 
July and his house was surrounded by a mob of communist-led youth 
who harangued him on his return from the ceremony. Billboards 
lined  the  roads  depicting  America  as  the  enemy  of  mankind  in 
general and of Indonesia in particular and no speech was complete 
without an anti-US tirade. 
Association with the West had become so dangerous that I told 
one of my best Indonesian friends in August not to see me anymore, 
242 
 
 
to save himself if he could. This man, Abu Bakar Lubis, was one of 
the bravest men I have ever known. He replied in terms I shall never 
forget. "I too expect Indonesia to be communist in a short while. But 
I will live my life, however short, as a free man. I will see whom I 
want to see, I have nothing to hide. If you don't come to see me, I'll 
come to see you and will do so openly," Lubis had been one of the 
lesser known student leaders who had applied pressure on Sukarno in 
1945   to   declare   independence   and,   though   PSI   rather   than 
Murba-oriented,  was  sufficiently  respected  by  Adam  Malik  to 
become one of the latter's principal professional associates in the 
Foreign Ministry less than a year later. During the intervening 
months, his life, like that of many others, was often to be in great 
danger.  On  one  occasion  around  October  or  November, 1965,  I 
learned by accident that a PKI attack on Lubis' life was to be staged 
from a house down the street from his. I walked in pitch dark for half 
a mile through the curfew to his house but his wife told me that he 
had already received a warning and found temporary sanctuary with 
an Army officer relative. 
To return from the atmosphere of terror at the personal level to 
the macro-political plane, the isolation and pillorying of the United 
States was only the opposite side of the coin to the development of 
the Chinese alliance. This alliance had already become of great value 
to China at the party level since the support of China by the third 
largest and most important communist party did much to overcome 
China's  minority  position  in  the  world  communist  movement. 
Several Aidit theoretical positions had been adopted by the Chinese 
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and their allies - mainly North Vietnam and North Korea - as part of 
the emerging Asian communist ideology beginning with Aidit's 
categorization  of  four  kinds  of  communist parties  in  September, 
1963  and  his  invention  of  the  concept  or  label  of  "modern 
dogmatists" which he applied to the Soviet side of the dispute.(2) 
This latter term had the advantage of supplementing the label of 
"modern revisionists" being applied to the Soviets by the Chinese 
and thereby countering the Soviet claim that its ideological enemies 
were "dogmatists". It implied a centrist or "correct" position that 
displayed neither the errors of leftist nor rightist deviation from the 
holy tenets of Marxism - Leninism. The most important Indonesian 
invention was yet to come, however, and that was the concept of the 
world countryside encircling the world city (Europe and America) 
that became Chinese gospel with the Lin Piao speech of September, 
1965, a speech that seems clearly related to the anticipated early 
victory of communism in Indonesia. The Chinese themselves have 
noted that the Lin Piao concept came from Aidit formulations earlier 
in the year but it would be fair to add that Aidit's statements were 
essentially a restatement of Sukarno's concept of the New Emerging 
Forces overcoming the Old Established Forces. The innovative 
Marxist thinker, as usual, was Sukarno in spite of his tactical need 
and apparent joy in dressing up his ideas in novel language that 
would not subject him to a charge of being a communist at a 
premature stage of the Indonesian Revolution. 
The Tavip speech in August, 1964, which marks the beginning 
of the final drive toward communism and alliance with China, had 
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been followed shortly by a Sukarno trip to Europe including the 
USSR and to several East Asian countries including Japan, North 
Korea, and China. Subandrio met with Chou En-lai at Shanghai in 
November, 1964 shortly after China's first successful nuclear bomb 
explosion in mid-October. As the Dutch writer, Antonie Dake, has 
correctly noted, some kind of arrangement must have been reached at 
this time for cooperation in the nuclear arena since Indonesia 
immediately began talking about its ability and intention to explode 
an atomic bomb in 1965. These remarks, which were stated most 
frequently by the Army chief of logistics, Brigadier General Hartono, 
were greeted with a great deal of amusement by Western officials at 
the time; it just seemed to prove again the ridiculous posturing of 
Sukarno's Indonesia which could not be taken all that seriously. In 
fact, this talk of a nuclear capacity demonstrated the remarkable 
closeness that was developing between the two countries. It also 
appears that the Chinese first broached the idea of arming the PKI, 
that is the development of an Indonesian fifth armed force, at this 
time  and  they  may  have  given  preliminary  indications  of  a 
willingness to equip such a force. In any event, this trip was soon 
followed by a trip to Jakarta of Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi. 
This was still in November, 1964. The Chen Yi trip resulted in an 
offer of a 50 million dollar Chinese credit but undoubtedly covered a 
variety of subjects including nuclear cooperation and supplying arms 
to the PKI. Subandrio followed up with a well publicized visit to 
Peking in late January, 1965 accompanied by Njoto of the PKI. The 
public statements on both sides projected effusive praise of each 
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other and claimed that the United States was increasingly isolated in 
Asia.(3) More important, it appears that Indonesia was offered an 
additional 30 million dollars in economic assistance to go with the 50 
million dollars from the Chen Yi trip and that China also made a 
concrete  offer  to  supply  100,000  small  arms  for  a  fifth  armed 
force.(4) Implementation was worked out over the succeeding 
months, largely through secret trips to China by the Air Force 
commander, Omar Dani. According to Robert Shaplen, Subandrio 
told a group of Indonesian diplomats in New York in mid-December 
that Indonesia's strategy was one of alliance with China, separation 
of the United States and Great Britain to the degree possible and 
elimination of all Western bases in Southeast Asia. Vietnam was also 
seen as a means of access to the Malay peninsula, according to this 
presentation.(5) 
The  gigantic  celebration  of  the  tenth  anniversary  of  the 
Bandung Conference offered another opportunity for top level 
meetings to be held in Jakarta between Chou En-lai and Sukarno, 
Subandrio and Aidit (as well as other Asian communist leaders such 
as Kim Il-Sung and Pham Van Dong). Sukarno's speech dwelled on 
the anticipated retreat of imperialism from East Asia, lauded the 
Dien Bien Phu victory that had preceded Bandung ten years earlier, 
predicted a new Dien Bien Phu in the offing, and launched the idea 
of a Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEFO) for the 
following year, a conference that would build on the momentum 
from  the  second  Afro-Asia  Conference  scheduled  for  mid-1965. 
Chou praised Sukarno as a great revolutionary leader and lauded his 
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concepts of Nasakom and Panca Sila. Several private meetings 
between Chou and Sukarno over a period of a week were reported in 
the Indonesian press at the time and it seems likely that China's 
approval of the CONEFO idea was obtained at that time. Chinese 
material support for the Conference was promised and shipments of 
Chinese building materials were alleged to be intended as a vehicle 
for introducing supplies of arms to the fifth armed force. Despite 
rumors at the time, it is not clear that this actually took place before 
September 30. 
Sukarno's plans and those of the Chinese suffered a momentary 
setback in late June of 1965 when the sudden overthrow of Ben Bella 
in Algeria required postponement of the Second Afro-Asian 
Conference  until  November  5.  Since  many  of  the  principals 
including Sukarno and Chou En-lai had already gathered in Cairo 
enroute to Algiers, where the conference was to be held, the last 
minute coup d'etat by Boumedienne wrecked hopes for rousing the 
Afro-Asian nations into support for the Sino-Indonesian 
revolutionary offensive and for isolating the moderate non-aligned 
countries led by India and Yugoslavia. Some observers at the time 
believed that Sukarno was not very happy with the idea of such a 
second Bandung Conference in another country because it might 
divert attention from his Conference of the New Emerging Forces for 
the following year. This view appears erroneous, however. The 
Indonesians themselves had continually asserted their support for 
both events and had claimed that there was no conflict between 
them. Indeed, one of Sukarno's main objectives at Algiers was to 
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have been a drumming up of support for CONEFO. A major 
conference where he was present to exert his personal influence 
would have been ideal to that end, particularly since he expected to 
be  one of  the  principal figures in  Algiers and would have been 
supported in that role by the Chinese and their allies. The latter 
included Ayub Khan of Pakistan, still an ally of the United States to 
some degree. While there was no ideological affinity between 
Pakistan and China, their common enmity toward India made them 
allies of convenience. The outbreak of war between India and 
Pakistan in September, a war in which Indonesia as well as China 
passionately supported Pakistan, was evidence of the practical basis 
for these affinities. The postponement of  the  Second Afro-Asian 
Conference was followed by a joint communique by Sukarno, Chou, 
Ayub and Nasser in Cairo and then by a lengthy trip of Subandrio 
through  Africa  to  solicit  support  for  a  radical  "New  Emerging 
Forces" bloc and for CONEFO, in particular. 
The presence of Sukarno, Subandrio, Aidit, and Njoto in Cairo 
at  the  same  time  as  Chou  En-lai  and  his  Chinese  delegation 
obviously   provided   an   opportunity   to   discuss   not   only   the 
Afro-Asian Conference (which was rescheduled for October, 1965 
but never held) but their common revolutionary strategy in Southeast 
Asia. There would also have been an opportunity to apprise the 
Chinese of Sukarno's thinking about how and when to enter the 
socialist stage including the way to deal with the specific problem of 
recalcitrant generals. There is no evidence to this effect, however, 
and it would be surprising if there were. Aidit alone went on to 
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China but only after a rather prolonged visit to the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe (he attended a Romanian Party Congress). While in 
the USSR, Aidit reportedly engaged in some acerbic exchanges with 
Suslov, the chief Soviet ideologue and a key figure in the overthrow 
of Khrushchev in late 1964. Aidit's assessment of the prospects for 
some movement by the new Soviet leaders toward Asian communist 
viewpoints may have been one motive; another was undoubtedly the 
joint desire of Sukarno and Aidit to maintain some kind of 
relationship with the Soviets as a future source of material assistance, 
as a still useful political ally of sorts against the United States, and, 
ultimately, as a hedge against China in unforeseen future 
circumstances. These were very secondary considerations in the 
atmosphere of mid-1965, however, and Aidit left his restrained 
reception in the USSR to bask in the warmth of the Chinese embrace. 
His  sojourn  in  the  Asian  communist  countries  was  cut  short, 
however,  by  a  summons  from  Sukarno,  whether  because  of  the 
latter's medical problem alone or, more likely, because of a need to 
consult as well on the major internal developments that were soon to 
unfold. However short the stay in China, collaboration must have 
been intense on both the general political/military offensive against 
the West and on the specific Indonesian plans for bringing the 
national democratic revolution to an early successful conclusion. 
Close connections were also proceeding at the governmental 
level. A Chinese parliamentary delegation was in Indonesia in early 
August, giving rise to a renewed statement by its official host, 
parliamentary  speaker  Arudji  Kartawinata,  that  Indonesia  would 
249  
 
soon explode an atomic bomb.(6) Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi 
came to Jakarta for the annual Indonesian national day and met with 
Subandrio and other Indonesian leaders.(7) The exchange of 
delegations between the two countries was to reach a crescendo on 
the eve of the September 30 affair largely because of the desirability 
of  showing  a  considerable  Indonesian  presence  at  the  Chinese 
national day celebration on October l. Twelve separate Indonesian 
delegations were in China at that time including an MPRS delegation 
headed by its Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister, Chaerul Saleh, 
and including Ali Sastroamidjojo and Wilujo Puspojudo (there were 
also several ministers including Brigadier General Sukendro who 
was reportedly on the September 30 Movement's hit list (8) and the 
Minister of Light Industry, a general named Andi Jusuf known for 
his earlier effectiveness in dealing with the Darul Islam rebel 
movement in Sulawesi). Other visiting government groups included 
a  delegation from the new Indonesian National Defense Institute 
headed by Wilujo Puspojudo, a  61 member Air Force Academy 
group and a parliamentary delegation. The PKI delegation was large 
but curiously was headed by a man well below Politburo rank, Sidik 
Kertapati (a Politburo member, Jusuf Adjitorop, was also present but 
only because he had been living in Peking for more than a year). 
Given past  levels  of  PKI  representation and  the  obvious current 
euphoria over Sino-Indonesian relations, the absence of any top PKI 
figure can only be explained by a PKI decision to have its entire top 
leadership available in Indonesia for the critical events about to 
unfold. It is also inconceivable that the Chinese leadership would not 
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be told the reason for Aidit's absence on October l, or assuming that 
could be explained, for the inability to send a leading deputy. It 
should  be  quite  clear,  however,  that  the  Chinese  knew  what  to 
expect. In fact, as the September 30 movement struck on the morning 
of October 1, the Chinese leadership showed itself to be remarkably 
well informed in passing along information to the top Indonesian 
delegations. The Chinese national holiday was to have been not only 
a  celebration of  the  past  victory  of  communism on  the  Chinese 
mainland; it was to coincide with a far-reaching new victory that 
would add Southeast Asia's largest nation to the ranks of 
revolutionary communism. Unfortunately for the celebrants, initial 
elation was to turn to the despondency of impending defeat long 
before that day was to pass. 
The Sino-Indonesian alliance was more than that, of course. It 
was the core of a league of all the Asian communist parties and states 
plus kindred souls who could be brought into the anti-Western front 
on  the  basis  of  their  perceptions of  the  interests  of  their  states. 
Norodom Sihanouk's Cambodia was thus proclaimed by Sukarno to 
be one of the five members of the Pyongyang-Peking-Hanoi-Phnom 
Penh-Jakarta axis that became a major new tenet of Sukarno's 
speeches in the final period of 1965 leading up to the abortive effort 
to enter the socialist stage. Sihanouk had apparently become 
convinced  that  the  only  hope  of  salvaging  an  independent  or 
relatively independent Cambodia under his leadership in an East 
Asia that seemed to him to be destined for a communist future was 
accommodation with the Vietnamese and Chinese communists. His 
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anti-Western diatribes of this period were scarcely distinguishable 
from those out of Hanoi, Peking and Jakarta and he later provided 
facilities and sanctuary to North Vietnamese forces fighting in South 
Vietnam. He did not favor accommodation with the Khmer Rouge, 
however, and seemed to look with secret favor on a counter-balance 
to the North Vietnamese. Whatever Sihanouk's real thoughts, Phnom 
Penh was deemed a worthy member of the new communist-oriented 
axis, perhaps in part because it provided some "Nasakom" flavor. 
Pakistan, it will be noted, was not labeled a member of the axis but a 
great  effort  was  made  to  court  that  country,  primarily  through 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the then somewhat rakishly leftist Foreign 
Minister, rather than through Ayub, but this relationship was clearly 
based on the enmity for India being expressed by all the "axis" 
members, but especially by China and Indonesia. 
The axis, nevertheless, was more than a matter of 
convenience, it expressed Sukarno's strong identification with a 
radically anti-Western Communist China and his own belief that the 
Indonesia of the "socialist stage" would at last be free to proclaim 
openly its communist orientation, albeit an eclectic and 
Indonesia-centric communism that  would  simultaneously be  both 
Marxist-Leninist and Marxist-Sukarnoist, to use the new slogan of 
Asmara Hadi. 
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Footnotes - Chapter X 
 
 
 
1. When USIA was withdrawn in early 1965, the departing 
Cultural Attache asked me to maintain a liaison between some 
of Indonesia's leading intellectuals and counterparts in the 
United States and Western Europe. These exchanges were in no 
way political or illegitimate by any normal standard but they 
had to be conducted through a diplomatic intermediary or the 
Indonesians would be cut off entirely from Western thought. I 
soon found that my new Indonesian intellectual contacts wanted 
the exchange to go on but were afraid to invite me to their 
homes or to be seen with a foreigner. Our meetings soon took 
on a semi-clandestine character which was necessary to protect 
these people and to allay their fears. It is paradoxical that, in 
totalitarian societies,legitimate Foreign Service officers are 
compelled by the environment to appear as furtive as 
intelligence officers if they are not to be reduced to 
office-bound ciphers while, in the West, KGB intelligence 
officers can take on more of the aura of straight forward 
diplomats because of the openness of their host societies. The 
line between the normal diplomat and the intelligence officer is 
imprecise, in any case. Both seek information or "intelligence" 
about what is going on and would like to influence 
developments in ways favorable to their country. The 
intelligence officer is prepared to obtain that information 
through agents who become clandestine employees with formal 
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reporting responsibilities generally determined on a contractual 
basis while the diplomat seeks the information through 
interviews; normal business contacts, social friendships, etc., 
and through attention to public speeches, the press, etc. 
Journalists tend to be closer to the latter category in 
methodology although there are important differences. Their 
access to confidential information may often be less since an 
interviewed party may fear disclosure more but the journalist 
may also receive information precisely because of the 
desirability of a leak to the public rather than to a friendly 
government. Journalists may also appear at some events where a 
diplomat's presence would be politically unwise. On the other 
hand, they may be excluded from events where a diplomat is 
welcome. 
2. Cited by Dake, pp 257-258. 
 
3. Harian Rakjat, January 27, 1965. 
 
4. Dake, p. 333. Also Brackman, p 46. Both based on trial 
testimony. Earlier Indonesian Army interrogation reports to the 
same effect are cited in the CIA report "The Coup That 
Backfired". 
5. Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand (New York, Harper and 
 
Row) 1969 p.80 
 
6. Warta Bhakti, August 9, 1965. 
 
7. Warta Bhakti August 19 and 21, 1965. 
 
8. General Sukendro, a member of Yani's small "brain trust", was 
regarded widely as a politically sophisticated anti-communist 
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officer who had once been close to Nasution. An intelligence 
officer, he had been a leading figure in organizing the 
Democratic League in 1960 and was more or less exiled abroad 
to an attache job soon thereafter. Sukendro was brought back to 
Indonesia by Sukarno in 1964, a rather curious development, 
and began to play a role in the leadership of the IP-KI party 
which, it will be recalled, had been placed under the authority or 
a prominent communist stooge, Mrs. Aminah Hidajat. Sukendro 
was then given a minister without portfolio assignment. 
Although Sukendro appears to have been able to stay in the 
good graces of Sukarno by playing something of a double game, 
he presumably remained primarily an Army loyalist who had 
the confidence of General Yani. 
 
9. Indonesia, The Coup That Backfired, p.2 46. 
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XI 
Testimony and Reports  
Concerning the Plotting of a Coup 
 
 
 
In the previous four chapters, I have reviewed the overt record 
of developments in 1965 that led up to the so-called September 30 
Movement coup. I  believe this open public record of the period 
provides the best basis for an understanding of what the so-called 
coup was all about - an essentially limited operation designed by 
Sukarno to get rid of a few recalcitrant generals in order to clear the 
road for entry into the socialist stage. Once successfully 
accomplished, Sukarno could have proceeded with a Nasakom 
cabinet, established a commissar system and a "fifth armed force" to 
gain full control over the military and proceed with his external 
alliance with radical Asian communism, as exemplified at that time 
by Peking. How soon he would have proclaimed entry into the 
socialist stage after the successful purging of the army leadership is 
unclear but it would have been soon since Sukarno's speeches had 
shown an impatience to do it "soon" and to come out openly with a 
commitment  to  a  communist future  for  Indonesia.  The  evidence 
embodied in the "Mahmilub trial testimony, other confessions or 
alleged confessions, and the reports and rumors that were received 
by myself and others, must also be examined in addition to the public 
record that has been analyzed in the preceding chapters. The validity 
256 
 
 
of this kind of information must obviously be questioned by the 
reader as well as by the author since the motives for its dissemination 
are varied. The Army and other political elements certainly wanted 
to paint as black a picture of the PKI as possible and every effort was 
made  to  demonstrate  PKI  complicity.  That  was  not  difficult, 
however, since the public record clearly demonstrates such a 
complicity in spite of a belated PKI cover story that was too eagerly 
accepted by some outsiders. Some of these outsiders were, at least 
subconsciously, more sympathetic to the PKI and Sukarno than to 
the Indonesian army. Their motivation was sometimes a matter of 
political affinity but often it was something else - either a feeling that 
a lifetime of intellectual and professional investment in an important 
subject had gone down the drain or the unfortunate tendency in some 
quarters to applaud any foreign political movement that castigated 
the United States, however totalitarian and oppressive it might be. 
The fact that there was an Army interest in pinning the blame on the 
PKI should be taken into account but that proper skepticism should 
not serve as  an  excuse to  ignore investigatory evidence when it 
supplements and helps to shed light on what transpired. 
The role of Sukarno should be treated somewhat differently in 
the examination of this material since the dominant trend of Army 
thinking was to protect Sukarno's reputation. Although his sympathy 
for the September 30 Movement and his hostility to the Army 
leadership  was  undisguised,  the  Army  leaders  initially  hoped  to 
retain Sukarno as a national symbol and to cover up his involvement 
to the degree possible. Indeed, they did not want to believe it at first 
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since,   infected   as   they   were   with   the   propaganda   that   had 
increasingly infused the society since 1957-58, their opposition was 
like that of the Sukarnoism movement of 1964. They wanted to 
redefine Sukarno to be the Sukarno they wanted, that is the leader of 
a non-communist Indonesian nationalism based on "Panca Sila". If 
only Sukarno would have complied, even after his assault on the 
Army  leadership,  he  would  have  gladly  been  retained  as  the 
pre-eminent national hero and "father" to them all. It is true, of 
course, that the victorious non-communist camp was not monolithic 
and that certain elements, both civilian and military, would like to 
have discredited Sukarno once they began to suspect his involvement 
and his vulnerability. That did not begin to manifest itself at first, 
however, and the trial testimony generally suffers from distortion in 
the direction of protecting Sukarno, rather than the contrary, in my 
view. Testimony or purported testimony that was never officially 
released but which has leaked out is logically subject to stronger 
suspicions of being unfairly aimed at Sukarno, perhaps by a more 
"hard-line" anti-Sukarno clique in the military. This could apply, of 
course, to the testimony of Marine Colonel Bambang Widjanarko, 
who was Sukarno's principal military aide and who figures strongly 
as a witness on the degree of Sukarno's involvement in this chapter. 
My  own  view  is  that  this  testimony  basically  rings  true  for  it 
generally coincides and supplements what is otherwise known. It is 
true that there is an air of bragging and therefore possible 
overstatement as to how much Bambang could have known. Perhaps 
this was caused by his own desire to inflate his importance and 
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perhaps it also reflected an effort by the interrogation team to add 
material gathered from other sources or to make a better case. Even 
with these potential drawbacks, the material must be considered as 
invaluable evidence  because  it  does  shed  additional  light  on  the 
proceedings and the motives and it comes from a source who was in 
a unique position to observe Sukarno at close range. 
Bambang Widjanarko's testimony and that of many others 
indicate that talk of a "general's council" was already rife in Palace 
circles in the first half of 1965 and that Sukarno questioned Yani on 
this  point  in  May.(l)  Yani  supposedly  responded  that  there  was 
indeed a general's council that dealt with senior Army promotions 
but he said there was no political body aimed at opposing Sukarno. 
This was somewhat disingenuous (and also typically Javanese) in 
that Yani must have known that Sukarno was aware of Yani's "brain 
trust" and had that in mind. Since it does not appear that the "brain 
trust" contemplated action against Sukarno but was simply trying to 
deal with Sukarno's revolutionary offensive, Yani may have felt that 
his response was honest enough. Certainly there is nothing surprising 
about the leader of an organization seeking political advice under the 
conditions of massive political upheaval then underway. It does seem 
likely that the "brain trust" decided to maintain the existing Army 
policy of playing for time - of keeping the PKI in check to the extent 
possible until Sukarno should pass from the scene but to do nothing 
overt against him or his political course as long as he was there. This 
would explain their ready verbal acceptance of the new Tri Ubaya 
Sakti  doctrine  and  of  their  lip  service  to  Nasakom  and  the 
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"revolution" as well as their later decision to hold firm in practice 
against the imposition of Nasakom advisory councils and a  fifth 
armed force but to do so by indirect means. Their whole posture was 
defensive and aimed at holding the line only on what was absolutely 
essential for maintaining the Army's integrity and capacity to resist 
in the more distant future when they could deal with a PKI 
unprotected by Sukarno. 
This same testimonial material also confirms what was in the 
press   about   Sukarno   and   Subandrio   presenting   the   Gilchrist 
document material to the four military commanders (Yani, 
Martadinata, Dani and Sutjipto) in May, at the same time, 
incidentally, as Sukarno's public embrace of Aidit and the PKI at the 
latter's 45th anniversary celebration. However, the trial material adds 
nothing of real importance other than raising the question of whether 
Sukarno and Subandrio were claiming that the document was found 
in the British Embassy in 1963 or at Bill Palmer's house in 1965. 
Bambang's testimony is probably correct that the first version was 
being told to the Army leaders since it was at least somewhat more 
credible while the other version was purely fuel for the propaganda 
campaign against the United States. The fact that this imperialist 
"plot" was supposed to be aimed at the assassination of Yani as well 
as Sukarno and Subandrio also supports a view that Sukarno was still 
hoping to get Yani to go along at this point and that Sukarno was not 
yet committed to a violent solution. The same testimony indicates 
that Sukarno was already particularly angry with Generals Parman 
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and Soetojo of Yani's staff. Both were to be victims of the September 
 
30 Movement. 
 
The next act in the drama, if we are to believe Bambang 
Widjanarko's testimony, is a meeting in Bali on June 6 which was 
Sukarno's birthday.(2) The interrogation report implies that there was 
a great deal of other testimony from Sukarno's entire staff and coterie 
that has never come out since the interrogators refer to information 
from other sources and ask Bambang about its validity. In this case, 
Subandrio,  Saleh,  Leimena,  Jusuf  Muda  Dalam  (the  pro-PKI 
President of the national bank), General Sabur and several minor 
characters were present for a Sukarno meeting with General 
Sjafiuddin, the regional military commander for Bali and the Lesser 
Sunda Islands. Not only Sjafiuddin, but the Governor of Bali and the 
police chief of the region (who were also at the meeting) were all 
well-known as pro-communist officials. Sukarno, according to 
Bambang's testimony, began with a discourse on the Jakarta-Peking 
axis and solicited Sjafiuddin's comments. The latter was supportive, 
of course, but then noted that different foreign policy themes seemed 
to animate the top Army leadership which made it difficult for 
subordinate  commanders  (like  Sjafiuddin)  to  know  what  to  do. 
Under Sukarno's encouragement, Sjafiuddin soon allowed as how 
there were some groups in the Army who were loyal to the President 
and his policies and some who were not. If that were true, observed 
the  Great  Leader,  some  changes  would have  to  be  made  in  the 
Army's top command. Sukarno then charged Sjafiuddin with 
investigating and reporting to him further while Subandrio chimed in 
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that Yani should be summoned and questioned. Bambang 
Widjanarko says that Sjafiuddin subsequently called at the Palace 
several times in the weeks and months that followed for personal 
discussions with Sukarno. On one occasion, Sukarno indicated that 
Yani would need to be replaced and solicited Sjafiuddin's views on a 
successor. The latter reportedly proposed General Mursjid, Yani's 
principal deputy but a man not in Yani's "brain trust". I should note 
at  this  point  that  I  have  seen  an  unrelated  report  concerning  a 
meeting of Yani with the regional Army commanders a couple of 
months earlier in which Sjafiuddin had rather smugly spoken about 
his  warm  personal  relationship  and  occasional  meetings  with 
Sukarno whenever the latter came to Bali. Sjafiuddin asked Yani's 
views on  such meetings with the  President. Yani  was  obviously 
annoyed. However, he had little choice but to say that he had no 
objection   but   he   added   that   he   wanted   "full   reports"   from 
subordinates on their meetings with the President. 
This reported meeting in Bali appears plausible to me since its 
timing accords with the public record and it also reflects the known 
attitudes of the participants. This account would appear to show, 
however, that Sukarno was already thinking of replacing Yani about 
six weeks before his July 25 speech to the PNI at which he praised 
the commitment of the 1926 PKI to violence as the only way to 
achieve  revolutionary  success.  In  Bali,  Sukarno  was  obviously 
leading Sjafiuddin on in a way that encouraged this leftist general to 
say things that Sukarno was already thinking. No mention was made 
of the means by which Yani would be removed but I believe the drift 
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of this conversation shows that Sukarno was already thinking of 
some kind of surgical strike against Yani and other non-communist 
Army leaders even though the thinking may not have gone very far 
in detail at this point. It is somewhat surprising that such a 
conversation would be carried on in such a large company (and this 
is true of the other Bambang observations) but it was Sukarno's 
established habit to deal with people in a large court-like setting. 
There  was  much  of  the  medieval  Javanese  sultan  in  Sukarno's 
makeup and style and he also appears to have acquired a certain 
sense  of  omnipotence and  belief  in  his  own  destiny.  The  entire 
course of events smacks of a belief that nothing could possibly go 
wrong; a belief in his own destiny as the heaven - ordained messianic 
Ratu Adil of ancient Javanese prophecy meshed perfectly in this 
respect with the Marxist belief in the inevitable progress of history 
from lower to higher stages. Now there was to be the glorious entry 
into the building of socialism fulfilling the historic mission of a man 
who was simultaneously the voice of the common people, the Great 
Leader of the Revolution, the embodiment of Javanese 
quasi-religious tradition and the Indonesian Lenin. 
Another interesting behind-the-scenes event reportedly occurred 
in July. This was a meeting between Sukarno and General Ibrahim 
Adjie, commander of the famous Siliwangi Division in Bandung. 
The report, which was said to be "unconfirmed", appears in the early 
CIA study called "The Coup that Backfired".(3) It says in essence 
that Sukarno approached Adjie and told him that Yani and other 
generals were plotting a coup against him. Sukarno then promised 
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Adjie that he could have Yani's job as commander-in-chief of the 
Army if Adjie helped to preserve order after Yani and the other 
generals were arrested. There was no mention of PKI involvement 
(Adjie, it will be recalled, had the reputation of being fanatically 
devoted to  Sukarno but strongly opposed to  the  PKI) or  of  any 
intention to kill the generals. Adjie reportedly agreed and the deal 
was settled. Adjie was given a medal and the Siliwangi Division 
came  in  for  praise  in  Sukarno's August  17  speech.  Adjie  stated 
publicly at this time that he would obey Sukarno no matter what 
happened. I never saw the above mentioned report prior to reading 
the CIA study some years later but I had always believed that Adjie 
had been bought off somehow and that the plot logically had to be 
based on an assumption that the Army's crack division, which 
surrounded  Jakarta,  would  not  move  against  the  September  30 
Movement. The Siliwangi division did not move, in fact, until the 
issue had been decided by local forces and Sukarno had fled from 
Halim air base to Bogor on the night of October 1. My suspicion that 
Adjie and the Siliwangi division had been neutralized in the 
September 30 affair was also based on reports that reached the 
Embassy in October 1965 that Sukarno had followed up the Army's 
refusal to accept the pro-communist Pranoto as Yani's replacement 
by advancing the name of Adjie as a compromise. This proposal was 
reportedly made during Sukarno's meeting with the surviving Army 
leadership on October 2 but was rejected by Suharto. It is also known 
that Adjie refused Suharto's orders to send Siliwangi units to the 
capital at first, arguing that he would have to get the President's 
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permission first. Adjie was certainly never trusted by the Army after 
this but was eventually sent off to Europe as an Ambassador. It 
should also be noted that pro-communist officers had been infiltrated 
into certain senior staff positions in the Siliwangi as a further 
guarantee of its neutralization. The CIA study holds that this reported 
conversation "is about the best evidence we have that Sukarno was 
genuinely  concerned  about  the  possibility  of  an  Army  coup".  I 
believe the reported conversation to be likely since it or something 
like  it  must  have  occurred  before  any  detailed  planning  could 
proceed  to  eliminate  the  Army  leadership. Otherwise, the  whole 
effort would have been foredoomed from the start since a Siliwangi 
loyal to the Army command could have crushed a local capital coup 
easily.   However,   I   do   not   believe   this   conversation   would 
demonstrate that Sukarno was "genuinely concerned" about an Army 
coup. On the contrary, it seems to me that Sukarno had determined to 
get rid of the recalcitrant generals for his own reasons - to impose his 
commissar system, create a fifth armed force, and, in general, to 
remove  the  impediments toward entering  the  socialist  stage.  For 
Sukarno, the obvious approach to Adjie was to provide the best 
rationale possible for taking such drastic action against the Army 
leaders and to base the contemplated action on alleged disloyalty 
against the head of state. This was the natural follow through to the 
Gilchrist documents ploy, the whole burden of which had been to 
allege foreign "imperialist" plotting with dissident Indonesian 
generals. The timing of the meeting with Adjie is not given but it 
was presumably sometime between Sukarno's return from Cairo on 
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July 8 and his speech to the PNI on July 28. The emphasis in the 
latter speech on a violent solution to revolutionary problems may 
very well have reflected Sukarno's belief that his recent success in 
managing to get Adjie on board meant that he could now turn to 
more realistic planning for the physical removal of the Army 
leadership that stood in the way of his commitment to enter the 
socialist stage in the near future. 
The next two developments that were unpublicized at the time 
occurred on August 4, that is about ten days after the PNI speech. I 
regard  these  two  developments as  related.  One  of  them,  though 
unpublicized, was widely known on the Jakarta rumor mill circuit at 
the time and it forms the basis for considerable trial testimony as to 
PKI motivations. This was the reported illness of Sukarno on or 
about August 4 (there is some confusion on the exact date among the 
sources and authorities). The second event has only been reported in 
the testimony of Bambang Widjanarko but, if true, it is of the utmost 
significance since  it  ties  Sukarno to  direct  plotting  with  Untung 
before or during Sukarno's supposed illness, before Aidit's return 
from China and before the various contacts between the PKI Special 
Bureau headed by Sjam and the September 30 group including 
Untung. As discussed in more detail later, the PKI Special Bureau, a 
clandestine unit under Aidit's direct control for infiltration of the 
Indonesian military, was to become the channel for operational 
control of the strike forces under Untung and Supardjo. Sukarno's 
reported illness will be discussed first. 
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Sukarno was supposed to have suffered a mild stroke on the 
evening of August 3 and rumors abounded that he was near death.(4) 
Aidit returned abruptly from China on August 6. He had been 
scheduled to remain abroad another week and the rest of his 
delegation did go on to Hanoi and at least a portion of it went on to 
Tirana. Aidit came back with a team of Chinese doctors in a special 
plane supplied by the Chinese. Accompanied by the Chinese doctors, 
he met with Sukarno in Bogor on August 9. Sukarno had travelled to 
Bogor that day and returned to Jakarta on August 10. Most of the 
trial testimony indicates that Aidit met with the PKI Politburo shortly 
thereafter and told them that Sukarno was in grave condition and that 
the PKI would have to act before he died. Politburo approval was 
obtained and everything was left to Aidit to implement, making use 
of  Sjam  and  his  Special  Bureau.  The  latter  supposedly  then 
mobilized the Untung group only in early September. 
As will be seen, there is considerable question as to whether 
Sukarno was sick at all on this occasion or, if he was, whether the 
illness was not intentionally blown out of all proportion as part of the 
PKI/Sukarno  tactics  to  provide  a  rationale  for  action  to  the  bit 
players. The illness story later fitted into the Army interest to focus 
the blame on the PKI while covering up the degree of Sukarno's 
involvement. In my judgment, it has also been misinterpreted by 
many Western writers as the key factor that propelled the PKI to take 
action. All of this is not to say that Sukarno's health was not a factor 
in a deeper and broader sense. Sukarno had a major chronic kidney 
problem, having lost one kidney already and having the remaining 
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kidney  in  potential  serious  trouble.  He  had  visited  a  prominent 
kidney specialist in Vienna in the fall of 1964 and was told that a 
large stone would have to be removed soon from his remaining 
diseased kidney or that he would die within a year or two.(5) This 
information must have had a powerful effect on Sukarno and his 
leading  followers  back  in  Jakarta  since  Subandrio  made  some 
curious comments at this time about Sukarno's health which he later 
attempted to disavow. Sukarno did not agree to the recommended 
operation, however, perhaps because of a fear that he would die in 
surgery (It has been suggested by some observers that Sukarno's fear 
was based on a mystical prediction many years earlier that he would 
ultimately die by the knife; while such an explanation accords with 
the significance of mysticism in the Javanese psyche and may have 
served as a rationalization for inaction, the underlying cause of that 
inaction was probably a more basic physical fear which could have 
inhibited anyone and particularly someone like Sukarno who never 
had  much  of  a  reputation  for  physical  courage).  The  Vienna 
diagnosis in late 1964 probably influenced Sukarno toward speeding 
up the revolutionary process and thus may account in part for his 
eagerness a few months later to "enter the socialist stage" soon. The 
validity of this general impact of the health question is not the same 
as the narrow question of an alleged stroke in August, however. 
I recall that the reaction of several of us in the American 
Embassy when we heard the health rumors at the time was one of 
profound skepticism. We noted that there was a tendency to leak 
health rumors about Sukarno when he was applying great pressure 
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for political change on the theory that any inclination of the Army to 
act would be undercut, by the Army's chronic posture of waiting 
until after Sukarno's departure before making a move. The rumors of 
illness would thus reinforce the Army's predisposition toward 
procrastination. We were right to be skeptical but for reasons that 
were more profound than we thought. According to the limited 
information available, Sukarno complained of chest pains on the 
evening of August 3 and claimed to have such pains on three 
occasions that evening and twice on August 4.(6) He was examined 
by  his  Indonesian  doctor  and  given  an  electrocardiogram  that 
evening and  another on  August 4.  These reportedly "showed no 
evidence of coronary thrombosis ....(and) the physicians treating the 
President concluded that he had had five attacks of coronary 
insufficiency but no coronary infarct". This verdict was apparently 
given after consultation among Sukarno's full medical team which 
comprised both Indonesian doctors and a resident team of four 
Chinese physicians (Aidit brought two additional Chinese doctors on 
his return two days later). There was also no apparent evidence of 
kidney complications although Sukarno's Viennese kidney specialist, 
Dr. Fellinger, was informed. Antonie Dake reports in his book, ln the 
Spirit of the Red Banteng, that he interviewed Sukarno's principal 
Indonesian doctor, Dr. Rubiono Kertopati and former Deputy Prime 
Minister Johannes Leimena, a medical doctor by training, some years 
later. They stated that the Indonesian doctors diagnosed the attack as 
not of lasting effect.(7) Nasution said that he thought the symptoms 
reported  to  him  (sudden  onset,  vomiting,  aches  and  pains  and 
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tiredness) sounded like an attack of severe influenza that was going 
around in Jakarta at the time.(8) Sukarno was reportedly still in bed 
on August 6 but was active on August 8 and went to Bogor on 
August 9 where he met Aidit and the new Chinese doctors. Sukarno's 
national  day  speech  on  August  17  was  long  and  physically 
demanding but it was delivered with his usual vigor and fire. 
The significant bit of information from Colonel Bambang 
Widjanarko raises great questions about the illness, particularly when 
we see the vagueness of the reported symptoms, the lack of 
confirmatory medical evidence from the doctors, and the quickness 
of Sukarno's recovery (he was never more active than he was to be 
over the next six weeks). Bambang Widjanarko was asked by his 
Army interrogators about information they had received from three 
other Palace sources (Suratni, Sukarti and Amanda Jacobs) that 
Untung had visited Sukarno in his bedroom on August 4. Bambang 
confirmed this visit and said that Untung had been accompanied by 
General Sabur, Untung's superior as commander of the Tjakrabirawa 
Regiment of palace guards. According to Bambang's testimony, 
Sukarno asked Untung if he were "prepared to accept orders that 
measures were to be taken against disloyal Army generals". Untung 
is said to have agreed.(9) 
There are no further details but, if valid, this evidence has 
sensational importance. It shows that Sukarno was directly involved 
with Untung at an early stage (before Aidit and Sjam, the head of the 
PKI Special Bureau). It also strongly implies that the whole Sukarno 
illness  story  was  a  convenient  cover  for  the  early  planning  and 
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consultations for the plot to get rid of the generals. These were, of 
course, busy times for Sukarno and the PKI leaders, especially Njoto, 
who also had to prepare Sukarno's major annual national day speech 
less than two weeks in the future. I do not feel absolutely certain that 
Bambang Widjanarko, as Sukarno's adjutant, would have had access 
to such an important meeting as this and one that would presumably 
require great secrecy. But I do feel that the document would reflect 
the army investigation's conclusions about the affair even if they 
were putting words in Bambang's mouth. Furthermore, Bambang 
Widjanarko was extremely forceful in making this point; after the 
first day of interrogation, the point was repeated twice in subsequent 
interrogation sessions.(10) Neither the Army nor anyone else has 
attempted to exploit this testimony. It was never released publicly 
but  only  leaked  to  Dutch  contacts  who  published  it   in  the 
Netherlands and who did not seem to perceive the doubt it cast on 
the whole illness story. Dake cites it in his book but believed that the 
illness only occurred on August 4 sometime after the Untung 
meeting.(11)  He  concluded  that  Sukarno's  alleged  illness  was 
brought on by stress over such a heady meeting. 
The  whole  business  of  the  timing  of  the  illness  is  rather 
confused, moreover, and this causes further doubt as to whether it 
really occurred. The CIA report sets the timing of its occurrence as 
the evening of August 3 and shows much more detail than the other 
accounts,  thereby  indicating  that  it  was  based  on  considerable 
detailed information from supposedly good inside sources. Several 
others in addition to Dake report the attack to have occurred on 
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August 4 while the official Indonesian chroniclers of the "coup", 
Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, say that Sukarno collapsed 
on  August 5.(12) One  would have  thought that  they, more  than 
anyone else, would have had access to precise information. Rex 
Mortimer puts the date of the attack as August 6.(13) My conclusion 
is that the Indonesian sources didn't have their story straight for the 
simple reason that there was either no attack or that it was so minor 
that it was not medically significant. 
It was significant politically, however, for here, I believe, we 
have the beginning of Sukarno's first concrete steps toward actually 
launching the September 30 movement. Aidit, and the PKI were then 
brought into the plot and I am quite prepared to believe that much of 
the  liaison,  detailed  planning,  etc.  was  carried  out  through  the 
Special Bureau of the PKI. (Actually it appears from the Subandrio 
Trial testimony that both Aidit and Njoto were sent telegrams on July 
31 at Sukarno's order to return at once from abroad. Njoto did so but 
Aidit delayed for several days. Sukarno claimed that he had only 
recalled Njoto at that point but Subandrio insisted that instructions 
were sent to Aidit as well). Use of the PKI as the channel for 
executing the plot is understandable because that channel was 
regarded as highly secret and skilled in clandestine operations. It is 
neither the first nor the last time that excessive faith was placed in 
the competence of an organization specializing in clandestine 
operations, of course. Sjam said later at his trial, and said it with 
great pride, that he had been the principal figure. Whether based on 
ego gratification or his own limited knowledge of the grand design, 
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Sjam was seriously in error. He was a supporting player who came 
into the performance well after the first act had been completed. Like 
Untung, Supardjo and the others, he was a professional executioner 
under  a  plan  that  was  highly  compartmentalized but  which  was 
executed  on  the  instructions  of  what  Dake  correctly  calls  the 
"Dalang" or puppet master, the Great Leader of the Revolution 
himself, Sukarno. 
Before turning to the evidence concerning the involvement of 
the PKI in the plot which followed shortly after Aidit's return from 
China, a digression should be made concerning another practical 
aspect of Sukarno's drive to enter the socialist stage, namely the 
grand purge of the PNI. Rex Mortimer's book speaks of growing 
resentment in the Central Java PNI led by Hadisubeno against PKI 
inroads and particularly against the communist led land reform 
agitation.(14) He says this stand of Hadisubeno was supported by "a 
determinedly anti-Communist group around former Deputy Prime 
Minister Hardi". Mortimer notes past Sukarno impatience with the 
PNI's lack of radicalism and loss of mass backing and says he then 
put pressure on the PNI to purge this group in "mid-1965". Noting 
testimony by PKI Politburo member Sudisman at his trial in 1967 
that the army leaders met in June, 1965 with the PNI leadership in an 
unsuccessful attempt to gain PNI cooperation against the PKI, 
Mortimer held that this consultation "may well have triggered 
Sukarno's counteraction". Mortimer also cites a Dutch journalist's 
interview in August-September, 1965 to the effect that Hardi 
acknowledged that "he had been assured that the Army would act in 
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time to crush the PKI". I do not find it unreasonable to believe that 
the specific facts are true as stated, that is that some efforts took 
place around June, 1965 on the part of Army leaders to encourage 
PNI resistance to the PKI. Mortimer's conclusions that Sukarno 
decided to purge the PNI because of any such Army-PNI meetings in 
June, 1965 are erroneous, however. This view overlooks the fact that 
Sukarno had begun his campaign to expel the "false Marhaenists" 
three months earlier, that is in March, 1965 during his two 
presentations to a gathering of PNI cadres at that time (and in 
conjunction with the beginning of his campaign to enter the socialist 
stage). Indeed, Hadisubeno had already been informally deposed by 
June  although  his  final  legal  expulsion  did  not  take  place  until 
August. Furthermore, Hardi and Isnaeni, the two main PNI figures in 
the central PNI apparatus who were purged, hardly sounded like they 
were  "determinedly  anti-Communist".  Isnaeni,  in  particular,  had 
been one of the more radical sounding PNI leaders throughout 1964 
and  early  1965  although  his  radical  rhetoric  may  have  been 
protective coloration, of course. They were purged primarily because 
they opposed the ouster of Hadisubeno and what would have 
amounted to the destruction of the Nationalist Party's Central Java 
base.  Even  Hadisubeno,  as  I  have  indicated  earlier,  kept  telling 
friends in mid-1965 almost up to the day of his final expulsion in 
August, that Sukarno just couldn't be intending to include people like 
him in his attacks on "false Marhaenists". Hadisubeno professed to 
believe that Sukarno must have communist infiltrators (like 
Surachman) in mind. The importance of this diversion from the main 
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story is that it is essential to understand that all the initiative was 
coming from Sukarno as part of his plan to enter the socialist stage 
and that occasional efforts of the non-communists to find some way 
to stop this drive toward their impending destruction were not only 
defensive but largely ineffectual. There was no "triggering" of a 
Sukarno reaction; he was simply being relentless and consistent in 
his pursuit of his revolutionary objectives. He did not even display 
much hatred or other emotion toward the victims; they were simply 
impediments in the path of the revolution and were treated almost 
mechanically as inanimate objects to be brushed out of the way. 
Sukarno even appointed Mrs. Hardi to a position as Deputy Minister 
of Culture in mid-year, a sign that no personal animus against Hardi 
was involved, if he would only agree to the revamping of the Central 
Java PNI into a pliable tool of the Ali/Surachman leadership and 
hence an echo of the PKI. Sukarno even showed his capacity for 
humanity in a non-political setting when he arranged about this time 
for a critically ill Sutan Sjahrir, his old political enemy who was still 
being vilified as a political symbol in the PKI press, to be transported 
from the Madiun prison camp to Switzerland for treatment. 
Following the meetings between Sukarno and Aidit after the 
latter's return, Aidit reported to the PKI Politburo that Sukarno was 
terribly ill and that the "General's Council" was preparing a coup, 
according to the Mahmilub trial testimony, that is the official 
Indonesian Government version. Aidit apparently got the Politburo's 
endorsement   of   his   proposal   to   operate   through   the   Party's 
clandestine Special Bureau to carry out the tactical military side of 
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the operation although Njono, the former labor leader who had 
become the head in 1964 of the Jakarta Regional Committee (or 
CDB as it was known by its Indonesian initials), was designated to 
organize PKI involvement with the Air Force in the military training 
of some 4,000 communist volunteers at the edge of Halim Air Base 
near a village called Lubang Buaja (crocodile hole). Njono 
subsequently  sent  out  secret  instructions  to  the  capital's  Party 
sections for volunteers who were assembled in batches at Halim for 
the Air Force's instruction. This operation was confirmed by Njono 
at his trial and there were numerous witnesses to this program after 
the Communist collapse. There is no reason to doubt this side of the 
story anyway; it is a logical, compartmentalized step in the tactical 
execution of the plan.(15) There were reports, which we even knew 
at  the  time,  that  PKI  cadres  in  Jakarta  had  been  instructed  in 
mid-September  to  take  extensive  security  precautions  such  as 
sleeping in different houses on different nights.(16) 
Sjam was briefed by Aidit on August 13 concerning Sukarno's 
supposed critical condition and the supposed plotting of the Council 
of Generals, according to the Sudisman trial testimony. The timing is 
the logical consequence of what had already taken place at much 
more senior levels. Aidit later met with the three top PKI Special 
Bureau people, Sjam, Pono, and Walujo (their real names were 
Kamarusaman, Marsudidjojo, and Subono), on August 25 where a 
decision was made, according to Dake, to prevent a coup d'etat by 
the Generals' Council.(17) Actually, the underlings were being told 
the cover story and what they needed to know to play their role. This 
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role flowed from the fact that each was a "control" for Supardjo (by 
Sjam), Untung (by Walujo), Latief and Sujono (both by Pono) and 
for other tactical military participants in what was seen as a limited 
tactical surgical strike. The PKI, according to all this mass of 
interrogation testimony, also controlled General Pranoto while a few 
other senior generals were apparently pro-communist. These senior 
people were not used in the military operation. That job was for 
tactical commanders like Supardjo and Untung because the troop 
levels to be maneuvered amounted to several battalions only; this 
was an operation to be conducted by an Otto Skorzeny equivalent, 
not by a Rundsted or a Rommel. 
The PKI Special Bureau operation really only commenced on 
September 4 when Untung had one of his regular meetings with 
Walujo and was told by the latter that he was to meet with two 
officers he did not know, Colonel Latief and Air Force Major Sujono 
on September 6. All the early interrogation material and the trials 
present this sequence as the first notification of Untung who was 
simply being ordered as a PKI pawn to enter a coup conspiracy. (The 
other Jakarta-based players were being informed by Pono while 
Supardjo was being given the  word long distance by Sjam).(18) 
Actually, if Bambang Widjanarko's testimony can be believed, as I 
believe it can on this point, Untung had already been informed by 
Sukarno a month earlier to expect something of this sort so that the 
smug  Sjam's  belief  that  he  was  informing a  previously ignorant 
Untung  for  the  first  time  was  misplaced.  Each  participant  was 
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undoubtedly sworn to keep what he knew to himself as part of the 
plot's compartmentalization. 
Even the PKI leadership below Aidit, Lukman and Njoto was 
apparently being informed only on a need to know basis. Sudisman 
and Sakirman, who were members of the Politburo's Standing 
Committee,  were  probably  more  fully  informed  than  others  like 
Njono and Peris Pardede but the trial testimony appears to show 
considerable gaps in the knowledge of the Politburo members who 
survived long enough to be tried. They were given the 
aforementioned cover story of Sukarno's illness and a prospective 
Army coup and all apparently agreed at the Politburo meeting on 
August  28  to  authorize  Aidit  to  do  whatever  he  judged  to  be 
necessary through his clandestine arm. There have been some hints 
from the trials of a difference in the Politburo over the degree and 
nature of the involvement but there does not appear to have been any 
significant opposition and what little  there was probably became 
magnified later in the eyes of the survivors because of their desire to 
blame  the  failure  on  Aidit's  adventurism  in  order  to  partially 
vindicate  themselves  and  to  make  it  easier  for  a  future  PKI  to 
separate itself from the mistakes of the past.(l9) In any case, the PKI 
was a monolithic highly disciplined party wedded to the concept of 
democratic centralism and there is no doubt whatsoever that the 
entire party would have loyally carried out whatever duties were 
assigned in the follow-through phase. Some apologists for the PKI 
have tried to distinguish between a few guilty culprits like Aidit and 
Sjam and a largely innocent Party structure otherwise but this view 
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does not hold water. Those who knowingly join a communist party 
and accept democratic centralism as a fundamental moral principal 
are also responsible to some considerable degree for the 
consequences of that party's decisions. Lukman and Sakirman were 
dispatched by Aidit to Central Java on September 29, for example, to 
supervise the Party's anticipated follow-through if the September 30 
affair had been successful and other Central Committee members 
also fanned out across the country for that purpose (however much 
they specifically knew of the details). Of those who were called upon 
to act because they had roles in the early stages of the planned 
action, a few figures, like Major Sigit in the next chapter, backed out 
of their planned roles but most figuratively saluted and performed 
their allotted duties. I do not mean to condone the mass killing of 
communists that began in late October but it is not legitimate to say 
that the PKI cadre structure was innocent. They and Sukarno bear 
great responsibility for their contributions to a national tragedy that 
flowed from their policies and actions. 
As the PKI and the military side of the September 30 Movement 
went  about  their  assigned  tasks  of  planning  and  preparation 
in-September (the military scenario is covered in the next chapter), 
Sukarno  continued  to  be  involved  with  overall  direction.  He 
consulted with senior generals loyal to him and his plot such as 
Omar Dani, General Mursjid, and General Sabur, often in the 
presence of such top civilian deputies as Subandrio and Leimena 
although the latter was almost certainly a silent and uninvolved 
bystander  on  this  issue.  The  President  undoubtedly continued  to 
279  
 
work closely with Aidit on the plot although the specific content of 
such meetings can only be surmised (although such surmise is no 
difficult task given the total context) and he even met with Supardjo 
on the eve of the action and apparently was in direct communication 
with Untung according to Bambang Widjanarko's testimony.(20) 
There is no evidence that Sjam and Pono knew of these contacts 
between their two leading military agents and the President; as 
minions they did not need to know. 
Omar Dani is known to have been sent on a secret mission to 
China by Sukarno in mid-September to speed up the shipment of the 
promised Chinese arms for the fifth armed force. Some of these arms 
had allegedly already arrived by ship in crates labeled as building 
materials for the CONEFO conference scheduled for 1966, an 
allegation that may not have been true. However, it does appear that 
arms were brought back on Dani's return flight, in any case. Chinese 
arms were supplied to the PKI volunteers training at the Lubang 
Buaja adjunct to Halim airbase. Dani has been extensively reported 
to have seen first Subandrio and then Sukarno privately on his return 
from China on September 21 and again to have met with Sukarno on 
the morning of September 29. The latter meeting followed 
immediately after a meeting between Dani and General Supardjo 
who had arrived from Kalimantan the day before to take effective 
military  command  of  the  operation.  Some  of  the  interrogation 
material holds that Supardjo had told Dani of a loyalist group of 
officers anxious to foil a General's Council plot and that Dani was 
conveying  this  to  Sukarno.(21)  Whether  that  version  reflects  a 
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Sukarno/PKI  cover  story  or  one  of  the  phases  in  a  somewhat 
doctored Army version designed to protect Sukarno while focusing 
on the PKI is not clear. (It might also indicate that Supardjo was 
honestly telling Dani what he believed to be true since he too had 
been brought in on a compartmentalized basis that was geared to the 
same cover story that had been fed to Sjam). What is clear is that 
such a rationale for the meeting is nonsense. Dani had to have been 
aware for weeks of the massive training of PKI volunteers at Halim 
and Sukarno's foreknowledge at this point should also be evident 
from all that has been said before. The details of this conversation 
need not concern us greatly, however; it was obviously connected 
with Supardjo's arrival, with the tactical military arrangements and 
probably with Sukarno's planned movements and actions after the 
generals were successfully abducted. Both the Dani trip to China and 
Supardjo's arrival in Jakarta were kept secret from people who had a 
right to know; Nasution as Defense Minister, Yani as Army Chief of 
Staff and, in Supardjo's case, General Suharto as chief of Kostrad 
since Supardjo was Commander of the Fourth Combat Command of 
Kostrad in West Kalimantan.(22) 
Sukarno was also continuing to meet with high-level advisors 
about  the  forthcoming  action,  according  to  the  testimony  of 
Bambang Widjanarko, and the reports of these conversations clearly 
show Sukarno as the driving force behind the preparations while the 
other players simply seem to be going along with the forceful 
personality of the Great Leader of the Revolution. Bambang's 
interrogation  report  shows  a  meeting  between  General  Mursjid, 
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Yani's estranged deputy, and Sukarno at 7:00 on the morning of 
September 23. The questioning of Bambang was reportedly based on 
previous interrogations of Sukarnoist cabinet minister Yusuf Muda 
Dalam and two Palace aides named Djamin and Henny. Omar Dani, 
Subandrio,  Saleh,  Leimena,  and  Generals  Sabur,  Sunarjo  and 
Sudirgo  were  all  present  as  well  as  the  ubiquitous  adjutant, 
Bambang. Mursjid is said to have reported to Sukarno that the 
targeted Army generals were still not loyal while Sukarno replied 
that he would then take action against them. Sukarno then asked 
General Sabur, the commander of the Tjakrabirawa regiment and 
Untung's direct boss, as to the status of preparations for the actions to 
be taken against the generals. He ordered that General Sudirgo, who 
was not present at the beginning, be called to the meeting to 
participate in the discussions. Sukarno is quoted as saying on this 
occasion "Sabur, the measures against them must be carried out," 
while Omar Dani piped in that "AURI (the Air Force) is at the ready 
and is behind you Bapak (Father - a common address toward 
Sukarno)". General Sudirgo was the head of the Army's Military 
Police and was one of several "loyal" generals who were reporting to 
Sukarno regularly about the purported disloyalty of such officers as 
Yani. Sukarno reportedly told Sudirgo that he had already ordered 
Generals Sabur and Sunarjo to take measures against the disloyal 
generals and ordered Sudirgo and the Military Police corps to give 
them support.(23) Sukarno was probably continuing to meet with 
other generals he regarded as loyal. Bambang Widjanarko reports 
that he met with General Pranoto sometime in September and that he 
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had discussions with Police General Sutjipto Judodihardjo about the 
identity of police generals who were regarded as disloyal and would 
have to be removed at a later stage.(24) 
Bambang Widjanarko's testimony contains a report of another 
meeting of Sukarno with Generals Mursjid, Sunarjo and Sabur plus 
some members of his entourage such as Yusuf Muda Dalam and the 
adjutants on September 29. This is the point where the interrogation 
data relating to the PKI Special Bureau and Untung levels show that 
a decision had just been taken to act on the night of September 
30-October 1 after a previous postponement of one or two days. 
Sukarno reportedly asked Sabur about the status of the preparations 
and  Sabur  responded that  the  operation was  being  prepared  and 
would  be  carried  out  when  ready.  Sukarno  reportedly  asked  for 
speed.  General  Mursjid  said  something about  an  army  unit  (not 
identified) that could be kept in reserve. Dani chimed in that the Air 
Force  was  ready.  Sukarno then  ordered  Chief  Commissioner (of 
Police) Sumirat to summon General Yani and some other officials to 
appear on October 1 and an appointment was apparently set up for 
that time at Merdeka Palace. Sukarno then told General Mursjid that 
he wanted Mursjid to replace Yani.(25) Bambang Widjanarko and 
two other Palace officials (Henny and Djamin) reportedly testified 
that Sabur called on Sukarno on September 30 with a file that 
supposedly contained a letter of appointment of General Mursjid as 
Commander  of  the  Army  and  that  Sukarno  signed  it.  Bambang 
further testified that on the night of September 30 a  letter  from 
Untung was delivered to Sukarno at  the Senayan stadium where 
283  
 
Sukarno was delivering a speech. A messenger gave the letter to a 
bodyguard who gave it to Colonel Bambang who in turn gave it to 
Sukarno. The latter put the letter in his pocket and then left the stage 
to go to the toilet. When Sukarno got to the outside gallery, 
accompanied, of course, by his retinue of guards and aides, he read 
the  letter  and  returned  it  to  his  pocket.  The  contents  were  not 
revealed to anyone. (The issue of the Untung letter appears again in 
the events of mid-October 1 when the "coup" began to go sour).(26) 
A final point from the Bambang Widjanarko testimony is that 
Sukarno reportedly met with General Supardjo on the morning of 
September 29. This was presumably after the meeting with Mursjid 
discussed three paragraphs above and, again presumably, a result of 
Omar Dani's separate meeting with the president shortly after Dani's 
initial meeting with Supardjo when Sukarno reportedly asked that 
Dani return with Supardjo. The Supardjo meeting allegedly took 
place at 11:00 A.M. The fact that there was a lot of scurrying back 
and forth during the day on September 30 should not be surprising. 
Furthermore, it appears well established that Supardjo's secret 
presence in Jakarta between his return on September 28 and his 
appearance before the world on October 1 was known to only a few 
people including Sukarno, Subandrio, Omar Dani, Aidit and Sjam 
(as  well  as  Untung and  company). Such  a  meeting would seem 
essential for Sukarno to get a feel for the man with whom he was to 
deal so extensively over the next few days and who was to be the 
real military professional of the operation. 
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Before examining the Bambang Widjanarko testimony which is 
fascinating but which raises questions of validity and interpretation, 
mention  should  also  be  made  of  a  reported  conversation  on 
September  30  between Sukarno   and General    Sughandi 
Kartosubrotot, a cabinet minister with a reputation for dogged 
faithfulness to the President (he had been in Bambang Widjanarko's 
job  a  few  years  earlier).  Sughandi had  spoken to  PKI  Politburo 
member  Sudisman  on  September  27  and  had  been  asked  by 
Sudisman to "join us". Sudisman had argued "whoever begins and 
strikes the first blow will win". Later the same day Aidit approached 
Sughandi and, referring to the earlier Sudisman conversation, told 
Sughandi that "we will start in a short time, in two or three days", 
that Bung Karno knows all about it and that Sughandi should join 
them. Sughandi claims to have reported these conversations to 
Sukarno on September 30 as a warning that the PKI was plotting a 
coup. Sukarno   reportedly    told  Sughandi not to be a 
"communist-phobe" and  that  he  should  realize  that  there  was  a 
Council of Generals that had to be dealt with. Sughandi claimed to 
have questioned the existence of a Council of Generals on the basis 
of assurances from Yani that the only Generals Council was one that 
had to do with promotions (this appears to be a blatant effort by 
Sughandi  to  ingratiate  himself  with  the  victorious  Army  leaders 
later)  but  Sukarno told  him  to  shut  up  and  not  to  meddle.  The 
President  added  that  "in  a  revolution  a  father  can  eat  his  own 
children" and finally threatened  to  strike  Sughandi.  This 
conversation has been cited by General Nasution as evidence that 
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Sukarno was at  least aware and supportive of the September 30 
movement before it was launched.(27) 
With all this evidence of Sukarno's meetings in late September 
on the table, what are we to make of it? Again, I believe it basically 
rings true. It fits with the general course of developments for one 
thing and it helps to make sense of what otherwise seems like 
nonsense. The interrogation report's allegations that a multitude of 
well known people were present, including some who have not been 
arrested, adds to the credibility since someone like Leimena could 
not be guaranteed not to denounce such a story if it were patently 
untrue. Another point is that the material raises new questions of no 
apparent advantage to the Army if it were not to be pursued. One of 
the strange aspects of Bambang Widjanarko's testimony is the role 
played by General Mursjid and Sukarno's apparent decision on 
September  29-30  to  name  him  Army  commander.  Yet  Sukarno 
turned around and appointed General Pranoto, the supposed PKI 
puppet, to the same position on October 1 and still later tried to name 
Adjie on October 2 after Suharto and the Army rejected Pranoto. 
Mursjid's name simply disappeared from consideration after the 
events of September 30 - October 1. In the absence of further 
information, I can only speculate that Sukarno was promising several 
"loyal" generals the same job to encourage their cooperation but 
another possibility is that Mursjid may have backed out when he 
learned that Yani and his other colleagues had not just been arrested 
but had been killed. There were rumors at the time that Mursjid was 
one of several senior generals who helped Suharto on October 1. 
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Perhaps Mursjid told Suharto about his conversations with Sukarno 
which could have shed early light on the terribly confused situation 
unfolding on the morning of October 1. Or perhaps Mursjid and 
Suharto were personally close in contrast to the former's apparent 
estrangement from Yani. But all of this speculation relates to an 
intriguing peripheral issue  but  only  a  peripheral issue.  The  very 
existence of such a loose end tends to show the authenticity of the 
total   information  available   to   the   Army  if   not   to   Bambang 
Widjanarko as the sole source (I do not mean to imply that I 
disbelieve the latter point, I simply feel that even if one were to grant 
some  tampering, there  would  still  remain  a  strong  case  that  the 
information itself was a composite from numerous sources and 
reflected the evidentiary conclusions of the investigators). 
Another interesting point is the indication that Sukarno was 
dealing with General Sabur to carry out the operation. This makes 
sense given Sabur's logical role in the direct chain of command from 
Sukarno through the Tjakrabirawa to Untung. This implies that the 
Sjam operation was not the only channel of instruction to Untung 
and the other military conspirators. I must confess that I also believe 
it casts some doubt on the whole elaborate story of the operation 
being directed through the Special Bureau of the PKI. It is at least 
conceivable that this side of the affair was fabricated or expanded for 
the sake of a show trial scenario that would cover up the degree of 
Sukarno's direction of the "coup" operation while providing the 
rationale for liquidation of a party that the Army despised. Even in 
1966  there  was  still  a  lot  of  feeling  among  anti-communist 
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Indonesians that Sukarno was just a poor misguided nationalist who 
had been cruelly manipulated by the insidious PKI and that terrible 
Machiavellian scalawag, Subandrio. To believe otherwise raised 
questions  as  to  why  all  these  insiders  and  beneficiaries  of  the 
Sukarno era had gone along with the Bung as long as they had. 
However, I do not wish to carry this argument very far. The material 
on the Special Bureau of the PKI is vast, the detail is extensive and it 
does not carry the scent of fabrication. I also know it was thoroughly 
believed to be valid by the US Government and by knowledgeable 
Indonesians whose integrity I trust. On balance, then I regard the 
Special Bureau operation as one of two channels of instruction to the 
Untung/Supardjo group, a set-up rendered necessary because of PKI 
operational involvement as auxiliaries at Lubang Buaja and as 
convenient because of the felt need for clandestine handling and the 
ability to apply pressure through the existing relationships between 
officers  previously  recruited  by  the  Special  Bureau  and  their 
handlers. 
The reported delivery of an Untung letter to Sukarno at 10:00 
 
P.M. on September 30, a few hours before the September 30 
movement assassination squads were being assembled at Halim air 
base, is also a fascinating indication of who was the real boss and 
driving force of the operation. Sukarno's sudden departure from the 
stage that night had been observed by the one or two foreign 
diplomats present and interpreted as some kind of physical collapse 
even though Sukarno soon returned to conclude his speech (at least 
two American Embassy officers were listening to the speech on the 
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radio but no Americans were present). Such was the power of 
suggestion  lingering  from  the   rumors  of   Sukarno's  purported 
"seizure" in early August. This report of Bambang's concerning a 
message to Sukarno from Untung also seems logical enough from all 
that had gone on before. Surely Sukarno would have been informed 
that the staging of the strike forces was underway when he was 
expected to play a role in the later stages (that were never reached) 
and this is particularly so if one believes that Sukarno had given the 
order for the whole operation. 
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General Suharto, and other Army leaders, Dani was Chief of 
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Staff of the Mandala Command (for operations against 
Malaysia) and Supardjo's Fourth Combat Command of 
KOSTRAD was operationally under the Mandala Command. 
The confused chain of command had purposely been instituted 
by Sukarno to undercut Yani's authority by that of Dani in some 
respects just as he had earlier played off Yani against Nasution 
by making Yani Chief of Staff of KOTI (the Supreme 
Operational Command) and thus responsible to Sukarno directly 
rather than through Defense Minister Nasution. 
23.  Bambang Widjanarko, pp. 11-14. General Sunarjo, like General 
Sudirgo, was from the Army's Military Police Corps but was 
serving as Deputy Attorney General where his main function 
was to handle Sukarno's secret and illicit "commissions" and 
other financial transactions as well as those of his wives. He had 
been personally close to Sukarno for some time. Despite the ties 
of these two military Police officers to Sukarno, it should be 
said that the military Police corps as a whole was neither 
 
pro-Sukarno nor pro-PKI and many of its officers were involved 
in the post-October 1 process that led to Sukarno's progressive 
loss of power. I base these comments on my personal 
acquaintanceship with some of these Military Police officers. 
24.  The Pranoto meetings are mentioned by Bambang Widjanarko 
on pp. 196-197. According to this account, Pranoto had been 
summoned by Sukarno to direct preparations for the Oct. 5 
Armed Forces Day parade. The Sutjipto discussions with 
 
Sukarno are cited on pp. 124-125. 
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25.  Bambang Widjanarko, p.14. 
 
26.  Bambang Widjanarko, p.21. 
 
27.  The Coup That Backfired, pp. 261-264. This conversation also 
appears in Ambassador Howard Jones' book, pp 322-383 and is 
mentioned by Brackman's The Communist Collapse in  
Indonesia, p. 69. John Hughes has a similar account based on 
his interview with Sughandi. Hughes, pp l5-16. The Indonesian 
magazine, Tempo, on October 6, 1984 carried a short account 
by Sughandi (who had become Chairman of President Suharto's 
Golkar Party in the meantime) on this meeting between him and 
Sukarno the day before the "coup". It shows Sukarno defending 
the PKI when Sughandi told him of PKI coup plotting, Sukarno 
accusing Sughandi of "communist phobia" and, finally, Sukarno 
becoming angry and ordering Sughandi to leave. 
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XII 
 
The Military Planning 
 
 
 
The normal military presence in Jakarta has been mentioned in 
an  earlier  chapter.  Although  the  Marines,  Air  Force  and  Police 
Mobile Brigade had some units in the capital that could be used as 
ground combat forces (infantry) at the time, they were not numerous 
nor  were  they  apparently  considered  as  a  significant  factor  that 
should   be   considered   in   the   planning   of   the   September   30 
Movement. This may have been because they were not considered as 
effective as the Army units for this kind of operation or it may have 
been  that  Sukarno  wanted  to  portray  the  operation  as  a  purely 
internal Army affair to cleanse its own ranks of senior officers 
deemed disloyal to the continuing revolution.(l) The Tjakrabirawa 
bodyguard regiment, which was, of course, a major factor on the 
Sukarno/PKI side, did have some non-Army components including a 
Marine battalion but the significant units that came into play on both 
sides  were  all  Army  and  the  real  dirty  work  was  accomplished 
largely by elements of Untung's First Battalion of the Tjakrabirawa 
with some small units from other Army forces attached. Among the 
other  standing  forces  was  the  Jakarta  garrison,  most  of  whose 
combat-ready forces, that is the First Infantry Brigade, were 
commanded by Colonel Latief, a coup ringleader. There were also 
two battalions of the elite Parakommando force (the RPKAD) under 
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Colonel  (later  Brigadier)  Sarwo  Edhie  which  was  part  of  the 
Strategic Reserve under the command of General Suharto. However, 
the perpetrators of the coup also believed that the local military 
balance in Jakarta was to be further drastically altered by the transfer 
of the two battalions of RPKAD (the Third Paratroop Brigade) to 
Kalimantan in connection with the anti-Malaysia confrontation. I 
was informed by excellent high level Indonesian sources in 
November, 1965, and periodically thereafter, of the RPKAD story 
and its decisive effect on the failure of the September 30 movement. 
It seems, according to this information that the two battalions were 
supposed to have departed shortly before the "coup" but that they 
failed  to  leave  for  the  rather  mundane  reason  that  there  was  a 
shipping tie-up in Jakarta's port of Tanjung Priok. This fact was 
probably known to General Suharto, the Kostrad commander, but it 
apparently did not filter through the chain of command in a way that 
caused it to become known to the coup plotters.(2) 
Meanwhile, the military forces in the capital were to be 
augmented by three additional paratroop battalions for the annual 
Armed Forces Day parade on October 5. One battalion each was to 
come from the three regional military commands on Java, the 
Siliwangi division (West Java), the Diponegoro Division (Central 
Java) and the Brawijaya Division (East Java). The units selected 
were the 328th or Kujang battalion from the Siliwangi, the 454th 
battalion  from  the  Diponegoro and  the  530th  battalion  from  the 
Brawijaya. There have been reports that President Sukarno had 
assigned  Colonel  Untung  and  General  Sabur  responsibility  for 
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planning the Armed Forces Day parade and that they may have had 
considerable voice in selection of the units to be introduced into the 
capital.(3) The two battalions from East Java and Central Java were 
commanded by secret communists responsive to the PKI Special 
Bureau (Major Sukirno of the 454th and Major Bambang Supeno of 
the 530th). These became the units that surrounded three sides of 
Merdeka Square in front of the Palace and embracing or abutting 
such key installations as the Radio Station (on the West side of the 
square) and the  Telecommunications Center (on the  South side). 
These installations were actually across their respective streets from 
the square itself and thus just outside the main perimeters of the 
530th battalion. Also facing the square on the south but outside the 
perimeter were the American Embassy, the National Front, the 
Partindo Party headquarters, and several other installations. 
The two Javanese battalions had arrived in Jakarta near the end 
of the day on September 25. It appears that the 328th battalion of the 
Siliwangi division did not arrive until the afternoon of October l 
although I am not sure of this (Robert Shaplen's book gives this 
arrival time).(4) There would have been an argument for the more 
distant 454th and 530th battalions to arrive earlier than the 328th 
because of a greater need for their officers to familiarize themselves 
with logistic and other preparatory arrangements. There were 
numerous rumors just after the coup that there had been some kind of 
plot for Armed Forces Day on October 5 to position the three 
battalions in a way where the Siliwangi unit could be faced down 
and disarmed by the two pro-communist battalions as well as rumors 
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that a plan to this effect was countermanded by another plan that 
would have positioned the Siliwangi battalion in such a way that it 
would have had the upper hand. These rumors gradually disappeared 
and their validity is unknown to the writer but they reflect what 
turned out to be correct perceptions of the loyalties of the units (or 
actually  of  their  commanders)  on  the  fateful  day  of  October  1, 
1965.(5) On the other hand, it may be that the plotters even believed 
that the Kujang battalion could also be manipulated on their side to 
some degree. Bambang Widjanarko's testimony mentioned at one 
point that General Sabur reported to Sukarno on the morning of 
October 1 that the forces available to the Untung group consisted of 
the 328th, 454th and 530th battalions as well as the Tjakrabirawa 
regiment.(6) Sabur could have been mistaken, of course, since he 
was  probably  not  involved  in  detailed  operational  planning  but 
merely passed on Sukarno's desires to others. Aside from the Kujang 
battalion, the bulk of the Siliwangi division, whose territory 
surrounded Jakarta, was to be immobilized by Sukarno's arrangement 
with General Adjie, as well as by backup manipulation of several 
other Siliwangi officers through the PKI Special Bureau.(7) 
The "coup" plan also envisaged manipulation of the Diponegoro 
division in Central Java in support of the September 30 Movement. 
Genera1 Surjosumpeno, the division commander, was not informed 
and was initially surprised when much of his general staff announced 
themselves as leaders of the September 30 Movement in Central 
Java, headed by his intelligence chief, Colonel Suherman. These 
officers had been recruited to the communist cause by the Central 
297  
 
Java branch of the PKI Special Bureau, headed by one Sudarmo. 
Similar manipulation had been accomplished in the various major 
cities of Central Java by local branches of the Special Bureau. Of 
seven Diponegoro battalions available in Central Java at the time, 
three were committed to the coup through their commanders, two 
through other senior officers and only two were unaffected.(8) 
The temporary military balance accordingly looked extremely 
good for the communist cause, at least for the short period required, 
particularly  since  many  of  the  combat  battalions  of  the  major 
Java-centered regional commands had been deployed to Kalimantan 
in connection with confrontation against Malaysia. Arnold Brackman 
states that some 68 Army battalions were stationed in Kalimantan at 
this time and it was known that Yani and the Army leadership had 
been concerned for some time that the stripping of infantry from Java 
to  reinforce  the  outer  islands  could  weaken  the  Army  position 
against a possible PKI coup.(9) The Army leaders apparently did not 
anticipate the degree of PKI infiltration of Army cadres, however, 
nor did they regard Sukarno himself as being completely tied in with 
the PKI in spite of all the evidence that was available to anyone not 
blinded by the conventional wisdom of a purely "nationalist" 
President interested only in his personal authority. The Army 
leadership  had  received  a  report  through  its  intelligence  chief, 
General Parman, on September 14 about an alleged PKI plan to 
assassinate the Army leaders on September 18. It took precautions 
but nothing happened. A later report was received by General 
Haryono on September 30 of an impending coup but the report was 
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greeted  with  laughter  at  a  senior  Army  staff  meeting  that  day. 
General Sughandi told a group of senior military officers at the home 
of Admiral Martadinata on the evening of September 30 that 
"something may happen tomorrow", apparently on the basis of his 
angry conversation with Sukarno about PKI plotting earlier that 
day.(l0) Although the situation was tense politically, neither Yani nor 
other senior generals took any particular precautions.(11) As October 
1 approached, the Sukarno/PKI forces felt they could count on an 
overwhelming balance of forces in their favor in Jakarta itself, 
immobilization of  the  Siliwangi  and  effective  domination of  the 
military balance in Central Java. Above all, they would have the 
advantage of surprise, decapitation of the potential opposition's 
leadership, and Sukarno's early announcement of support against an 
alleged nest of traitors. 
The "coup" strike forces in Jakarta were to be divided into three 
segments or "commands"; the relatively small group that would seize 
the targeted generals (called "PASOPATI") under the command of 
another PKI-controlled officer from Untung's First Tjakrabirawa 
battalion, Marine Lt. Dul Arief, the much larger group for control of 
the city ("BIMASAKTI") under a Captain Suradi, and a Base 
command ("PRINGGODANI") under a Major Gatot Sukrisno.(12) 
All  three  commands reported  to  a  Central  Command headed  by 
Untung, Latief, Air Force Colonel Sujono and, of course, the 
ubiquitous Sjam and Pono. The central command assembled shortly 
after midnight on the morning of October l at the Aerial Survey 
Office which was located between Halim Air Base and the center of 
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the city and which had been procured for the operation in advance by 
Sujono. This headquarters was to move to Halim later in the morning 
of October 1. 
The  "Pasopati"  strike  force  under  Lt.  Dul  Arief  had  at  its 
disposal about four companies of troops including companies from 
Untung's Tjakrabirawa battalion and Latief's First Infantry Brigade. 
The accounts vary slightly as to the exact composition of this force 
which may have included detached companies from the 454th and 
530th battalions and Air Force paratroops but there is no question 
that it was either entirely or primarily a professional military 
force.(13) The PKI volunteers that had been trained at Lubang Buaja 
were retained as a reserve force but, except for the possibility of a 
few in the background at the homes of Nasution and Yani, they were 
never committed to action until late afternoon on October 1 when it 
was too late. The "Bimasakti" group consisted primarily of the 454th 
and 530th battalions and had the more traditional military assignment 
of holding the Merdeka Square area adjoining the Palace including 
the  radio  broadcasting  facilities,  the  telecommunications  center 
across  the  street  from  the  south  side  of  the  Square  and  various 
military commands that fronted on the square. While this included 
the Ministry of Defense and Army headquarters, the coup forces did 
not seize Kostrad headquarters on the East side of Merdeka Square. 
They also did nothing to interrupt Army communications through the 
Supreme Command (KOTI) network. 
The  "Pringgodani" command stayed  at  Halim  Air  Base  and 
provided a staging point for the strike forces, a secure base area to 
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receive the captured or murdered generals, a PKI reserve force to 
assist in the disposal of the victims and a back-up headquarters area 
to which Sukarno, Aidit and other leaders could be accommodated 
for such time as might be required. It was clearly anticipated that the 
whole affair would be brought to a smooth and speedy conclusion, 
that Sukarno would endorse the suppression of the nefarious efforts 
of  traitorous  generals  to  depose  him  (the  cover  story),  that  a 
Nasakom cabinet would follow soon after, and the road would be 
open to the "socialist stage" Sukarno so ardently desired. The 
interrogation reports describe in great detail the tactical planning by 
the Sjam/Untung group in a series of meetings that began only on 
September 6.(14) The initial group consisted of Sjam and Pono of 
the PKI, Untung, Latief and Sujono, a Major Agus Sigit who 
commanded a battalion of the First Infantry Brigade under Colonel 
Latief  and  a  Captain  Wahjudi,  who  was  acting  commander  of 
another battalion of the First Infantry Brigade, an air defense unit. 
Wahjudi was reportedly dropped at Sjam's initiative because of some 
kind of dissatisfaction with his performance. Sigit, on the other hand, 
appears to have withdrawn on the basis of personal excuses after 
becoming convinced that the operation lacked adequate planning and 
sufficient military resources to ensure effective execution. Both Sigit 
and Wahjudi were otherwise responsive to PKI control, however, 
and apparently offered no danger of premature disclosure. Lt. Dul 
Arief, who was not a member of the planning group, was reportedly 
in contact with Untung for detailed planning of the kidnapping as 
early as September 7 after being contacted first by his PKI control. 
301  
 
Further  meetings  of  the  central  command  group  took  place  on 
 
September 9, 13, 19, 23, 25 and 28. 
 
The September 13 meeting marked the beginning of concrete 
discussion of what troops would be required and it was also the 
scene  of  a  dispute  between  Major  Sigit  and  Sjam  over  troop 
adequacy. This meeting is also interesting because Sjam told the 
group that "the Great Leader of the Revolution has his own role also. 
The Bung will later on obtain a separate settlement."(l5) Major 
Sukirno, commander of the 454th Battalion of the Diponegoro 
Division, had been contacted by Untung on September 15; Untung 
had previously commanded this battalion as late as early 1965 before 
his transfer to the Tjakrabirawa. Untung was reportedly informed by 
Sjam at the September 19 meeting that he would be the designated 
leader of the movement, primarily because of his role as Sukarno's 
personal bodyguard. The CIA study says the fact that Untung was a 
battalion commander of the Presidential guard "was doubtlessly a 
consideration in the PKI's selection of him". This statement is correct 
if the expression "PKI" includes Sukarno, as it should, for Sukarno's 
reported meeting with Untung on August 4 had already settled this 
question, whether Sjam knew it or not (he probably did not as he was 
limited to a particular tactical role and was operating within the 
need-to-know framework being conveyed to him by Aidit - who, in 
turn, was merely one of Sukarno's senior henchmen). The September 
19 meeting also reportedly decided on the identity of the generals to 
be targeted on the basis of a list conveyed by Sjam. 
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The September 23 meeting was informed by Pono of the PKI 
that the participation of both the 454th and 530th battalions had been 
assured and that a unit of 30 armored cars would be provided from 
Bandung (from the Siliwangi division). This latter contribution never 
materialized. The group was also informed at this time about General 
Supardjo and his prospective role as liaison between the group and 
Sukarno.  The  September  25  meeting  set  September  29  as  the 
tentative date for the strike but this was later postponed, primarily 
because of Untung's desire for further preparations and briefings 
after the scheduled arrival of the 454th and 530th battalions. Untung 
visited both units after their arrival in Jakarta on September 25 and 
subsequently checked out the base facilities at Halim along with Dul 
Arief and a number of subordinate officers who were to be involved 
in the operation. The group met on September 28 at Sjam's house 
where last minute details were discussed and again on September 29 
when the precise timing for the strike was set for the following night 
of September 30-October 1. September 29 was also the date when 
Subandrio and Njoto departed for North Sumatra, Lukman and 
Sakirman for Central Java and other PKI leaders for various minor 
provincial capitals, apparently to guide and lead the country-wide 
acclamation   that   was   to   follow   the   news   that   a   nefarious, 
imperialist-organized plot of traitorous generals had been uncovered 
and suppressed.(l6) 
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Footnotes – Chapter XII 
 
 
 
1. Omar Dani was reportedly offered leadership of the purge 
operation but refused on the grounds that an Army commander 
was needed for what should appear to be an Army operation. 
Notosusanto and Saleh, p.37 (based on the Heru Trial 
testimony). 
2. The intended transfer of the RPKAD battalions and their actual 
availability on October 1, probably the single most important 
reason for the failure of the so-called coup, is noted in The  
Coup That Backfired, pp 34-35. This was based, of course, on 
Embassy reporting. John Hughes in his Indonesian Upheaval, 
says he was told by Colonel (later Brigadier General) Sarwo 
Edhie, the RPKAD commander, that General Supardjo had 
requested in August that these units be sent to reinforce 
Supardjo's forces in North Kalimantan. Sarwo Edhie told 
Hughes that the scheduled departure date was October 1 and 
that Edhie cancelled the departure on hearing the news of that 
morning's stirring events. Actually, this was probably a 
re-established date after a postponement. 
 
3. Shaplen, p. 98 and Hughes, p. 19. As noted in the previous 
chapter, Bambang Widjanarko mentions a role for Pranoto as 
well. 
4. Shaplen, p.106. 
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5. Hughes says there had also been a plan to carefully place 
Tjakrabirawa troops behind other troops in the parade. Hughes, 
p.19 
6. Bambang Widjanarko, p. 71. 
 
7. Ambassador Jones mentions a meeting in Bandung on August 
 
25 between Sjam of the PKI and General Rukman, a former 
chief of staff of the Siliwangi, General Supardjo (the military 
leader of the September 30 movement who came from a 
Siliwangi Division background) and Colonel Sukardi, the 
Mayor of Bandung. A source is not mentioned but the former 
Ambassador had access to US Government reports for his book. 
Several years later it was discovered that about ten officers of 
the Siliwangi division, including one of Adjie's leading aides, 
were under the control of the PKI Special Bureau. 
8. Notosusanto and Saleh, p. 58. 
 
9. Brackman, The Communist Collapse. p. 226. 
 
10.  Tempo, October 6, 1984 (Sughandi article). 
 
11.  The Coup That Backfired (preface). Jones, p. 374. 
 
12.  The Coup That Backfired p.160. Also Notosusanto and Saleh. 
 
13.  The Coup That Backfired, p.2, says there were four companies 
in the Pasopati group: one from the Tjakrabirawa, one each 
from the 454th and 530th battalions and one from the First 
Infantry Brigade. The Notosusanto/Saleh account, which was 
the semi-official version of the Indonesian Army, specifies a 
slightly different breakdown that included one company of 
Tjakrabirawa, one company each from the 454th and 530th 
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battalions, two platoons each from the First Infantry Brigade, 
 
the Air Force "Quick Action" troops (the PGA) and the Cavalry. 
This breakdown was given on the basis of availabilities several 
days before D-Day. The cavalry (armor) and PGA troops were 
not available at the last minute according to the CIA study 
which is also emphatic that no PKI youth were involved in the 
actual strikes. However, Notosusanto and Saleh give a precise 
breakdown for the forces used at each General's house and this 
includes a platoon of Pemuda Rakjat (PKI youth) and a platoon 
of Air Force troops (in addition to one squad of Tjakrabirawa 
and one platoon each from the 454th and 530th battalions). It 
lists two squads of Pemuda Rakjat and one squad from the Air 
Force at Yani's house in addition to the larger contingents (one 
platoon each) from the 454th, 530th and First Infantry Brigade 
plus a squad of Tjakrabirawa. Haryono and Sutojo were struck 
entirely by Tjakrabirawa units, according to this version. 
14.  These meetings were covered at considerable length in The  
Coup That Backfired, pp 110-155 and in John Hughes, 
Indonesian Upheaval. These and other such accounts are based 
on the material in the Indonesian Army interrogation reports 
and the trial testimony. 
15.  The Coup That Backfired, pp 121-122. 
 
16.  The Army appears to have had some information which it was 
attempting to confirm that a meeting took place in the Palace on 
September 26 for a division of territorial responsibility between 
Sukarno, Subandrio and Leimena in the second stage of the 
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plan. Subandrio was to handle Sumatra, Leimena to remain in 
charge in the capital and Sukarno to operate from Central Java 
or Bali. This appears in the Bambang Widjanarko interrogation 
reports (p.72) but is not further explained since the adjutant 
knew nothing of such a meeting. 
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XIII 
 
The Day of the Generals 
 
 
 
Dul Arief's Pasopati strike forces moved into Jakarta from their 
staging area at the village of Lubang Buaja on the outskirts of Halim 
Air Base in Air Force trucks at about 4:00 AM on the morning of 
October 1. Units of a platoon or more surrounded each targeted 
house   but   the   actual   approach   was   made   by   a   uniformed 
Tjakrabirawa officer or non-com who purported to have a message 
from the  President. Generals Yani, Harjono and Pandjaitan were 
killed resisting capture while Generals Suprapto, Sutojo and Parman 
were overpowered and taken to Lubang Buaja where they too were 
later killed by order of Colonel Latief. Although General Nasution, 
the biggest prize, was assigned a raiding force of about 100 men, he 
managed to escape in the darkness over the back wall into the yard of 
the Iraqi Ambassador where he remained hidden behind a  water 
barrel.  A  search  for  Nasution  was  terminated  quickly  when  the 
raiding party mistook Nasution's aide, Lieutenant Tendean, for 
Nasution in the darkness. The younger officer, who physically 
resembled Nasution, had purposely donned the General's jacket and 
cap and gone outside in the turmoil. Nasution's younger daughter 
was shot and eventually died, one of many incidents that added 
pathos to the murders and helped to contribute to the Army's 
subsequent determination to destroy the PKI that it held responsible 
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and to the wave of public indignation that supported that decision. 
Nasution, who injured his ankle in going over the wall, remained in 
hiding until 6:30 AM when he recognized one of his adjutants among 
the army personnel called to the scene after the attackers' flight to 
Halim. Nasution was then taken to a safe place near the headquarters 
of the Strategic Reserve Command, Kostrad. 
Another of Nasution's aides, Namdan Mansjur, had contacted 
the Jakarta garrison commander, Major General Umar 
Wirahadikusumah on the Armed Forces communications net about 
5:15 A.M. and Umar came immediately to Nasution's house, arriving 
at 5:30 A.M.. Joined by five armored vehicles he had ordered to the 
spot from the 7th Cavalry Battalion of his command, General Umar 
tried to catch up with the raiding party but was unsuccessful.(1) One 
of the many mistakes made by the plotters was to leave the special 
Armed Forces communications network undisturbed in spite of their 
seizure of the regular communications center. The Strategic Reserve 
commander, General Suharto, was not attacked and his swift reaction 
that day was to save the country from a communist destiny. Suharto 
was informed about 5:30 A.M. that shooting had taken place by his 
neighbor, a civilian named Mashuri who was to become a cabinet 
minister after Suharto became head of the government six months 
later.(2) Soon thereafter Suharto was informed by General Umar that 
a number of Army Generals had been seized by unknown people. 
Confusion was obviously rampant and was to remain so for some 
time. Suharto conferred at his home with others for an hour or so and 
then drove to Kostrad headquarters, arriving between 6:30 and 7:00 
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A.M. He has said later that he had already decided to assume 
command of the Army until such time as General Yani's fate had 
been determined. Although General Mursjid, as Yani's senior deputy, 
would appear to have been a logical successor, General Suharto had 
previously been designated by Yani to act in his stead during Yani's 
absences and had done so in the past. 
Soon after Suharto's arrival at Kostrad headquarters, General 
Umar reported and readily agreed to Suharto's decision to assume 
command. Umar had been busy over the previous two hours. He had 
given up the fruitless chase after Nasution's raiding party to go to the 
homes of several other abducted generals (all but one lived in the 
same general area) and then to Merdeka Palace where he had not 
found  the  President  in.  He  had  seen  General  Supardjo  there, 
however, which was surprising since Supardjo was supposed to be in 
Kalimantan. This news also had a profound effect on Suharto who 
was Supardjo's commander and knew nothing of this visit. Merdeka 
Square  was  also  surrounded  on  three  sides  by  numerous  troops 
which Umar had already identified as the 454th and 530th battalions. 
They were armed and wearing special scarves for identification 
purposes, apparently prepared by the PKI women's affiliate, 
GERWANI. At this point little was known to Suharto. He was aware 
that  a  hostile operation was underway, that  Supardjo was at  the 
Palace where he shouldn't have been, and that at least two regular 
battalions and all or part of the Tjakrabirawa Regiment appeared to 
be operating under unknown leadership for dubious purposes. The 
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killing  and  kidnapping of  a  number of  senior officers obviously 
made the situation ominous. 
Six or seven months later, I had an interesting conversation that 
was arranged for me with a man who was a member of a small group 
of people who were friends of Mashuri, the man who had first alerted 
Suharto. He said that four or five members of this so called Gajah 
Mada  group  (named  after  Gajah  Mada  university  in  Yogyakarta 
where they had been colleagues) were quickly assembled by Mashuri 
at Suharto's house and all of them were trying to reach a conclusion 
as to what was taking place on the basis of the meager information at 
hand. The early assumption was that Sukarno must have died and 
that a hostile pro-communist group around the President was trying 
to seize power. This was also the early assumption at the American 
Embassy; since the Embassy was located on the south side of 
Merdeka Square, we had all passed the road block at its southwest 
corner and seen troops along the street leading the rest of the way to 
the Embassy. Reports of shooting had already been phoned in to the 
duty officer early that morning from personnel living in the 
Kebayoran suburb; this was the attack on General Pandjaitan. My 
Gajah Mada source, who also had a position of some significance at 
the time, said that an early idea was to reach the prestigious Sultan of 
Yogyakarta, Hamenku Buwono, who was living in Jakarta at the 
time, and take him to Bandung to become the nucleus of a rival 
government. The Sultan was reached but, after being told of the 
fuzzy  information available,  demurred from  the  plan  because  he 
suspected  some  devious  move  by  Sukarno  himself.  The  Sultan, 
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according to this version, would act only if it could be confirmed that 
Sukarno was indeed dead and an illegitimate seizure of power was 
underway.(3) Arnold Brackman reports in his post coup book that 
former Vice-President Hatta told him in an interview that he too had 
suspected Sukarno's hand behind the peculiar events from the 
beginning.(4) I was also told by this Gadja Mada source that an 
all-out effort was then made to ascertain the fate or whereabouts of 
Sukarno and that the fact that he was alive and at Halim was first 
learned from Sukarno's Japanese wife, Dewi, about 10:00 A.M. on 
the basis of a message she had just received from Sukarno. In a brief 
and carefully worded statement in an Indonesian magazine in 1984, 
Dewi claimed that she heard "by telephone" at 9:00 A.M. that there 
had been an attack on the homes of Nasution and Leimena. She said 
she had received a fuller account from an aide at 1:00 P.M. at which 
she was told that a PKI coup was underway against Sukarno. She 
added that she received a letter from Sukarno that afternoon telling 
her he was in good health and at a safe place. This would appear to 
contradict the account given above as to timing although it is also 
possible that Dewi knew more than the article implied since her 
careful specification of a letter from Sukarno in the afternoon did not 
rule out earlier knowledge by telephone, whether through the 9:00 
A.M. call (which may have been from Sukarno) or otherwise.(5) 
Sukarno had spent the night at Dewi's house. Each of his wives had 
her own residence; the spurned Fatmawati lived in the Kebayoran 
suburb; her successor as Sukarno's senior wife, the pro-communist 
Hartini, lived at the Bogor Palace; Dewi was in south central Jakarta 
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in an area called Slipi; and Harjati was in the Chinese district of 
Grogol  after  a  recent  move  from  the  diplomatic  and  ministerial 
central residential area. Sukarno had returned to Merdeka Palace 
from  his  speech  to  the  National  Conference  of  Technicians  at 
Senayan stadium (where he had reportedly received Untung's written 
message) about 11:00 P.M. and had then gone to Dewi's house where 
he had spent the night. She was out and had to be summoned so 
Sukarno probably did not get to bed until fairly late. However, he 
rose early and left for the palace at 6:30 A.M. according to a later 
account by his bodyguard.(6) He was undoubtedly expected to be 
there fairly early since Supardjo and the commanders of the two 
battalions around Merdeka Square were there before 7:00 A.M. 
waiting to see him. It appears that Sukarno's bodyguard received a 
report on his car radio over the Tjakrabirawa network advising them 
of reports that the Tjakrabirawa headquarters had already received 
from the Jakarta police that shootings and kidnappings had taken 
place. Sukarno now went to the home of his other Jakarta based wife, 
Harjati, instead of the Palace. He was advised to do so by Colonel 
Saelan, the Deputy Commander of the Tjakrabirawa. Saelan was 
acting on the basis of information that the Palace was surrounded by 
unknown troops (the 454th and 530th).(7) Saelan also went to 
Harjati's house and advised Sukarno of Nasution's escape, the news 
of which he had learned in the meantime. The fact of Nasution's 
escape was not known by Supardjo or by the Untung group at its 
command center in the Aerial Survey Office near Halim. Sukarno's 
diversion  from  Merdeka  Palace  appears  to  have  resulted  from 
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another failure of coordination that was a by-product of the secret, 
conspiratorial handling of the entire action and the high degree of 
compartmentalization. Neither Saelan, nor Police Commissioner 
Sumirat who had told Saelan about the unidentified troops around 
the Square, nor Sukarno himself, were aware that these troops were 
on their side. Bambang Widjanarko, when asked this question, said 
that Sukarno had given his orders to General Sabur and Colonel 
Untung of the Tjakrabirawa and had expected that the whole affair 
would be executed by Tjakrabirawa forces. It is not clear whether 
Bambang was told this or whether he was guessing; if the latter, it 
sounds like a reasonable conclusion.(8) As for Colonel Saelan, this 
would hardly be the first time that a deputy (to Sabur) was not 
informed of what was going on. Both Sumirat and Saelan had been 
in  the  background at  some  of  the  Palace  meetings described by 
Bambang Widjanarko but  they  were  probably not  cut  in  on  the 
detailed operational planning being conducted through the PKI 
Special Bureau meetings with Untung and the other tactical military 
commanders. It would seem that the left hand did not know what the 
right was doing and that Sukarno himself was not aware of the 
specific deployments but was counting on his military professionals 
for this. 
The escape of Nasution, which Sukarno now learned from 
Saelan,  must  have  upset  Sukarno greatly.  He  was  aware  of  this 
information some time before Supardjo at the Palace or Untung and 
his  comrades  at  CENKO  headquarters  were  to  realize  they  had 
missed the biggest fish. Sukarno commented to Supardjo when they 
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met later that morning at Halim that Nasution's escape would have 
grave  consequences. He  had  also  sent  an  Air  Force  intelligence 
officer to Nasution's house to inquire solicitously about the General 
in the hope of learning something more concrete about his fate. In 
any case, Sukarno decided to go to Halim Air Base about 9:30 A.M. 
following some  discussion among  Police  Commissioner Sumirat, 
Assistant Attorney General Sunaryo and Col. Saelan of a possible 
alternative of a house in the Kebayoran suburb under Tjakrabirawa 
control. (9) In his later cover-up effort, he (or others on his behalf) 
said that he wanted to be near an aircraft for quick flight if his 
security required it but he also made it plain that he went to Halim of 
his own free will and that he was very much aware of the fact that 
this  was  the  central  base  of  the  entire  September 30  Movement 
operation. Before continuing with the critical events of that day, a 
day that exposed monumental blunders of planning and judgment, a 
narrowness of approach that was unable to deal with unforeseen 
contingencies, and an apparent failure of physical courage on the part 
of the Great Leader, one must address the question of Suharto's 
availability and also that of others such as Umar. There are, in fact, 
some haunting unanswered questions as to why the commander of 
the Strategic Reserve and a man who had been authorized by Yani to 
take over in his absence was not struck down with the rest. These 
questions were exacerbated by the failure of Suharto or those around 
him, to come forth with a clear coherent statement early on. It was 
implied for a long time that Suharto was on the list too but somehow 
had  miraculously  escaped.  Several  contradictory  versions  floated 
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around Jakarta for months. One said that raiders had come to the 
home of another much more junior general (Ibnu Subroto) in the 
same block because they had the wrong address and then left when 
they discovered their error. Another said that Suharto was at the 
hospital with his sick child all night. Still another, and by far the 
most persistent, claimed that this mystically oriented general had 
been told by his dukun, or spiritual advisor, to sit at the confluence of 
two bodies of water and meditate on this particular evening (the date 
had significance for Javanese and was being observed by others 
including much of our Embassy at an all-night Wajang or Javanese 
shadow-play  performance).  An  offshoot  of  this  story  was  that 
Suharto had gone fishing. The source I mentioned earlier, who told 
the story of planning to take the Sultan of Yogyakarta to Bandung, 
answered my question on this subject with the already ancient third 
version above and this was at least six months after the night of 
September  30/October  1.  It  was  clarified  later  that  Suharto  had 
indeed visited his sick child at the hospital on the evening of 
September 30 and had then gone home. His performance on October 
1 suggested a sufficiency of sleep. In any case, Suharto was simply 
not on the hit list. Strangely, Suharto and his sick child were visited 
at the hospital on the evening of September 30 by no less a figure 
than Colonel Latief. This story, which Suharto later confirmed, was 
well known among knowledgeable Indonesians and diplomats at an 
early point. Both Latief and Untung had served under Suharto in the 
past and Suharto had even attended Untung's wedding earlier that 
year. 
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Certain severe foreign critics of the Suharto regime (American 
and Dutch) have tried to explain these anomalies by hinting that 
Suharto  sucked  everyone  else  into  an  incredible  plot  with  the 
intention of causing it to go awry and thereby providing an excuse to 
seize power. The Suharto-Latief meeting has been shrugged off by 
Suharto as, in retrospect, an effort to see what Suharto was up to. 
The explanations for Suharto's exclusion from the hit list and the 
Latief meeting were inadequate or poorly presented but the effort to 
portray Suharto as a diabolically clever plotter who sucked everyone 
else into a plot that he would then foil to achieve power is simply too 
wild to be taken seriously. For one thing, Suharto's subsequent 
conduct was not only one of swift military action but a constant 
effort to get Sukarno to act as a president and father figure who 
would  disown  the  PKI  but  continue  to  lead  the  nation  along 
nationalist lines. Suharto also offered command of the Army to 
Nasution when the latter escaped but Nasution was unable or 
unwilling to accept. Suharto had to be pushed and prodded by the 
student movement and his own more hawkish subordinates to act 
against Sukarno and even that was delayed for more than six months. 
A more reasonable explanation may be derived from recalling 
that President Sukarno did not want to launch a civil war against a 
large group of people. He simply wanted to clear the path to the 
socialist stage by eliminating what he saw as a very small group at 
the top of the Army who visibly opposed his program for 
Nasakomization of the military. If the whole Army were taken on, 
the  Army  had  the  physical  power  to  win  but  the  wave  of  the 
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revolution was considered so powerful in a political and 
psychological sense, and Sukarno's prestige so high, that a surgical 
strike  to  eliminate  a  clique  alleged  to  be  in  league  with  the 
imperialists to kill the President would appear plausible and would 
also intimidate everyone else. Suharto was viewed, not without 
reason, as an essentially apolitical professional inclined toward 
Javanese  mysticism and  a  man  who  was  not  in  the  inner  circle 
around Yani.(10) Furthermore, he was probably thought to lack any 
significant troop strength of his own in the Jakarta area since the 
RPKAD was believed to be in Kalimantan or on the way. It also 
appears that Untung and Latief had a genuine regard for Suharto as a 
former chief and they probably also saw him as a largely un- 
westernized fellow Javanese who unconsciously projected an image 
of being in the same general Sukarnoist camp from the standpoint of 
cultural values. He was one of the few top Indonesian generals, 
moreover, who had not been trained in the United States and who did 
not speak English. Whatever the reasoning or, more accurately, a 
lack of reasoning, the failure to include Suharto on the hit list was a 
mistake as grave as overlooking the presence of the RPKAD 
(although the two points are closely related). The escape of Nasution 
was also important but more in the psychological effect on Sukarno 
than on the practical level of the local military balance. As will be 
seen, other significant errors followed such as the failure of the 454th 
and 530th commanders to stay with their troops and, above all, the 
vacillation, self-centeredness, and even cowardice of Sukarno when 
the chips were down. 
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The first radio announcement of the September 30 Movement 
was made at 7:20 A.M. Although brief, this broadcast made it clear 
that a  "Revolutionary Council" had taken military action for the 
alleged purpose of preventing a coup by a "Generals Council" 
scheduled for October 5 and thereby had saved the President. The 
first specific word from the radio about the President came only at 
1:00 P.M. when a message from General Sabur, as Tjakrabirawa 
commander, announced that Sukarno was safe and still leading the 
country. This announcement points to a regular chain of command 
from Sukarno through Sabur to the coup leaders and thence to their 
troops at the radio station. The first decisions of the Revolutionary 
Council were announced around noon and repeated periodically over 
the next two or three hours. 
All  of  these  announcements gradually provided Suharto and 
others with some clues as to what was going on but the picture 
remained very confused. Suharto moved swiftly and decisively after 
hearing the report from Umar and coming to understand from the 
initial radio broadcast and Supardjo's presence at the Palace some of 
the broad outlines of what was happening. As early as 9:00 A.M., a 
courier  was  sent  from  the  Commander  of  the  Third  Paratroop 
Brigade of Kostrad (which may indicate contact already with the 
RPKAD) to the 454th and 530th battalions ordering them to report to 
KOSTRAD. As parachute units from the regional commands, these 
battalions could be considered under the operational command of the 
Third Regiment and of KOSTRAD, i.e. Suharto, while in 
Jakarta.(11) This  is presumably why Suharto had actually reviewed 
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the 454th and 530th the previous day. This effort was unsuccessful 
but further efforts to induce the deputy commanders to report to 
KOSTRAD continued. It should be noted here that the more junior 
officers  and  the  troops themselves had no rea1 understanding of 
their role. They had been briefed to some extent on the cover story 
of a "General's Council", an alleged  plot,  and  the  need  to  protect 
the  President  but  they  had  no firm idea of who was friend or foe 
either. This presumably explains why KOSTRAD headquarters was 
able to operate virtually alongside the  opposition  forces  and  why 
emissaries   from   Suharto   were received   with   confusion.   The 
problem  was  compounded  by  the failure  of  Sukarno  to  go  to 
Merdeka Palace where he was expected by Supardjo and the two 
battalion commanders. Supardjo soon left by helicopter for Halim 
but the two commanders remained at the Palace  for  the  apparent 
purpose  of  better  communication  with Supardjo and Untung. The 
result was to  leave their troops under the direct control of  their 
deputies who were not part of the plot but were simply obeying orders 
from their immediate commanders. It was not long before the senior 
officers gathering around KOSTRAD, some of whom had intimate 
prior connections with these units, began to sense the vulnerability of 
the subordinate commanders in these battalions to persuasion. 
Meanwhile,  Sukarno  arrived  at  Halim  Air  Base  sometime 
 
shortly after 9:30 A.M. where he was welcomed by Omar Dani and 
Dani's deputy, Leo Wattimena. During the preceding three hours at 
Haryati's house, the president had ordered the head of the 
Tjakrabirawa intelligence section to go to Nasution's house to inquire 
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about his safety and thereby learn whether he had indeed escaped. 
This intelligence officer, Lt. Col. Ebram, then went with Sukarno to 
Halim. The head of the Pasopati kidnapping force, Lt. Dul Arief, 
reported to Untung at the Aerial Survey Office about 8:00 A.M. that 
his mission had been successfully accomplished and all seven 
genera1s, including Nasution, had  been  captured or  killed.  After 
listening to the initial radio broadcast and believing that all was 
going exceptionally well, the headquarters group moved from the 
Aerial Survey Office to Halim about 9:00 A.M. All the principals 
were now soon located at Halim although in three different places. 
Sukarno's headquarters was at one place, the home of Commodore 
Susanto, his pilot, Untung/Supardjo's at another and Aidit of the PKI 
at a third. Aidit had arrived at 2:00 A.M. that morning. Supardjo was 
to act as the connecting link. 
After Supardjo had been brought from Merdeka Palace to Halim 
by Omar Dani's intelligence officer, Lt. Col. Heru, (named as one of 
Untung's deputies on the Revolutionary Council), Supardjo and Dani 
reportedly congratulated each other on their success.(12) Supardjo 
met with the recently arrived Untung group and after being fed, 
reported to Sukarno about 10:30 A.M.. The trial reports indicate that 
Supardjo was congratulated by Sukarno, who appeared at that time to 
consider the operation basically successful, but that Sukarno also 
questioned  Supardjo  as  to  whether  Nasution  had  indeed  been 
captured or whether he had escaped. Supardjo was reportedly patted 
on the back and told he had done a good job. I was advised of this 
latter point by a very well placed Indonesian in whom I had great 
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confidence long before the interrogation reports began to emerge, 
apparently on the basis of his inside information as to the course of 
the  interrogations  while  in  progress.  This  was  a  man  who  had 
initially disbelieved my repeated early statements that Sukarno must 
have been involved and his coming to me with this report was in 
surprised acknowledgement. I am accordingly convinced of its basic 
accuracy.(l3) Sukarno also reportedly commented that incidents like 
the killing of the generals happened and were but a ripple in the 
Revolution.  The  subject  of  a  new  commander  of  the  Army 
apparently came up at this meeting with several names being 
mentioned. According to some reports, Supardjo asked to consult 
with his comrades and eventually returned with the name of General 
Pranoto. This version would imply that the Pranoto choice was 
cleared with Aidit. Other versions attribute the decision to Sukarno 
himself. Hughes cites the Omar Dani trial testimony that the names 
of Mursjid, Suharto, and Basuki Rachmat were all mentioned along 
with that of Pranoto but that Sukarno dismissed the other names 
saying that Suharto was "stubborn", Mursjid "always fighting" and 
Basuki Rachmat "often sick".(14) Adam Malik, who was close to 
Suharto at the time, told American Ambassador Marshall Green in 
December that Sukarno had appointed Pranoto to replace Yani at 
11:00 A.M. and that this was a strong argument for assuming that 
Sukarno already knew that Yani was dead, a fact that would be 
known  only  to  those  in  on  the  plot  at  that  time.(15)  If  the 
appointment was  made  at  11:00 as  stated  by  Malik to  Green, a 
referral to Aidit seems doubtful, at least by way of Supardjo as the 
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liaison, since there is no indication that Supardjo had two meetings 
with Sukarno between 10:30 and 11:00 A.M. as would have been 
necessary. In any case, the version given by Malik to Green seems 
more likely to me as Sukarno was not taking orders from Aidit and 
would feel no need to clear such a non-technical decision. Emissaries 
were then sent, in any case, shortly thereafter to summon Pranoto 
and General Umar to the Palace but the emissaries were referred to 
Suharto who refused to let them go on the grounds that "too many 
generals had already been lost". Bambang Widjanarko was to play a 
role in a second effort to fetch Pranoto but his understanding appears 
confused~  probably  because  he  had  arrived  at  Halim  after  the 
morning discussion of Pranoto. His interrogation says or implies that 
the Pranoto appointment had been deferred to an afternoon meeting 
which broke up at 5:00 P.M. Sabur then came out of that afternoon 
meeting and sent Bambang into the city to get Pranoto. The fact that 
Bambang was sent on such a mission and returned with a negative 
message from Suharto is clear but the adjutant appeared wrong in 
assuming that his mission was original. That second mission will be 
mentioned later. 
To pick up another important thread of the story now, the 
Revolutionary Council issued a decree and two decisions which were 
signed in the flush of apparent victory in the morning but which were 
broadcast at noon and early afternoon as doubts began to set in. The 
decree, which was signed at 10:00 by Untung, Supardjo and Air 
Force Lt. Col. Heru, was first broadcast at 12:00 noon and repeated 
three more times over the next two and one half hours. It announced 
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the decommissioning of the existing Dwikora cabinet (which could 
still operate temporarily on a caretaker basis), the assumption of 
power "for the time being" by the Revolutionary Council, and the 
intent to form provincial revolutionary councils at several levels. It 
was stated that a new cabinet would be formed in due course by the 
Revolutionary Council. 
Much has been made of the fact that this decree did not mention 
either the office of the President or the person of Sukarno and it is 
true that  this omission caused many to  assume that  a  coup was 
underway which was anti-Sukarno in nature, whatever else it may 
have been. The trial evidence, particularly the testimony of Untung, 
is clear that there was no intention to set Sukarno aside and all the 
actions of the President, before during and after these events, should 
make it clear that Sukarno was both sympathetic and involved. The 
reasons for the omission are not entirely clear. There has been some 
indication that an earlier version of the Revolutionary Council's first 
decree was signed by Sukarno but then torn up because of a loss of 
nerve.(16) This allegation may well be true but it has never been 
confirmed. An equally plausible possibility is that there was never 
any intention for Sukarno to be a signatory. It would have been a 
logical plan to  have the  original action appear as  an  emergency 
rescue  action  by  brave  and  loyal  followers intent  on  saving  the 
revolution and its leader from a counter-revolutionary plot as stated 
in the early morning broadcast and then for Sukarno to come into the 
affair with a public statement of support when a stunned and 
immobilized Army and nation had to accept the fait accompli. This 
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expected statement would be buttressed by a powerful propaganda 
campaign to downplay the violence and to emphasize the necessary 
removal of a grave threat. The dismissal of the existing cabinet was 
considered a necessary step to pave the way for the Nasakom cabinet 
that both Sukarno and the PKI had long desired. Even that would 
have been but a way station toward a full communist regime. There 
is  no  indication that  Sukarno disapproved of  this  decree  or  was 
surprised by its contents. Surely the non-communist but 
opportunistic members of his sizable entourage that day would have 
said something in the aftermath if he had disapproved and even the 
Army would have found it convenient to cite any such evidence as 
part of its effort to pin everything on the PKI and exonerate the 
President if only he would cooperate. 
This decree was followed by two decisions which were signed 
by Untung alone around 10:00 A.M. and broadcast several hours 
later. The second "decision" is of minor significance but curious 
since  it  established  Untung's  rank  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  as  the 
highest rank in the armed forces. This was clearly a smoke screen to 
support the image of a group of young officers taking action to save 
the revolution while underlining the egalitarian thrust of their 
supposed thinking. The fact that the real tactical commander, 
Supardjo, was a general and Latief was a colonel, exposes the 
contrived nature of this announcement. It is also clear that Untung 
himself was a disciplined obeyer of orders who hardly appears as a 
forceful politically-motivated figure in the drama. He is largely a 
symbol of what this Indonesian shadow play was trying to project. 
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The first decision purported to be more meaty; it announced a 
 
45 member revolutionary council with a  five member leadership 
group that seemed rather peculiar at first glance. Actually, its 
symbolism and its leftist cast were readily apparent. I recall, for 
example, that the Political Section of the American Embassy was 
able to analyze the composition rather quickly and to cable 
Washington that it appeared to signify communist direction in spite 
of a smokescreen of other names. This analysis was possible in spite 
of the fact that the Embassy could know little or nothing about the 
purported  leaders  of  the  Council  or  some  of  the  other  obscure 
figures. In spite of the red herrings and non-entities, the overall 
composition of the 80% or so of the names that were known plainly 
reflected the previous directions of Sukarno's leftward bias. Based on 
present information, the composition of this Council is even more 
clear. The announced leadership was more symbolic than real. The 
Chairman (Untung) was there as a symbol of the multi-service 
Presidential guard. The four deputies represented the four armed 
forces (Supardjo from the Army, Heru from the Air Force and two 
obscure names from the Navy and Police). Latief and Sujono, who 
were the two key September 30 Movement figures beyond Supardjo 
and Untung, had to be relegated to mere membership in the Council 
along  with  Colonel  Suherman,  the  head  of  the  "movement"  in 
Central Java, in order to provide the desired symbolism of balance 
between services. Given the supposed egalitarian thrust of the second 
"decision", one might have expected to see a name like Lt. Dul Arief, 
who  commanded  the  real  dirty  work  of  seizing  the  "General's 
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Council" members but there was no room on the list for officers that 
junior.  Instead,  the  military  composition  of  the  Revolutionary 
Council was led by Omar Dani followed by the seemingly compliant 
existing heads of the Police and Navy (an accurate ordering of the 
three in their willingness to go along with Sukarno's pro-PKI views). 
The list otherwise included names like Generals Basuki Rachmat 
(East Java Commander), Umar Wirahadikusumah (Jakarta 
commander), Amir Machmud and Solichin (commanders in the outer 
islands) as well as a few others in the Army and Air Force. The 
Army generals were neither leftists nor strong Sukarnophiles such as 
Pranoto, Mursjid, Sjafiuddin and Adjie, nor were they well known 
anti-communists like Mokoginta, Panggabean and Kemal Idris. They 
appear, instead, as commanders whose apparent apolitical and 
traditional  Javanese  inclinations  did  not  seem  to  require  their 
removal but who held key commands that would require some 
"stroking".  Suharto's  name  is  not  included  despite  the  reported 
respect for him by Untung and Latief. According to Brackman, 
Suharto was reportedly disliked by Sukarno dating from Suharto's 
command  of  the  West  Irian  confrontation  two  years  earlier,  a 
possible, if highly speculative, indication of Sukarno's personal 
involvement with the Revolutionary Council list.(17) On the other 
hand, Suharto may have been omitted because he was thought to be 
of less consequence than Umar, for example, due to his supposed 
lack of troops. 
Neither  these  officers  nor  most  of  the  other  Revolutionary 
 
Council membership, including the PKI members, were consulted. 
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Bambang Widjanarko reports for example, that the Sukarnoist Police 
Minister, Sutjipto, was openly upset when Sukarno showed him and 
others the list at Halim because of the failure to consult him 
beforehand  and  because  an  unknown  field  grade  officer  named 
Anwas  Tanumidjaja  was  above  him  on  the  list  as  a  Deputy 
Chairman. According to Bambang, Sutjipto soon agreed to leave it 
all in Sukarno's hands, however.(18) The civilian composition of the 
Council included Subandrio and Leimena but not Chairul Saleh - an 
obvious clue as to its orientation given Saleh's informal linkage to 
the banned Murba Party and his image as a PKI target. The Council 
was especially heavy on pro-communist leaders of parties other than 
the PKI (Surachman for the PNI, Siradjuddin Abbas for the Perti 
Party, and Arudji Kartawinata for the PSII), and other leftist front 
leaders (Zaini Mansjur of the PNI youth, Mrs. Suryadarma of peace 
front notoriety and also the wife of Omar Dani's pro-communist 
predecessor, and Karim of the Journalist Association). There were no 
members of the PKI Politburo but there were a large number of 
second level PKI figures (Tjugito, Sukatno of the Pemuda Rakjat, 
Hardojo, Siauw   Giok Tjhan and Mrs. Suharti Suwarti of 
Gerwani).(l9)  The  Marine  Commander,  General  Hartono,  and  a 
pro-communist Jakarta police official, Sukarto, were included. The 
list proceeded by categories  or "functional groups" with 
representation on an apparent Nasakom basis. While the complexion 
is clear, it is even more clear to anyone knowledgeable about 
Indonesian politics at the time that the whole exercise was symbolic. 
This symbolic purpose was confirmed later by the trial testimony but 
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the latter is not needed to support the conclusion. One other 
announcement drafted at 9:30 that morning was that of Omar Dani. It 
was broadcast in mid-afternoon and expressed support for the 
September 30 Movement. This statement would be used as early 
evidence of Dani's complicity in the so-called coup as would the 
similar message of support in Harian Rakjat the next day implicate 
the PKI beyond redemption. 
Although hopes did not die for the September 30 Movement 
until late afternoon, they began to wane before the end of the 
morning. Sukarno had learned by this time of Nasution's escape and 
of  Suharto's  efforts  to  rally  the  Army.  He  had  apparently  also 
1earned that Suharto had significant forces at his disposal in the 
RPKAD. The CIA study says that Sukarno was reported to have 
shown great interest in the RPKAD that morning and "according to a 
very reliable source, he protested to Supardjo at one point, 'you told 
me the RPKAD would not be in Jakarta'".(2O) Supardjo reportedly 
tried to reassure Sukarno that this fact would not be material. The 
President may also have felt that things had been bungled in other 
ways such as the killing of the generals and the omission of Suharto 
whose already forceful role must have come as a surprise. As a 
colleague has pointed out, Sukarno may have been reassured by 
Latief on the basis of the meeting at the hospital that Suharto would 
be no problem. If so this would have been another shock and reason 
for Sukarno to lose confidence. In any case, Sukarno told Supardjo at 
noon to stop the movement, saying that he wanted to prevent further 
bloodshed and adding something to the effect that if the movement 
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could not be stopped, it would be butchered.(21) According to 
Bambang Widjanarko's account, and he was steadfast in maintaining 
this testimony in several interrogation sessions, Sukarno sent an aide 
named  Suparto  to  Dewi's  house  to  retrieve  his  uniform  of  the 
previous evening. The uniform was brought to Sukarno in a plastic 
bag between noon and 1:00 P.M. Sukarno then ordered Bambang to 
retrieve a letter from one of the pockets which Sukarno took and 
destroyed. Bambang said he did not see the inner contents of the 
envelope at any time but that it appeared from the envelope to be the 
letter from Untung of the previous evening.(22) While the President 
did not reject the movement, he was clearly trying to pull back from 
this point on. He did not announce his support for the September 30 
movement  as  had  obviously  been  expected  but  authorized  a 
statement to be made in the name of General Sabur that "Sukarno 
was alive, safe, in good health, and still in control of the state and the 
revolution." This message was broadcast by the radio still controlled 
by the September 30 movement at 1:30 P.M. 
Returning to the Suharto side of the drama, Suharto had quickly 
notified the Navy and Police of the apparent coup and secured 
promises of cooperation from Martadinata and Sutjipto or their 
representatives. The Navy promise of support was apparently urged 
on Martadinata by his deputy, Admiral Sri Muljono Herlambang, 
although the latter ran into difficulty with Suharto later over his 
subsequent loyalty to Sukarno. Omar Dani and the Air Force did not 
respond to these earlier overtures but the contacts helped to enlighten 
both sides as to the structure of the crisis. The commander of the 
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Jakarta police district, General Sawarno, who was the initial contact 
point in the Police, did not cooperate with Suharto in practice, 
however. In the course of the day, Sawarno sought to arrest police 
personnel cooperating with Suharto and he was accordingly forced to 
resign in November because of Kostrad pressure. 
Meanwhile,  Suharto  had  sent  another  courier  to  the  deputy 
commanders of the two "rebel" battalions around Merdeka Square at 
11:00 A.M. without results. Efforts continued, however, as Major 
General Basuki Rachmat, the commander of the Brawijaya Division 
from East Java, who happened to be in town for consultations with 
Yani, and Brigadier General Sabirin Mochtar succeeded about 2:00 
P.M. in convincing the deputy commanders of the 454th and 530th 
Battalions to go to Kostrad. They were then briefed by Suharto who 
told them that their units were being used by a coup movement and 
that the whole story of a Generals Council and a plot against the 
President were lies. The fact that Sukarno's name was not on the 
Revolutionary Council list was one of the powerful arguments that 
the units had been tricked. The 530th Deputy Commander, Captain 
Suradi, returned with General Sabirin, and briefed the subordinate 
company commanders. The entire unit (except for "B" Company 
which was with Lt. Dul Arief) then went to Kostrad and became 
available to Suharto. This was about 4:30 P.M. The 454th might 
have followed except for the fact that its commander, Major Sukirno, 
had left Merdeka Palace to visit his troops and promptly resumed 
control. Suharto now had available to him the two battalions of the 
RPKAD,  the  328th  Kujang  (raider)  battalion  of  the  Siliwangi 
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Division, the 530th battalion and various other elements including 
much  of  Colonel  Latief's  First  Infantry  Brigade  of  the  Jakarta 
garrison which was apparently being salvaged by General Umar and 
other officers. In the face of Suharto's now real threat of attack, the 
454th withdrew without a fight to Halim Air Base. Shortly thereafter, 
some 2,000 communist youth from the reserve unit at Halim, which 
were being sent into the city to bolster a deteriorating situation, gave 
prearranged passwords to their supposed comrades of the 530th 
battalion and were promptly disarmed to their great surprise. Suharto 
now sent  the  RPKAD to  take  up positions near  Halim  with the 
intention of launching an assault if more subtle tactics did not 
prevail.(23) 
Another  emissary  was  now  sent  in  the  late  afternoon  from 
Halim to Kostrad with instructions to fetch Pranoto and Umar. This 
courier   was   Bambang   Widjanarko,   the   Presidential   adjutant. 
Bambang says in his interrogation report that he was in a hall at 
Halim outside of a meeting that took place about 4:00 or 5:00 P.m. 
between Sukarno and his senior advisors including Deputy Prime 
Minister Leimena, Admiral Martadinata, Police General Sutjipto, 
Omar  Dani,  Generals  Sabur,  Sunarjo  and  Supardjo.  Bambang 
believed that the final selection of Pranoto was made in that meeting. 
After the meeting broke up around 5:00, Bambang was instructed by 
Sabur to take the news of Pranoto's appointment to Kostrad 
headquarters and to summon both Pranoto and Umar 
Wirahadikusumah to report to the President at  Halim. Failing to 
locate the two generals, Bambang said he met General Suharto about 
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7:00. Suharto refused to allow either general to go, however. Suharto 
made clear to Colonel Bambang Widjanarko that he was now in 
command of the Army pending information on Yani's fate and that 
he was ready to launch an assault on Halim in the near future. He 
asked the colonel to get Sukarno out of Halim quickly before such an 
attack would be launched. 
Bambang Widjanarko now returned to Halim about 8:00 P.M. 
where he reported Suharto's reply to Sukarno that Suharto had taken 
temporary command of the Army and would not let Pranoto appear. 
He also reported his visual observations which were equally or more 
significant. He had seen Nasution at Kostrad and heard him say that 
the army should restore order in a way that implied military action 
was  imminent but  that  a  political  solution should  be  left  to  the 
President. He had seen RPKAD troops occupying the south and west 
sides of Merdeka Square and he had observed other troops with 
scarves in trucks on the Jakarta bypass road. The last must have been 
the 454th Battalion retreating to Halim. Bambang says he voiced his 
military opinion to Sukarno that an attack on Halim was imminent 
and he urged Sukarno to leave the Air Base. General Supardjo was 
reportedly among those present during this discussion. According to 
Bambang's account, Sukarno was furious at Suharto's message, 
disagreed with his assumption of the army command and his refusal 
to allow Pranoto to leave in spite of the President's direct command. 
Omar Dani intervened to say that a plane was ready to take Sukarno 
to Yogyakarta or Madiun in Central Java. The discussion was then 
interrupted by the arrival of Dewi and Sukarno went with her into 
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another room. In her 1984 article in Tempo, Dewi noted her arrival 
at Halim where she found the discussion to revolve around proposals 
for a Sukarno flight to Central Java. Dewi said she tried to talk 
Sukarno into returning to Merdeka Palace in central Jakarta but that 
Sukarno refused because he regarded it as too dangerous (because of 
its proximity to Kostrad). She attributed Sukarno's attitude to his 
receipt of "one-sided information". Dewi says she then advocated his 
going to Bogor which would have placed her on the Leimena side of 
the debate.(24) 
Bambang Widjanarko says that he made strong representations 
to  Deputy  Prime  Minister  Leimena  in  the  interim  to  convince 
Sukarno to leave and that he was supported in this by Colonel Saelan 
of  the  Tjakrabirawa  and  by  the  head  of  the  bodyguard  detail. 
Actually, Leimena  had  probably argued  for  a  Sukarno departure 
already but was able to use these additional pressures from the 
security professionals to get Sukarno to at least consider going to 
Bogor rather than to Central Java. Various accounts hold that Omar 
Dani  wanted  the  President  to  go  with  him  to  the  air  base  near 
Madiun. Although Sukarno had apparently considered going to 
Central  Java,  either  with  Dani,  with  Aidit  or  both, he  was  now 
persuaded or compelled to go to Bogor or perhaps some combination 
of the two. In a 1984 statement on the public record (as distinct from 
the  less  established testimony in  the  Devious  Dalang), Bambang 
Widjanarko asserted that he and Leimena (and two aides) got into a 
vehicle with Sukarno followed by a vehicle with Dani. The issue of 
whether Sukarno would fly to Central Java with Dani, and perhaps 
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Aidit, or go to Bogor was apparently still not decided as Bambang 
says that Dani thought they were going to the airstrip. However, 
Bambang claims that at the third crossroad he (Bambang) ordered 
the vehicle to continue straight ahead rather than turning off to the 
airstrip. Sukarno then reportedly asked where they were going and 
repeated the question three times until Leimena signalled Bambang 
to respond at which Bambang "finally" informed the president that 
they were going to Bogor. At Sukarno's prodding, the adjutant 
supplied various reasons associated with Bambang's responsibility 
for assuring the President's security including a strained rationale for 
not relying on the aircraft.(25) 
In this connection, there were persistent reports in Jakarta in 
 
1966 about an alleged plane-side meeting between Aidit and Sukarno 
at which an angry Aidit was reportedly seen to throw his coat on the 
ground. There was clearly no such meeting but there may have been 
some basis for this confused account in that Aidit was reported by 
flight personnel to have cast his coat on the ground when preparing 
to  leave  by  plane  for  Yogyakarta himself about two  hours after 
Sukarno's departure. Aidit would undoubtedly have been furious if 
he had expected Sukarno to go with him. Perhaps Sukarno, Aidit, 
and Dani originally planned to go together at a later hour but the 
pressure of an imminent attack from Suharto's forces caused Dani 
and a wavering Sukarno to opt for a quicker departure by air without 
Aidit, who was at another location at Halim irrespective of whether 
the omission of the PKI leader was caused by inadvertence or by 
intention. On the other hand, it seems likely that some kind of word 
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would have gone to Aidit as to the situation and Sukarno's plans 
before his departure including the President's intention to pursue a 
political strategy of trying to restore the status quo ante. It is clear 
that Aidit subsequently operated on a basis of almost total reliance 
on the President to provide protection for the Party and to provide 
another of his magical solutions. This adds to the impression that 
Aidit regarded Sukarno as the virtual supra-organizational head of 
the Party based on Sukarno's acknowledged leadership of "the 
Revolution" that both saw in similar terms. 
The  ride  to  Bogor  with  Leimena  and  Bambang Widjanarko 
appears to have been uneventful although Sukarno seems to have 
been in something of a daze from Colonel Bambang's interrogation 
report. After their arrival around midnight, both Sabur, who was 
presumably in another vehicle of the convoy, and the Colonel 
telephoned  Suharto  to  report  the  President's arrival.  Not  trusting 
either, Suharto reportedly sent another officer to the Bogor Palace to 
confirm Sukarno's arrival. This was apparently Colonel Sarwo Edhie 
of the RPKAD. 
Suharto now directed the two RPKAD battalions to begin 
infiltrating Halim Air Base and they succeeded in capturing it by the 
next morning after a minor skirmish with remnants of the by now 
demoralized 454th Battalion, many of whom had quietly slipped 
away. Suharto had already denounced the September 30 Movement 
on the recaptured Radio Indonesia the previous evening and was now 
in undisputed military control of the capital. Much of Central Java 
was to remain in "rebel" hands for the next day or two but the news 
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of Suharto's triumph in Jakarta soon demoralized the September 30 
 
Movement leaders there and the regional commander of the 
Diponegoro Division, Brigadier General Suryosumpeno, was able to 
re-establish his control in Semarang after escape from early arrest by 
the "coup" forces. Yogyakarta and Solo remained in hostile hands for 
another day and were politically if not militarily insecure for some 
time thereafter. The days and months that followed are important to 
this story and Sukarno even appeared at times to have had an outside 
chance at a comeback but, in retrospect, the decisive turning point 
had occurred sometime in the late morning of October 1 when 
Sukarno   decided   against   continuing   with   the   September   30 
Movement. 
 
The CIA study, the Coup That Backfired, holds that Sukarno's 
decision was made in the early afternoon on the basis of the return of 
the initial group of couriers from the President to Kostrad with news 
that General Suharto had refused to allow Pranoto and Umar to come 
to Halim. It further says that Suharto instead "decided to send one 
person - Deputy Prime Minister Leimena - to Halim to negotiate with 
the President" and that Leimena delivered an ultimatum for the 
President to leave Halim by 4:30 P.M. or Suharto would attack. The 
attack did not take place at that time, of course, although it is true 
that  Leimena played a  key role  in  convincing Sukarno to  go to 
Bogor. 
I believe this account is somewhat inaccurate.(26) It seems 
unlikely that Suharto delivered an ultimatum through Leimena or 
that Leimena took a very forceful approach with the President that 
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early. It would also appear that Sukarno's basic decision to begin 
backing  away  from  close  identification  with  the  September  30 
Movement was taken earlier, probably between 11:00 and 11:30 if 
we  are  to  believe  he  told  Supardjo  to  stop  the  September  30 
Movement around noon and particularly if he tore up the Untung 
letter about this time as claimed by Bambang Widjanarko. Of course, 
there may well have been a steady progression in Sukarno's loss of 
nerve starting with the early morning mix-up over the identity of 
troops around Merdeka Square (6:30) followed by unconfirmed but 
gradually more certain indications of Nasution's escape (7:00 10:00) 
followed by news of the RPKAD presence in Jakarta (11:00-11:30?), 
followed by more definite word of Suharto's vigorous assumption of 
command (2:30 or earlier). Even if there was no early exchange over 
Pranoto, it is clear that Martadinata came to the Palace from 
KOSTRAD and conveyed a report about Suharto's actions.(27) While 
Sukarno was backing off, he had not given up all hope even in mid- 
afternoon, it would appear, since Bambang Widjanarko's account has 
him showing the list of the Revolutionary Council to Leimena and the 
others when they arrived at 2:30 and as the renewed effort to summon 
Pranoto would indicate. However, Sukarno did order the evacuation by 
helicopter of his three children from Merdeka Palace, which occurred 
at 4:00 or 5:00 P.M.(28) After their arrival at Halim, the children were 
subsequently flown to Bandung. The return of Bambang Widjanarko 
about 8:00 P.M. with news of RPKAD deployments around Merdeka 
Square and of Suharto's intention to attack Halim must have shown 
that   any   hope   of   a   military   triumph   was   finished,   however. 
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Furthermore, word of all these developments must have been coming 
in from other sources. The 454th battalion's arrival at Halim would 
have been reported immediately and well before the Colonel's return, 
for example. Furthermore, the entire city was open to travel back and 
forth all day so that messengers and agents almost certainly were going 
and coming. It is noteworthy, for example, that American embassy 
officers including myself were able to move around the city all day 
trying to get some kind of feel for what was taking place and having no 
trouble in moving about (while not learning much that would clarify 
the confusion), the only excluded area being that which was held by the 
two battalions immediately in front of the Embassy. 
I have expressed a rather conventional view that Sukarno 
"chickened-out" whether it was in the late morning or sometime 
thereafter although one could argue that he was only reflecting a very 
perceptive analysis that his military and PKI lieutenants had badly 
mishandled the whole affair in a number of ways, that the military 
balance  in  Jakarta  would  be  against  him  in  contradiction  of 
everything that had been assumed, and that the only hope now lay in 
fuzzing his role and trusting to his mesmerizing oratory to bluff his 
way to a political solution, citing at every opportunity his prestigious 
positions as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, President 
for Life, Great Leader of the Revolution, etc. He may also have 
counted on the nature of General Nasution, whose reluctance to stand 
up to Sukarno was well-established. Unfortunately for Sukarno, 
Suharto was to be much more resolute than Nasution for all his 
Javanese politeness and political vagueness. Nevertheless, there is a 
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strong possibility that Sukarno could still have won through if he had 
announced his support for the September 30 Movement publicly and 
early, claiming it had forestalled an attempted coup against him by a 
"General's Council". Much of the Armed Forces would have rallied 
to the Great Leader of the Revolution, not so much because they 
really loved or respected him, but because it was ingrained habit and 
what everyone was used to saying. This would have risked civil war, 
of course, and would have required a toughness and decisiveness that 
Sukarno seemed to lack. He was a man of great determination and 
doggedness over the long term; he was even capable of courage in 
pursuing his convictions at great risk if the risk were not immediate. 
But   Sukarno was so enraptured with verbal   symbols and 
achievement of his goals through indirect and sly maneuvers that he 
seemed incapable of firm and decisive leadership in a crunch, 
particularly when that involved a physical threat to his person. He 
was devoted to the "revolution" and a revolution in the Marxist sense 
but his massive ego had brought him to identify the revolution with 
his own destiny. Ultimately, the revolution had to take second place 
when the chips were down, if only during the crucial moment that 
sometimes constitutes a major turning point in the history of nations. 
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Footnotes - Chapter XIII 
 
 
 
1. These events were fairly well established and are covered in 
considerable detail in Hughes, Notosusanto and Saleh, and The  
Coup That Backfired. 
2. Mashuri's role as Suharto's first informant was well known in 
Jakarta soon after these events. According to Suharto's 
biographer, O.G. Roeder, a television technician on his way 
home from work had observed highly unusual activity at the 
homes of Nasution and Harjono. He informed an Army captain 
who called Mashuri,who then woke up Suharto. Cited by Brian 
May, The Indonesian Tragedy (London and Boston, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul) 1978, p.98. 
3. Hughes, pp. 59-50 has a more sketchy but similar account. 
 
4. Brackman, p.S3. 
 
5. Tempo, October 6, 1984 (Dewi statement). 
 
6. Ibid. (statement by Police Lt. Col. Mangil Martowidjojo). 
 
7. This account is based on the Coup that Backfired and the 
 
Hughes book, supplemented by considerable detail in Mangil's 
 
1984 statement in Tempo. 
 
8. Bambang Widjanarko, pp 58-59. He says later (p.60) that 
Sukarno only learned the identity of the troops surrounding the 
Palace from Supardjo at Halim. This account coincides with the 
later announcement by the Tjakrabirawa leadership that it had 
taken Sukarno to Halim because of concern about the presence 
of unidentified troops around the Palace. See Hughes, p.55. 
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9. Tempo, October 6, 1984 (Mangil statement). 
 
10.  Curiously, General Pranoto was also absorbed with Javanese 
mysticism. The two generals were otherwise quite different in 
both personality and political loyalties. 
11.  Notosusanto and Saleh, p.32. 
 
12.  The Coup That Backfired, p.24. 
 
13.  Bambang Widjanarko, who arrived at Halim about 11:30, that is 
after the Sukarno - Supardjo meeting, was told by participants 
that Sukarno looked very pleased, treated Supardjo as the purge 
commander, and said, "you have done well, why did Nasution 
escape?" while patting Supardjo's back. Bambang says that the 
persons present at this meeting were Omar Dani, Sabur, Colonel 
Saelan, Mangil (head of the bodyguard), and Brigadier Generals 
Suparto and Sunarjo. This account parallels all the others and is 
not new except for providing an indication of who witnessed the 
scene. Bambang Widjanarko, p.61. Notosusanto and Saleh, 
p.41, say that Supardjo reported to the President who was 
"noncommittal" but also clearly did not condemn the events of 
the previous night. 
14.  Hughes, p.69. 
 
15.  American Embassy telegram 1770 of December 15, 1965, 
Indonesia Country File, National Security File, LBJ Library. 
16.  Our Embassy had such a report from an Army Colonel as early 
as December, 1965. See American Embassy telegram 1791 of 
December 17, 1965, Indonesia Country File, National Security 
File, LBJ Library. 
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17.  Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, p.98. c 
 
18.  Bambang Widjanarko, p.l29. 
 
19.  There were rumors for many months that Sjam, the head of the 
PKI Special Bureau whose existence was soon unearthed, was 
really Tjugito, an overt member of the PKI Central Committee 
who had long been Njono's deputy as head of tne SOBSI labor 
union affiliate and who more recently had switched to the PKI 
Secretariat staff. This rumor was probably derived from 
speculation over Tjugito's appearance as the ranking PKI name 
on the Revolutionary Council list. This error is contained in 
Hughes book, p.71, for example. Tjugito escaped the early 
round-ups and was only apprehended some years later with the 
PKI remnants trying to conduct guerrilla warfare in East Java in 
 
1968. This was long after Kamarusaman, the real "Sjam", had 
been apprehended. 
20.  The Coup That Backfired, pp 34-35. 
 
21.  The Coup ThatBackfired, p. 35. Another version has him saying 
that, if the movement were not stopped, he would be the 
butcher. 
 
22.  Bambang Widjanarko, p. 29 and p. 76. 
 
23.  This account of the actions around Merdeka Square is well 
established and appears in all the standard accounts. The Army 
Information Officer, Brigadier General Ibnu Subroto, issued a 
statement that appeared in Antara (Warta Berita) on October 23, 
1965 that exonerated the personnel of the 454th and 530
th
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battalions below their commanders and reported the efforts of 
 
Generals Basuki Rachmat and Sabirin Mochtar. 
 
24.  Tempo, October 6, 1984, Dewi statement. 
 
25.  Ibid, Bambang Widjanarko statement. 
 
26.  The CIA study, The Coup That Backfired, says that messengers 
from Sukarno went into the city in the early afternoon and had 
no trouble in persuading Leimena (and others like Martadinata) 
to go to Halim but failed to get Pranoto and Umar to go because 
of referral to Suharto who refused. This account says Suharto 
then "decided to send one person - Deputy Prime Minister 
Leimena to Halim to negotiate with the President" and that 
Leimena gave an ultimatum for the President to leave Halim by 
4:30 P.M. or that Suharto would attack. Suharto did not observe 
that deadline but Sukarno eventually decided to leave much 
later. This return of the initial couriers is said to have led 
Sukarno to instruct General Sabur to make his announcement. 
The account in Bambang Widjanarko's testimony is the most 
detailed regarding the chain of events at Halim insofar as he 
knew them from his own observation. However, his account 
may overstate his influence on Leimena and inflate his own 
importance. Nevertheless, as noted later, it does not seem likely 
that Leimena was "sent" by Suharto to Sukarno with an 
ultimatum to leave or that Leimena would have been very 
forceful with the President as ear1y as depicted in the CIA 
account. 
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27.  Bambang Widjanarko, pp 65-66, states that Martadinata urged 
Sukarno to get in touch with General Suharto but the President 
refused on the grounds that Kostrad was supporting the Council 
of Generals. It is clear that many of the cabinet ministers such 
as Leimena, Sutjipto and Martadinata were confused in varying 
degrees about what was happening and that their knowledge of 
Sukarno's intentions also varied greatly. Martadinata had not 
been involved in the pre-September 30 Palace plotting sessions 
and probably believed on his arrival at Halim that Suharto was 
putting down a coup against the government as a whole. 
28.  The Coup that Backfired sets the arrival of Sukarno's children at 
 
4:00 P.M.; Mangil's detailed statement on movements in 
 
Tempo, October 6, 1984 puts the arrival at 5:00 P.M. 
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XIV 
 
The Early Aftermath 
 
 
 
The next few days appeared rather quiet on the surface as if 
both players and spectators had been exhausted by the momentous 
events  of  October  1.  Many  were  indeed  physically  as  well  as 
mentally exhausted. There had been little sleep for the 
Untung/Supardjo   task   forces   during   the   night   of   September 
30-October 1 and even Sukarno had probably had only a few hours 
sleep that night. Some later observers found it odd that the President 
retired for a nap at one point on the morning of October 1 but that 
may have been either a necessity or one of the wiser decisions of the 
day. The battalions occupying Halim air base during the night of 
October 1-2 must also have been spent by morning and even the 
politicians were probably long awake pondering the meaning of it all 
for the nation and especially for themselves. Fearing the possibility 
of being cut off from communications, our embassy and undoubtedly 
others posted political officers in the embassy chancery around  the 
clock with radios turned on for possible announcements. Our 
knowledge at this point was extremely fragmentary, being based 
primarily on monitoring of radio announcements and sight 
observations around the city, although our military attaches were 
beginning to  make  contacts  on  the  afternoon of  October 1  with 
knowledgeable Indonesian officers. The Indonesians were to keep 
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their distance for some time as were we, however, in order to avoid 
any excuse for Sukarno or communist charges of a US-supported 
Generals' Council. Leading Indonesian generals like  Suharto and 
Nasution remained aloof for months although one of our political 
officers, Mary Vance Trent, was soon in contact with Nasution's wife 
whom she had known a long time. 
The appearance of the October 1 issue of Harian Rakjat, the PKI 
daily newspaper, was not much different than any other day, the 
main  story  being  Sukarno's  speech  of   September  29   to   the 
communist university student affiliate, the CGMI. The October 2 
issue was to be a sensation, however, for it fully confirmed PKI 
support for the September 30 Movement. Harian Rakjat's banner 
headline said that "Lt. Col. Untung, Commander of the Tjakrabirawa 
Battalion, Saves the President and the Republic of Indonesia from a 
Coup of  the  Council of  Generals". It  proceeded to  set  forth the 
Revolutionary Council membership and other decrees and orders of 
the Council, the order of the day by General Omar Dani, the Sabur 
statement on Sukarno's safety and continued leadership of the 
Revolution, the appointment of General Pranoto Reksosamudro as 
caretaker commander of the Army, and a demand for the death of 
five named "capitalist bureaucrats" or "Kabirs" who appeared to be 
selected  more  for  their  anti-PKI activism than  their  wealth. The 
kidnappings and murders of the generals were not mentioned. An 
editorial and several cartoons strongly supported Untung and the 
September 30 Movement and condemned the alleged coup being 
planned by the Council of Generals for October 5.(1) PKI sympathy 
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was clear and irrefutable. What is more, no other significant Jakarta 
daily was so nakedly revealed as on the side of the September 30 
Movement and the PKI thus appeared to stand alone with Untung. 
Actually, a few minor left-wing newspapers had also exposed 
themselves to some degree and were subsequently banned. The PNI 
Central Board headed by Surachman had also issued a statement in 
support of Untung that was to appear in the Party newspaper Suluh 
Indonesia but, despite some leakage of the original document, the 
PNI was able to alter the statement before final publication in a way 
that confused the issue of who it was supporting other than its usual 
total   commitment   to   Sukarno.   In   a   1984   statement,   Ruslan 
Abdulgani, a member of the PNI Central Board in 1965, said that 
Surachman appeared at Ruslan's house at l:00 P.M. on October 2 and 
acknowledged that he had already announced PNI support for 
Untung's Revolutionary Council.(2) Suluh, Harian Rakjat, the 
Partindo  organ,  Bintang  Timur,  and  the  several  minor  pro-PKI 
papers were all subsequently banned. 
The Harian Rakjat edition had obviously been prepared during 
the afternoon of October 1 and gone to press then or early in the 
evening. General Umar, as Jakarta military commander, had placed a 
temporary ban on all newspapers at 6:00 P.M. except for the two 
military dailies, Angkatan Bersendjata and Berita Yudah, although it 
may not have been implemented for a while due to all the confusion 
and strain on resources and communications. Many have tried to 
explain  such  a  monumental  blunder  when  the  September  30 
Movement was in the process of failure. Even if the paper had gone 
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to press during the late afternoon, the question has been asked as to 
why distribution was not halted once the tide had irrevocably turned. 
A major factor would seem to be the probable psychological distance 
between the newspaper and the small band of actors at Halim, a 
factor that was exacerbated by the absence of chief editor Njoto in 
North Sumatra and the low rank of the available editorial staff. It 
may well be that the communist editors in their downtown offices 
were   still   confident   long   after   confidence   had   turned   into 
despondency at Halim where no one happened to think about 
informing the newspaper given their total absorption with the 
unfolding catastrophe. The visible signs of the day's events were not 
very evident for most people and the paper was probably relying 
primarily on the radio broadcasts. These would indicate that all still 
seemed to be going according to plan at the time of the Omar Dani 
order-of-the-day announcement at 3:30 P.M. Word of the Pranoto 
appointment appears  to  have  been  the  last  item  received  by  the 
newspaper as the October 2 edition carried a stop press designation, 
but this news had probably arrived by courier. There is every reason 
to believe that the paper was readied for the distribution system and 
the responsible staff was departing at a time when they felt confident 
but when the final collapse was actually underway. When and if they 
did receive news of catastrophe in the evening it may have been too 
late to stop the routine flow of distribution coupled with the fact that 
the news of defeat was sure to cause panic, particularly since PKI 
cadres  in  the  capital  had  been  briefed  for  several  weeks  on 
emergency plans to go underground. It is also possible, as some have 
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suggested, that  the  Army learned of  the  damaging nature of  the 
edition and purposely facilitated distribution to impugn the PKI, but 
there was certainly no evidence to that effect at the time. Whatever 
happened to cause PKI failure to prevent this gross indiscretion, the 
effect was decisive in demonstrating PKI guilt.(3) 
There was some other early evidence of PKI sympathy for the 
Untung coup such as a favorable Pemuda Rakjat demonstration in 
Yogyakarta, a pro-coup statement by the communist mayor of Solo 
(Surakarta), Utomo Ramelan, and a message from the 
pro-communist Governor of North Sumatra, General Ulung Sitepu, 
but communist complicity would have come out much more slowly 
if it were not for the Harian Rakjat blunder. This would have allowed 
Sukarno time to apply his normalization tactics of returning to the 
status quo ante much more effectively and would have made it more 
difficult for the anti-PKI forces to take swift action while they still 
had the momentum. Meanwhile, nothing was known definitely about 
the fate of General Yani and his colleagues although much could be 
surmised. The Bambang Widjanarko interrogation now produces an 
important sequence on October 2. The interrogators appear to have 
had information already from other witnesses that a radiogram from 
the Commander of Halim Air Base had been given to Omar Dani 
about evidence of corpses being found at Lubang Buaja. Under 
questioning, Bambang Widjanarko said he had been told the 
following  day  by  another  adjutant,  Colonel  Kardjono,  and  by 
General Sabur that such a report had been received and passed to the 
president, who then ordered Colonel Saelan of the Tjakrabirawa to 
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take  a  team  to  Halim  to  look  for  the  bodies on  the  evening of 
October 3. The Saelan team went to the Air Base and commenced a 
search but were interrupted by the arrival of RPKAD troops, 
according to this account. The purpose of this search was said to 
have been the President's desire to remove the bodies and related 
evidence.(4) In  any  case,  the  remains were  soon discovered and 
exhumed by the Army and readied for the highly publicized funeral 
on October 5. Sukarno did not attend the funeral but sent Subandrio 
instead. The President's callousness toward the fate of the generals 
was widely noted and hardened the new Army leaders toward 
preventing a return to the status quo ante. At this time it was not 
known that Sukarno had commented to Supardjo on the morning of 
October 1 that such things (as the death of the generals) happen in a 
revolution  but  both  he  and  Subandrio  were  to  make  similar 
comments beginning at  the cabinet meeting on October 6 where 
Sukarno treated the murders as a minor incident which should not 
disrupt the path of the revolution. Sukarno did, from time to time, 
make grudging statements subject to different interpretations that he 
did not approve of the Revolutionary Council and the September 30 
movement. However, the main thrust of his posture from here on was 
to protect the PKI, to disparage the importance of what had occurred 
and even to imply that there had indeed been a plot by a "General's 
Council" that loyal followers had merely tried to thwart. 
In the days that followed, various important participants in the 
events of October 1 came under Sukarno's protection in the Bogor 
Palace grounds. Omar Dani had given a briefing to Air Force officers 
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at Iswahjudi Air Force Base west of Madiun after his arrival there on 
the  morning  of  October  2,  a  briefing  that  described  Sukarno's 
presence at Halim and his congratulations to Supardjo. He then flew 
to  Semplak  Air  Base  near  Bogor  that  afternoon  and  rejoined 
Sukarno. Dani no longer discussed Sukarno's role after his initial 
blunder  of  saying  too  much  at  Iswahjudi. Dani  remained  in  the 
Bogor Palace with Sukarno and even stayed under its protection after 
Sukarno returned to Merdeka Palace on October 13. Dani and his 
family subsequently flew to temporary exile in Phnom Penh in 
Sukarno's personal plane on October 19. Sukarno had been forced by 
that time to replace Dani as head of the Air Force but did so "with 
honor", and subsequently made him Minister of Civil Aviation. Dani 
was persuaded to return in April, 1966 and was reported to have 
deeply implicated Sukarno in testimony that has never been released. 
Although Aidit remained in Central Java, he sent Lukman to attend 
the October 6 cabinet meeting in Bogor. Njoto also attended that 
meeting after his return from North Sumatra. After Lukman's 
departure, Aidit reportedly considered joining Sukarno as well but 
was unable to obtain a plane and was afraid to go by car. Both Njoto 
and Lukman remained under Sukarno's protection at Bogor for a 
time but eventually were forced by public pressure to leave. They 
were both killed. According to Bambang Widjanarko, General 
Supardjo also spent three days living in a small pavilion on the 
Bogor Palace grounds before moving on. When student and Army 
pressure later developed against such pro-communist ministers as 
Subandrio and Oei Tjoe Tat, Sukarno extended as much protection to 
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them  as  he  could.  In  regard  to  Supardjo,  Sukarno  had  initially 
ordered him to take charge of the battalions at Halim but Supardjo 
fled with Sjam.(5) Presumably his stay at Bogor followed his 
separation from his PKI contact. Supardjo was captured a year later 
after a massive search. When found, he had a letter of protection 
from the President. 
Colonel Sarwo Edhie of the RPKAD called on Sukarno on the 
morning of October 2 and asked him the fate of the generals. He was 
told that this was a minor matter in a revolution. A more significant 
meeting occurred on the afternoon of October 2 when Suharto met 
with Sukarno at Bogor in the presence of Leimena, Dani, General 
Adjie, Pranoto, Sabur and various senior officers of all services. 
Early reports that have not been confirmed in the literature, say that 
Sukarno initially renewed his order for Pranoto to be Army 
commander and then fell back on Adjie as a compromise proposal 
but that Suharto rejected both. The CIA study does not mention this 
point but says that Sukarno called Suharto "too stubborn" when the 
Kostrad commander pressed for firm action on the missing generals. 
Sukarno  reportedly  then  turned  to  Adjie  and  said  he  had  not 
appointed Adjie to command the Army because Adjie was also "too 
stubborn and too much known as an anti-communist". Sukarno 
reportedly insisted at this meeting that the political settlement of the 
matter should be left to him.(6) Bambang Widjanarko said, 
incidentally, that Pranoto reported to Sukarno on October 3 after 
Pranoto   had   received   orders   from   the   Army   to   reject   any 
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appointment by Sukarno but he then agreed with Sukarno to leave 
the question of his appointment to the President. 
Sukarno spoke on Radio Indonesia on October 2 (the first hard 
evidence to outside observers that he was alive). He called for calm, 
said the leadership of the Army was directly in his hands, that he had 
appointed Pranoto to carry out the daily tasks of the Army and had 
assigned Suharto to restore order. This required a great deal of gall 
considering all that had happened. This broadcast was monitored by 
Ambassador  Green,  Deputy  Chief  of  Mission  Galbraith  (who 
replaced  Green as  Ambassador five  years  later)  and  by  Political 
Counsellor - later Ambassador - Ed Masters and Political Officer 
Bob Rich, both of whom were sleeping in the Embassy as part of a 
round-the-clock vigil that Masters had instituted for the Political 
Section. All those who heard the broadcast commented on its brevity 
and   the   depressed,  colorless   tone   of   Sukarno's  voice.   Frank 
Galbraith, who had known Sukarno longest, observed that the voice, 
though  definitely  Sukarno's,  was  totally  unlike  him  and  showed 
either extreme fatigue, an awareness of failure, or both. Sukarno 
spoke again on October 3, this time in a tone of anger. He denied 
Suharto's accusations that the Air Force had been involved in the 
September 30 Movement and explained his presence at Halim Air 
Base as being at his own volition in order to be near a plane. 
Incredibly, he again made no comment regarding the attacks on the 
country's top military commanders. Sukarno's defense of the Air 
Force was particularly incredible given Dani's order of the day, the 
staging of the raids from Halim, and the retreat of the 454th Battalion 
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there. This was part of a transparently false effort to exonerate the 
PKI and the Air Force (as well as Sukarno) and claim that the whole 
affair was nothing more than an internal Army matter. This original 
cover story might have appeared plausible if the enterprise had been 
successful but everything had gone wrong and it was clear that both 
the emperor and his men were without clothes. Unfortunately, a 
number of distant foreign observers of Indonesia (those at Cornell 
and others) repeated this version and some have become entrenched 
in this position, whatever their reasons. 
The cabinet meeting of October 6 was not attended by Nasution, 
who was preoccupied with his dying daughter, nor by Suharto who 
was not in the cabinet. Although the subject of the meeting was the 
September 30 Affair (soon to be called "Gestapu" from a clever 
acronym based on the Indonesian words Gerakan September Tiga 
Puluh - Movement of September 30), Sukarno's posture was one of 
restoring normalcy and ignoring or slighting what had happened. He 
did condemn the killings themselves (privately he defended them on 
at least one reported occasion) and held the dismissal of the cabinet 
by the Revolutionary Council to be illegal. (7) Sukarno also did not 
express appreciation to Kostrad, he did not condemn Untung, 
Supardjo and the others, and he did not express disbelief in the 
rationale for the Untung coup - that is the prevention of a coup by a 
General's Council. Indeed he implied the opposite and that posture of 
his was to be clear in all that followed. He called for a halt to all 
anti-communist agitation, defended Nasakom, defended the Chinese 
link and demanded restoration of calm, return to the status quo ante 
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and  he  promised  a  political  solution  by  him  and  him  alone 
somewhere down the road. He also met privately with Lukman and 
Njoto and reportedly received a written message from Aidit at this 
time as well as other messages later. According to the trial testimony, 
only one Aidit message was intercepted and that message proposed 
six points for Sukarno to follow, the main themes of which were to 
shift  the  re-establishment  of  security  to  the  police,  to  condemn 
neither the Revolutionary Council nor the Generals' Council but to 
treat them equally, to instill calm and a return to normalcy and to 
promise a political solution later by the Great Leader himself. 
Actually Sukarno was already doing most of these things and his 
later statement of October 23 made all these points. 
Although  the  September  30  Movement  soon  collapsed  in 
Central Java, this region and others remained highly unstable.(8) The 
Diponegoro Division Commander, General Surjosumpeno, could not 
fully count on many of his units and he soon ordered the return of 
several battalions from duty in other islands. The situation was 
sufficiently chaotic that the RPKAD battalions under Sarwo Edhie, 
now promoted to Brigadier General, were sent to Central Java. They 
arrived on October 17. The PKI leaders, such as Aidit, had no great 
difficulty in moving around Central Java in this early period but 
there  was  initially  no  effort  to  organize  a  communist  armed 
resistance. They were following the same old strategy of relying on 
Bung Karno to shield the Party and to contain the outburst of Army 
fury that had been loosed. It was a reasonable gamble since the 
alternative would have given the Army an even greater excuse for a 
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crack down which it had the ultimate capacity to effect. However, 
this policy failed and Aidit has been roundly condemned for his 
over-reliance  on  Sukarno  by  communist second-guessers ranging 
from PKI remnants to the Chinese to the Soviets. Their criticisms are 
based more on their own interests in self-justification and positioning 
themselves against rivals than on the Indonesian realities that 
confronted Aidit, however. As Aidit began to see in mid-October 
that  Sukarno was  being  ignored  and  that  Suharto  was  intent  on 
turning the September 30 fiasco into an opportunity to crush the PKI, 
widespread but ultimately ineffectual communist attacks, 
intimidation and terror began to take place in Central Java after 
October 21 or 22, particularly in the area around the towns of Klaten 
and Bojolali that had been the scenes of violent rural clashes in 
mid-1964. Several  police  stations were  overrun, communist road 
blocks were established, several hundred PKI opponents were 
reportedly killed and thousands were intimidated. This wave of 
violence was soon suppressed by the RPKAD, however, and the 
tables were turned. As the RPKAD now began a serious hunt for 
Aidit and other PKI leaders, aroused anti-communist civilians began 
to kill their communist neighbors. The fury of the great massacres 
had begun. 
Much has already been written on the slaughter of communists 
and other civilians, many of whom were undoubtedly innocent 
victims of the hysteria or of a neighbor's long smoldering enmity. 
Along with other political officers of our embassy, I was among the 
first to report the wave of stories and rumors reaching Jakarta. This 
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was before the stories reached the American press and a host of 
journalists descended, often for a quick week or two of instant 
expertise. No one has the slightest idea of how many people were 
killed since the people doing the killing weren't talking in most cases 
while the stories were coming in second and third and ninetieth hand. 
In retrospect, I believe there was a tendency to overestimate the 
numbers at the time and I am indebted for these views to a colleague 
of those years, Dick Howland, who wrote a very thoughtful piece for 
internal US government consumption on this issue. The point is not 
to minimize the tragedy but to seek some kind of objectivity where 
reliable  data  cannot  and  will  never  be  available.  Several  points 
should  be  kept  in  mind  as  arguments  on  the  side  of  lowered 
estimates. First, there was a tremendous tendency toward gross 
exaggeration long before the tragedy. I remember a political rally in 
Medan where the distant central party organization of the PNI in 
Jakarta claimed a million people were in attendance. However, the 
local PNI paper had only claimed 100,000 and I was told later by 
Americans who observed the rally that the crowd could not have 
been more than 10,000. The level of exaggeration in that case, and in 
others,  was  not  minimal;  it  was  spectacular.  We  had  initially 
forgotten about this disposition toward gross exaggeration, given the 
sensational quality of the news. Reports were coming in of 10,000, 
20,000 or 50,000 people being killed in this town and that, often 
where the normal population was no greater than that. Rivers were 
supposedly being choked with bodies but when our Consul General 
in Surabaya, a fluent Indonesian speaker with ten consecutive years 
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of working on Indonesia in Washington and Jakarta, dashed off to 
the  alleged sites, he  found nothing. The British Consul General, 
whose house was located alongside the Brantas River, did see three 
bodies wash up on the river bank but that is a far cry from the 
exaggerated stories that reached the foreign press. 
Another factor was that  some local  Army officers who had 
flirted with the PKI in its heyday were now anxious to demonstrate 
their anti communist credentials. Some encouraged killing but more 
of them talked an even more extravagant game. The single most 
extreme claim we heard came from such an Indonesian Army officer 
in a particular middle-sized Javanese town. Another factor was that 
many PKI members and sympathizers, fearing the terror that was all 
too evident, simply fled to other places or to relatives. It was often 
assumed that all the missing were dead. Finally, I regret to say that 
there was a certain competition among foreign newsmen to come up 
with a more sensational story than the next guy. Embassy officers 
talked to many of these visiting journalists and began telling them 
that an honest story would say that there was no way of setting a 
figure; even well positioned Indonesians were telling us the same. I 
recall the answers of some journalists that they had to come up with 
a figure that was higher than the last one reported or they would 
strike out with their papers. One of these fellows was the first to 
reach the million mark, if I remember correctly. He was in Indonesia 
for a whole week. In saying all this, I do not wish to disparage a lot 
of fine reporting and often thoughtful efforts to get at the truth to the 
degree  possible  by  such  journalists  as  John  Hughes  and  Denis 
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Warner. Some of those who made the comments noted above were 
also basically good reporters but were under a great deal of pressure 
to compete. Although few were so honest as to acknowledge it, there 
was a considerable subconscious pressure on everyone to inflate the 
numbers and make a better story. This does not imply that numbers 
were manufactured from nothing; it simply means that the stories of 
50,000 in town X, 100,000 in Y province, etc., could simply be 
added up indiscriminately to reach large numbers despite the 
possibilities of overlap, of no real sources for the fragmentary figures 
being added, and for the fact that much of the real killing was going 
on at night and at least in semi-secrecy. The plain fact was that the 
country  was  in  a  state  of  chaos  and  there  was  no  coherent 
government structure or rule of law in the affected areas. I have no 
"wise" estimate and distrust all such supposedly balanced, educated 
guesses. The slaughter could range from the 87,000 once announced 
by Sukarno to the million figure some have mentioned. Indeed, it 
could even be less or more than that range. Whatever it was, it was 
an appalling event. 
These killings tended to be concentrated in particular regions 
and to occur at different times. Central Java was first and reflected 
the rural tensions that had been rubbed raw by the 
Sukarno-supported PKI land reform drive of 1964. East Java was 
similar but    the conflicts were  further exacerbated  by the 
abangan-santri class division and by the anti-communist militancy of 
the local NU party (in contrast to its Sukarnoist Jakarta-level 
leadership).  Bali   was  affected  by   the   creeping  settlement  of 
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land-hungry Javanese peasants into the Western portion of the island 
during the previous decade or so and by PNI resentment that its once 
dominant position had been eroded by a burgeoning local PKI that 
was  supported  by  an  unusual  conglomeration  of  communist  or 
pro-communist top island officials in the Governor's palace, the army 
and  the  police.  North  Sumatra, the  fourth  scene  of  concentrated 
violence, had  been  rent  by  conflicts between the  Sumatrans and 
imported Javanese estate workers (i.e. - rubber plantations) as well as 
by rifts between rival Sumatran tribal groupings. Sukarno and the 
PKI were not responsible for the underlying social conflicts but they 
bore most of the responsibility for inflaming the issues in a 
revolutionary rather than a problem-solving direction. It is also clear 
to  me  that  Sukarno's post-Gestapu behavior  tended  to  incite  the 
Army and anti-communist civilians to strike much harder than would 
otherwise have been the case because of their fear that this 
overpowering  figure,  who  had  made  an  imprint  on  Indonesian 
history like that of Napoleon on France, would somehow pull it all 
out. 
 
If he were to do so, it would have to be without the support base 
of the PKI whose leadership and cadre structure continued to be 
hunted down and systematically destroyed. The deaths of Lukman 
and Njoto have been mentioned. Aidit himself was reportedly 
captured  on  November 22  by  the  RPKAD in  Central  Java  after 
betrayal by an intelligence agent who had infiltrated the local Party 
organization. He was summarily executed and buried secretly. The 
capture  and  death  of  the  PKI  chairman  is  shrouded in  mystery. 
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Various alleged interrogation reports appeared in Jakarta in the 
months that followed as well as an alleged confession in a Japanese 
newspaper  but  all  of  these  documents  appeared  suspect.(9)  The 
entire Politburo was eventually wiped out except for one member 
who was fortunate enough to have been in China and who remained 
there. Most of the Central Committee met similar fates. In spite of 
the round-up of the PKI, Sukarno continued to defend the Party as 
best he could and to proclaim his dissatisfaction with the flow of 
events. There are some indications that he even communicated 
secretly with Aidit before the latter's capture although that evidence 
is tenuous. He gave a speech to a group of university students in 
December  that  was  not  carried  by  any  newspaper  in  which  he 
dwelled on how much the PKI had contributed to the Revolution. 
"The PKI", he said, "has contributed more than any other party or 
group". He referred particularly to the thousands of PKI members 
who had been killed or arrested in the 1926 uprising, a repetition of 
his identification with the 1926 PKI rebellion that he had projected in 
his July and September speeches to the PNI and PSII.(l0) Two weeks 
earlier, he had told the Air Force Command and staff school that the 
Indonesian revolution was leftist and that no one could change its 
leftist course, neither generals, nor political organizations nor foreign 
ambassadors.(11) In a speech in Bogor in mid-January on the day 
when violence was narrowly avoided between the anti-communist 
KAMI student organization and the Tjakrabirawa, Sukarno 
thundered that he could not change. Those who wanted to follow him 
should follow, those who liked him should defend him. He then 
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changed his voice into what sounded like an order for coming action, 
"form your ranks, do not act wildly, await my command".(l2) The 
so-called Sukarno Front soon followed. 
Indeed, Sukarno really did appear at times to have the potential 
to get it all back. From October 1 until Suharto's seizure of state 
power on March 11, the Great Leader was down but never out and 
there was a duality of power in the country that has few parallels in 
history - a brief period in the Russian revolution during the rise of 
the Soviets alongside the Kerensky Government being the only such 
event that comes to mind. Adam Malik, the central figure in the 
Sukarnoist movement of 1964, 
a  close  collaborator of  the  Army at  this  time,  and  a  future 
foreign  minister  and  vice-president,  told  Ambassador  Marshall 
Green in late January, 1966 that he was not optimistic and believed 
there was a 50-50 chance that Sukarno would get away with it after 
all and resume Indonesia's march toward communism.(13) 
The above comments by Malik had followed a meeting between 
Sukarno and his top leaders and cronies plus the military service 
commanders in which the President had insisted on Nasakom and 
demanded that all his commands be executed. No one demurred. 
Nasution seemed grateful as early as October that he had succeeded 
at long last in establishing warm working relations with Sukarno and 
had exchanged several warm hand-delivered personal letters with the 
President. Hope springs eternal, apparently, as Nasution was said to 
feel that he was "making headway" with the President.(14) The early 
sense of surface calm after the September 30 affair persisted for 
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some days and is reflected in the somewhat curious nature of the 
Indonesian press and of the news agency, Antara, which went on in a 
kind of business as usual fashion, printing the same old anti-Nekolim 
slogans, talking about the New Emerging Forces and a big 
international anti-Western bases propaganda show on Bali called by 
its Indonesian acronym, KIAPMA. Not much was said in the Antara 
press coverage for a  while about the September 30 affair which 
seemed  to  be  treated  as  an  acute  embarrassment. Following the 
generals'  funeral  and  Sukarno's  defiance,  the  word  was  quietly 
passed to Moslem and other anti-communist youths to begin sacking 
PKI buildings, book stores etc., and this became a chief characteristic 
of Jakarta life in mid-October. I was among those who witnessed 
some of these scenes from a distance including the destruction of the 
three communist book stores in Jakarta that I had visited once a 
month or so for the previous two years or more. One was an annex to 
the main PKI headquarters which was being sacked. Formerly hostile 
crowds had now become friendly to Americans although there was 
yet no real contact. At first, there was a tendency to assume that the 
changes underway would lead no further than the ascendancy of a 
leftist (Ali) PNI syndrome rather than that of the PKI. 
This was not to be, however, as the genie was thoroughly out of 
the bottle. In the weeks that followed, the new student movement 
began to be organized into KAMI (university students) followed a 
little later by KAPPI (secondary students). These movements were 
not entirely spontaneous and were fanned by the underground 
Masjumi, the PSI and sympathetic elements in the Army such as 
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Sarwo Edhie of the RPKAD and Kemal Idris, Suharto's successor as 
commander  of  KOSTRAD  following  Suharto's  promotion  and 
Kemal Idris' quick and successful suppression of the PKI and its 
sympathizers in North Sumatra. The students, sometimes reinforced 
by sympathetic Army men in civilian clothes, came close to an open 
battle with the Tjakrabirawa in Bogor as they demonstrated 
increasingly against the President as well as Subandrio and the PKI. 
The student movement was gaining strength and self-confidence and 
it was also gaining a will of its own under its own young leaders. Its 
courage and discipline were  impressive. I remember one 
demonstration against Subandrio who, in  his First Deputy Prime 
Minister capacity, had taken over former First Minister Djuanda's 
office next door to our Embassy after Djuanda's death. The students 
marched up the street by thousands in columns of platoons and were 
faced by troops who began firing volleys over their heads. As rifles 
came to shoulders, the students dropped prone on the street as if by 
pre-arranged signal, then promptly rose and resumed their progress 
between volleys. It is not clear whether Subandrio was there or not 
but the noisy demonstration was not halted although no effort was 
made by the students to penetrate the building on that occasion. The 
non-communists had learned well from the communist side how to 
orchestrate a  demonstration involving cooperation between 
demonstrators and government forces according to a pre-arranged 
scenario. It was also in the tradition of the Indonesian wajang or 
shadow play, a tradition that tends to emphasize the posturing and 
disposition of forces rather than their actual use. 
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Although the masses were by now aroused in their millions 
against him, Sukarno had the determination to fight back. The man 
may have wavered on more than one occasion in the face of an 
immediate  physical  confrontation but  he  had  the  courage  or  the 
stubborn commitment to stick to his guns as long as the threat was 
less than immediate. An effort was made in January to organize a 
mass action counter-attack under the slogan of a "Sukarno Front" 
(Barisan  Sukarno).  This  front  was  nominally  headed  by  Chairul 
Saleh who was now back in Sukarno's favor, given the dwindling 
choices available, but Saleh turned over operational control to Lt. 
Col. Sjafie, a somewhat mysterious police officer with criminal 
connections who had become a minister attached to the Presidium 
with responsibility for security. Sjafie worked diligently to organize 
leftist students as a counter to KAMI. The Partindo Party, which the 
Army was reluctant to suppress because of the known personal 
closeness of its leaders to Sukarno, became a front for the infusion of 
thousands of PKI militants. Occasional clashes occurred while the 
leftist youth had the support of friendly military units such as the 
Tjakrabirawa, the Marines and some units of the police. Efforts were 
also made to mobilize support in East and Central Java where any 
kind of backing could be found, as  among the Marines. Retired 
General  Bambang  Supeno  (Nasution's  old  nemesis  of  ten  years 
earlier and not, of course, identical with the younger officer of the 
same name who commanded the 530th battalion) was enlisted to 
recruit a basis of support in his old East Java Brawijaya Division. He 
later became the main figure in the Sukarno Front efforts of a later 
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period. All these efforts were to little avail, however. The Army 
countered the Sukarno Front gambit with a tactic reminiscent of the 
Sukarnoism movement of 1964. It proclaimed itself, and encouraged 
all its provincial supporters to declare themselves, members of the 
Sukarno Front. Everyone still claimed to support the mystical figure 
of "Bung Karno", however remote that image might be from the real 
Bung Karno whose political position was clear for all to see even if 
no one wanted to admit it publicly. 
The real Bung Karno kept trying, however. He suddenly 
announced a new cabinet on February 21, 1966. The new cabinet 
was more left-leaning than its predecessors with the addition of a 
number of additional crypto communists. Open communists were all 
on the run or dead. The biggest surprise was not who was in the 
cabinet but rather who was dropped-- General Nasution as Minister 
of   Defense.   The   General,   in   accordance   with   his   inimitable 
vacillating style, accepted his expulsion meekly and in the process 
lost much of the respect of the Army, the student movement, and 
other anti-communist forces. The people now turned to Suharto as 
their principal hope for firmness against a Sukarno effort to reclaim 
his authority and return even more forcefully to a pro-communist 
path. They also turned to themselves. The now powerful student 
groups, KAMI and KAPPI, launched massive demonstrations that 
openly began attacking Sukarno himself for the first time. The Palace 
was surrounded and members of Sukarno's new cabinet were 
prevented from arriving by normal means. Confrontation between 
the Tjakrabirawa and the students ensued, shooting occurred, and a 
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student was killed. The crowd was boisterous but more festive than 
ugly. The dead student, Arif Rachman Hakim, became a martyr and 
the students were galvanized into increasing the pressure despite 
Sukarno's prompt banning of KAMI, a ban that was ignored. 
Although students were in the forefront, others were also active. One 
retired Army officer I knew supplemented his behind the scenes 
support of the student movement by "arresting" communist cabinet 
ministers and taking them to KOSTRAD, where they would soon be 
released. The Army was not prepared to move against the President 
directly as yet although it did not discourage this popular pressure 
either. 
Tension was clearly mounting to a breaking point. The week of 
March 6-11 became crucial. A KAMI and KAPPI led mob attacked 
the Foreign Ministry in an anti-Subandrio gesture on March 8 and 
wreaked great destruction. Simultaneously a Sukarno Front mob was 
staged out of the Partindo headquarters down the street from the 
American Embassy and launched an attack on the Embassy that was 
not just one of the show demonstrations of the past but an attack with 
blood in the eye. Fortunately the once-open Embassy had been 
provided with heavy grillwork and other defensive measures that 
made penetration difficult without high explosives. The mob set fire 
to more than thirty automobiles and lobbed a few Molotov cocktails 
against the front of the building (one came through the window of 
Political Counsellor Ed Masters) but the mob itself did not get in. Its 
members finally retreated into Merdeka Square just as the 
KAMI/KAPPI mob  was  driven there  from the  Foreign Ministry. 
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Troops intervened and the two groups were dispersed amid a hail of 
gunfire, all in the air. Our embassy soon received intelligence reports 
that a more serious attack was being readied for March 12 with the 
intent of entering and killing the occupants of our embassy (or so it 
was said). A hectic burning of almost all our documents took place 
on March 10 and 11 and was stopped only in the early evening when 
an Indonesian with high Army connections telephoned to say that 
Suharto had sent three generals to Sukarno in Bogor with an 
ultimatum to surrender power and that Sukarno had done so. At long 
last it was all over, he said. 
This is getting ahead of the story a bit, however, as Sukarno was 
making a serious bid that week to recoup his power. He scheduled a 
series of meetings with the country's elite at which he planned to face 
them down, beginning with the most easily pressured level and 
gathering momentum toward the final confrontation with the military 
leadership including regional commanders on Saturday, March 12. 
During the March 10 meeting with representatives of eight political 
parties  (Murba was  still  banned and  the  PKI  was  obviously not 
represented), Sukarno demanded complete obedience and renewal of 
the struggle against "Nekolim". Threats were made and all the 
participants  including  General  Sukendro  of  the  pro-Army  IP-KI 
Party succumbed to the pressure and signed a pledge of fidelity to 
the President and his policies. The next day a cabinet session was 
held in Merdeka Palace with the same end in mind. It was never 
completed, however, as word was brought to Sukarno that unknown 
troops (the RPKAD) were moving in, as indeed they were. Sukarno, 
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Subandrio and Saleh fled to a helicopter and were lifted to Bogor as 
the  cabinet session broke into confusion. This became a  famous 
scene with Subandrio forced to leave so rapidly that he left his shoes 
behind.  This  was  also  a  period  of  Sukarno  efforts  to  mobilize 
military forces on his behalf and it appears that he received a pledge 
from Marine General Hartono to use his forces to defend the 
President. With the military meeting still on and with leftist troops 
and mobs baring their teeth for a confrontation, no one could be 
absolutely sure that the Suharto-led Army would stand firm. Suharto 
again proved himself a man with a keen sense of how and when to 
apply decisive power in a forceful yet gentle way allowing his 
antagonist a line of retreat. Three senior generals, Basuki Rachmat, 
Andi Jusuf and Amir Machmud were sent to Bogor with a paper for 
Sukarno to sign that in effect turned over all significant power to 
Suharto while leaving Sukarno with his titles. Although apparently 
presented with outward politeness and signs of respect, the quality of 
ultimatum was made crystal clear. Following the already 
well-established pattern of his life, Sukarno gave in to the pressure of 
an open, immediate confrontation. The next day witnessed a joyous 
celebration by the students and most of the people of Jakarta, 
complete with a military parade. 
If the late morning of October 1, 1965 marked the turning point 
for the collapse of the Sukarno-led communist effort to take total 
power in Indonesia, March 11, 1966 was the second turning point 
whereby a period of dual power and anarchy was ended and a "new 
order"  for  Indonesia firmly initiated.  Sukarno would continue to 
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struggle like a helpless, doomed insect but there was never any doubt 
of the outcome. Subandrio, Dani and various other pro-communist 
ministers  were  soon  arrested;  a  new  cabinet  was  formed  under 
Suharto with Adam Malik and the Sultan of Yogyakarta as parts of 
an initial triumvirate; the jails were emptied of anti-communist 
political prisoners and efforts were begun to shift Indonesia's internal 
and external orientation. 
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Footnotes – Chapter XIV 
 
 
 
1. An English translation of the editorial appears in Hughes, p. 78. 
 
2. Tempo, October 6, 1984, Ruslan Abdulgani statement. 
 
3. A detailed analysis of the Harian Rakjat and Suluh Indonesia 
editions of October 2 appears in Benjamin R. Anderson and 
Ruth T. McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965  
Coup in Indonesia (Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press) 
1971. This is the controversial "Cornell Paper" that was 
criticized by many for its view that the September 30 affair was 
primarily an internal army coup by disgruntled younger officers, 
mainly from the Central Java Diponegoro Division, who 
succeeded in drawing the PKI and Sukarno into the affair as 
"dupes". While it should be obvious that I disagree 
fundamentally with that thesis, the Cornell paper does contain 
useful information and insights at the level of micro-analysis. 
However,I know of no one in the US Government who was 
there, no other knowledgeable diplomat or journalist on the 
scene, and no Indonesian official of any political complexion 
(with the possible exception of the PKI) who agreed with the 
thesis of the Cornell paper. The authors were led astray in part, I 
believe, by distance from the scene and the obvious Army effort 
to slant the material to serve its political goal of destroying the 
PKI while covering up for Sukarno. The Army initially did not 
really understand Sukarno's role very well either and was 
wedded to the idea that he had been manipulated by the PKI and 
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that gray eminence, Subandrio. The real failure of perception at 
Cornell was similar to that of the Army, an inability to 
comprehend Sukarno's drive to "enter the socialist stage" in the 
immediate future in spite of everything that the President had 
been saying and doing. The authors' dissatisfaction with the 
inadequacies of the official explanation led them to an even 
more idiosyncratic explanation that stretched credulity - the 
postulation of a fiendishly clever group of young officers in 
place of the reality of a not very bright assortment of Sukarno 
loyalists whose concept of discipline led them to personal ruin 
for the sake of a leader whose commands were law. 
4. Bambang Widjanarko, pp.25-27. 
 
5. See Jones, p.389, Bambang Widjanarko, p.33. 
 
6. The Coup that Backfired, p.88. 
 
7. Several writers have reported the remarks of General Sutjipto 
that some two weeks after the murders Sukarno told him that 
the generals had been executed with dignity by a kind of 
People's Court and with apologies to the victims. His 
description made it all seem very nice. See The Coup that  
Backfired pp. 92-93. Also Hughes, pp 44-45. This Sutjipto was 
an Army Major General on the staff of KOTI, the Supreme 
Command, and was not identical with either of the two police 
generals of that name who have been mentioned in this work, 
although neither of the above sources provides a clear 
identification. 
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8. A description of the September 30 Movement in Central Java 
and Surjosumpeno's escape does not seem necessary to this 
work. Fairly detailed accounts are available in Notosusanto and 
Saleh, pp 52-59 and in Hughes, pp.143-146. 
9. The classical account of Aidit's capture appears in The Coup  
That Backfired, pp. 77-84. Also see Hughes 162-172. I received 
an excited report of Aidit's alleged capture from a student 
activist who had reportedly heard it from the Army some weeks 
before the November 22 date. The news was later disavowed by 
the source. I have often wondered whether this first report may 
not have been true after all and that Aidit underwent more 
prolonged interrogation efforts than would have been possible 
in the official version where death soon followed capture. 
 
10.  American Embassy Jakarta telegram 1842 of December 22, 
 
1965, Indonesia Country File, National Security File, LBJ 
Library. 
11.  American Embassy Jakarta telegram 1654 of December 4, 1965, 
Indonesia Country File, National Security File, LBJ Library. 
12.  American Embassy Jakarta telegram 2077 of January 17, 1965, 
Indonesia Country File, National Security File, LBJ Library 
13.  American Embassy Jakarta telegram 2183 of January 28, 1966, 
Indonesia Country File, National Security File, LBJ Library 
14.  American Embassy Jakarta telegram 1181 of October 25, 1965, 
Indonesia Country File, National Security File, LBJ Library. 
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XV 
 
Nationalism and Communism  
 
in Indonesia and Elsewhere 
 
 
 
Before  proceeding  with  an  examination  of  the  direct  and 
indirect effects of the unexpected collapse of Indonesian communism 
on other countries and on the balance of power in Asia, some further 
summary remarks  on  Sukarno  and  Indonesian communism seem 
necessary. These will be set forth in this chapter and the next. 
In developing my views on the importance of Sukarno's 
ideological commitment toward a communist future for Indonesia as 
the key to the otherwise bizarre September 30 Movement's abortive 
coup, I have become aware of the great difficulty many people have 
in seeing Sukarno as a "communist". These discussions tended to 
founder on at least three obstacles that have both semantic and 
conceptual roots and cause people to talk past each other. One 
problem was the tendency in the West, and in the United States in 
particular,   to   view   communism   and   nationalism   as   mutually 
exclusive  absolutes. Of  course,  everyone  also  knows  that  Soviet 
communism and Russian nationalism co-existed and were 
interwoven and that the communist-led upheavals in places like 
Vietnam and Cuba had strong national roots. Yet there has been a 
tendency to argue that a movement or a particular figure was at 
bottom either a communist or a nationalist. These arguments still go 
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on in the somewhat fruitless debates over whether we "drove" Castro 
from a virgin-like pure nationalism toward communism or whether 
Ho Chi-Minh might not have been rescued for a kind of liberal 
democratic or at least "Titoist" Vietnamese nationalism if only we 
had sided with him against the French. There is far too much liberal 
romanticism and wishful thinking in these positions but one must 
also  admit  that  something  similar  has  occasionally  appeared  to 
happen as in the apparently genuine conversion of Aung San in 
Burma from his underground communist party membership before 
1944 to a kind of democratic and national-centered socialism before 
his assassination in 1948. This can be explained, at least in part, by 
the policies of the British Labor Government under Prime Minister 
Attlee and the attitudes of Admiral Mountbatten but it was also a 
reflection of Aung San's capacity for intellectual growth. The need 
for Americans to categorize national Marxist leaders one way or the 
other was propelled to a great extent by the early post-war view that 
nationalism was "the great bulwark against communism", a view that 
rose from the heavy dependence of weak Marxist parties on Soviet 
support during the late 1940s and early 1950s and on the claims of 
communism itself to be a unified international movement. The test of 
true communism appeared to be, and to a great extent was, abject 
fidelity to an omniscient Moscow. Beneath the surface, this 
international orientation was always suspect; the break-up of 
Moscow's authority made it more so. Still, the subconscious after 
effects linger on in our thinking. 
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A second problem is the residue of McCarthyism on the liberal 
mind in the United States. The irresponsible demagoguery of 
McCarthy and other right wing extremists in the late 1940s and early 
1950s led to an excessive reaction. It became not only unfashionable 
but a sign of implicit intellectual bankruptcy to regard a radical third 
world  figure  as  "communist",  however  radical  and  Marxist  the 
content of his rhetoric or his policies. Some writers on Indonesia 
have dismissed even the possibility of examining a communist basis 
to Sukarno's outlook with a flip assertion that the easy thing to do 
would be to label Sukarno a communist. The implication is that 
anyone who adopts such a hypothesis must be a political Neanderthal 
with a bent toward Fascism. This position might be sustained if the 
criticism   were   to   be   followed   up   with   an   imaginative   and 
well-documented analysis of Sukarno's motivations that could really 
explain why he so thoroughly identified himself with the communist 
party  internally  and  with  the  more  extreme  communist  parties 
abroad. Instead he is portrayed as a political eunuch or as an 
opportunistic intellectual lightweight. While simplistic and emotional 
communist labels must be eschewed, I believe that the equally 
simplistic and emotional dismissal of such a possibility should also 
be avoided. The merits of the case should be argued, not dismissed 
without argument through the  implicit intimidation that  one  is  a 
Neanderthal for daring to believe that people may have been 
communists who acted and talked that way. 
A  third  impediment  to  seeing  the  communist  quality  of 
 
Sukarno's political orientation is the subconscious picture that most 
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Americans had of communists as ascetic or at least very serious 
appearing men in proletarian suits of the Stalin or Mao variety who 
fit some kind of standardized personality mold or image. There has 
been such a syndrome in communist behavior in most places and 
most times but it is hardly an essential point and, in any case, there 
have been many exceptions. It is true that the young PKI leaders 
were conservatively dressed and of sober demeanor, although not 
nearly to the degree of their Chinese comrades, but Sukarno never 
felt a need to abide by such conventions for a variety of reasons 
including his need to play to broad national (and especially Javanese) 
expectations about the properties of a paramount leader, his need to 
be a11 things to all men for the sake of the early stages of the 
revolution and, far  from least, his  own ebullient personality and 
epicurean tastes. Although Marxism-Leninism claimed to be an 
internationalist doctrine, its primary inner appeal has been to 
paranoiac nationalism. Indeed, communism has only been successful 
in appealing to portions of national elites in those have-not or 
degraded countries like Russia, China, Indonesia, and much of the 
Middle East where there was a highly developed sense of national 
inferiority coupled with a considerable sense of potential (or lost) 
grandeur.(1) Marxism's implicit paranoiac appeal was to blame one's 
troubles on someone else (capitalism, imperialism, colonialism, etc) 
and  to  project  visions  of  grandeur  (building  socialism  and  then 
communism, ending exploitation of  man  by  man,  having a  total 
monopoly on revealed truth). At the individual level, a person who 
typically lapses into a paranoiac approach toward dealing with felt 
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inferiority is not so much the fellow with a 90 IQ but the confused 
and disoriented fellow with a 120 IQ who knows he has the basic 
mental equipment to succeed but is not doing so. He could (and may) 
take  a  problem-solving approach of  lowering his expectations or 
improving his qualifications by hard work and study or by some 
combination of the two but it is much easier to blame it all on others. 
While nations cannot be regarded as organic personalities 
susceptible, en masse, to structural psychological afflictions like 
paranoia and catatonic schizophrenia (avoidance of an unpleasant 
reality by shutting out its very existence), politically conscious 
nationalists may  and  do  identify  with  their  nations in  ways that 
closely   resemble individual  psychological behavior, in my 
observation. Marxism has intellectual features that may be examined 
on their objective merits but the appeal to nationalist elites has 
primarily been to these intrinsic paranoiac qualities in the core 
doctrinal tenets of Marxism. A corollary, incidentally, is that no 
individual chooses a paranoiac course of behavior for the sake of 
someone else's ego; he does so only for his own ego. Similarly, no 
nationalist leader chooses a paranoiac solution (communism is only 
one) to the problems of an "inferior" nation with "superior" 
aspirations for the sake of some external power (i.e. Moscow or 
Peking), he does it for the sake of his own nation. Paradoxically, the 
purportedly internationalist doctrine of Marxism was almost 
inevitably destined to attract rabidly nationalist adherents - to the 
degree, of course, that they achieved power on the basis of their own 
efforts. 
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This quasi-psychological digression seems useful in order to 
explain the nature of Sukarno and other Indonesian 
Marxist-nationalists, whether they were formally in the PKI or not. 
My view of the young Sukarno, and this is hardly controversial, is of 
an intelligent, sensitive, romantic, young man who became steeped at 
an early age in the glories of Javanese culture and then immersed 
himself in the heady atmosphere of radical nationalist politics. It is 
clear   that  he  was  highly  resentful  of  Dutch  supremacy  and 
hyper-sensitive to racial slights. These feelings were not uncommon 
for  most  subjugated  peoples  but  Sukarno  felt  them  especially 
strongly. His story of his brief boyhood courting of a Dutch girl and 
the crude rejection by her family was revealing of this sensitivity as 
were some of his comments to Ambassador Howard Jones. On one 
occasion, he put his bare brown arm alongside the white arm of 
Jones and gave forth a bitter soliloquy on the slights he had suffered 
or thought he had suffered as a young man.(2) Sukarno was more of 
an intellectual and theoretician than most people have given him 
credit for but he was attracted to Marxism from deep emotional 
needs. His mental agility then gave him the capacity to adapt that 
Marxism  to  his  individual  needs  and  to  construct  an  elaborate 
network of Marxist rationalizations to express his needs. One of 
Sukarno's deepest impressions appears to have been his secret but 
very minor role in the 1926 PKI uprising which he alluded to time 
and again in 1965.(3) The scene was always the same and had to do 
with a message being smuggled from an imprisoned PKI "leader" in 
the Ciamis jail to Sukarno to "carry on the struggle". Sukarno never 
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revealed who was the source of the message or precisely what his tie 
to the 1926 PKI had been. His role was probably minor and whatever 
germ of truth there was had probably become magnified in Sukarno's 
mind over the years. However imaginary and however inflated, this 
linkage seems to have been extremely important to Sukarno's 
romantic view of himself as a revolutionary of heroic quality. The 
fact that he had to keep this early PKI linkage secret or at least 
obscure over the decades to protect his credentials as the pre-eminent 
non-sectarian national leader appears to have increased its 
significance to Sukarno and to have romanticized it. 
Sukarno's Marxism was in one sense subordinate to his 
nationalism in that he could never countenance subordination to a 
foreign political party or country. He also was clear-sighted in seeing 
independence as the major early goal to which all else, including 
social reform, should be subordinated. Achievement of communism 
without a Nasakom way-station was unthinkable to Sukarno since 
the first goal was to mobilize all  the national forces against the 
colonial power. After independence had been achieved and become 
more or  less  old hat, the  need for further revolutionary struggle 
became an increasing psychological need for a man like Sukarno 
who  romanticized  his  self-appointed  role  as  the  leader  of  a 
continuing revolution. The  dialectic  of  history then  provided the 
intellectual justification to express the deep craving Sukarno felt for 
continuing revolutionary upheaval. The communist dialectic itself 
had justified the subordination of purely communist goals to national 
goals  in  the  independence  struggle.  That  same  dialectic  now 
382 
 
 
sanctioned, and even demanded, a shift to ultimate communist goals. 
A belief in a revolution of different stages was deeply ingrained in 
Sukarno's thought process. It may be noted, incidentally, that this is 
not merely the thought processes of 1965; it was always there in the 
past, even if muted. It is implicit in the Nasakom idea that goes back 
to 1927. The two stage revolution also appears in some of Sukarno's 
statements and writings of  the  early post war period, notably in 
"Sarinah",  a  publication  of  the  year  1947.  According  to  the 
Australian biographer, C.L.M. Penders, Sukarno, "unlike some of the 
socialists and communists ... who considered the revolution foremost 
as a movement for social and economic change, ... argued that the 
revolution was solely nationalistic and that a social-economic 
revolution should not be attempted until after complete national 
freedom and consolidation had been achieved". Penders went on to 
cite Sukarno's views from "Sarinah" as saying that Indonesia "had 
only  reached  the  national  revolutionary phase  in  the  world-wide 
struggle against capitalism and imperialism, and all efforts therefore 
should be directed at establishing an Indonesian nationalist state, 
which was a pre-requisite for any true socio-economic development. 
National unity was of the utmost importance and a class struggle 
should be avoided".(4) This position explains Sukarno's posture of 
unity at all costs in the early post-war period but it also points to a 
commitment for the  true revolutionary to  move on to  the  social 
revolution in a later stage and that is exactly what Sukarno was 
saying  in  1965  -  that  the  time  had  at  last  come  for  the  social 
revolution to become paramount. There is no contradiction between 
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these  two  postures of  unity  and  independence first  in  1947  and 
achievement of "socialism" as the top priority in 1965 along with its 
handmaiden of "progressive revolutionary unity" based on the PKI 
and those fellow travellers willing to go all the way with a now 
identical Sukarno/PKI prescription for the real Marxist revolution. 
The two stages concept is also enshrined in the Political Manifesto 
(Manipol) of August 17, 1959 and I would attribute its presence 
there to Sukarno himself even though Aidit may have had a hand, as 
claimed, in the drafting of that speech. Sukarno was far too much a 
master of language and far too knowledgeable about ideology and 
doctrine to accept material he opposed and that goes as well for the 
later speeches drafted in part by Njoto and Oei Tjoe Tat. 
Sukarno's romantic view of the 1926 PKI revolt and his own 
identification with that "generation" were encouraged by Aidit, of 
course. At the Sixth PKI Party Congress in September, l959, Sukarno 
praised the PKI saying, to quote Guy Pauker, that "from the time of 
his youth till the present he had always cherished feelings of close 
friendship with the PKI". Aidit then responded that, "We who are 
obliged by the Party to study the history of the Party and the struggle 
of the Indonesian people, know just how close are the spiritual ties 
between the PKI and Bung Karno. It was none other than Bung 
Karno, still then very young, who warmly welcomed the heroic 1926 
rebellion".(5) The implication is that Sukarno was, at a minimum, a 
PKI sympathizer in 1926, if not a secret Party member. This subtle 
influence on Sukarno may have strengthened his sense of 
identification but it  was hardly decisive. Sukarno had long been 
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inclined in this direction and remarks like those of Aidit were 
probably viewed by Sukarno primarily as evidence that Aidit, unlike 
Musso and Alimin, understood Sukarno's revolutionary commitment 
and had a similar view of what tactics and policies were required at 
different stages. 
Quoting again from "Sarinah" in 1947, Sukarno said that "it is 
socialist theory which makes us understand that the present stage of 
our  revolution can  be  nothing else  than  a  national stage..... The 
Indonesian nationalist who thinks and acts in a social-nationalist way 
is a socialist in the true sense of the word, Conversely, an Indonesian 
'socialist' who already wants to 'organize' a social revolution, is a 
 
'socialist' who harms the revolution".(6) This view of Sukarno in 
 
1947 was sharply at odds with the Musso approach of 1948 and 
helps to explain Sukarno's readiness to repudiate Musso during the 
Madiun affair (along with his personal interest in being number one). 
This 1947 Sukarno view, which remained consistent over the years, 
was identical with the PKI position in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 
however. Indeed, no one was more vociferous than Aidit in 
repudiating  those  (like  the  Murba  Party)  who  claimed  that  the 
socialist stage had arrived or was arriving in 1964-65 and in Aidit's 
general position that the tasks of the national democratic stage must 
continue to be emphasized and socialist revolution postponed until 
the time was ripe to enter the socialist stage. As noted elsewhere, it 
was Sukarno, not the PKI, who finally decided that it was time to 
enter the socialist stage and to do so by acts of violence that would 
ensure its irreversibility, but both Sukarno and the PKI - despite the 
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latter's apparent initial doubts - agreed that certain objective events 
were necessary to make the transition. Although expressed in the 
jargon of crushing imperialism and feudalism, the real meaning of 
the requirement was the achievement of a monopoly of power by the 
communists through dominance of civil politics (essentially 
completed) and political control of the military (attempted on 
September 30/October 1). 
What about Sukarno's occasional statements that he was not a 
communist as in the "autobiography" prepared by Cindy Adams, in 
similar comments from Sukarno's "Nationalism, Islam and Marxism" 
in 1927, and even one speech as late as 1965?(7) I regard these 
statements as  tongue-in-cheek remarks aimed  at  lulling  domestic 
anti-communist and Western audiences. The "lie" may not have been 
outright in that Sukarno would call himself a "socialist" in the same 
statement and otherwise take strong Marxist positions so that he 
could say to himself that he was using the term "communist" in the 
sense of a Soviet lackey or of a formal PKI card-carrying member or 
of a target of anti-communist hysteria with all that such an image 
would imply. The man was exceedingly capable of hair-splitting 
rationalization when convenient. He loved to project different images 
in different directions. After the burning of the British embassy in 
September, 1963, Sukarno came to the US ambassador's residence to 
put on a friendly show in order to placate Western opinion without 
retreating an inch on substance. I recall vividly his act of calling 
himself the Indonesian Clark Gable (an allusion that also appears in 
the Cindy Adams' book which was aimed at disarming or dividing 
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Western opinion). Delivered in English, this speech was totally 
different from his speeches in Indonesian to Indonesian audiences. 
By chance, I happened to live across a small canal from the Soviet 
residential compound where Sukarno appeared the next day. My 
Indonesian speaking colleague, Henry Heymann, and I walked over 
to the wall alongside the Soviet compound and listened to Sukarno's 
speech to the Soviet embassy in both Indonesian and the Russian 
translation (my Indonesian was still weak but my Russian was then 
still strong). Between us, Henry and I could report a speech 180 
degrees different from the speech of the previous day which had 
indeed had its effect on some of the more gullible Americans. A 
difference of emphasis was to be expected, of course, but Sukarno 
was able to project a totally false posture when it was tactically 
useful. 
Aside from such anecdotal examples (and there could be many), 
Sukarno's occasional statements of being a Marxist and a socialist 
but not a communist pale into insignificance when viewed against 
his statements of identification with the PKI, particularly in 1965, his 
record of consistently pushing the revolution toward a communist 
climax, and the clear course of conduct that he adopted in attempting 
the liquidation of the last obstacles to communist power. For those 
who  prefer  to  regard  Sukarno  as  a  nationalist  rather  than  a 
communist, it is suggested that the same criteria then be applied to 
D.N. Aidit, for their views were essentially the same. They both 
wanted a two-stage revo1ution in Indonesia in which the second 
would be "socialist" in the Leninist sense but only as altered to fit 
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Indonesian conditions. All communist revolutions that are organized 
by indigenous forces are also nationalist and tend to have deviations 
that are natural to the situation in the particular country. Asian 
communist revolutions also tend to emphasize the role of the 
peasantry and see Asia as more important than Europe. This is hardly 
surprising. Indonesia, of course, did not take the path of a peasant 
armed revolt but that was hardly desirable given the position of 
Sukarno and the left at the top of the formal government structure 
and  the  distribution  of  military  power  elsewhere  although  in  a 
context where loyalties ×were blurred and lip service was paid to 
Sukarno's slogans and concepts. 
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Footnotes – Chapter XV 
 
 
 
1. Nineteenth and even Eighteenth Century Russian history is 
replete with evidence of this deep inferiority complex. In 
philosophy and literature, the "Westernizers" tended toward 
excessive mimicry of the West as a response to perceived 
Russian backwardness while the "Slavophils" tended to 
withdraw unduly into a search for unsullied virtue in the 
Russian peasant and Russian village. These contrasting 
reactions to perceived inferiority were also manifest in a less 
intellectual way in the policies of various Tsars. Peter and 
Catherine II often carried Westernization to extremes (e.g. 
French rather than Russian to be spoken at the Court) while 
Nicholas I withdrew Russia behind a kind of iron curtain more 
than a century before Stalin, looking for virtue in Russian 
backwardness. 
2. Told by Ambassador Jones to his staff in late 1963 or early 
 
1964. 
 
3. The story appears, for example, in "Sarinah", in Cindy Adams' 
Autobiography of Sukarno, in his speech of July 25, 1965 to the 
PNI and in his September - 1965 speech to the PSII. 
4. Penders, pp. 109-110. 
 
5. Pauker, "Communist Prospects in Indonesia" (Santa Monica, 
Calif., Rand Corporation) 1964. p. 43. 
6. "Sarinah", p. 235, quoted by Penders, p.ll2. 
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7. Cindy Adams, Sukarno; an Autobiography (Indianapolis) 1965 
quoted by Penders, p. 32. 
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XVI 
The Rise and Fall of Indonesian  
Communism – A Perspective 
 
 
 
The   story   of   Indonesian   communism   has   been   one   of 
spectacular advances and sudden collapses over a period of half a 
century. Nowhere in the world outside the Soviet Union did 
communism gain such an early foothold at the end of World War I 
(the Bela Kun regime in Hungary was a transitory phenomenon and 
hardly related to the re-introduction of communism under the aegis 
of the Red Army in the late 1940s). The reasons for communism's 
early impact on Indonesia are complex but there are several key 
factors. There was the conscious effort of energetic and dedicated 
Dutch Marxists to propagate their ideology and their skillful 
appreciation of the need to build up a national leadership even if that 
were to mean significant nationalist distortion. Second, the country 
was  in  the  early  stages  of  a  fervent  nationalist revival  that  was 
intellectually susceptible to the appeal of the Leninist analysis on 
imperialism and colonialism. Third, the deep-seated internal societal 
conflicts between abangan and santri in Java and other cleavages 
provided a seedbed for consciously anti-clerical, secular, political 
movements. This latter factor also was a source of great weakness in 
another sense, however, since it ultimately divided the nationalist 
movement.   Furthermore,   the   Indonesian   nationalists,   whether 
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communist or not, faced a well-organized and determined foe in the 
Dutch administration, unlike their counterparts in a chaotic, anarchic 
China that had never been ruled by outsiders whatever their indirect 
and  tangential  inroads  on  Chinese  sovereignty.  The  genius  of 
Sukarno was to recognize from the beginning (or from the lessons of 
the 1926 PKI failure) that a strictly nationalist revolution aimed at 
independence was essential as a "first stage" and that any ultimate 
"socialist" revolution would not only have to be deferred to a distant 
future but would have to be blurred for the sake of nationalist unity 
in the first stage. The corollary was the Nasakom idea which was 
inherent in Sukarno's approach from 1927 on - a tactical united front 
doctrine that avoided the internationalist crudities of Leninist jargon 
in order to weld together a genuine national front toward 
independence. The degree of accomplishment was all the more 
remarkable given the conflicts within Indonesian society and the 
additional geographic liabilities inherent in a far-flung archipelago. 
Sukarno's contribution also rested on his ability - although this is 
also a characteristic of Indonesia reflected throughout its history - at 
being able to assimilate foreign ideological imports in an eclectic 
manner that suited local circumstances. Marhaenism expressed that 
idea, the adapting of Marxism to Asian conditions, and this 
willingness to adapt was evident among such formal Indonesian 
communists as the early Semaun, Tan Malaka, and, above all, Aidit - 
as long as they lived and worked in Indonesia. It may even have been 
true of the early Musso and Alimin but they, and particularly the 
former, were contaminated by their long exile in Moscow. The final 
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great  advance  of  Indonesian  communism in  the  late  1950s  and, 
especially, the early 1960s was due, above all, to the patronage and 
tactical  brilliance  of  Sukarno  although  it  received  help  from  a 
flexible PKI leadership who were more than just opportunistic 
manipulators of the "nationalist" Sukarno. They were young men 
who essentially agreed with Sukarno's vision of the Indonesian 
Revolution and of his recipe for mixing Marxism and nationalism. 
They  were  the  ultimate  Sukarnoists  -  more  so  than  the  less 
ideological Sukarno sycophants and opportunists - because Sukarno 
ultimately proved that his ideological commitment to a communist 
Indonesia, toward "entering the socialist stage", was more powerful 
than anyone imagined. The Chairul Salehs, Ruslan Abdulganis, 
Johannes Leimenas and the others found that Sukarno was dead 
serious about his Marxist perspective for Indonesia and that this 
Marxism was not a watered-down compromise but a hard-line, 
Leninist version. 
Why  then  did  Sukarno  and  communism  fail?  Much  of  the 
answer is implicit in the story that has been told in these pages. The 
major underlying reason that governed everything else was 
overconfidence. The  propaganda of  Sukarnoism and  communism 
had become so all-pervasive, and the fear of non-conformity was so 
great, that everyone sounded like communists and Sukarnoists 
whether they were or not. Both Sukarno and the PKI had also come 
to regard their enemies with contempt. Like Mao, they considered 
their non-communist enemies, both domestic and foreign, as paper 
tigers to be despised strategically even though one had to be careful 
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of their latent raw power tactically. Sukarno had been able to divide 
and conquer step by step and to set the tone of the dialogue to the 
extent that the non-communists even opposed his efforts through 
such a lame excuse for a policy as trying to redefine Sukarnoism. 
Furthermore, Sukarno really believed in the historical dialectic; he 
saw his entry into the socialist stage as the inevitable consummation 
of an historical process. A non-Marxist aspect of his thought, his 
belief that he was the chosen instrument of destiny, the Ratu Adil of 
ancient prophecy, made him less cautious than a Lenin with the 
latter's "one step forward, two steps backward" dictum that allowed 
for adversity. 
Aside   from   this   all-important   climate   of   optimistic   self 
assurance  that  caused  Sukarno  to  go  off  half-cocked  to  his 
rendezvous with destiny, there were many practical failures as well 
as Sukarno's personal failing of an acute lack of personal courage in 
the  face  of  a  direct  physical  threat.  The  single  most  important 
practical cause for failure, however, was the overlooked presence of 
the two RPKAD battalions. But for that accident of fate, General 
Suharto would have been without the requisite forces to act and all 
the other mistakes could have been overcome. A corollary failure 
was the serious underestimation of General Suharto as noted later. 
Another major failing was the excessive compartmentalization and 
"need-to-know" inhibitions which caused too many players to work 
at cross purposes because the right hand did not know what the left 
was doing. The failure of Sukarno to go to Merdeka Palace on the 
morning of October 1 was just such a failure. The mishandling of 
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Harian Rakjat's publication was another. Even the failure to know 
about the RPKAD's delayed departure for Borneo was probably the 
result of this narrow, compartmentalized approach and lack of 
adequate planning and foresight. There seemed to be no allowance 
for mishaps. The plan was devised and each part was to be executed 
rigidly and efficiently - and this narrowly defined execution was 
rather efficient overall - but there was a lack of thoughtful overall 
direction that would have permitted more flexible responses. 
Even so, a Sukarno who could show such willingness to take 
risks  in  launching  a  plan  proved  excessively  cautious  in  its 
execution.  Prompt  Sukarno  public  reaction  on  the  morning  of 
October 1 that he had been shocked by the heinous imperialist plot 
against him and a cry to rally the country behind the Great Leader of 
the  Revolution  and  Supreme  Commander  of  the  Armed  Forces 
would not only have rallied his civilian supporters but also much of 
the Armed Forces. Even a suspicious Suharto would have found it 
difficult to deal with such a position. Of course, the escape of 
Nasution  did  make  this  more  difficult.  Nasution's  escape  was 
probably more important in this sense of providing a channel for 
undermining or disputing the intended claims that a heinous plot had 
been  discovered  and  squelched  than  in  any  Sukarno  fears  of 
Nasution as a military strongman. If Nasution had taken over the 
Army rather than Suharto, it is not unlikely that Sukarno would 
eventually have found a way to regain his authority. 
Finally,  of  course,  the  quality  of  Suharto  as  a  man  of 
tremendous resolute strength and a natural bent toward inter-service 
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diplomacy and political maneuver must be accorded considerable 
significance.  Suharto  could  not  have  pulled  it  off  without  the 
RPKAD but the instrument also required a resolute directing force 
and one that knew when to apply direct pressure and when to let up. 
It is not really possible to know, of course, the degree to which 
General Suharto's tactics of slow, but remorseless, pressure were 
calculated and the degree to which he was merely engaging in 
opportunistic adjustments to the situation as well as reacting to the 
gradual development of his own views. There is a rather good case 
for giving considerable weight to these latter factors since Suharto 
seemingly had to be pushed and cajoled by the student movement 
and his own more forceful subordinate commanders to move against 
Sukarno in the long interregnum between October 1, l965 and the 
March 11 order. Still one must also be impressed by both his firm 
resolution and his tact on October 1 and by his ability to shift power 
away  from  Sukarno  in  a  way  that  did  not  set  off  any  violent 
inter-service clashes that were always a latent possibility. 
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XVII 
 
The Impact of Failure 
 
 
 
A major thesis of this book is that the failure of the September 
 
30 - October 1 coup became a historical turning point not only for 
Indonesia but also for the entire East Asia region and to some extent 
beyond. Although Indonesia's   size and  strategic importance 
contributed to this result, they are secondary to the psychological 
impact on Asian communism resulting from the great, and probably 
excessive, expectations of the Asian communists that they were 
winning everywhere and that the non-communist forces, both 
indigenous and foreign, were in disarray and retreat. The shock of 
unexpected defeat in Indonesia, it will be argued, was especially 
great on Chinese ambitions and served to drive the nascent Cultural 
Revolution almost immediately into an orgasm of inner-directed fury 
while also leading to a major shift in the focus of the Sino-Soviet 
dispute. Before delving into those issues of positive cause and effect, 
it is also worth examining the probable effects of a successful 
outcome for the communists. While perforce speculative to a degree, 
it should not be overly difficult to postulate the broad outcome of a 
communist victory in Indonesia that was so widely expected by the 
communists themselves. A successful elimination of the 
non-communist leadership of the Army was to be followed by Army 
acceptance of a new leadership consisting of leftists or Sukarnophiles 
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such as Pranoto, Sjafiuddin, Adjie and Mursjid. Officers such as the 
latter two were not communists but are believed to be men that 
would have totally accepted Sukarno's guidance and would have 
gone along with the policies of real Nasakom advisory councils and a 
communist-dominated fifth armed force that would have made any 
future effective resistance to a communist Indonesia impossible. 
Highly regarded, but apolitical, professional soldiers like Suharto 
(and this is how Suharto was then perceived) might have been 
retained for a time but in safe positions that would not threaten 
Sukarnoist or communist control. Loyalty to both Sukarno and 
Marxism would have become ever-stronger requirements for 
advancement  and  the  Pranoto/Sjafiuddin/Omar  Dani  coloration 
would become the norm at the higher command levels of the armed 
forces. While this process would have been continuous over several 
years, it is clear that Sukarno would not have waited for its 
completion to proclaim entry into the socialist stage and to install a 
Nasakom cabinet dominated by the PKI and the wide array of 
communist sympathizers and opportunists available in the other 
parties or outside them. Some of the other parties such as the PNI 
and Partindo would have been merged with the PKI in due course 
while others would have been allowed to exist in limbo for a while 
but the PKI would have quickly become the openly acknowledged 
"vanguard". The relationship of the Party to the State would have 
become Leninist with variations suited to Indonesian conditions. 
Meanwhile, the international posture of Indonesia was already 
well established as a close ally of China and as a presumptive leader 
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of the most radical tendencies in the Third World. A successful 
"coup" would have reinforced these existing tendencies and ensured 
their acceleration. Although an Afro-Asian Conference, previously 
postponed because of the Algerian coup, depended on others, 
prospects would have been better for its occurrence in late 1965 or 
early 1966 if Indonesia had not gone awry. More important, the great 
Sukarno dream of a Conference of New Emerging Forces (CONEF0) 
would have taken place in 1966 with strong Chinese backing. 
CONEF0 was to have led to a radical permanent international 
organization in competition with the UN and a platform for rallying 
the Third World against the West. The degree of its future long-term 
success is highly questionable, of course, but it would certainly have 
been a source of trouble while it lasted. 
More significant than the ephemeral world of radical interna- 
tional conferences and posturing would have been the effects of 
communist victory on East Asia. First of all, it is extremely difficult 
to  believe  that  China,  whatever  internal  convulsions might  have 
occurred anyway, would have retreated into itself if the planned 
monumental communist victory in Indonesia had indeed come to 
pass. The prevailing current of anti-Western activism on a regional 
scale would have been strengthened, not weakened, and the only 
recently proclaimed Lin Piao line of the world countryside 
surrounding (and vanquishing) the world city (of North America, 
Europe and their adherents) would have been bolstered by a mighty 
practical deed. Weak Southeast Asian states like Malaysia, Thailand 
and the Philippines would have been intimidated toward compro- 
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mise, neutralism and eventual accommodation - or so, at least, would 
the Asian communists have postulated. The pressures from the 
communists on these countries would certainly have mounted and 
not only at the level of psychological intimidation but in accelerated 
support for insurgencies. The costs to the United States, Britain and 
the Commonwealth countries would have increased with foreseeable 
effects on their domestic constituencies. My own view is that the 
effect of higher cost would have been compensated by a greater 
awareness of the threat and that the U.S., in particular, would have 
become  more  committed,  rather  than  less.  This  is  by  no  means 
certain, however. In any case, the overall problem of militant Asian 
communism would not have receded but would have grown and the 
history of all of East Asia in the rest of the 1960s and 1970s, and 
probably beyond, would have been vastly different and vastly more 
difficult. 
Turning now from the nebulous but significant world of what 
might have been to what actually did occur, the concluding chapters 
will briefly examine the main outlines of change within Indonesia 
itself followed by a discussion of the impact of the Indonesian 
political cataclysm on the region and the world. Some of this effect 
was direct and can be analyzed in traditional terms but much of it 
was subtle and indirect and requires the reader to compare the 
psychological climate before October 1, 1965 with that which 
followed and to do so in regard to the various affected countries of 
which China and the United States are the most significant. The 
point in all that follows is not to blow up the country of Indonesia as 
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a determinant of the fate of larger and more powerful nations but to 
lay the changes that followed to major shifts in psychological 
perceptions and attitudes. Much of this attitudinal shift was of an 
"out of awareness" variety, yet the chain of events is very clear and 
the  arguments  for  causality  do  not  appear  far-fetched  if  one 
re-examines these events with a  dispassionate mind and a  broad 
perspective. 
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XVIII Indonesia's Post-
Sukarno  
Development 
 
 
 
The new leaders of Indonesia were men with strong records of 
nationalist and anti-colonial activity. They had been in the forefront 
of the struggle against the Dutch and they subscribed to policies of 
jealousy  guarded  independence  and  non-alignment. Many  of  the 
slogans of the earlier Sukarno era, particularly "Panca Sila", were to 
remain  sacred  symbols  of  Indonesian  nationalism.  Open  alliance 
with the West was unthinkable, nor was it sought. 
The United States was obviously gratified by the turn of events 
but it also moved cautiously. A cable from Ambassador Marshall 
Green on October 23, 1965 had advised the Department of State to 
take  great  care  in  offering  US  assistance  so  as  not  to  evoke  a 
negative reaction. It suggested some forms of "safe" assistance such 
as  food  under  Public  Law  480  to  be  handled  through  private 
voluntary agencies, extension of export credit insurance to facilitate 
normal  exports,  quiet  resumption  of  both  civilian  and  military 
training programs in the US if requested by the Indonesians and 
routine  handling  of  inquiries  for  rice  imports  from  the  US. 
Assistance should be rendered without publicity and only if it would 
not  weaken  friendly  elements  politically.(l)  A  Title  I  PL-480 
program was actually begun around August/September, 1966. Every 
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effort  was  made  to  keep  a  discreet  but  friendly distance  and  to 
prevent  any  heavy-handed  attempt  at  overt  alignment,  a  policy 
course that was generally accepted in Washington and carried out 
with wisdom. Ambassador Green was also a strong proponent of 
keeping a low profile in Jakarta and, above all, of restraining the 
inevitable tendency of program agencies like AID and USIA to build 
up their staffs to the highly visible presence of earlier years. This 
effort was perhaps less successful but it did serve to balance off the 
political advantages of a low profile against the obvious needs of 
program agencies such as AID to have sufficient staff to manage 
needed programs when they became necessary (particularly in light 
of Congressionally - mandated paperwork requirements). 
After the "March 11 Order", which effectively shifted power 
from Sukarno to Suharto, a major international effort was required to 
salvage the Indonesian economy from its virtual collapse during the 
late Guided Democracy era. 0ne of the first steps was to re-schedule 
the Indonesian debt in the summer of 1966. The international effort 
was  eventually  managed  through  an  international  consortium  of 
donor nations from Western Europe, North America and the Pacific 
Basin.(2) The consortium served the economic and managerial 
function of reducing duplication of effort and ensuring a rational 
application of resources to real needs. It also served the political 
function of minimizing visibility and projecting a professional and 
technical quality to the effort. The new Indonesian government 
contributed greatly to  its  own  economic rehabilitation and  to  its 
capacity to apply external assistance fruitfully by its appointment of 
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an all-star cast of highly-trained professional Indonesian economists 
led by Professor Widjojo Nitisastro to key ministerial positions that 
would manage the economy. This sensible professionalism was 
continued on the whole in the three decades that followed in spite of 
continued Army dominance in other fields, endemic corruption in the 
execution of contracts and business deals, and other blemishes. 
Despite chronic problems of overpopulation, underdevelopment, and 
disregard by some officials for broader national interests in specific 
cases, there is no question that the years since 1966 saw first, a 
remarkable recovery from economic disaster and later, a consistent if 
uneven pattern of economic growth and modernization, at least until 
the stumble of the late nineties. 
While  relations with  the  West  gradually improved, relations 
with China and other Asian communist countries rapidly 
deteriorated. The Chinese embassy and other Chinese facilities had 
been sacked shortly after the attack on the US Embassy mentioned 
earlier and Sino-Indonesian relations proceeded to a point of ultimate 
collapse.  Foreign  Minister  Malik  and  his  close  advisors  in  the 
Foreign Ministry sensibly sought to maintain diplomatic relations 
with Peking in order to preserve a genuine non-aligned posture but 
were overruled by a strong wave of anti-Chinese sentiment in the 
Army. Strangely, relations with North Korea were somehow 
preserved to a degree. Relations with the USSR and the European 
communist countries remained very  much  what  they  had  been  - 
correct,  formal  and  very  distant.  The  real  shift  in  Indonesian 
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diplomacy was a strong effort toward association with its erstwhile 
local enemies. Confrontation with 
Malaysia was quickly ended on August 11, 1966 after visits by 
Suharto's trouble shooter, Ali Murtopo, an intelligence general. 
Indonesia also re-entered the UN in September, 1966. It was 
unthinkable that Indonesia would join the Western alliance system of 
SEAT0, however, and this alliance system had, in any case, lost most 
of the minimal luster it had achieved. A new vehicle was needed and 
it was forged entirely by the non-communist nations of Southeast 
Asia without the participation or advice of outside countries. The 
new grouping, established at Bangkok on August 8, 1967, was called 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN. Not only 
Indonesia but most of the once weak and uncertain countries of the 
region were coming of age. ASEAN was strongly non-aligned in 
spite of the continuing connections of the four members other than 
Indonesia with either the US (the Philippines and Thailand) or the 
UK (Malaysia and Singapore). ASEAN purported to be primarily an 
economic and social grouping rather than one with a political 
orientation and it eschewed military cooperation. In actual fact, 
ASEAN was  a  political  grouping from  the  beginning -  a  useful 
device for developing cooperation between non-aligned Indonesia 
and  four  Western-oriented  neighbors  in  a  non-communist  but 
non-aligned framework. The US leaned over backwards to respect 
this indigenous orientation in the years that followed, particularly 
until the trauma of Vietnam receded into history after the end of the 
Ford   Administration.   More   recently,   ASEAN   cooperation   on 
407  
 
regional political and security issues such as Kampuchea (Cambodia) 
became more overt although this was generally done through 
consultation of  the  five  countries  (six  with  the  later  addition  of 
Brunei and then, seven with Burma) outside the formal ASEAN 
mechanism. 
The internal development of  Indonesia since 1966 has  been 
characterized by a continuation and even a strengthening of army 
domination of government. President Suharto was clearly the 
dominant figure from the beginning but political direction was 
initially shared in a triumvirate that included Adam Malik and the 
Sultan of Yogyakarta and which was backed by a wide assortment of 
Western-oriented  civilian  intellectuals.  The  Sultan  never  played 
much of a role. Malik did continue to play a significant role as 
Foreign Minister and was the key figure in regaining respectability 
for Indonesia on the world stage. His power to influence general 
policy, never very strong, gradually declined, however, and he was 
eventually moved to the prestigious but powerless position of Vice 
President in 1978. From there he was moved to the still prestigious 
but lower position of Chairman of the MPRS where he replaced 
another declining figure, General Nasution. Malik died in l984 and 
was treated with honors. The changes were not simply a matter of 
changing a few personalities at the top (although some significant 
high level personality conflicts accelerated the trend). More 
profoundly, many  of  the  bright secondary level  civilian  advisors 
were shunted out of key positions and eventually out of government 
entirely. This turnover, which affected such PSl-oriented intellectuals 
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as Sudjatmoko, also applied to political parties. It should be noted 
that this shift concerns the political sector, not the economic, where 
Western-educated civilian economists continued to reign. The old 
Masjumi leaders such as Natsir and Mohammed Rum were released 
from prison after the fall of Sukarno but were not allowed to play a 
significant role in the new Islamic party that was to combine the NU 
and the old Masjumi. The principal possible political threat to 
government supremacy was seen, in fact, as a possible resurgent 
political Islam. 
The early thrust of political reorganization, which had a touch 
of Sukarno's philosophy, was to organize party politics into three 
groupings - a "functional group" or "Karya" syndrome that would 
constitute the Suharto and Army vehicle (with hangers-on from the 
civilian components of the government), a nationalist component that 
would cater to the old PNI and associated secular constituencies and, 
finally, the new Islamic vehicle. The Suharto-led "Karya" grouping 
was overwhelmingly endorsed in the parliamentary elections that 
followed in 1971. The MPRS elected Suharto as President and Adam 
Malik as Vice President in 1973. Elections have followed regularly 
every five years. The system of government has been conducted on a 
constitutional basis and, from a democratic perspective, was at least 
an improvement on the institutions of Guided Democracy and, for 
that   matter,   on   what   might   have   occurred   under   a   more 
heavy-handed military leadership. There is no question, however, 
that, despite the subtlety and aura of constitutionalism, the army, and 
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Suharto personally, was fully in control until 1998 when the Suharto 
system collapsed. 
The chief characteristic of the Suharto regime had been, in fact, 
to recoil from the flamboyance and excessive politicization of the 
Sukarno era by de-emphasizing politics to the degree possible. The 
theme instead was to build internal stability and the economic and 
technical basis for a modern state through a concentrated economic 
development program. Indonesian nationalism, including the 
on-going effort to integrate the diverse archipelago into a  viable 
unitary state, remained strong but its face changed to one of plodding 
persistence from one of frenetic emotionalism. The Suharto regime 
has been criticized on several counts: its suppression of the 
communists including prolonged incarceration of thousands without 
trial, an aura of widespread corruption, and its monopoly of power. 
There is considerable justification for all these criticisms although 
not as much as the picture its enemies have tried to portray in their 
fury  over  the  defeat  of  communism  in  the  world's  fifth  most 
populous country and sixth in area. A discussion of these charges 
follows. The initial wave of killing has been discussed in a previous 
chapter. This tragedy, which was inspired by the terror that had 
gripped Indonesia both before and after October 1, 1965, had largely 
run its course during the anarchic conditions of late 1965. Mass 
arrests of PKI cadres followed and some 30,000 prisoners were still 
held as of the mid-1970s. Most of these prisoners were subsequently 
released or brought to trial and convicted. A one-sided propaganda 
barrage, based almost entirely on communist-supplied information, 
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was leveled at Indonesia for several years. This propaganda barrage 
often inflated the number of prisoners held and tried to discredit the 
Suharto regime by claiming  widespread resort    to torture, 
mistreatment, etc. On the other side of the coin, the new Government 
was influenced by the previous record of PKI resort to violence and 
by the undoubted fact that the Communist Party, along with Sukarno, 
had made no bones about its intention to crush its enemies and had 
taken the initial violent steps to implement that intention. The Army 
and most Indonesians felt no compunction, under  these 
circumstances, in moving decisively to remove this recurring threat 
from Indonesian life. There were undoubtedly miscarriages of justice 
in individual cases and probably individual atrocities by particular 
people or units as there always are in major upheavals. I do not 
believe (nor did the US government believe) that this was the policy 
of the Indonesian Government, however. Furthermore, Indonesia 
lacked the procedures and legal machinery to try large numbers of 
communist cadres in a normal manner since the real case against 
them was their official positions within the structure of a tightly 
disciplined organization based on  democratic centralism that  had 
participated  in  an  illegal  conspiracy  to  employ  violence  against 
senior officials of the state and to change the institutions of that state 
by illegal means. There is little question that disciplined Party 
members would have executed instructions for the follow-through 
measures if the operations had been more successful. Their 
responsiveness to Party leadership authority is at the very heart of 
what it means to be a communist. To argue an absence of guilt is to 
411  
 
argue that involvement in a failed conspiracy cannot be punished 
while  involvement in  a  successful conspiracy would also  not be 
punished since the victors in a successful revolution would cast aside 
all aspects of previous legality and instead would be meting out 
punishment according to "revolutionary" law. Such a self-serving 
concept of justice is fine for the communists since it boils down to 
the proposition that anything done by them is justified by the 
revolution and that the opponents of communism are guilty by 
definition whether they win or lose. Not suprisingly, such a "heads I 
win, tails you lose" proposition was not acceptable to the Indonesian 
Army or to non-communist Indonesians generally. 
The charge of widespread corruption in high places as well as 
low had much greater validity. There was also much less excuse for 
this continuing corruption than for detention of communist cadres 
under extra-legal  procedures. It   may be argued   that the 
institutionalization of corruption was already well advanced in the 
Sukarno era and that the new order had merely operated according to 
existing standards. This excuse might have had some merit for the 
first few years of the new order but it lacked substance over the long 
haul. The fact that corrupt financial practices on a massive scale 
reached to the very top constituted a particular stigma. The charge of 
monopolization of  power  or  excessive  authoritarianism  was  also 
generally valid although there are again  some mitigating 
considerations. Army power was needed at the beginning to restore 
security and to overcome the sharp polarization of Indonesian society 
that was the legacy of the Sukarno era. A strong hand was also 
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needed to restore and energize an economy that had reached a point 
of  collapse.  The  Suharto  regime  did  not  significantly  loosen  its 
control or expand its base in subsequent years, however. On the 
contrary, it shunted aside a wide spectrum of able, 
democratically-oriented forces that had been at the forefront of the 
effort to stop the PKI and Sukarno. Masjumi and PSI intellectuals 
were gradually replaced by Army officers or toadies in a11 too many 
cases while even the Army was altered to reflect Suharto's factional 
wishes at the expense of potential rivals. Even such stalwart figures 
of 1965-1966 as Sarwo Edhie and Kemal Idris were sent abroad to 
minor diplomatic posts and then retired. Although it is unfortunate 
that the system did not become more open and democratic than it 
did, it must also be said that the Suharto regime was neither 
totalitarian nor severely repressive. Indonesia became a freer society 
than it was under Sukarno's late guided democracy and much, much 
freer than the communist order that Sukarno wanted to install if the 
September 30 Movement had been successful and Indonesia had 
thereby "advanced" into the socialist stage. 
In sum, Indonesia, though less than perfect, was far better off 
economically and even democratically than it had been in 1965. Its 
rejection of the communist camp and its basic realignment with the 
moderate side of the non-aligned movement have also been of 
inestimable value to the cause of stability in East Asia and to a 
secure future for the non-communist, Western-oriented nations of the 
region. That new-found regional stability and sense of security in 
turn provided the basis for the establishment of an economically 
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dynamic Pacific rim that has become a major success story of the 
past 30 plus years. 
While the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s affected all the 
countries of the region, Indonesia’s problems were greater given the 
political stagnation of Suharto’s long tenure and the corruption that 
had contaminated his regime. Since this book is limited in scope to 
the events of 1965 and their highly favorable results in terms of US 
foreign policy and overall Asian stability and progress, no attempt 
will be made to speculate on Indonesia’s future development here. 
The problems are great but so is the opportunity to move toward a 
more democratic and just society that will, however, be uniquely 
Indonesian. 
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Footnotes – Chapter XVIII 
 
 
 
1. American Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1164 of October 23, 1965, 
Indonesia Country File, National Security File, LBJ Library. 
EXIM credit insurance was specifically added in a follow-on 
message (Embassy telegram 1165). Also see Indonesia, Crisis  
and Transformation 1965-1968, Marshall Green (Washington,  
D.C., The Compass Press) 1990, pp. 113-119. 
2. The international consortium group, or IGGI, consisted of 
Indonesia, Australia, Belgium, France, the FRG, Italy, Japan, 
the Netherlands, the USA, the IMF and the IBRD. Observers 
represented Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the OECD and the UNDP. The first 
IGGI meeting was held in Amsterdam February 23-24, 1967. 
See Department of State Report on the Administration of 
Lyndon B. Johnson. Volume I, Administrative History, LBJ 
Library. 
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XIX 
 
The Effect on China 
 
 
 
I believe that the Communist failure in Indonesia had a much 
more profound effect on China than has generally been recognized 
by Western observers including most of the Western specialists on 
China.  In  essence,  it  will  be  argued  that  this  debacle  shattered 
China's optimistic expectations concerning a revolutionary tide that 
was about to engulf Southeast Asia and drive the West generally and 
the  United  States  in  particular  out  of  the  region.  The  imminent 
victory of Communism in Indonesia was taken for granted by the 
Asian Communists and was viewed as a mighty coming blow against 
a West that found Sukarno distasteful but did not really understand 
that  Indonesia  was  to  become  more  than  a  nuisance;  it  was  to 
become a full-fledged Communist state closely allied with Peking, 
Hanoi,  and  Pyongyang.  The  very  excessiveness  of  Chinese  and 
Asian Communist optimism, an  optimism reflected in  Lin Piao's 
famous ideological tome of September 3, 1965, for example, 
exacerbated  the  subsequent  sense  of  failure  and  the  need  for 
re-evaluation of foreign policy that came in its wake.(l) This is not to 
say that a new, more sober, foreign policy was the immediate result. 
Indeed, the initial reaction was to repeat the old slogans but to shift 
the attention of the governing elite from foreign affairs to an internal 
orgasm  of  self-destruction  called  the  Great  Proletarian  Cultural 
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Revolution. The Cultural Revolution has been evaluated largely in 
terms  of  its  internal  dynamics  and  its  origins  in  the  factional 
struggles that had become all too apparent since the late 1950s. My 
purpose is not to dispute the importance of these internal factors in 
setting off the Cultural Revolution, but to suggest that there is a 
significant relationship between the fact that they came to a head 
immediately after the Indonesian disaster and the course and texture 
of Chinese politics over the next few years. If one grants that the 
specific, more narrowly factional motivations for the Cultural 
Revolution were already in place, it is by no means so clear that it 
had to unfold in such an all-absorbing frenzy or that China's previous 
optimistic  and  aggressive  foreign  policy  would  disintegrate  into 
sterile rhetoric and a shift of foreign policy focus to narrow border 
issues with the Soviet Union that could lead to no positive results. It 
was almost as if China had flung itself into a temper tantrum from 
which it would eventually emerge as a status quo power that had 
made its peace with the region it previously had hoped to lead into a 
bright revolutionary future. Instead, China was to become a central 
factor in a whole new constellation of international relationships. 
The nature of the Sino-Soviet rivalry changed radically during this 
period and the effect of that rivalry shifted from being a destabilizing 
factor to one of reinforcing the equilibrium of forces in East Asia. 
East Asia, and particularly Southeast Asia, now changed from one of 
the more unstable and explosive areas on earth before 1965-1966 to 
becoming one of the more stable regions in the world. These new 
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conditions also made it possible for the region to undergo a vast 
economic expansion and a rapid pace of modernization. 
Before examining the changes in Sino-Soviet relations, Chinese 
regional foreign policy, and relations with the United States, and to 
speculate further on the effects of the Indonesian collapse on China, 
it may be useful to look briefly at the internal angle. The Chinese 
revolution had been fraught from the beginning with a confusion of 
aims and the methods to achieve those aims. Although Mao was a 
communist, he came to his communism through an agrarian-based 
nationalism and populism. While theoretically perceiving that the 
socialist stage of the revolution would have to be marked by 
industrialization and modernization (becoming more European-like), 
Mao tended to romanticize the virtues of China's backwardness. He 
identified with the rural peasant qualities of the Chinese revolution 
and appeared to resent many of the practical results of urbanization 
and  bureaucratization.  Like  the  Soviets,  he  longed  for  a  "new 
socialist man" to be created by successful revolution, but his image 
of that new socialist man was vastly different from the Soviet view 
for Mao felt uncomfortable with the dominance of technology that 
was at the forefront of the Soviet ideal. Mao also romanticized the 
ideal of continuing revolution for its own sake and, in this latter 
sense, he was much like Sukarno. 
Although the roots undoubtedly lay still deeper in the past, the 
internal strife, for our own limited purpose, may be traced back to 
1958-1959  when  Mao's  Great  Leap  Forward  policies  of  rural 
communes and back-yard blast furnaces came under criticism and 
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had  to  be  displaced  by  a  more  realistic  course.(2) Liu  Shao-chi 
emerged as President of the Republic and effective head of the 
operating   government   system   while   Mao   continued   as   Party 
Chairman with continuing prestige but much reduced real authority. 
On the other hand, the more radical Maoist side of the political 
equation had also been reinforced in some respects by the 
compromises of the period, notably in the rise of Chen Po-ta as a 
Party ideologue and especially by the replacement in 1959 of Peng 
Te-huai as defense minister by Lin Piao. Peng Te-huai apparently 
became vulnerable because of overly direct criticism of Mao's Great 
Leap policies but he was also attacked by Lin Piao for alleged 
revisionist policies in the armed forces that amounted in essence to 
excessive stress on technology and military professionalism at the 
expense of the Maoist values of revolutionary spirit and the primacy 
of man over machine. Although Mao could not be attacked so 
directly, Peng Te-huai's criticisms were seen as valid by many and 
this support was evident in an allegorical literary work by a noted 
writer, Wu Han, who described the sixteenth century struggle of a 
noble Mandarin who had stood up against a despotic emperor. This 
work  was  heavily  criticized  by  the  radical  Chiang  Ching  group 
whose efforts to publish a critique were foiled in late 1965, however, 
by Wu Han's protector, the powerful Peking party chief, Peng Chen, 
who also headed the five-man committee that had oversight 
responsibilities  on  cultural  questions.  The  Chiang  Ching  group 
finally succeeded in publishing the original critique of Wu Han by 
Yao Wen-yuan, a Chiang Ching supporter who became Minister of 
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Culture and achieved later notoriety as one of the "Gang of Four", 
through Chen Po-ta's influence on the People's Daily and through the 
backing of Lin Piao. This was in November 1965. Despite a series of 
delaying actions such as Wu Han's self-criticism in December, 1965, 
which was limited to technical rather than political factors, Peng 
Chen was soon forced from his positions and an attack followed 
shortly thereafter  on  Liu  Shao-chi. The  Cultural Revolution was 
much more than a series of purges at the top, of course; it erupted 
into a massive frenzied upheaval that affected virtually all the 
institutions of Chinese society. The phenomenon of the Red Guards 
soon appeared, leftist-organized student mobs that harassed and 
harried all who could be portrayed as bureaucrats, conservatives and 
"revisionists". 
There is no way of knowing with certainty exactly what 
arguments were being leveled behind the scenes in the Chinese 
leadership in this period or, even more difficult, what weights were 
being attached to internal and external factors by various Chinese 
political figures. Indeed, the Western scholarly literature on this 
subject reflects a variety of viewpoints although those who place 
considerable weight on external factors tend to highlight 
developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute and the US threat as most 
significant.(3) Certainly  more  was  being  said  publicly  about  the 
internal   debate   on   cultural   issues,   broadly   defined,   and   on 
Sino-Soviet and US issues but that does not mean that the Indonesian 
debacle was not praying on the minds of the Chinese leadership -- 
particularly since it seemed part of a chain of Third World reversals 
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including the overthrow of Nkrumah in Ghana, Indian military 
success against Pakistan and collapse of the Second Afro-Asian 
Conference as a result of the overthrow of Ben Bella in Algeria. One 
might argue, in fact, that the Indonesian setback was so monumental 
and shocking to Chinese revolutionary expectations that it could not 
be fully and openly faced publicly. It would be inconceivable, 
however, for the sudden and unexpected defeat of its principal allies 
on both a state-to-state basis and a Communist Party basis -- that is 
Sukarno and the PKI -- not to stun the Chinese leadership. The 
effects on the latter would be particularly great if some aspects of the 
Indonesian  relationship  had  been  controversial,  as  they  probably 
were, and if the defeat could be attributed to allegedly mistaken 
policies by Liu Shao-chi and others. 
It must be emphasized here that the Sino-Indonesian 
relationship  had  become  remarkably  close  in  1964-1965.  The 
Chinese  were  fully  aware  of  Sukarno's  intention  to  "enter  the 
socialist stage" in the immediate future and to have understood that 
as a commitment to Indonesian communism. They had been 
repeatedly briefed by Aidit on the PKI's commitment to communist 
victory through and with, rather than against, Sukarno and had come 
to   accept   that   strategy   despite   some   ideological   misgivings. 
High-level visits back and forth between the two countries were 
almost continuous and the Chinese leaders most visibly linked with 
this interchange were Liu Shao-chi, Peng Chen and Chou En-lai. 
China was working closely with Sukarno to organize a spectacular 
Conference of New Emerging Forces in Jakarta in 1966 and was 
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supplying much of  the  material assistance needed to  construct a 
conference site. China had also promised Sukarno and the PKI arms 
for the Fifth Armed Force and had worked closely with both in 
promoting the whole concept of such a force as well as the effort to 
introduce a political commissar system in Indonesia. Indonesia's 
helpful role in fronting for China as a leader of the radical forces in 
Afro-Asian forums has been noted elsewhere. To use an apt analogy, 
Indonesia was playing a role in the new "axis" much like that played 
by Mussolini in relation to Hitler. It was the major junior partner of 
China. 
Based on frequent Indonesian public statements in late 1964 
about  an  impending  nuclear  weapons  capability,  it  would  even 
appear that the Chinese may have been induced to agree to some 
form  of  nuclear  cooperation  between  the  two  countries.  Some 
writers, notably Dake, have speculated that China might even have 
agreed to help Indonesia explode a nuclear bomb. It seems unlikely, 
however,  that  the  Chinese  would  have  gone  that  far.  A  more 
plausible explanation for all the Indonesian publicity on an 
impending nuclear capability is that the Indonesians were using such 
publicity to press the Chinese for all they could get on the one hand 
and, on the other, that Sukarno was using the prospect of Chinese 
nuclear assistance to sway the Indonesian military toward indulging 
his plans for both internal radicalization and a close partnership with 
Peking as the core of his foreign policy. 
The existence of some reservations has been noted. Both the 
 
Chinese and the Soviets -- and this is a fundamental question for 
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communist ideology -- have always been faced by the question of 
how narrowly should a communist movement be based on a hard 
core cadre party and, conversely, how much should it open up to a 
wider  range  of  viewpoints  to  achieve  success.  Both  communist 
parties and individual communists have wavered back and forth on 
this issue but the ideological "charge" has been sufficiently great that 
the accepted position at any given time has been regarded as the 
gospel while opposing views have been anathema. Lenin answered 
this  question  narrowly  at  the  second  Russian  Social  Democratic 
Party Congress in 1903 and during the years of exile thereafter, 
although he relented to some degree after Bolshevik victory in 1917. 
A subdued Soviet internal debate on this issue was apparent in the 
1960's over the question of how far one should go in supporting 
"national democratic" leaders believed to be sufficiently committed 
to  an  ultimate   goal  of  scientific   socialism  (Sukarno,  Castro, 
Nkrumah, Ben Bella, Ne Win, Sekou Toure, etc.) rather than 
traditional communist parties. The Chinese apparently thought the 
Soviets were too inclined to stretch the definition of what constituted 
an acceptable Marxist in the early 1960's and attacked the Soviet 
notions about "national democracy" of that period. This debate was 
obscure and complex, however. The Chinese initially welcomed the 
Castroite success in Cuba, for example, although they naturally 
opposed Castro when he soon began to show pro-Soviet colors. Mao 
probably thought better of such revolutionaries as Che Guevara and 
even Castro than of the old-line bureaucratic Cuban party. The 
Chinese also courted the Ben Bellas, Boumediennes, Nkrumahs and 
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Sekou Toures and they were all happy with Indonesian Communist 
advances under Sukarno. Nevertheless, the Chinese found it 
convenient, in their debates with the Soviets, to criticize the latter for 
advocating the possibility of a "parliamentary road", for excessive 
collaboration   with   "bourgeois   nationalists",   and   for   peaceful 
co-existence not only with the despicable West but with 
non-communist forces generally. The Chinese mocked Khrushchev's 
position at  the  Twenty-Second CPSU Congress in  1961 that  the 
Soviet Union had surmounted class differences and was now a "state 
of the whole people". They called this "Goulash Communism". 
I believe there was periodic Chinese criticism of the PKI before 
late 1964 for too much PKI collaboration with Sukarno and too much 
reliance on the peaceful PKI road to power through revolution from 
above. The evidence is understandably thin but there were occasional 
veiled PKI comments after the PKI's apparent total identification 
with the Chinese against the Soviets on the public stage to the effect 
that the PKI was beholden to no foreign party in choosing its strategy 
and tactics. It was always adamant in identifying itself with Sukarno, 
not for tactical reasons that contemplated ultimate betrayal of 
Sukarno, but because PKI views of the Indonesian revolution were 
similar to those of Sukarno. The Chinese leadership (or at least the 
leadership of  Liu  Shao-chi) went  along  with  this  and  may  have 
argued its appropriateness to those internal Chinese party elements 
who  would  have  been  more  focused  on  ideological  purity  and 
conflict with the Soviet Union than with the geo-political 
opportunities opened by Indonesia's drive toward its own form of 
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goulash Communism. (One might call it "nasi goreng" communism 
after the national dish that mixes rice with bits of meat and 
vegetables). It seems most likely that Mao went along with this 
opportunistic but sensible strategy too (he met high-level Indonesian 
visitors, after all) but he was also not very closely identified with 
what  was  largely  a   state-to-state  operation.  Mao  could  have 
positioned himself to be associated with the expected success but he 
was also in a position, along with the ideologues, to criticize the 
whole official approach to Indonesia after it had failed. 
This scenario certainly fits both the post-debacle line toward 
Indonesia and much of the subsequent criticism of Liu Shao-chi. The 
PKI,  after  its  fall,  was  consistently and  openly  criticized  for  its 
peaceful strategy, for its collaboration with "national bourgeois" 
elements  that  by  implication  and  innuendo  now  conveniently 
included the discredited Sukarno, and for its failure to conduct a 
revolution of armed struggle from below. Never mind that Sukarno 
had been more militant in advocating a violent entry into the socialist 
stage  than  the  PKI  itself;  communists  are  adept,  after  all,  at 
re-writing  history  to  suit  opportunistic  convenience.  As  for  Liu 
Shao-chi, he was pointedly called the "Chinese Khrushchev", which 
hardly related to any supposed identification with Khrushchev's 
cultural policies. This term of opprobrium was clearly directed to the 
core issues of the Sino-Soviet debate which had been concerned with 
the degree of collaboration with "bourgeois" governments and the 
extent to which peaceful tactics could be tolerated. It related, in other 
words, to the extent to which China was over-confident in expecting 
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a spectacular communist victory in Indonesia (and throughout 
Southeast Asia as a follow-up) through revolution by manipulation 
from the top. It is a myth, of course, to think that any other route was 
open to the communists (the PKI and Sukarno) in Indonesia. Indeed 
the route that was followed had to be perceived as having excellent 
prospects for it really should have been successful with any luck at 
all.  The point of  the  later  criticism was not to  reflect  the  truth, 
however, but to  cut  a  convenient myth to  the  cloth of  factional 
convenience and the need for scapegoats. Liu was not only 
specifically criticized for his advocacy of the possibility for 
communist success through a "parliamentary road" and "peaceful 
coexistence" but both he and his wife were criticized for ostentatious 
bourgeois conduct in their dealings with Sukarno.(4) 
Liu was also specifically accused of favoring the "united front 
from above" to the neglect of "the united front from below".(5) This 
accusation was not only pegged specifically to Indonesia but also to 
Burma where Liu was said to have advocated during a 1962 tour of 
Burma that the Burmese (White Flag) Communist Party make up 
with General Ne Win and cooperate with him in the building of 
socialism. The ideological question for Burma was somewhat similar 
to  Indonesia,  incidentally,  although  Ne  Win's  focus  was  almost 
totally internal and his style was the opposite of Sukarno's. Ne Win 
had once been a secret member of the Burmese Communist Party but 
formally left it in 1944 in accordance with the policy of the dominant 
"Thakin" leadership at the time. Ne Win's "Burmese road to 
socialism", although highly nationalist and even xenophobic, was 
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also rooted in a Leninist type system including a "vanguard" party 
organized on the principles of democratic centralism and a  state 
system remarkably similar to those in formal communist states.(6) 
The charge against Liu Shao-chi, in other words, was not a wild 
charge applicable to just any Third World state but only to those few 
where there was a genuine intra-communist debate over how to treat 
eclectic mixtures of nationalism and "communism" (or totalitarian 
Marxism) of which Sukarno and Ne Win were both examples. 
The initial Chinese reaction to the news of the September 30 
 
Movement's apparent success on the morning of October l was one 
of undisguised pleasure. The Chinese hosts informed the visiting 
high-level  Indonesian  delegations  that  were  there  to  honor  the 
Chinese national day quite early of the formation of a Revolutionary 
Council and the death of the Indonesian generals. General Sukendro, 
a member of the Indonesian MPRS delegation headed by Chairul 
Saleh, has reported that the Chinese hosts even had a complete list of 
the assassinated generals by 11:00 A.M. on October 1, which was 
five hours before this information was announced by Jakarta. The list 
included the  name  of  General  Nasution which  confirms that  the 
Chinese had an advance copy of the target list but did not know of 
Nasution's   escape,   a   point   that   the   Supardjo/Untung   tactical 
leadership was just learning from Sukarno.(7) 
The subsequent Chinese reaction to the Indonesian defeat was 
one of stunned silence, followed by vituperation over the destruction 
of the PKI. The Chinese official establishment in Indonesia took an 
emotional die-hard position rather than trying to make the best of a 
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defeat. It breathed an all-encompassing defiance that played into the 
hands of its enemies. China's whole attitude was one of retreat into a 
defensive  shell  in  which  it  refused  to  acknowledge  publicly  the 
extent of the disaster but focused instead on other issues, as if to 
avoid the pain of dashed hopes. Peng Chen and Liu Shao-chi, the 
two senior officials most connected with the Peking-Jakarta axis, 
soon came under severe attack and fell from power. Peng Chen, the 
defender of Wu Han, had also been closely associated with the 
Indonesian alliance, notably in his celebrated trip to Indonesia in 
May, 1965, and was an early purge victim. Even Chou En-lai, who 
was also prominent in the Indonesian relationship with Sukarno and 
Aidit, was on the defensive and was only able to survive because of 
his adroitness, his power base, and his relative lack of vulnerability 
on the domestic issues that were purportedly the driving forces of the 
Cultural Revolution. Chou's position was strengthened by his early 
support of Chen Po-ta's attack on Peng Chen in December but he was 
more vulnerable as a patron of Chen Yi and as a personal symbol of 
bureaucracy, modernization, nationalism and an urbane, 
cosmopolitan style, all these qualities being anathema to the ideals 
that characterized the Cultural Revolution. 
While the Indonesia issue lay largely below the surface like a 
giant  iceberg,  the  tip  occasionally showed as  well.  The  Chinese 
charge d'affaires in Jakarta, Yao Teng-shan, became a public hero 
after his expulsion by the new Indonesian political constellation in 
April, 1966. Although welcomed by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi as 
well  as  being  received  by  Mao  and  Lin  Biao,  Yao  and  another 
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expelled official launched a fierce attack on Foreign Minister Chen 
Yi for his alleged failure to support the Indonesian communists and 
the Chinese minority in Indonesia. Yao soon became the leader of 
the radical clique in the Foreign Ministry and was reportedly egged 
on by the Chen Po-ta group to seize control of the ministry which he 
briefly succeeded in doing. Yao and Wang Li, a senior figure among 
the radicals around Chen Po-ta, eventually over-extended themselves 
in carrying the radical offensive too far and Wang was arrested on 
the orders of Chou En-lai with Mao's apparent acquiescence, after 
their instigation of an attack on the British Embassy in Peking. There 
are other connections if one looks closely. Lin Piao's most important 
statement after his pre-September 30 Affair pronouncement about 
the world countryside surrounding the world city was a speech on 
May 18, 1966. Lin spoke at length on this occasion about the 
possibility of a coup d'etat. While the theme was geared to the tense 
internal situation in  China, it  seems clear  that  Lin Piao  had  the 
Indonesian disaster in mind as well. He spoke, in fact, about the 
rising number of coups d'etat in the world at large and listed 
Indonesia, Ghana, and Syria as the most recent examples of what had 
"today become a fad". One might argue that the military 
miscalculations of the apparently dominant leftist political forces in 
Indonesia stimulated the Chinese Communist leaders to give 
additional weight to  internal military considerations and  to  draw 
other appropriate lessons from the Indonesian experience. Strong 
efforts were made by Lin Piao in this period to strengthen central 
control over the military structure of the country and to place greater 
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emphasis on political indoctrination. The PLA chief of staff, Lo Jui 
ching, was purged in December, l965 and replaced by a Lin Piao 
loyalist. Although the rise of the Red Guards was a result of internal 
political dynamics, leadership interest in ensuring a revolutionary 
cast to organized Chinese youth was probably also reinforced by the 
spectacle of Indonesian youth - once regarded as the glorified cutting 
edge of the Revolution - becoming the most visible instrument of the 
anti-communist reaction to the PKI and later Sukarno himself. 
The principal argument for arguing a significant impact of the 
Indonesian communist collapse on Chinese policy is not to cite a 
study of the tea leaves, however, but to stand back and look at the 
larger picture to recall the pervasive revolutionary optimism of 
September,  l965,  the  significance  accorded  to  the  Pyongyang, 
Peking, Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Jakarta axis, to the hopes for a Second 
Afro-Asian Conference and a Conference of New Emerging Forces, 
to the encirclement of the world city (the old Established Forces) by 
the world countryside (the New Emerging Forces) and to see what 
followed. China almost immediately retreated into itself in an orgy of 
internally directed radicalism that reminds one of the McCarthy era 
in the United States which was, in many ways, a last gasp of 
American isolationism to avoid external commitments by attacking 
artificial   enemies   at   home.   The   years   immediately   after   the 
Indonesian debacle were also a period in which the focus of the 
Sino-Soviet quarrel shifted from rivalry over who was the stronger 
proponent of national liberation struggles in the Third World 
generally and in Southeast Asia in particular to Chinese irredentist 
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claims and border clashes. While it  is true that Chinese charges 
against Russian imperialist acquisitions were made before October, 
1965, they were not a central theme as they were now to become. 
The great build-up of Soviet forces in Outer Mongolia and along the 
border only began in earnest around this time (1967-1968) and 
reflected  the  significant  changes  in  the  texture  and  locus  of 
Sino-Soviet   tensions.   These   border-centered   tensions   grew   in 
intensity the following year with a series of military clashes 
commencing at the Ussuri River island of Damansky or Chenpao in 
March,  1969.  A  few  months  later,  the  Soviet  leader,  Leonid 
Brezhnev, launched a proposal for an Asian security arrangement. 
Though general, and probably not expected to be taken seriously 
because of  the  easily calculable reactions of  the  non-Communist 
states of the region to whom it was directed, the Soviet proposal was 
clearly designed as an anti-Chinese measure. Both sides were by now 
clearly subordinating ideological consistency to the primacy of direct 
bilateral confrontation and courting potential tactical allies against 
each other from among non-Communist as well as Communist 
countries. 
Chinese fear of the Soviet Union was undoubtedly contributing 
to the intensity of internally directed Chinese radicalism and the 
Soviet threat was  also  a  central issue among Chinese leadership 
factions.  Nevertheless,  it  should  be  noted  that  the  initiative  for 
shifting the Sino-Soviet debate from leadership and strategy 
preferences in the Third World did not come from the Soviet Union 
but from the Chinese. It was the new Chinese emphasis on historical 
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Russian encroachment in Siberia with its implicit claim that vast 
Soviet territories should rightfully be Chinese coupled with increased 
Chinese aggressiveness concerning the more openly disputed border 
areas  such  as  Damansky  island  that  led  to  the  Soviet  military 
build-up, not the reverse. Although bellicose, the Soviet response 
was essentially defensive. It is sometimes difficult to know which 
came  first, the  chicken  or  the  egg,  in  such  mutually reinforcing 
animosities, but  I  would submit  that  this  is  one  case  where  the 
initiative for change in a relationship is clear. It is the Chinese who 
in 1966-67 raised the ante of the existing dispute (even though the 
Soviets may be accorded the bulk of responsibility for the original 
split) and this, I believe, can be ascribed to their loss of faith in the 
positive unfolding of their optimistic hopes for a communist East 
Asia. 
Meanwhile, the new Administration in the United States had 
begun a cautious minuet of gestures toward the Chinese following 
the Ussuri clashes and the Chinese were responding, as Henry 
Kissinger's memoir makes clear.(9) China was still immersed in the 
Cultural Revolution internally at this time but on a declining level of 
intensity. Pragmatism was gaining strength, particularly in foreign 
policy, and the desirability of some accommodation with the U.S. 
was becoming more evident, particularly since the posture of the new 
Nixon Administration was not so rigid as might have been expected. 
Beginning in early 1969, the United States began a series of steps 
designed to signal a shift in China policy including a relaxation of 
trade controls and removal of travel restrictions. The enunciation of 
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the Nixon Doctrine in mid-1969 also showed that the United States 
was de-emphasizing direct military involvement in favor of greater 
demands on its allies and friends in East Asia and elsewhere to pull 
their own weight. And behind the scenes, assurances of a US desire 
for some kind of relationship were being conveyed to China through 
Pakistan and Romania. That China understood these signals and was 
now favorable itself toward a foreign policy shift became apparent in 
1970 with the surprise Chinese invitation to a U.S. table tennis team 
in Tokyo to come to China. The 1971 Kissinger visit to China that 
startled   the   world,   and   the   1972   Nixon   trip   and   Shanghai 
communique that followed, were the results of this changed Chinese 
policy. 
The new Chinese policy could only be based on a radically 
different Chinese assessment: the United States was no longer the 
great impediment to Chinese revolutionary expectations in Asia for 
the simple reason that the Chinese no longer entertained such 
expectations as a practical matter. There were other factors 
contributing to the change in Chinese perceptions, of course. These 
included Chinese awareness of a more immediate and more directly 
military  Soviet  threat  than  had  been  the  case  in  the  past.  Other 
factors were the implications in the Nixon Doctrine that the US as a 
matter  of  policy  would  be  less  directly  involved  in  the  region 
coupled with the increasingly obvious erosion of American domestic 
support for the war in Indo-China. All of these factors were also 
shaped to some degree by the Indonesian upheaval directly or by the 
indirect results including the shift in Chinese policy after Indonesia 
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toward provocation of the Soviets and toward a loss of real interest 
in revolution in Southeast Asia. This is not to say that these factors 
did not have a life of their own, of course, for it is not my intention 
to allege a single causative factor. Nevertheless, the Indonesian 
upheaval was a much more significant factor in inducing these 
changes than has been generally realized and this applies particularly 
toward China. 
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Footnotes – Chapter XIX 
 
 
 
1. The key passage from Lin Piao's September, 1965 statement 
reads as follows: "Taking the entire globe, if North America and 
Western Europe can be called 'the cities of the world', then Asia, 
Africa and Latin America constitute the rural areas of the world. 
Since World War II, the proletarian revolutionary movement in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America has been growing vigorously. In 
a sense, the contemporary world revolution also presents a 
picture of the encirclement of cities by rural areas. In the final 
analysis, the whole cause of world revolution hinges on the 
revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin 
American peoples who make up the overwhelming majority of 
the world's population. The socialist countries should regard it 
as their internationalist duty to support the peoples' 
revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America". Lin 
Pao added that "The Chinese Revolution has successfully solved 
the problem of how to link up the national-democratic with the 
socialist revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries". 
K.H. Fan, editor, The Chinese Cultural Revolution: Selected  
Documents (New York, Monthly Review Press) 1968, p. 96. 
The Lin Piao thesis was already evident in Peng Chen's speech at 
the PKI anniversary celebration in Jakarta in May 1965 and was 
attributed by Peng Chen to PKI Chairman Aidit. Aidit's position 
was actually a reflection of Sukarno's thesis on the New 
Emerging Forces overcoming the Old Established Forces. See 
435  
 
INR (State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research) 
Research Memorandum RFE-39 of September 24, 1965, China 
Country File, National Security File, LBJ Library. 
2. For the events between the Eighth Congress of the Chinese 
Communist Party in May, 1958 and the factional struggles of 
the Cultural Revolution period, I have drawn particularly on 
Jaap Van Ginneken, The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao (London, 
Penguin Books and Amsterdam, Uitgeverij En Boekhandel) 
1974 and Lowell Dittmer, Liu Shao-chi and the Chinese  
Cultural Revolution (Berkeley, California, University of 
California Press) 1974. 
3. A useful summary of the contrasting analyses among a multitude 
of Western writers on the causes of the Cultural Revolution is 
contained in James C. F. Wang, The Cultural  Revolution in 
China: An Annotated Bibliography (New York and London, 
Garland Publishing, Inc.) 1976. None of Wang's annotations 
mentions Indonesia as a factor. Most of the authors cited by 
Wang highlighted the power struggle, many dwelled on the 
dichotomy between modernizers and traditionalists or 
"revisionists" and conservatives, and a few focussed on the 
Sino-Soviet dispute. A CIA Special Report of August 5, 1966 
entitled "China's Growing Isolation in the Communist 
Movement" noted that China launched a vigorous effort only 
two years earlier to build a bloc of supporters but that this effort 
had met failure. This failure was attributed largely to China's 
"rigid dogmatism" and to more flexible Soviet tactics after the 
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fall of Khrushchev although the report did note that, "Of all 
China's recent reversals abroad, the one in Indonesia has been 
the most serious". See China Country File, National Security 
File, LBJ Library. Another CIA Intelligence Report of April 1, 
1966, "Peking's Setback in Indonesia", called the September 30 
 
Affair "a major diplomatic debacle" for China and pointed out 
that China as well as Sukarno had set great stock in the 
forthcoming CONEFO and that China had relied on Indonesia 
for playing a central role in various front and Afro-Asian 
organizations hostile to the Soviets, a device now lost. 
Available in the Indonesian Country File, LBJ Library. 
4. Liu was attacked specifically on the peaceful co-existence issue 
in September, 1968 at a time when the US and the PRC were 
discussing a re-opening of their bilateral ambassadorial talks, a 
course that the radicals obviously did not favor. 
5. See Dittmer, p. 225. 
 
6. Dittmer, p.225, refers to these charges. After the 1962 Ne Win 
coup, Burma became one of several third world states regarded 
by the Soviets as embarked on a "non-capitalist path" or, to use 
other Soviet terminology, to have become a 
"national-democratic state". I ran across an official unclassified 
Burmese Government document in 1970 which stated in a quite 
straightforward manner that Ne Win had been a secret member 
of the Burmese Communist Party and had left it in 1944 as a 
result of Aung San's decision to act similarly (Aung San was the 
Burmese independence leader assassinated in 1947 and, I 
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believe, had made a genuine conversion). While in Burma, I 
became a rather good friend of a co-founder of the Burmese 
Communist Party, a man who left the Party but remained a 
committed Marxist and a close adviser to Ne Win. This man 
believed strongly that Ne Win's Marxism was not only genuine 
but more rigid than his own. My own studies of the Burma 
Socialist Program Party structure and programs led to similar 
conclusions. 
7. Arthur J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in Indonesia", China  
Quarterly, January-March, 1966, as quoted by Brackman, The  
Communist Collapse in Indonesia, p. 149. 
8. Van Ginneken, pp. 113-114. 
 
9. Quoted by Van Ginneken, pp. 56-57. 
 
10.  Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, Little, Brown 
and Co.) 1979 pp. 167-194. 
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XX 
 
The Effect on Vietnam  
 
and the United States 
 
 
 
The US effort in Vietnam and in Indo-China as a whole has 
been greatly criticized in many quarters. It is probably still an issue 
so beset with emotion that any effort to analyze the effect of the 
Indonesian turnaround on attitudes toward the Vietnam War will 
have to contend with deeply-held convictions that were spawned by 
the domestic controversy over US involvement and its heavy costs in 
what many have seen as a dubious cause. 
There were many aspects to the controversy and some are not 
relevant to the points to be made in the discussion that follows. The 
way in which US involvement proceeded, the size of the build-up, 
the extreme Americanization of the effort until the later stages, the 
debates over head-counts, the atrocities, the debate over confining 
the ground action to South Vietnam, the bombing, and a host of other 
issues can be debated on their respective merits but they are not 
really relevant to the basic issue for this study of whether there was 
more than a local threat to South Vietnam which lay behind the US 
decision to intervene. Reducing the question to a well-known but 
simplistic slogan was the domino theory really valid and, if so, was it 
more valid in one period than in another? A second point, and the 
main purpose of this section, is to examine the degree to which the 
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Indonesian upheaval changed the strategic picture and brought about 
largely sub-conscious or poorly articulated changes in the American 
public perception of US involvement. In this connection, there was 
some considerable attention paid in 1966-67 to the question of 
whether  US  intervention  in  Vietnam  encouraged  the  Indonesian 
non-communists to react forcefully to the "communist coup" in 
Indonesia. A better question would be what effect the collapse of 
Indonesian communism had on the Vietnam War and particularly on 
the   attitudes   of   the   non-regional   participants   and   interested 
observers. 
First, the domino theory. I believe strongly that the domino 
theory had a great deal of validity before 1965-66 but that it rapidly 
lost its validity thereafter. Most of the critics of the domino concept 
became vocal after the strategic changes had taken place, had little 
understanding of the degree of communist revolutionary optimism 
before the Indonesian catastrophe, and only saw - in a vague- "gut 
feeling" sort of way - that the regional threat was overstated at the 
time their criticisms were being voiced. What they failed to see, or 
preferred to ignore, was that the domino theory had a great deal of 
validity up to October, 1965, if much less thereafter. Indeed, the 
domino theory really was an American shorthand summation of the 
openly  expressed  position  of  Asian  communism  at  the  time,  a 
position that quickly receded after the 1965 defeat in Indonesia. 
Meanwhile, the defenders of US involvement in Vietnam also 
failed to perceive the strategic change since the importance of 
Indonesia was never fully understood; it was regarded as a side show 
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(or at best a minor second front) to Vietnam for the quite 
understandable reasons that Vietnam was where the US was heavily 
engaged with its own forces and Vietnam was where the real fighting 
and dying were taking place.(l) The change in Indonesia was 
welcomed greatly by the Johnson Administration, of course, but it 
had little effect on perceptions of the strategic threat. The point in all 
this is to conclude that both sides in the bitter Vietnam debate were 
talking at cross purposes about the validity of the domino theory and 
the rationale for US involvement and both were at least half wrong 
on this aspect of the debate. 
While it may sound as if I am trying to paper over the issues of 
that debate, I should make it clear that I personally remained 
convinced that US involvement in the Vietnam war was not only 
correct in 1964-65 when the strategic threat was real but in 1968 or 
even in 1973-74 when the strategic threat had receded. The issue in 
the later period is more narrow, however, and has to do with the US 
obligation  to  an  ally  and  to  the  people  of  a  small  country  that 
deserved a better fate, irrespective of the reduced effect of hostile 
conquest on US strategic interests. While US troop withdrawal and 
Vietnamization were warranted and should have been pursued earlier 
and at a more serious pace, US congressional refusal to authorize 
war material, particularly ammunition, to the beleaguered South 
Vietnamese forces was one of the more shameful acts in American 
history, in my judgement. But whether one agrees with this latter 
view or not, that is a moral issue that is largely irrelevant to the thesis 
of this chapter. 
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To return to the domino theory, the central core of that idea was 
that a Chinese-led communist threat to all of Southeast Asia was 
very real in 1964-65 and that an uncontested communist take-over of 
South  Vietnam  would  lead  to  the  progressive  fall  of  the  other 
non-communist states of the region. Some simplified the underlying 
proposition to  an  overly military scenario of  Chinese hordes (or 
Vietnamese hordes) physically invading the rest of the region. That 
kind of simple-minded thinking existed but was essentially wrong. 
Vietnamese forces had and would continue to intervene in Laos and 
Cambodia where Hanoi had always seen itself as pre-eminent, but 
the threat elsewhere was much more indirect. China, and other 
communist states, would have continued to provide training, 
equipment, advisors and the like to guerrilla movements and this 
support would probably have increased, but direct intervention was 
not the real threat. As noted elsewhere in this book, all the East 
Asian communist countries and parties - and this extended to the 
dominant Sukarnoist element in the government as well as to the PKI 
in Indonesia - believed that they were riding a revolutionary wave 
that was about to engulf the region. This was manifest in everything 
that was being said by all of them at the time. The US was regarded, 
in Mao's immortal words, as a paper tiger strategically even though it 
was  to  be  feared  and  countered  on  a  tactical  level.  Communist 
victory in Vietnam might take time but was ultimately seen as 
inevitable (they weren't far wrong but largely because of their victory 
in the American media as well as their strength on the ground). More 
important,  the  imminent  shock  of  giant  Indonesia  becoming  an 
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openly communist state through a series of actions in late 1965 was 
expected, and correctly so, to send shock waves through the smaller, 
weak non-communist states of the region. As Ambassador Marshall 
Green was fond of saying after he became Assistant Secretary for 
East Asia Affairs in 1969, states like Thailand, Malaysia and 
Singapore would have seen themselves as caught between a gigantic 
pincers with a massive aggressively revolutionary China to the North 
and  a  large  (if  not  exactly  massive  in  the  sense  of  China) 
aggressively revolutionary Indonesia to the South. Only the US 
commitment in Vietnam and British, Australian and New Zealand 
commitments in  Malaysia appeared to  stand in  the  way  of  their 
coming together. Again the threat was not so much physical as one 
of overwhelming intimidation to small, weak countries, each with 
problems of insurgency, internal subversion and social, economic 
and ethnic viability. This was the real domino theory and, in this 
psychological sense, it was clearly warranted in 1964-65. 
The  communist  failure  in  Indonesia  obviously  removed  the 
threat from the south but the effect was greater than that. It removed 
the psychological intimidation of encirclement - a threat from only 
one direction, no matter how powerful, somehow fails to project the 
terror  and  uncertainty that  derives  from  encirclement. Still  more 
significant was the withdrawal of China into itself as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Revolutionary rhetoric remained but the air had 
gone out of the balloon of Asian communist revolutionary optimism. 
China had begun to undergo the great sea change that would make it 
a status quo power for the next decade or more. The intensity of 
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communist efforts in Vietnam would persist but that continued 
communist hyper-nationalism would now be confined to the 
Vietnamese and contained within an Indo-China framework. 
Communist insurgencies in Thailand, Burma and elsewhere were 
gradually to lose steam despite continued, but increasingly 
perfunctory, Chinese support while China was eventually not only to 
reassure the non-communist states of the region of its benign 
intentions but even to encourage their resistance to a communist 
Vietnam that was depicted by the early 1970s, however 
simplistically, as a tool of Soviet encirclement efforts. The decline of 
the  threat  was  not  perceived clearly  or  immediately (particularly 
given the difficulty of understanding what was happening in China) 
and so the transition in people's awareness of the changed strategic 
threat was gradual and not linked to any specific act. By 1968, I 
believe, an increasingly strong but inchoate sense had grown among 
many Americans, led of course by the original critics, that the threat 
was not all it was cracked up to be and that the rationale for the US 
agony in Vietnam could not be sustained. The domino theory was 
seen as invalid but no one bothered to see that it had been valid 
earlier, whatever its validity in 1968. Indeed, the old time critics 
preferred to fuzz that issue if it ever came into their heads at all; it 
was far more pleasant to their egos to say that they had always been 
right - that there had never been a threat sufficient to merit a US 
commitment. 
Some  important  figures  in  the  Johnson  Administration  had 
understandably tried  to  attribute  the  successful  comeback  of  the 
445  
 
Indonesian non-communists to resolute US action in Vietnam. Given 
the degree of polarization in US political opinion by 1966-67 and 
especially by 1968, it is not surprising that the stronger and more 
rigid opponents of the Vietnam War were quick to deny any such 
causal relationship. This debate, like most that are so heavily 
emotional and polarized, was not very illuminating. It should be 
clear from all that has been said earlier that the September 30 affair 
failed because of overconfidence, excessive compartmentalization, 
poor planning, plain bad luck, and Sukarno's loss of nerve. Suharto 
responded  to  what  he  saw  as  a  deadly,  immediate  threat  to  a 
non-communist  Army  and  he  would  have  responded  in  sheer 
self-defense irrespective of whether Indo-China had gone communist 
or not. It is less clear, however, whether Yani and others would have 
stood as firm earlier on the issues of a  fifth armed force and a 
political commissar system had the US failed to defend South 
Vietnam when the North Vietnamese regulars were introduced, or if 
Britain and the Commonwealth had weakened in their assistance to 
Malaysia  which  was  the  likely corollary  of  a  US  failure  to  act. 
Certainly the Army's show of resistance to the march of communism 
under Sukarno's benevolent protection was never frontal and never 
very strong, even as it was. If the revolutionary tide had seemed even 
more of a juggernaut than it was, the Army leaders may well have 
acceded to these measures so that a "peaceful" entry into the socialist 
stage would have been possible and the September 30 affair either 
unnecessary or  structured quite  differently. Similar  psychological 
connections can be adduced for later developments such as the rise 
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of the anti-communist student movement and the long-delayed but 
eventually firm Suharto decision in March, 1966 to stop Sukarno's 
efforts to effect a creeping return to full power in a pro-communist 
context. There is no way that one can be sure of what the perception 
of a victorious North Vietnam and a cowed US would have done to 
destroy hope and the will to resist but there must have been some 
significant effect. 
Leaving the vagaries of the above "what if" questions of policy, 
it is more fruitful, I believe, to look at the effect of Indonesia on the 
US. This effect is already implicit in the previous discussion but now 
it  can  be  made  more  explicit.  The  growing  awareness  of  the 
declining validity of the domino concept, the perception that China 
was not going to roll down through Southeast Asia since it was 
consumed with its internal agonies, and the sense that the rest of 
Southeast Asia was becoming more viable raised the question in the 
popular mind (and this was fed especially by the more superficial, 
slick and pontificating school of journalism) of why are we there? 
The issue was obfuscated further by all those side issues previously 
mentioned  such as South    Vietnamese  corruption,  excessive 
American visibility, atrocities, etc., so that all issues related to 
Vietnam became   merged together in one great whine of 
condemnation. Boiled down to its essence, however, the core 
phenomenon was the traditional problem of democracies and 
especially of the United States with its residue of isolationism - an 
inability to sustain a high cost operation for complex ends, however 
justifiable, when the perceived threat was not massive, clear and 
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truly vital to the United States. There are many other factors that can 
explain the US disenchantment with Vietnam than the indirect results 
of the Indonesian reversal but this overlooked chain of events was of 
great significance. Democracies cannot follow through on strategic 
victories and the Indonesian upheaval was a strategic victory that 
changed  the  face  of  the  Asian  balance  of  power  or,  better,  the 
political equilibrium of the entire region as well as the sense of 
where the momentum lay. Because of this major shift in political 
momentum, the outcome in Vietnam had become largely irrelevant - 
or  relatively  more  irrelevant  -  to  the  future  of  the  region.  This 
became ever more clear in the decades that followed as Indo-China 
remained mired in backwardness, incompetence and vestiges of 
Marxist rigidity, while large numbers of its population fled abroad as 
"boat people" or otherwise. The rest of the region (except Burma) in 
the meantime experienced spectacular economic growth and the even 
more  important development of  greatly  enhanced  self-confidence 
and social and psychological stability. Problems remained 
considerable and some will take generations to overcome but anyone 
who has seen the region change over the last few decades cannot but 
be impressed that these countries are vastly stronger today than they 
were in the early 1960s. 
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Footnotes - Chapter XX 
 
 
 
1. This was especially true in the upper reaches of government 
 
and, quite naturally, in the US military establishment which was 
perforce fixed on the place where it was so deeply involved. 
However, it was also even true among the professional ranks of 
the East Asia Bureau at State - or at least that was the 
impression gained from visits to Indonesia by many officials of 
the Bureau. The State Department and other civilian agencies 
like CIA and AID were heavily engaged in civil operations 
programs in Vietnam and it was natural for policy attention to 
focus on the area where one's own resources were so heavily 
committed. 
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XXI 
 
The Soviet Role in Asia - Before  
 
and After 
 
 
 
The effect of the communist debacle in Indonesia on the Soviet 
Union is more difficult to evaluate than its impact on China, largely 
because the Soviet Union had lost out to China in their struggle for 
the affections of both Sukarno and the PKI. In one immediate sense, 
the failure of Sukarno's coup was helpful to the Soviet Union; it 
allowed Moscow to adopt a holier-than-thou, I-told-you-so attitude 
toward its ungrateful Indonesian erstwhile allies and toward all those 
Third World radicals who had courted or were in danger of courting 
China in preference to the Soviet Union. At the Party level, China's 
loss of its most important ally in the Sino-Soviet conflict effectively 
broke the back of the Chinese Communist Party threat to become a 
viable  alternative  leader  of  the  world  communist movement and 
Soviet ability to disparage Chinese prescriptions for revolution was 
enhanced. 
There were also some subtle but quite real negative 
consequences.  The  Sino-Soviet  and  Indonesian-Soviet  conflicts 
were, after all, still within the communist family. From this time on, 
communism all but ceased as a believable alternative for those 
portions of East Asia that had not become communist in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II or that were already in the 
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process of being overcome by powerful indigenous communist 
movements. This last category was limited exclusively to 
Indo-China. As earlier chapters have noted, the shattering of 
communist hopes for  Indonesia was  a  defeat  for  communism in 
general. Furthermore, Soviet investments in Sukarno's Indonesia had 
been massive and relatively recent and it could always have been 
hoped before the debacle that Sukarno would ultimately see the error 
of his more recent ways and reject Chinese for Soviet support. This 
dream was now gone. Even at the ideological level, there was a 
setback of major proportions as Indonesia, along with Castro's Cuba, 
was  one  of  the  two  leading  examples  of  the  Soviet  view  of  a 
"non-capitalist path" for the  Third World, that  is  the  concept of 
"national democracy." This blow was aggravated by the fact that the 
third country to be declared a national democracy, Ghana, also fell 
from this state of incipient grace with the overthrow of Nkrumah at 
the same time as the change in Indonesia. The theory continued but 
in much weakened form and against a tide of growing doubts as to its 
efficacy even among Soviet ideologues. Although there were some 
new recruits to the “national democratic” category in the years ahead 
such as Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique, many of the early 
examples had to be removed from that category in subsequent years 
such as Egypt and Guinea.  Furthermore, there was no escaping the 
fact that greater skepticism was required regarding the longer term 
stability of leftist third world regimes as well as their long term 
commitment to Leninist principles.  The early failures of “the non- 
capitalist path” in Indonesia and Ghana set the tone for a growing 
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perception that communism was not to be the wave of the future—a 
trend  that  ended  in  the  collapse  of  communist  optimism  in  its 
original heartland. 
In the years that have followed, the Soviet Union was reduced 
to a virtual zero as a potential model for Southeast Asia. Its influence 
became limited to a Vietnam that wanted the Soviet Union as a 
powerful but  distant  ally  against  a  very  proximate China  whose 
interests no longer coincided with those of the Vietnamese after 
China lost interest in the cause of an expanding revolutionary Asian 
communism while Hanoi was more committed than ever to conquest 
of   South  Vietnam  and   effective  suzerainty  over   the   rest   of 
Indo-China as it saw American will deteriorate. This is not to say 
that Soviet military power was not recognized by the nations of 
Southeast Asia. Indeed, a  Soviet threat in such terms was much 
discussed, especially by Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew, but this 
perception of an outside military threat was much different than the 
earlier threat of powerful internal communist movements aided and 
abetted by a Soviet Union regarded as the fountainhead of a hostile 
world-wide movement. This shift in the perception of the Soviet 
Union from an immediate subversive danger to a distant, if powerful, 
Great Power that lacks resonance in the region paradoxically 
increased regional willingness to allow the Soviet Union a limited 
entree for such purposes as trade, cultural relations and diplomatic 
acceptability. A certain suspicion remained, and justifiably so, but 
the ASEAN countries, in particular, now regarded themselves as big 
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boys  able  to  deal  with  whatever  subversive  emanations  might 
protrude from the Soviet official presence. 
Meanwhile, the real shift in the focus of Sino-Soviet rivalry 
from   leadership   of   national   liberation   movements   to   direct 
state-to-state  confrontation led  to  Soviet  pre-occupation with  the 
containment and encirclement of China. The Soviet leadership at the 
highest levels, including Brezhnev himself, began to advocate the 
need for an Asian   security conference and a new security structure 
that was never spelled out. Despite the vagueness of this scheme, 
Soviet  diplomacy  and  Soviet  propaganda  put  forth  considerable 
effort in trying to induce the non-communist countries of East Asia, 
and Southeast Asia in particular, to agree to the necessity for such a 
formal arrangement. The Soviet concept was vigorously denounced 
by the United States but it lacked any resonance in the region in any 
case and even the Soviets did not appear to regard it as a viable 
proposal. Its purpose was rather to foster the appearance of a broad 
coalition against a China with which the Soviets were increasingly 
locked in an acerbic direct confrontation. The bitterness of that 
confrontation had subsided by the 1980s but Soviet efforts to foster 
an encirclement of China with allies or at least rivals of China such 
as India continued. The Soviet military build-up also continued with 
the  existing  land  force  structure  supplemented by  greater  Soviet 
naval activity in the Western Pacific and the acquisition of a base at 
Cam Ranh Bay in South Vietnam. 
The shift of communist Vietnam from the Chinese to the Soviet 
orbit in the 1970s and early 1980s deserves further comment. The 
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first  step  in  this process was  Hanoi's perception that  China was 
becoming increasingly disinterested in the cause of Southeast Asian 
revolution after  the  Indonesian debacle  -  irrespective of  whether 
Hanoi connected this withdrawal to Indonesia or merely to the 
Cultural Revolution as an internal Chinese phenomenon. This was 
followed by very practical reasons for Vietnamese dissatisfaction 
with China; the latter began to interrupt the flow of Soviet assistance 
across the Chinese rail system - a feature of their trilateral relations 
that had become both common and quite clear to external observers 
by 1967-68. These Chinese actions were not simply the disruptions 
of the Red Guards and contending Chinese factions; they were 
conscious Chinese policy. This policy was not directed so much at 
Vietnam as at the Soviet Union which was becoming much more of a 
direct target of Chinese venom by this time as noted in another 
chapter. Nevertheless, it was Hanoi that was harmed and precisely at 
a time when its prospects for conquest of the south seemed to be 
taking on a new dimension as the result of the growing shift in US 
public  opinion.  The   basis  was   accordingly  being  laid   for   a 
Vietnamese shift of primary reliance from Peking to Moscow, that is 
a shift from an alliance of common ideology and common regional 
strategy that had characterized the Sino-Vietnamese relationship 
before September 30, 1965 to an alliance of convenience based on 
more narrow and parochial interests of the Soviet-Vietnamese 
partners. The Soviet interest was the search for some kind of a toe 
hold in the region from which it was otherwise poorly positioned 
(with  the  future  base  at  Cam  Ranh  Bay  a  later  bonus)  and  the 
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extension of its effort to encircle China. The Vietnamese interest was 
to garner Soviet material support for its pan-Indo-China designs and, 
later, to offset a China that wanted to confine Vietnam to Vietnam 
proper as its policies in Laos and Cambodia were to show. 
In sum then, the Soviet Union was largely frozen out of East 
Asia politically after the Indonesian upheaval and had to resort to a 
somewhat increased military presence and a courtship of its 
Vietnamese ally  in  order  to  harass  China  and  to  maintain some 
minimal participation in the affairs of the region in the hope that 
there would be a better outlook for its interests sometime in the 
remote future. The impact of the communist collapse in Indonesia on 
all this is related more to what transpired in the Chinese change of 
posture than to any direct relationship although the general decline of 
communism's appeal in Southeast Asia after 1965 also limited Soviet 
capabilities. And with the rise of Gorbachev and his last ditch efforts 
to  salvage  the  Soviet  Union  through  contained  liberalization, all 
these  calculations about communist advance toward its  supposed 
inevitable world triumph became irrelevant. 
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XXII 
 
The Broad International Effects 
 
 
 
A stone dropped in a pond will send out ripples that reach far 
from the point of original impact although with diminishing effect. 
The Indonesian upheaval had such far reaching effects. One reason 
for this was the intrinsic importance of Indonesia because of its size 
and strategic location. A second was the indirect impact of the 
communist failure in redirecting China's militant external stance into 
a focus on internal policy and accommodation abroad. There was 
still a third factor that merged with the Indonesian upheaval and the 
resultant China effect to extend these influences yet further. This 
latter factor was not knowingly related to the Indonesian upheaval 
but the coincidence was nevertheless real. I am referring here to the 
conscious innovative foreign policy pursued by Richard Nixon and 
Henry Kissinger on a global scale. As articulated in particular by 
Kissinger, there was a deliberate effort to shift the structure of 
international relations from the  bi-polar system that  grew out of 
World War II into a multi-polar structure based on five large 
agglomerations of power: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, 
Japan and Western Europe. To some extent this theme may have 
reflected Kissinger's personal interest in the Metternichean analogy 
of the stable Congress of Vienna settlement that followed the end of 
the  Napoleonic  Wars.  In  a  deeper  sense,  it  was  also  a  natural 
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evolution in thinking that reflected evolving realities. The world was, 
in fact, decreasingly bi-polar in several ways. Soviet hegemony over 
international communism was fading. This was not only evident in 
the  increasing bitterness  of  the  Sino-Soviet split  but  also  in  the 
greater variety that was slowly developing in Eastern Europe and 
elsewhere. Both Western Europe and Japan had recovered from their 
wartime prostration and were becoming more assertive. The practical 
inability of the US and the Soviet Union to translate their awesome 
military power into commensurate political influence and the rise of 
limited but nevertheless important constraints of ethics and 
precedence served to provide smaller powers with more leeway to 
assert themselves without bringing down upon their heads the wrath 
of one or more of the great powers. Partly, of course, this was simply 
a matter of the smaller players learning how far they could go as the 
new  post-war  balance  became  more  settled  and  predictable  and 
partly it reflected both internal and external restraints on great power 
freedom of action. The Kissinger model was overly simplistic in my 
view as it did not take sufficient account of countries or "power 
centers" other than the arbitrarily selected "big five" and tended to 
downgrade  the  significance  of  medium  and  small  nations  as 
important actors, not just as pawns being acted upon. Nevertheless, 
the Nixon/Kissinger scheme had merit and, in any case, it had its 
effect upon US policy. 
As   Kissinger   makes   clear   in   his   book   on   his   official 
stewardship, neither he nor the President looked upon the opening to 
China as simply a crass playing of the "China card" against the 
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Soviet  Union  but  rather  saw  the  opening to  China  as  part  of  a 
multi-polar balance or "concert of the world" that would involve all 
the powers including the Soviet Union in a stable system of checks 
and balances which in turn would sustain the general peace. This is 
also clear from what actually transpired. Nixon and Kissinger wasted 
no time after the Shanghai communique in following up their 
successful visit  to  Peking with  a  visit  to  Moscow. This  was  no 
ordinary visit, moreover, it was to be the launching of a US-Soviet 
detente and a general East-West detente that went far beyond the 
limited previous moves such as Brandt's Ostpolitik. A whole array of 
agreements were signed including a structure of significant foreign 
trade commitments (and Most Favored Nation treatment for the 
USSR) and a bevy of new exchange arrangements. The first SALT 
agreement,  which  had  been  bogged  down  in  technicalities,  was 
rushed  to  a  conclusion  and  the  United  States  reversed  its  long 
standing veto of a European Security Conference, albeit with 
insistence on getting some quid for the quo in the form of a "basket 
three" on human rights. This grand scheme was only partially 
realized, of course, in large part falling far short of expectations 
because of the virtual collapse of Presidential authority as a result of 
Watergate. Nevertheless, SALT one and CSCE - the European 
Security and Cooperation structure - remained as seemingly 
permanent institutional products of the Nixon/Kissinger policies. 
How can these essentially European-centered structures be tied 
to the Indonesian upheaval? Although there are also purely European 
and  US-Soviet  bilateral  factors  that  contributed  to  the  march  of 
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policy in this direction, it is difficult to see how all this would have 
come about without the prior China opening. And, as I have said, the 
China opening became possible only because of the powerful effect 
of  the  Indonesian  reversal  on  Chinese  policy.  From  the  US 
standpoint, the Nixon visit to Moscow would hardly have occurred 
without the  prior  accommodation with  China  which  allowed  the 
American leadership to conclude that a stable multi-power balance or 
"council of the world" was a viable new course. The Soviet Union 
too, although it wanted a CSCE, expanded trade with the US, and a 
strategic arms agreement favorable to its perception of its interests, 
would probably not have been willing to deal with the Nixon 
administration on so grand a scale, or would have demanded 
unacceptable terms, without the specter of a US-China 
de-facto-alliance against it in view. Furthermore, if the Sino-Soviet 
conflict were still being conducted on the premises of 1965 - that is 
an all-consuming struggle over leadership of national-liberation 
movements and an effort to prove who had the most revolutionary, 
anti-imperialist spirit - it is doubtful that Moscow could have gone so 
far in the appearance of US-Soviet accommodation. There will 
undoubtedly be many objections to carrying this argument on the 
effects of the Indonesian turnaround so far afield. There is no way, 
really, of measuring the effects of major historical watersheds on 
distant developments when causal factors are also appearing from a 
variety of other sources. The changes in policy are also not clear cut 
from a time standpoint as the reaction of men to events is seldom 
precipitous but rather is conducted gradually and by stages to make 
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the change palatable to one's conscience and the strong human need 
to demonstrate consistency. The Sino-Soviet debate, for example, 
continued to speak in terms of national liberation movements after 
1965-66 and it is only a matter of judgment based on long-term 
perspective to hold, as I do, that the "oomph" went out of this issue 
and shifted to direct border questions after 1966. Vietnam attitudes 
were, of  course, affected by  a  variety of  other factors including 
mistakes in execution, internal dissent and even long-standing 
emotional antipathies of a personal nature toward certain US leaders. 
Each reader can judge for himself the extent to which the arguments 
set forth in these pages can be carried. Nevertheless, I would submit 
that the long-range effects of the Indonesian upheaval should be 
seriously considered, most clearly, of course, in the more immediate 
vicinity of the new-found East Asian stability, in the attitudes of 
China toward its neighbors, and in the collapse of the domino theory 
in the United States with all that meant in terms of a sustained direct 
American role in Vietnam. The effects of the Indonesian reversal, if I 
am right, were generally favorable to US policy but not entirely so. 
Asian security was enhanced but US policy in Vietnam was 
negatively affected. But then all major historical upheavals produce 
complex effects on the external environment, the negative and the 
positive (from whatever viewpoint) interlacing in unforeseen ways 
that also cannot be detached from their interplay with other complex 
causes. That is one of the frustrations of the social sciences but also 
one of its fascinations. Indonesia is not only typical in this respect, it 
affords an unusually rich field for study and conjecture. 
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